A REFLECTION ON THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGETICAL METHOD OF PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

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General introduction

Philo was probably born around 25 C.E. and died perhaps between C.E. 45 and 50. He was an Alexandrian Jew who came from a wealthy family. Josephus states about Philo's brother Alexander that he was "foremost among his contemporaries at Alexandria both for his family and his wealth" (*Ant*. 18: 259 and 20: 100). Alexander could even afford to lend money to Agrippa I. The son of Alexander, Tiberius Iulius Alexander who was born in C.E. 15 became the prefect of Egypt, the highest post of a Roman official in that country. Josephus tells ust that he later apostasied from Judaism. Philo had the benefit of a good solid Greek education or in other words the *enkyklios paideia*. He always stressed the value of a good general education as a necessary stepping stone for higher things.

Philo was certainly a cultured and social man, which is suggested by references in his writings. He took part in banquets, *Leg. all*. 3; 155f., frequented the theatre, and heard concerts, *Ebr*. 177 and *Prob*. 141. He watched boxing, wrestling and horesracing, *Prob*. 26.

We do not have much information regarding Philo. To reconstruct Philo's life we have to rely on statements from Philo himself as well as on statements from Josephus.

Philo must have had a successful public career and Josephus calls him "aner ta panta endoxos". Philo had to divide his time between a political career and his own pursuits. Philo complains about this in Spec. 3.3, where he mentions that he is interrupted by "civil cares".

Philo headed the Jewish delegation of five men (*Legat*. 370), which was sent in 39/40 by the Jewish community in Alexandria to Gaius Caligula in Rome. This delegation was sent after the pogrom against the Jews in Alexandria under the prefect Flaccus. Just as in the religiuos sphere so in the political sphere Philo defended the Jewish community. Philo in his defence of Jewish rights appealed to the fact that during Augustus reign the Jews had the right to live according to their ancient laws (*Flacc*. 50, *Legat*. 152-158). Philo advocated that the Jews should not be separated from the Romans or Greeks or worse be considered on par with the lower class Egyptians. That Philo had important connections in Rome is suggested by the fact that he displays sympathies for stoicism, which was not popular in Alexandria (Niehoff 1999: 40).

Philo's primary activity was the exegesis of Scripture, which took on various forms. The main purpose of his exegetical writings, was to demonstrate that the Mosaic writings are compatible with Greek philosophical thinking and that the Mosaic laws were the inspiration for Greek philosophical activity. The Jews in Alexandria were surrounded by varoius cultures which naturally resulted in an effort to define oneself in this environment. As Barth notes one is defined in relation to the Other and defining the Other in other words means defining oneself (Barth in Niehoff 1999: 36).

Philo also suggests that his exegesis of Scripture is only one possible interpretation and should not be understood as the only one possible. For Philo the exegesis of Scripture was not purely set on theoretical grounds but was rooted in one's spiritual life. Philo on a number of occasions describes how his exegetical activity was linked to his mystical experiences. In one passage he relates how his mind was inspired to various ascents, where he travels with the sun, moon or other heavenly bodies in the upper air (*Spec*. 3: 1-6). These ascents result of one being divorced from earthly cares, giving one a birdseye view of the Laws of Moses and therfore providing a hermeneutical key in their interpretation. Philo refers to a voice in his soul, experiences of light and ecstatic experiences during which he lost consciousness (*Migr*. 34-35).

Philo travelled to the Jerusalem Temple and worshipped there. It is difficult to reconstruct Philo's relationship with the Jews in Palestine. Previous scholarship layed a great stress on dividing Judaism in Philo's period between Palestinian Judaism and Hellenistic Judaism, however this has abated. This division has further moved into Christian scholarship where the division was made between a Palestinian Christian Jewish Church and a Hellenistic Church with Hellenising tendencies. In this regard G. Delling proposed that we should understand the term Hellenistic synagogue to include all the synagogal communities in the Graeco-Roman world, where Greek is used as the main language and which formed minority groups in a non-Jewish environement (Delling in Borgen 1987: 207).

It would be unreasonable to assume that by virtue of Philo's relationship with Alexandrian Jews his ideas or thought would naturally be rejected in the Palestinian Jewish communities. Philo certainly does not mention the Jews who associated with the temple in

Leontopolis in Egypt during Ptolemaic rule. Philo realised that the Jews were not defined by their geographic location, but by their sense of belonging together and this had to be emphasised and reconfirmed (*Mos*. 1. 278).

Philo does show respect to the native Egyptians and recognises them for their pursuit of learning and regards them as teachers of arithmetic, geometry (*Mos*. I: 214). However, Philo is more critical in relation to the Egyptian worship of animals and specifies the worship of bulls, rams, goats, and hawks, fishes (*Dec*. 76-80; *Legat*. 139.163). Further Philo writes that the Egyptians are arrogant and jealous and that they have an ancient and innate hostility to the Jews (*Agr*. 62; *Flac*. 29). Through the prayers of the consecrated race the nations of the world were to be delivered from evil and participate in what is good (Mos. I: 149).

Philo has a high regard for the Ptolemaic kings and writes in *Legat*. 138: "*Take first the kings of Egypt. In three hundred years there was a succession of some ten or more of these, amd none of them had any images or statues set up for them in our meeting-houses by the Alexandrians, although they were of the same race and kin as the people and were acknowledged, written and spoken of by them as gods*".

The Septuagint served as the foundation for Philo's interpretive work as it did serve as a foundation for other Jewish writers in Alexandria. It is also possible that Philo is inventing previous authorities, simply to create a space for dialogue in which his points would be able to come across (Dillon 1993: 155).

Philo's treatises were undoubtedly popular especially amongst Christians and pagan philosophers. Later normative Judaism took a cold stance toward Philo. It is possible to argue that Philo was valued more in the non-Jewish environment at least outside of Alexandria than he was in the Jewish environment. Sterling believes that there is evidence that Philo's treatises were circulating in Egypt, Syria, and Rome within Jewish and Pagan circles during the first and second centureis C.E. (Sterling 1999: 29). In Syria and Egypt it were the Christian liturgists who were drawing from Jewish sources (Hellenistic Synagogue Prayers) and a Jewish sect (2 Enoch) used some of his works (Sterling 1999: 30).

Philo expository writings fall into the exposition of the law of Moses, the exegetical commentaries, which are divided into Questions and answers on Exodus and Genesis and the allegory of the laws. Philo wrote also treatises, which may be termed apologetic and philosophical writings.

While scholars are not sure wether to call Philo a philosopher, an exegete or religious thinker, we always have to realise that Philo's primary allegiance is towards the Mosaic Scripture. To use Sandmel's term we may speak of Philo,s religiosity. In this regard religiosity means one,s subjective interpretation or original interpretation of a common religious tradition (Sandmel 1979: 83). Philo,s religion was not different from the religion of the Rabbi,s and Jews, but his religiosity was (Sandmel 1979: 83).

In studying Philo we have to always keep in mind the two facets of his background. One of these facets is his Jewish background and the other is his Greek background. Both of these backgrounds have a different understanding of the universe and our destiny. The Greek concept of man and his destiny is equal to a rational enquiry into mans existential qualities. From these it is possible to derive knowledge about man and his destiny. On the other hand the Jewish belief is centred on the concept, that it is God who has concretely in history revealed man's destiny and purpose. Of course, Philo makes a synthesis of both of these views.

Philo is certainly a 'spiritual' writer in the sense that he was mainly interested in the soul's relationship with God. In this concern he is thoroughly Jewish. The allegorical method which will be discussed, is according to Philo, one important means, which enables one to comprehend the Scriptures and therefore embark on a meaningful relationship with God.

Practically all Philo's works have a strong relationship with the Jewish Bible, which is the most important writing according to Philo. Philo following the Jewish tradition divides Scripture into three parts. Philo writes: "Laws and oracles delivered through the mouth of prophets and psalms and other books which foster and perfect knowledge and piety" (*Cont*. 3, 25). The Pentateuch (Law) is divided by Philo into the historical and legislative divisions. The historical part is

further divided into the story of creation of the world and the rest of the stories called by him genealogical (*Mos*. II, 8, 46-47; *Praem*. I, I).

Runia writes: "the conventional but most informative way of dividing up Philos writings remains the following double tripartition" (Philo in Early Christian Literature, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993, p. 37). (1) the *exegetical* writings: (a) the *Quaestiones in Genesim* and *Quaestiones in Exodum* (6 treatises); (b) the Allegorical Commentary (21) treatises); (c) the Exposition of the Law (12 treatises); (2) five *philosophical* treatises; and (3) four *historico-apologetic* treatises. Forty nine books remain from Philo, which amounts to three-fourths of his total work.

Unless specified otherwise, the quotations from Philo's works in the following discussion are taken from the standard translation of F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. In terms of searching in Philo's works there are at least five different techniques: Leisegangs Indices, Mayers Index Philoneus, Borgen and Skarstens KWIC concordance, and the TLG database.

Philo and scholarship

There is almost no information regarding the personality of Philo. Philo is a controversial figure in almost all respects. There are numerous studies devoted to Philo, which deal with various aspects of his thought. However, there is little scholarly consensus on many aspects of his writings. It can be said that many scholars that deal with Philo, end up producing a Philo in the image and likeness of their own ideas and theories concerning Philo.

While it is difficult to systematize the various scholarly approaches to Philo, it can be stated with a necessary dose of generalization that there are two basic extremes that guide the interpretation of Philo. Either he is seen firmly set in the Jewish tradition, or firmly set in the Hellenistic Greek tradition. Of course, not many scholars would set him in one of these extreme contexts, but these positions set the boundaries of the possible interpretative contexts of Philo.

Isaac Heinemann, concentrating on the treatise *De specialibus legibus*, concluded that Philo spiritualizes his Jewish heritage, by means of using Greek structures (see I. Heinemann, *Philon griechische und judische Bildung* Breslau 1932, repr. 1962).

Goodenough characterizes Philo as a mystic, who combined his Jewish heritage, with oriental mystical elements and Greek systems of thought.

Goodenough realised that very early, the Christian movement had its own pictorial art and other religious concepts. Goodenough believed that this rapid development was only possible due to the fact that there must have been a marginal Judaism, which served as a precursor to the Christian movement. He included Philo into this marginal Judaism. Goodenough writes: "The shreds of literature we have from Greek speaking Judaism before Philo, and the full achievement recorded in Philo's time, indicated that the Jews were captivated by their neighbour's religion and thought. Yet since a Jew could not now simply become an initiate of Isis or Orpheus and remain a Jew as well, the amazingly clever trick was devised, we do not know when or by whom, of representing Moses as Orpheus and Hermes-Tat, and explaining that the Jewish "Wisdom" figure, by translation "Sophia" was identical with

that "Female Principle in nature which Plutarch identified as Isis! (Goodenough 1935: 6-10).

Goodenough recognised in Philo the principle of the "light stream" and that of the "great mother". The light stream is a concept, which resembles a certain reconciliation between the immanent and transcendent concept of God. Since this light stream flows down from the transcendent God and enables one in this world by means of the mystery to unite himself or to approach God. While scholars do not agree on many issues with Goodenough, it is acknowledged that Philo uses many terms, which are identical to language used in the mystery cults.

Goodenough proposes the following methods of reading Philo: reading Philo through his language and manner of thought until having a sense of his writings as a whole; penetrating his world of intention and dialoguing with him; carefully observing the context of each passage and the document in which it appears; attempting to understand his language and placing ourselves in his time; trying to hear his voice and realize his interests and motivation (Goodenough 1962: 19-29).

Goodenough's emphasis on Philo's relationship with the Greek mystery cults also appeared in authors such as H. Leisegang (Leisegang 1919; 1941). Scholars such as R. Reitzenstein, E. Brehier and J. Pascher underlined Philo's relationship with the Egyptian mystery cult.

For Walther Volker, Philo is primarily a Jew, who used snippets of Greek thought, to illustrate his Jewish exegetical project. Philo's piety is similar to the piety of Jesus ben Sirach.

According to the well known work by Wolfson dealing with Philo, Philo is a "philosopher in the grand manner", who while incorporating various ideas into his thought is an original thinker or an original Jewish philosopher. Wolfson reached this conclusion by using his "hypothetico-deductive method". Philo, according to Wolfson set the stage for the development of Islamic and Christian philosophy (see H. A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* 2 vols. Cambridge Mass. 1947, 1962). However, one of the criticisms leveled at Wolfsons interpretation, is that Philo work in its structure does not correspond to such a grand philosophical aim. Philo according to Wolfson represents "a Hellenisation in language only, not

in religious belief or cult… it did not cause them [the Jews] to change their conception of their own religion" (Wolfson 1948 I: 13). Wolfson disagrees with the notion associating the influence of the mystery cults on Philo, as states that Philo merely used terms borrowed from the mysteries (Wolfson 1948: I: 45-46).

While not a Philonic scholar in the strict sense, Andre-Jan Festugiere, in his work *Hermetica*, characterized Philo as Hellenistic man, versed in the Greek traditions of philosophy current in his day, who did not produce any original thought in his writings (see A.-J. Festugiere, *La revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste* 4 vols. Paris 1945-1954, repr. 1981).

Similarly to Andre-Jan Festugiere, Marguerite Harl acknowledges that Philo does not display a large degree of original thinking in terms of ideas and images, which are predominantly drawn from the Greek framework of thought. However, Harl believes that Philo, displays original thought in respect of his synthesis of the Jewish religious framework and Hellenic thought. Philo is one of the first authors too interpret Jewish theological ideas about revelation in a Greek mode of thinking (see M. Harl, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* in *Les aeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* vol. 15; Paris 1967). While using Greek ideas and images Philo remains firmly rooted in the Jewish tradition.

One of the most important works regarding Philo, was the work entitled "Le commentaire de l'Ecriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie" by V. Nikiprowetzky (ALGHJ 11 Leiden 1977). Nikiprowetzkys main thesis consists of stressing the exegetical character of Philos work. Philos aim was the interpret the Scripture. Thus, Philo begins with the Scripture and he does not use Scripture as a mere inspiration for the development of his own thought, but uses Scripture as the canon, which always guides him. Philos aim is merely to uncover the hidden meaning of Scripture. While Philo uses philosophical ideas from a variety of sources, these ideas have an *illustratory* character, and are used as instruments in the exegesis of Scripture (Nikiprowetzky 1977: 159-180). Philos exegesis further falls within the Synagogal tradition of the question and answer method of exegesis. Instead of seeking the title of a philosopher, Philo realizes the limitations of philosophy.

Some ideas about Philo were also introduced in the well known work by John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*. Dillon however, as he

himself writes, only discusses Philo in respect of his philosophical background (London 1977).

An important scholar in the more recent period is David Runia. Runia has produced a number of important works dealing with Philo. An important earlier work is *Philo and the Timeaus of Plato*. Runia similarly to other scholars in the modern period has concentrated on Philo's exegesis as one important key to understanding Philo's thought and context. Runia has concluded that Philo is a writer in his own right. As Runia writes, Philo is *doing his own thing*. "He is offering a philo-sophically orientated exegesis of the Mosaic account, the undertaking of which requires in Philo's enterprise the use of Platonic doctrines as found in the Timaeus" (Runia 1986: 519).

Another important modern scholar in Philo is David Winston, who presents Philo as a "convinced and ardent Platonist" with pronounced mystical tendencies" (See *Philo of Alexandria: The contemplative life, The giants, and Selections* (New York 1981). According to Winston Philos originality lies in this synthesis of numerous traditions and ideas. In terms of Platonism, he was primarily interested in its mystical tradition. Winston further concludes that Philo was a Middle Platonist. Philo rejects Platos pluralism and instead proposes a mystical monism (or monotheism).

One of the main motors of renewed scholarly attention to Philo in the modern period, was the Philo institute, which was established in Chicago in 1971. This institute publishes the Studia Philonica Annual, which promotes Philonic scholarship.

The fruit of decades of Philonic research has resulted in a number of trends in Philonic scholarship. One of these trends realizes the importance of methodology in studying Philo. A further trend is to study Philo in the context of his own generation and time. But one of the most important trends in the study of Philo is the renewed emphasis on exegesis as a central pillar of Philo's work.

The nature of Philo's treatises

Scholars have often debated the issue of whether Philo's treatises display a systematic structure in terms of their themes and thought. This is of course complicated by the fact that Philo wrote treatises that differ in their aims and structures. Some argue that Runia has no system whatsoever, while others discern a deep system in Philo's work. Some like Runia believe that Philo is predominantly a writer *sui generis*, who does not give space to comments on his own exegesis.

In this context one may quote the translators of Philo Colson and Whitaker who observe: "*Philo is an inveterate rambler. This word does not mean that the thoughts are disconnected. In fact it is the mark of the true rambler that his points are always connected, and that he is unable to restrain himself from following up each connection as it occurs. Philo takes his text and expounds its philosophical meaning and proceeds to illustrate it from some other text, in which he discerns the same idea. But this second text generally contains some other words in which he finds some other ideas, too valuable to be passed over. The process might, of course, go on indefinitely, but even Philo feels that there must be some limit to it and ultimately returns to his main subject*" (Colson, Whitaker 1929: 10).

Wolfson believes, that while the form of Philo's writings on the surface seems artificial, the fact is that Philo underneath this veneer displays complete systematic thought (Wolfson 1948: 96). This is so according to Wolfson, because Philo was following the exegetical procedures as followed in the synagogue and therefore his writings appear on occasions unsystematic.

The Pentateuch was read serially in the synagogue and was completed in cycles of three years (Wolfson 1948: 96). Only a few sections from the Prophets were read usually as an appendage. The Pentateuch was commented on in the synagogue by sermons and homilies. Wolfson believes that Philo adopted the verse by verse commentary on the Scripture from the practice which was prevalent in the schools attached to the synagogue. Further, the fact that Philo comments almost exclusively on the Pentateuch and not on the prophets, would seem to confirm his link to the synagogue (Wolfson 1948: 96). Wolfson argues that Philo presents his philosophical comments on Scripture in fragmentary form, since this was dictated by

his verse by verse commentary on Scripture. Thus one verse could have suggested one philosophical concept while the other a different philosophical concept (Wolfson 1948: 97).

Similarly to Wolfson, Nikiprowetzky believes that Philo's exegesis of *quaestio* followed by a *solutio*, which he considers as the main 'mother cell' of Philo's exegesis, grew out of the practice at the synagogue (Nikiprowetzky in Runia 1984: 227). Thus Philo progresses from one question and answer to the next, which are all in turn based on the particular biblical lemma which is being discussed. Nikiprowetzky believes that if there is any coherence in Philo it must be based on this question-answer structure (Nikiprowetzky TT, 8, 54 in Runia 1984: 229). Scholars generally agree with Nikiprowetzky on his assertion that the *quaestio* followed by *solutio* is a basic feature in the allegorical commentary. Radice argues that the *solutio-quaestio* structure is indicative of a circular structure of exegesis. Radice writes: "The *solutio* answers the *quaestio* and also introduces a surplus element, which in turn results in another biblical text be called upon, which again can have a surplus element and so on" (Radice in Runia 1987: 111).

According to Runia, while Nikiprowetzky's observations are correct he underestimates the role of secondary biblical texts in Philo and further that Philo does not necessarily have to start by commenting on a text or question, but on other things, such as opinions of other exegetes, grammatical observations and so on (Runia 1984: 230).

While in certain cases it can be obscure, it does appear that Philo often develops and follows a theme in his interpretations. A theme can underlie an entire treatise or Philo can discover a theme in a particular passage which could be interpreted in line with that theme. Thus in *Leg* A 11 II 65-70 the term 'shamelessness' gives rise to the development of a theme and the discussion of 'three kinds of shamelessness". The single word 'husbandman' from Noah, gives rise to the development of a theme of a whole treatise the *De agricultura*. The various chapters of a treatise can have various themes, while the treaty as such could have an overall directive theme or idea. This of course would give rise to an impression of unsystematic construction. In this context a notable feature of the allegorical treatises is Philo's intention of connecting them into a continuous chain, in contrast to the work in *Quaestiones*.

Runia believes that there are patterns of correlation in Philo's exegetical works. In his exegesis of a main Biblical text and secondary Biblical texts Philo develops themes which are also located in other parts of his work, and of course which bear a relationship to Greek philosophical themes (Runia 1988:90). Runia writes: "Philo's method is primarily that of *correlation*, i.e. he relates Mosaic words and concepts (e.g. *kyrion onoma*) to acceptable philosophical ideas" (Runia 1988: 90).

Mack believes that Philo can in certain cases create a plan for a particular enterprise, by formulating a hermeneutical principle upon which the series is then based. Philo seems to indicate such a plan for a series in *Abr* 1-6 and in *Praem* 1-3. Philo identifies an underlying correlation between the Pentateuch as a law and the world order (as *physis, nomos*). This is the hermeneutical principle, which will treat and classify the Pentateuch as a unit (Mack 1984: 266). There are three divisions which Philo then discusses: cosmogony, history, and the legislation of the laws. Cosmogeny is developed in *De opificio mundi* and deals with issues of creation. History is dealt with in its particular treatises and includes the treatment of lives of patriarchs and Moses. The tractates on the Decalogue and the special laws deal with the laws. Treatises on virtues, rewards and punishments end the series. The patriarchs lived before the law but in accordance with the law of nature (Stoic conception of the *sophos* living according to nature). Mack sees in this division a "clear evidence of a holistic and systematic approach to the hermeneutical task" (Mack 1984: 266). But Mack himself acknowledges that the plan is unevenly developed and in some instances just a background framework rationale for the organisation of various materials (Mack 1984: 266).

Jacques Cazeaux is one scholar who believes that Philo displays a total coherence in the literary composition and structure of his treatises (Cazeaux, 1, 7, 27, 31, 220, 347, 585 in Runia 1984: 211).

To support his conclusion Cazeaux introduces the terms *substitution* and *redundance* as indicative of two traits in the structure of Philo's treatise. The first term deals with Philo's continuing quotation of other texts to support his base text. The second term deals with Philo's anticipation of other themes and verses while at the same time explaining one text. This teleological method results in substituted texts

and elements being introduced into the text in view of the following themes (Cazeaux TC 157, 498, 503-5 in Runia 1984: 213).

Cazeaux further discovers *symmetry* and *movement* in Philo's text. "Philo organises his substituted texts and figures into symmetrical patterns of correspondence and contrast, positive and negative features" (Cazeaux TC 39, 87, 111, 430, 541-2 in Runia 1984: 213). According to Cazeux's schema the basic unit in Philo is the chapter, which are based on the lemma from Scripture.

Central to Cazeaux' theory is really minimal input of Philo in his exegesis, since Philo wants to preserve the unity of Scripture and let it speak in its own terms. Runia writes in response to Cazeaux: "The understanding of allegory as an experience midway between reason and aesthetics, the "jeu serieux" of imagination and memory in search of the "logique profonde" of scripture, (Cazeaux TC 592-5) cannot but have the effect of reducing the influence of Greek thought on Philo to a minimum" (Runia 1984: 219). Runia believes that in contrast to ascertaining a minimal input of Philo, Philo by use of the allegorical method floods the Scripture with Greek ideas and concepts affirming that the study of Scripture is the true philosophy (Runia 1984: 219).

Philo and other writers of his period

Philo was not an isolated figure in Alexandria. While we do not have sufficient evidence, it is possible to conclude, that Philo was not the only one using the allegorical method of interpretation in his period. There are also other writers who show a similar apologetic concern as Philo does. Thus there are others who sought to prove the value of a religious system by appealing to the fact that its values can be found in other religions.

The Septuagint was utilized by other writers of the Jewish Alexandrian literature. Fragments from the third century B.C.E belonging to this tradition are preserved in Eusebius work *Preparatio Evangelica*. These fragments include the work of Demetrius who wrote under Ptolemy IV Philopator and whose work probably bore the name *On the Kings of Judaea*. Demetrius discusses the patriarchal history which is based on the Septuagint. Importantly Demetrius displays exegetical concerns and employs the *quaestiones et solutiones* mode of interpretation, which was also later used by Philo. He formulates his biblical history in the framework of Greek chronological historiography. Similarly to Manetho, who also lived in the third century and wrote on Egyptian history, Demetrius attempts to show the considerable age of his native tradition. Manetho similarly attempted to show the considerable age of the Egyptian tradition.

Another work preserved in Eusebius is attributed to a certain Ezekiel and is titled *The Exodus*. This work was probably written eiether during second half of the third century or the first half of the second century B.C.E. In this work there is a glorification of Moses who seems to gain divine attributes, although there is significant debate on the nature of Moses' exaltation in this work amongst scholars. The work belongs to the genre of tragedy and shows how a Egyptian Jew utilizes Greek literary methods. Another work from the second century B.C.E. also seems to give Moses divine attributes. This is a work by a certain Artapanus who wrote a work *On the Jews*.

An important writer was Aristobulus who came from a high-priestly family and lived at the time of Ptolemy VI Philometor (181-145). References to Aristobulus and his writings can be found in Eusebius (EH 7, 32: 17-18, fragment 1, taken from the writing of Anatolius),

Praeparatio Evangelica (PE) 8, 10: 1-17/(Fragment 2); PE 13, 12: 1-2 (Fragment 3); PE 13, 12: 3-8 (Fragment 4); PE 13,12: 9-16 (Fragment 5, partly found also in PE 7, 14: 1). Aristobulus is also found in Clement, Eusebius, and Origenes Contra Celsum and 2 Macc. 1: 10.

The form of Aristobulus writings had probably the form of a dialogue, where the Ptolemaic king gave questions to Aristobulus. Aristobulus took over Greek philosophy in an eclectic manner and shows predominant affinities with Plato and Pythagoras. Aristobulus uses the allegorical method of exegesis to solve anthropomorphisms and argues that the Greek philosophers learned from Moses. Aristobulus develops his understanding of anthropomorphisms in the context of a question by the Ptolemaic king who rejects anthropomorphic language and Aristobulus replies that if humans are to understand Gods law they should not fall victim to mythological and human conceptions.

Aristobulus argues that Plato and Pythagoras took over ideas from the Jewish law, which was known to them from pre-Alexandrian translations (PE 13, 12: 1-2).

Aristobulus discusses the doctrine of the "divine voice" in fragment four (PE 13,12: 3-8). Aristobulus argues that the "divine voice" was not a real spoken word, but the preparation to the works of creation and that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, through this doctrine of the "divine voice" were led to the truth of the creation account found in Moses laws. Similarly Philo in Sacr. 65 argues that there is no time interval or essential difference between Gods word and his deed.

According to Aristobulus only creation is subject to time and not God, and he views the six days of creation as establishing the course of time and of gradation within the created world.

In contrast to Philo, Aristobulus develops a modest form of allegorical exegesis (Borgen 1987: 14).

Explanations against anthropomorphisms are found in various literatures of the period, such as Tg Onq where the phrase "Gods hand" is explained as Gods power in Exod. 3: 20 an interpretation also followed by Aristobulus (Borgen 1987: 13).

The Stoic Aratus is quoted by Aristobulus, as stating that there is one invisible God, who created the cosmos and who rules over the

cosmos. Phaenomena of Aratus 5 states: "For we are indeed his offspring". This is also quoted in Acts 17: 28.

Philo was followed by other writers who utilized the allegorical method of interpretation. These included Gnostic writers such as Valentinus, who was born around 100 C.E in the Egyptian Delta. Valentinus carried Philo's allegorical project even further than Philo, since by using the allegorical method of interpretation Valentinus not only interpreted a given text, but his interpretation and commentaries became a new text itself, whereas Philo never gave his commentaries the same authority as he gave the Scripture. More will be said about Valentinus below.

We have other writings from Alexandria which comment on Scripture and which like Philo prefer to use hermeneutic techniques favoured by Greek etymologists and allegorical interpreters. These writings include the *Explanations of the Book of Moses* by Aristobulos and the so-called *Letter of Aristeas to Philocrates* by Pseudo-Aristeas. Similarly to Philo the authors of these texts regard Scripture as the highest expressions of wisdom and precede Philo.

Just as Philo does, so the Alexandrians discover Greek wisdom in the Scripture. Thus a passage from Homer was read allegorically in such a way, that it proclaimed the desired Jewish theological message. Just as Heraclitus promoted the authority of Homer over Plato and other philosophers, so the Alexandrian Jewish writers promoted the superiority of Moses over other writers. These other Jewish Hellenistic traditions seem to confirm the view that Philo was not an individual writer of his genre, but that there must have been a solid tradition before him in this kind of allegorical commentary on Scripture.

By utilising the allegorical method, the Alexandrian Jewish writers discover that Greek concepts and wisdom is reflected in the Mosaic corpus and perhaps derived from this corpus. Similarly to Philo, Heraclitus, Aristobulus and Aristeas are proponents of the allegorical method. Aristobulus writes that Moses, "by using words that refer to other things" (*eph' heteron pragmaton logous poioumenos*), proclaims "arrangements of nature and preparations for great events" (Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 8.10.3)", (Dawson 1992: 75). In his interpretation of the Exodus, Aristobulus believes that Greek astronomical observations

about the positions of the sun and moon are reflected in the Jewish dating of Passover (Dawson 1992: 81).

The Alexandrian Jewish writers shared similar concerns with Philo. Just as Philo did, so the Jewish writers realised that Scripture contains a number of passages, that do not accord well with a literal interpretation. These included passages, which dealt with anthropomorphic descriptions of God. Aristobulus is distressed by "those devoted to the letter alone" (*toi graptoi monon proskeimonoi*), (*Praep. Evang*. 8. 10. 5), whose readings reflect a "fictional and anthropomorphic (*mythodes kai anthropinon*) way of thinking about God" (*Praep. Evang*. 8. 10. 2) common to those without "insight and understanding" (*Praep. Evang.* 8. 10. 5).

There are references in Philo which do suggest, that there could have been a Jewish hellenistic exegetical tradition. Philo does refer to others who practised allegorical interpretation. Philo mentions his predecessors (*Vita Mos* I 4; *Spec Leg* I 8), his contemporaries (*Cher* 21-28; *Heres* 280-281; *Mut* 141-143; *Somn* I 188; *Abr*. 99; *Jos* 151) and mentions others who had other forms of interpretation (literalists (?): *conf* 14; *Somn* I 102; II 301; *Quod deus* 21; 133; *Quaes* Gen I 8; 10; II 28; 58 and possibly extreme allegorists (?): *Migr* 89-90) and finally the Therapeutae (*Vita Cont* 28-29). Philo also mentions Aristobulos and Ps. Aristeas.

Philo writes that the Therapeutae could be carried away in ecstasy due to their study. Philo writes: "[C]arried away by a heaven-sent passion of love', they 'remain rapt and possessed like bacchanals or corrybants' [*Contempl*. 12]. It is possible that the Therapeutae did have their own community around Alexandria and it is possible that Philo could have taken part in their rituals (Sly 1996: 144).

The evidence of the Hellenistic Jewish writers is important for the study of Philo's background. Nevertheless the evidence from these Jewish-Hellenistic writers is not all-encompassing and it is nevertheless difficult to reconstruct the tradition which preceded them and their relation to other traditions.

Scholars have devised a number of theories which deal with the possible pre-Philonic allegories. Bousset identified a Q source allegory. This Q source "began as an allegory of Adam and Eve as symbols for *nous* and *aisthesis*, described in terms of Stoic psychology but

understood in a soteriological way, and continued, apparently, through the patriarchal narratives" (Bousset in Mack 1984: 244).

Heinemann identified a 'Cynic' source on the basis of *Spec Leg* II 41-207 (Heinemann in Mack 1984: 246). This source took over the Jewish rites and customs and discovered in them a cosmic order, an interpretation according to Heinemann not found in other Philo's writings (Heinemann in Mack 1984: 246). This source further, interpreted the Jewish religious ethos and festivals in terms of Cynic-Stoic views (Heinemann in Mack 1984: 246). Similarly Hegermann believed that certain features in Philo saw the interpretation of a Jewish cult in terms of a cosmic mystery (the High Priests robes, the temple, Sinai story), (Hegermann in Mack 1984: 247).

Goulet believes that the 'extreme allegorists' whom Philo attacks in *Migr*. 89-93 (those that discount the literal meaning) are to be identified with the *fyziki andres* referred to by Philo in *Abr*. 99 and that these were responsible for the development of a pre-Philonic allegorical commentary (Goulet in Runia 1989: 592). The allegorical system of these allegorist's was based on moral and ethical concerns. These centred around the mind overcoming passions and the senses so that it could live a life of excellence (*areti*), which would in turn be in harmony with the rational structure of the cosmos. Goulet suggests, that these extreme allegorists could be identified with the Therapeutae mentioned in *De vita contemplativa* 29 by Philo (Goulet in Runia 1989: 593). Philo described their allegorical method in parag. 28 and 77-8. Another feature of these allegorists was a "fidelity to the text and far reaching coherence of symbolism and conceptuality, features which are not found in Philo" (Runia 1989: 594). According to Goulet, Philo built on the tradition of these allegorists, but of course refused to take an extreme stance and allegorise for example the figure of God (Goulet in Runia 1989: 594).

Amir believes, that there could have been a pre-Philonic exegetical Jewish tradition and that a possible feature of this earlier tradition was that the 'raw' Greek myths were transplanted into Jewish thought, with a limited number of modifications, which however were then more and more adapted to a religiously based Biblical context (Amir 1984: 23). This notion for example is suggested by Philo's adaptation of the Greek

concept of the hemispheres. Amir points out how Philo gradually transforms this Greek myth into a more and more Jewish structure.

Traditionally since Philolaus, the Dioscuri were seen to represent the two hemispheres. While Philo has certain reservations as to the physical interpretation of the hemispheres, he does attempt to allegorise temple features to represent the hemispheres. Firstly, Philo interprets the two Cherubim in the temple in the midst of which was the Ark of the Covenant as symbolic of the two hemispheres and which moved around with their wings around the Ark of the Covenant which represents the earth (*Cher*. 25f.; *Vita Mos*. 2. 98).

Later Philo modifies his views (*Vita Mos*. 2. 98f). Philo writes: "In accord with their position facing each other, some (*tiines men*) explain the Cherubim as symbols of the two hemispheres… But I (*ego de*) would like to think…" Here Philo modifies his earlier stance of accepting the Cherubim as representing the hemispheres. Later Philo see's the hemispheres represented in the two *shoham*-stones on the shoulder pieces of the high priest (*Vita Mos* 2. 122f).

Spiritual groups

Philo's testimony to the existence of the Essenes and the Thera-peutae is well known and forms a valuable piece of evidence in constructing the history of these groups. Philo views various "spiritual" groups with great respect, although he does not dwell on dogmatic or philosophical issues in relation to these groups. In regards to the Essenes Philo writes: "I have discussed the Essenes, who persistently pursued the active life and excelled in all or, to put it more moderately, in most of its departments. I will now proceed at once in accordance with the sequence required by the subject to say what is needed about those who embraced the life of contemplation" (*Vita Cont*.1). The Essenes love God and there fellow man and interpret the laws especially on the seventh day (*Quod Omn* 75-91).

The Essenes and the Therapeutae are popular in Philo, possibly due to the fact that Philo emphasised the practical life according to the laws of Moses and the aspect of the heavenly ascent (Borgen 1987: 43). The Therapeutae, illustrate the aspect of the heavenly ascent, already in this life they are citizens of heaven (*Vita Cont*. 90). Philo often links both contemplation and theory together with practice, as in *Leg all* I: 58: "the

theory of virtue is perfect in beauty, and the practice and exercise of it is a prize to be striven for".

These communities are signs of the future eschatological communities where evil will be overcome (Borgen 1987: 43). Thus to show this aspect, Philo contrasts the Essenes and the Therapeutae with the religious and social life of the pagan world (*Vita Cont* 40 ff.; *Quod Omn* 76 ff.), and also contrasts the Essenes and the Therapeutae with other communities outside of Judaism (*Vita Cont* 14-16; cf. *Omn* 91). Even great kings look on the Essenes with admiration: (*Apol Jud* 11: 18, *Omn* 88-91).

One of political opponents in Alexandria of Philo was the Stoic philosopher Chaeremon of Alexandria, who was a ierogrammateus (T6 and F4,12,13) and a filosofos (T3,4), more particularly a Stwikos (T9,10 and F3,10,11,14). Chaeremon applied the Stoic allegorical method of exegesis to Egyptian mythology. Porphyry claimed that Origen "made use of the works of Chaeremon the Stoic and Cornutus from which he learned the allegorical method of the mysteries among the Greeks and applied it to the Jewish Scriptures (T9. T12). Two testimonia in the *Souda* assign him a place among professional philosophers in Alexandria and that he had a successor. He was an Egyptian priest who also wrote a book *On Comets* and also on grammatical aspects of logic. Porphyry states that Chaeremon did not accept the doctrine of the incorporeal being and that he interpreted Egyptian theology wholly in terms of physical existents such as the celestial beings (Fr. 5).

Plutarch of Chaeronea deals with the Isis and Osiris myths. In the work De Iside et Osiride, Plutarch is aware of Stoic interpretations, but operates with a Platonic perspective (Sterling 1993: 106). It is possible that Plutarch wrote it towards the end of his life in 120 C.E.

Numenius of Apamea is another interesting figure of second century C.E. Platonism. One of the most important of his works is *On the Good*. In the first book Numenius argues that all religions concur with Platonism that God is incorporeal. Eusebius cites Numenius as follows: "After having spoken to this point and sealing it with the testimonies of Plato, it will be necessary to return and connect it to the teachings of Pythagoras, and to summon the most reputable nations, introducing their rites and doctrines, and the setting up of temples, all

carried out in agreement with Plato, whatever the Brahmans, Jews, Magi, and Egyptians have determined" (F1a).

These above mentioned authors as Philo attempted to show that there was truth in all religions.

Here the Philonic source (Congr. 124-125) is compressed, and is an edited version of the Philonic model.

Philo and the role of philosophy

Philo distinguishes between a number of meanings in philosophy. On one level philosophy is connected to the study of Mosaic Law. Philosophy is also the concrete practice of the Mosaic Law, which amounts to the pursuit of wisdom. Further, on another level Philo distinguishes philosophy in the technical sense of Greek philosophy or as a unification of the arts and knowledge as revealed in the paideia.

Following the ancient philosophers Philo had a different understanding of the role of philosophy than is prevalent today amongst modern philosophers. Philosophy in the ancient world was closely related to religion, so that the two were almost interchangeable. It was often difficult to determine the difference between the practice of philosophy and its theoretical basis. It is possible to argue that Philo went a step further in this respect and subjugated philosophy to the revealed Word of God.

Ancient philosophers adamantly believed that there is only one truth albeit with many guises. This is in contrast to the modern views reigning in philosophy where the identity of truth and its character is less certain. In ancient minds, a "widespread pessimism reigned with regard to the attainment of that truth through new and innovatory insights" (Runia 1986: 531); (see the "decadence theory" of Posidonius found in Seneca *Ep*. 90).

The problems are complicated by are modern understanding of what constitutes philosophy and its projection to ancient times. As was stated philosophy functioned in ancient times in a similar fashion as theology would today. Whether Philo would desire to be understood as a philosopher in today's terminology remains doubtful. It seems that the purpose of Philo and others who engaged in similar activity was purely to interpret Scripture and link Scriptures message to the concrete context of the day and in Philo's case this context was dominated by Platonic thought. In his exegetical work Philo's main instrument was allegory. It is important to keep in mind in this regard that allegory can produce any conclusions which can include various Platonic notions such as was the case in Philo, but also other notions which are determined by the interests and background of the author. "Allegory", says Bruns, "presupposes a cultural situation in which the literal

interpretation of a text would be as incomprehensible as a literal translation of it" (Bruns 1987: 630).

In this regard Maimonides himself states that his work Guide for the perplexed was not composed as a philosophical work: "Know that my purpose in this treatise was not to compose something in the natural sciences /physics/, or to make an epitome of notions pertaining to the divine science /metaphysics/… For the books composed concerning these atters are adequate. If, however, they should turn out not to be adequate with regard to some subject, that which I shall say concerning that subject will not be superior to anything else that has been said about it. My purpose in this Treatise… is only to elucidate the difficult points of the Law and to make manifest the true realities of its hidden meanings" (Guide 2.2, Preface, trans. Pines, p. 253).

It is important to not that in ancient time's philosophers and schools functioned in a different manner than is the case today. As stressed by Glucker, philosophers in Philo's time did not belong to a school in the sense of an institution, but rather were affiliated to a particular αἵρεσις (Glucker in Runia 1993: 127). The term affiliation obviously implies that the philosopher was mobile in his intellectual enterprise and could change affiliation whenever he or she chose. Philo understands "Mosaic philosophy" or groups of its practitioners as a kind of αἵρεσις, even if he does not use the term as freely as Josephus does (Runia 1993: 127). He describes the Therapeutae as having τῆς αἱρέσεως ἀρχηγέται ("leaders of the school") who have shown them the way in allegorical exegesis (*Contempl*. 29). Runia stresses that Philo deliberately presented the philosophy of Moses as parallel to Greek "schools" or αἱρέσεις since this enabled him to change affiliation.

As shown by Winston this aspect of the fluidity of philosophical schools and thinking can be seen in the case of Numenius of Apamea. Numenius of Apamea set about reconstructing Plato's philosophy and argues that Plato was actually a Pythagorean and that the later works of Plato were falsified (24.70; 24.57). It is interesting that Clement (*Str*. 1.150.4), Origen (*C. Cels*. 1.15; 4.51), Eusebius (*PE* 9.7.1) and Numenius (*Nat. hom*. 17.17 Morani) call Numenius a Pythagorean. However, Eusebius presented Numenius as a Platonist (Winston 1993: 145). In contrast to the Christian writers the Platonists avoided the designation of Numenius as a Pythagorean (Winston 1993: 145). Porphyry lists

Numenius along with Cronius among the Pythagoreans (Eusebius *HE* 6.19.8), but this appears to mean only that Numenius "Pythagorised" and not to exclude him from being a Platonist (Winston 1993: 145). Moreover, Porphyry counted Numenius and Cronius among the Platonic authors studied by Plotinus, beside Severus, Gaius, and Atticus (*VP* 14.1-12), (Winston 1993: 145). "It is clear that the expression "Pythagorean" does not preclude one from being a Platonist" (Winston 1993: 145). "Clements designation of Philo as a "Pythagorean" was therefore probably not meant to preclude him being a Platonist, but was used only to indicate that both he and Plato had "Pythagorised" (Winston 1993: 146).

Philo was not overly enthusiastic about the role of philosophy and believed that philosophy could also hinder the pursuit of truth. In its negative aspect philosophy is a vipers nest of sophistry and discordance (*Conf*. 114, *Her*. 246-248). In its positive role philosophy is concerned with "the knowledge of the highest and eldest cause of the whole of reality", in other words corresponds to Gods Laws as found in the Mosaic code (*Virt*. 65). As insightfully observed by Runia "Philosophy (in the scholastic manner of the Greeks) has an essentially propaedeutic role, supplying categories, concepts and ideas for the understanding of wisdom (the Mosaic Law in its deeper meaning)", (Runia 1986: 537).

In order to conceptualize Philo's stance towards philosophy Runia postulates a distinction between exegetical philosophy and philo-sophical or philosophically orientated exegesis (Runia 1986: 544). Exegetical philosophy in this regard deals with a text, which is used in a kind of inspirational manner as a useful starting point for a discussion, which reaches far beyond the given text (Runia 1986: 544). An example of an extreme kind, would be M. Heideggers use of Presocratic texts. Also the use of texts such as *Ex*. 3: 14, *Is*. 7:9, *Sap. Sal*. 11: 20, *Rom*. 11: 36 in Medieval and Patristic philosophy would fall into this category. In terms of Philo, texts such as *Gen*. 1: 27, *Ex*. 7: 1, *Num*. 23: 19, which he uses on numerous occasions would fall under this heading. Runia states that Philo however, overwhelmingly uses philosophically orientated exegesis, which has two features. (1) "the attempt is made to interpret the scriptural text in relation to accepted (but not systematically expounded or proven) ideas; (2) the primacy is given to the actual text, which the commentator is obliged to follow wherever it leads, though

he naturally reserves the right to relate it to other parts of the sacred word" (Runia 1986: 544).

In terms of whether Philo attempted to construct a philosophical system, it can be stated that he aimed to offer his readers a φιλοσοφία καί λογική στοχαστική. It was λογική because it advocated and itself engaged in the quest for the intuitive vision of the rational unity and coherence of transcendent noetic being, suddenly achieved after long years of exercise in the science of dialectics" (Runia 1986: 547). "It was στοχαστική because that vision was scarcely attainable (in this life) and, if attained, could not adequately be put into words" (Runia 1987: 547). "The form of the dialogue, containing the dialectics of actual discussion, was required to point the way, each dialogue adding new insights or revising what had gone before" (the dogmatism of the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists overstressed the former, the scepticism of the New Academy overstressed the latter aspect of Plato's philosophy). "Given Philo's debt to Platonism, it is not surprising that a rather precise correspondence exists between the "foundation" of his thought and that of Plato" (Runia 1986: 547).

For Philo, philosophy is the handmaid of Wisdom (σοφία). Philo in the treatise *On Consorting with the Preliminary Studies* (*De Congressu*), which is an exegesis of Gen. 16: 1-6 writes: "*And indeed just as the school subjects (ta enkyklia) contribute to the acquiring of philosophy, so does philosophy to the getting of wisdom. For philosophy is the practice and study of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes*". Philo realises that learning is not the only necessary feature in the soul's progress to God. He writes: "*We must not indeed reject any learning…Yet when God causes the young shoots of self-inspired wisdom to spring up within the soul, the knowledge that comes from teaching must straightway be abolished and swept off*" (*Sacr.* 79). In this statement Philo's understanding of philosophy is clearly set out. Philosophy has a strongly religious character since it provides a means to attain purely religious or revelatory truths. Philosophy is a means to religious ends.

Philo is in agreement with the Stoic definition that philosophy is the practice of Wisdom. Of course Wisdom in both Palestine and Hellenistic Judaism was traditionally identified with the Mosaic Law (Wolfson 1948: 149). So when Philo speaks of Wisdom he is speaking about the Mosaic Law.

Philosophy has a number of instruments or subjects at its disposal, that must be mastered before one proceeds further in his or her knowledge. In the story of Hagar and Sarah in Genesis, Philo understands Hagar (*therapenis*) as symbolising the encyclical studies and Sarah, the mistress (*despina*) to symbolise philosophy (*Congr*. 14, 71-80; cf. 4, 13-19; *Post*. 38, 130). The Stoics also use the term "handmaid" as a description of the encyclical studies (Wolfson 1948: 145). Aristo of Chios, following Aristippus, calls the encyclical studies handmaids (*therapene*) and philosophy as the mistress *(despina)* or queen (*vasilisa*), (Diogenes, II, 79-80; Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4, 109 (Arnim, I, 349-350), (Wolfson 1948: 145).

Being faithful to his Jewish religion Philo clearly sets out limits for philosophising. In Philo, philosophy stemmed out of a religious premise (revelation) and not vice-versa. Wolfson believed that Philo formulated eight religious principles that needed to be preserved when one philosophised. These included the "existence of God, the unity of God, Divine providence, the creation of the world, the unity of the world, the existence of ideas, the revelation of the Law, the eternity of the Law" (Wolfson 1948: 149). These principles are of course not merely religious principles but Jewish principles. Due to his religious concerns one can argue that Philo cannot be truly called a philosopher. Philo was not interested in philosophical questions for their own sake. Philo does not concern himself with philosophical questions such as whether the soul has two 'parts' or three or whether the division should be between the *hegemonikon* and the seven faculties.

Reason according to Philo did not answer all the questions, and was subject to faith. Just as philosophy was subject to the law. Philo writes: "*It is best to have faith (pepistevkene) in God and not in our dim reasonings (logismis) and insecure conjectures" for "an irrational impulse issues forth and goes its rounds, both from our reasonings and from mind that corrupts the truth*" (*Leg. All*. III, 81, 228, 229).

However, apart from his limitations in philosophising, Philo frequently used products of philosophy. Philo alludes to a variety of philosophical sources, which include the pre-Socratics such as the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Zeno, the Sophists, Cynics, Stoics, Peripatetic philosophy, Academicians, Sceptics and so on. Philo is an eclectic and never limits himself to a particular philosophical system. In

Sacr. AC 79 Philo states that all learning is good and not to "reject any learning that has grown grey through time" and it is necessary "to read the writings of the sages and listen to proverbs and old-world stories from the lips of those who know antiquity, and ever seek for knowledge about the men and deeds of old". But though "it is sweet to leave nothing unknown", there is a superior, "self-inspired wisdom" that God can cause to grow in the soul and this surpasses all else, for it is wisdom of God rather than 'the guidance of men'. By means of the allegorical method of Scriptural interpretation, Philo can discover all the best products of classical philosophy.

An important trait which Philo shared with other philosophers was his belief that it is through the intellect that one is able to arrive in God. One proceeds firstly to know the creatures and then God. Once he knows God he is able to attain contemplative blessedness. Thus, in his adaptation of *theoria*, Philo departs from the Jewish tradition.

Whatever the case as is made sufficiently clear in Philo's writings, Philo considered Moses as the philosopher par excellence and not Plato from whom he draws abundant inspiration. In *De opificio mundi* he claimed that Moses "had both reached the apex of philosophy and had been taught by oracles the most significant and essential aspects of nature" (*Opif.* 8). The two are in perfect harmony since "the cosmos is in harmony with the law and the law with the cosmos" (*Opif.* 3). However, Philo also notes that Greeks educated Moses (*Mos.* 1.18-24).

There are a number of scholars who argue that Philo did not display any originality in his philosophy. For example Lee does not value Philo highly as an innovative thinker (Lee is a member of the Vlasossian method, which applies modern philosophical analysis to ancient philosophers and philosophies). This is so, since Philo, as a Mosaic commentator does not indulge himself with such philosophical issues as the epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief, ontological issues like the precise status of nature of "matter", or difficult metaphysical matters like Plato's odd and obscure account of the creation of, and nature of, the soul.

In this regard Lee contrasts Philo to Augustine who "toils through the process of considering and *rejecting* interpretations that, as he believes (and argues!), will *not* work, making him labor to bring forth a philosophically, as well as doctrinally, satisfying understanding. (*Fides*

quaerens intellectum turns out to involve a lot of analytical and argumentative *work*.)". Philo does not display the penetrating discussions of Augustine on the nature of time (Book XI of the Confessions). Philo's work consists mainly of choosing themes as they suit his work of drawing parallels between Scripture and his Allegorical interpretation. Lee rejects the position of Runia that we should see Philo as a "philosopher in his own right" (Lee in Runia 1993: 122).

In recent years a number of scholars have emphasized Philo's exegetical work as a useful starting point in determining Philo's role and relationship to philosophy. This line of scholarship was already advanced by C. Siegfried in a work written in 1875. It is especially Nikiprowetzky who emphasizes Philo as an exegete (see his work *Le commentaire de l'Ecriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie* 1977). Philo understands the Law of Moses as philosophy. Therefore in studying the Scriptures one is able to appropriate this philosophy. Nikiprowetzky's central point is that Philo's works have the character of a **commentary** on Scripture and they are structered according to a fashion which was prevalent in the Synagogue, i.e. the interpretative tradition there. Hence the project of Nikiprowetzky centred on the study of Philonic treatises as commentaries. The Greek tradition provides the technology for Philo's exegesis of the Scripture. The understanding of Philo entails the study of exegetical themes and the Biblical text without divorcing any of them form each other.

Some scholars such as Dillon have criticized Nikiprowetzky that in his distinction between philosophy and exegesis he went too far. After all, one does not engage in exegesis in an intellectual vacuum. Dillon comments on Nikiprowetzkys position: "He would see Philo, not primarily as a philosopher, *but rather as* an exegete, who *used* Greek philosophy as it suited him, but did not adopt any consistent philosophical stance. The force of such an antithesis entirely escapes me. How can one become an exegete in an intellectual vacuum? What stimulus would prompt one to such an activity? Obviously, Philo is constrained by the nature of his source-material, as anyone must be who decides to do philosophy through the medium of commentary (the Neoplatonists are under just the same constraint, both in commenting on Plato, and, more acutely, in commenting on Aristotle), but this merely exercises his ingenuity, calling for tactical variations, in his basic

philosophical position, not vacillation or incoherence… (his emphases)", (Dillon in Runia 1993: 120). Runia has concluded that Philo could be called a "philosophically orientated exegete" (Runia 1993: 121). Whatever the case Philo is the first philosopher to have postulated that God in his essence is unknowable and undescribable. Further Philo's concept that the noetic cosmos or the model is the creation of God is also unique.

Philo's character as an exegete of Scripture was also studied by Borgen. Importantly Borgen seeks to analyse Philo's historical context. Borgen in this regard writes: "Philo was one among several interpreters of the Pentateuch in the Jewish community of Alexandria. Some differences and agreements among them are reflected in his writings. Moreover, Philo's Pentaetuchal interpretations have been produced within the context of his own and his compatriots' historical situation. Philo draws on the expository activity in the synagogue" (Borgen 1997: 9).

The *similarity* and not *dependence* between philosophy and Judaism lies in the fact that both Philosophy provide means to the humans to see beyond and approach God (*Spec*. 1. 37-40; The road to God in *Post*. 101-02; *QE* 2. 13), (Sterling 1993: 102). Philosophy and Judaism lead to service in God and enable one to gain immortality" (*Congr*. 114 and *Opif*. 77 respectively).

Philo can use various exegetical techniques in his argument that the Jewish religion is the most superior philosophy. One such technique is arithmology. For example, by means of his interpretation of the Sabbath and his use of arithmology Philo is able to show that the order prescribed by Moses has a universal validity (Moehring 1995: 176).

Philo and Hellenistic Philosophy

Introduction

There is no doubt that Philo in his writings owes a great debt to Hellenistic philosophy. Further, it is especially Plato who plays a dominant role in Philo's thought. Runia observes that the reason why Plato is so dominant in Philo, is that Philo understood Plato to be the most Mosaic of ancient philosophical systems (Runia 1986: 519). However, Philo draws on various other traditions of Hellenistic philosophy as he see's fit. Thus we see evidence of Stoic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean and other traditions in Philo's writings. It is nevertheless important to emphasise that whatever philosophical concepts Philo may use, he "measures" everything according to the Scripture, which is the ultimate authority for Philo.

In terms of Plato, Philo draws heavily on the *Timaeus* especially in regards to Plato's ontological and epistemological doctrines. But Philo is also "up to date" with Platonic developments in general and seems to be in dialogue with Platonic thought in his own day. Thus there are certain affinities between Philo and Middle Platonism.

In this context Wolfson discerns two ways how Plato's ideas were interpreted in history. Thus either they were interpreted extradeically (existing outside of God), as intended by their inventor or they could be interpreted in the manner of Philo, in other words intradeically (existing within God as his thoughts), followed by an extradeical stage (Wolfson 1948: 119).

Where Plato did not correspond to Philo's intentions, Philo freely chooses other philosophical ideas more suited to his purpose. In this regard he can move to Aristotelian concepts. Thus for example Philo realised that Plato's theology of cosmic celestial gods and a world creating Demiurge would not accord well with his Jewish background. So instead of this scheme Philo opted for the Aristotelian scheme of a completely transcendent, immaterial and unchangeable Intellect. This 'Being as Being' (*Mut*. 27) is the ground of everything. In order to serve a link between the metaphysical Origin and the visible world Philo adopts Aristotle's notion of Powers, which enable the Origin to bring about a physical effect. The Logos represents the Power of God immanent in the cosmos. The Logos is the cause of order and rationality

in visible reality. Philo's notion of science also has strong affinities with Aristotle. Rational and empirical study for Philo enable man to gain knowledge of the eternal Ideas and Powers of God. However, this study cannot enable one to attain knowledge of transcendental realities and for this one must be free from his material constraints, which is characterised as an awakening from a deep sleep.

Aristotle's concept of the Unmoved Mover can also be discerned in Philo's description of how the Creator placed all the planets as drivers in their own chariot (*Cher*. 24). He however did not trust any of them with the reins, but left their government in his own hands (*exitisen eavtu*), (Cf. *Opif*. 46). In its resemblance of terminology it refers to the motif of 'the golden chain' in Homers *Iliad* 8. 1-24, which was allegorically interpreted by Aristotle in order to arrive at his concept of the Unmoved Mover (Cf. Aristotle, *Motu animalium* 4, 699b37).

Philo and Plato

While Philo utilizes various philosophical traditions, nevertheless Plato plays a dominant role in Philo's thought.

In his work *Philo and the Timeaus* Runia concluded: "the profound influence of Plato's writings and their interpretative tradition must be recognized for what it is, a pillar of Philo's though which, if removed, would cause the whole edifice to totter and collapse" (Runia 1986: 518). Further, "on the other hand it would be wrong to conclude from this that Philo, *himself* is a Platonist, the reason being that "he is doing his own thing" (Runia 1986: 519), i.e. constructing a Mosaic philosophy".

In order to address Philo's position Runia resorts to the example of an ellipse. Philo standing somewhere in the middle of the ellipse always has to refer to some point on the ellipse, be it Platonic thought or Hellenistic Judaism, but his position within the ellipse always presupposes that we cannot align him squarely with one position or another.

Plato introduced his cosmology in his quasi-mythological masterpiece the *Timaeus*. It is highly likely that the "publication" of the work occurred around 360-355. The *Timaeus* has a dialogue structure and is a production of a debate between *Timaeus*, *Critias* and *Hermocrates*. In this regard Timaeus is characterized as reaching the summit of philosophy. The Timaeus has a mythical framework and discerns a world of being and the world of becoming with the parallel distinction between

νόησις and *δόξα*. The function of the Demiurge is to impose order on the disorderly realm of necessity. The Demiurge is a *νους*. The *τρίτον γένος* is the receptacle or *ἐκμαγείον*, which is basically a medium out of which sensible images appear in and out of.

The Timaeus played a central role in the later development of Platonist philosophy. However, the work itself created as many problems as it answered. Future Platonist philosophers and not only they, were to discuss many of the issues that the Timaeus left unresolved. The main issues, which were later discussed, are neatly summed up by Runia, (1) The question of whether the creational event occurred in time or should it be understood as an eternal process of generation? (2) The precise character of the Demiurge and his relation to the Ideas (3) what is the nature of the receptacle? (4) What is the relation between the analysis of reality in the *Timaeus* and the metaphysics presented in books VI and VII of the *Republic* and the so-called Unwritten doctrines"? (5) Does Plato present a negative or positive evaluation of the cosmos? (6) What is the relation of mans soul to the cosmic soul, the Demiurge and the Ideas?, (Runia 1986: 39).

A few years after the appearance of the Timaeus the leadership of the academy passed to Speusippus (407-339), who was succeeded by Xenocrates (396-314). These two immediate successors of Plato reflected on the Timaeus and gave it a non-literal interpretation. Speusippus interpreted the *Nous* Demiurge as on the second level below the One and the Indefinite dyad (fragment 89 Isnardi, 58 Taran; cf. Dillon 17-18). Aetius wrote that Xenocrates on the other hand took a different position and identified the Nous with the Monad as one of the two highest *ἀρχαί* (Fr. 15).

The most influential reflections on the Timaeus were of course produced by Aristotle (384-322), who rejected the doctrine of the Ideas, and the notion that visible realities are derived *λογικως* from higher principles. Aristotle further strongly defended the doctrine of the eternity of the cosmos. Aristotle ignored the Demiurge and accused Plato of not propounding the doctrine of the efficient cause (*Met*. A 6 988-a8-11). Aristotle posited a highest *Nous* who causes motion *ὡς ἐρώμενον* (*Met*. L 7 1072b3). Aristotle further posited a doctrine of the fifth element with circular motion, from which the heavenly bodies are composed (*De Caelo* 1.2-3, 3.2,7, *De gen*. 1.2, 3.5 etc.). Aristotle equated

Plato's receptacle with his ὕλη principle, which was conceived as a natural substrate (ἐξ οὗ) and associated it with his doctrines of potentiality/actuality and immanent form (*Phys*. 1. 9, 4.2 209b11-16, *Ce Caelo* 3. 8 306b17-20, *De gen*. 2.1 329a13-27).

The Stoics did not reject the Timaeus but used it for their own means. The Stoics emphasized a doctrine of corporealisation, i.e. that only bodies can act on bodies. The Stoics adhered to a doctrine of two principles- the Logos as active ἀρχή and matter as passive ἀρχή, which bears resemblance to ideas found in the Timaeus. The Stoics believed that the Man's soul is a fragment of the all-pervading divine Logos. He lives according to reason and its law (Cf. Zeno at *SVF* 1. 162, 179, 262).

During the leadership of Aresilaus the Academy of Plato underwent a skeptical phase and its main feature could be characterized as a glorification of the cosmos.

Plato was again in vogue towards the end of the second century B.C.E. when a number of philosophers displayed a greater respect for Plato's philosophy. This return to Plato culminated in the figure of Eudorus who marks a turn toward dogmatic Platonism (flourished in around 30 B.C.E.). This return to dogmatic Platonism as exemplified by figures such as Eudorus, coincided with the period of Philo.

Philo's use of the Timaeus

There are a number of scholars who believe that Philo did not use the *Timaeus* directly but through the mediation of handbooks, doxographies or recent philosophers such as Posidonius. Other scholars disagree with this notion and believe that Philo quoted the *Timaeus* directly.

Runia concluded that there are twenty instances of quotations, paraphrases and direct reference of the *Timaeus* in Philo, which of course is not numerous if Plato's writings are taken as a whole (Runia 1986: 367). However, as shown by Runia's study, there are numerous allusions to Plato's doctrines, terminology and imagery (Runia 1986: 371). In regard to the Timaeus, Philo displays a marked interest in theocentric and anthropocentric issues (Runia 1986: 372). In utilizing the Timaeus, Philo's main interest is in the cosmological, theological, anthropological aspects, to the detriment of other Platonic doctrines related to dialectics, epistemology, logic and others. In terms of science,

Philo displays a marked interest in Plato's astronomy. In this context, it is no surprise that it is Philo's treatise *De opifico mundi* that shows the greatest debt to the *Timaeus*. This is so, since this treatise concentrates on cosmological issues.

Philo displays a marked interest in utilizing various forms of imagery. In this regard he utilizes a number of images from the Timaeus, such as concerning the creative activity of the Demiurge, the descent of the soul, the trilocation of the soul and its struggle against the passions.

In terms of exegesis Philo also draws on the Timaeus. In this regard Runia points to two basic ways in which the Timaeus is utilized in Philo's exegesis. One of these ways is what can be termed *for purposes of exegetical illustration* (Runia 1986: 402). In this regard the Biblical verse provides the basic text and the passage from the Timaeus is used as material illustrating the problem, without affecting the interpretation. Thus an example from the Allegorical Commentary can be invoked. In Lev. 3: 4 the liver is set aside in the preservation offering. Philo in illustrating his exegesis of this passage uses Plato's designation of the liver to account for this honor bestowed on the organ (*Spec*. 1.216-219). These issues illustrate Philo's *opportunism* in exegesis where he uses various materials to suit his own purposes (Runia 1986: 403).

The way Platonic dictum inspires Philo's exegesis is seen at *Sacr*. 76-79, where Philo uses the *Timaeus* passage 22b "You Greeks always remain children". Here Philo's exegesis is formed by the Pentateuchal texts (*Lev*. 2: 14, *Lev*. 19: 32, *Num*. 11: 16, *Lev*. 26: 10). Here the category of νέα found in the Biblical text triggers of a recollection of Plato's words <u>νέοι ἐστέ ψυχάς</u>… While not using the exact words Plato's ideas are used by Philo (Runia 1986: 76). Plato's ideas are responsible for Philo's comparison between new inspired thoughts and ancient learning (Runia 1986: 76). Philo's respect for ancient thought is influenced by the *Timaeus* passage. Thus, in this regard Scripture forms the starting point for exegesis, while the fruits of the exegesis are the result of the inspiration of the Timaeus.

Another mechanism where the Timaeus is utilized consists of *for purposes of exegetical explanation* (Runia 1986: 403). In this mode the passages of the Timaeus gain greater importance and are used to *explain* Biblical passages in their philosophical dimension. In this regard the

philosophical context of the passage from the Timaeus may be taken into account.

For example at *Opif*. 16-25, Philo interprets the "day one" of Gen. 1: 1-5 in reference to the noetic model of the *Timeaus*. This implies a greater and more deeper explanation of the text. Another example consists of Philo's exegesis of Gen. 31: 20, which recounts that Jacob fled from Laban. Philo invokes another verse Gen. 30: 42 in order to explain the hatred between the two protagonists. In this regard the difference between the marked and unmarked sheep only makes sense if seen against the background of the Timaeus and the doctrines of the ideas and immanent form.

The last categories are the *purely philosophical discussions* (Runia 1986: 405). Here the *Timaeus* is discussed for its own sake, and the references occur primarily in the philosophical treatises.

Runia writes: "It becomes apparent that, in Philo's eyes, the *Timaeus* is in the more important aspects of its exegetical applicability a kind of blueprint that offers partial guidance to the exegete in the construction of his edifice of scriptural commentary. It exercises a direct influence on the way that Philo as philosophizing exegete reads the Pentateuchal text, both in its diverse parts and as a whole" (Runia 1986: 409).

There are some scholars who believe that there was a kind of Alexandrine tradition of Platonising exegesis, of which Philo is one representative. This position has however been criticized by other scholars, who point to the paucity of sources for such a tradition. For example Aristobulus makes no mention of Timaeus material.

Plato's epistemology can be detected for example in *Op. Mund*. 16, where following Plato, Philo states that 'this visible world' was made after God had first 'fully formed the intelligible world'. The verb denoting the creation of the visible world is associated with the noun *demiourgos, demiourgeo*. In regards to the intelligible world the adjective is νοητός, and the noun κόσμος. The intelligible world is of course the non-corporeal pattern for the visible world. Philo believes that Moses saw the κόσμος νοητός (world of Ideas) on mount Sinai. In *Quaest. In Ex. II. 90* Philo states that Moses was shown 'the paradeigmatic essences, wholly incorporeal". In *Som. I. 185-7* Philo distinguishes between "this world discerned by sense", and the world "which only intellect can perceive", a world which was "framed from the eternal forms". To

approach the world of Ideas one must begin with "material objects". Similarly the Scripture at its literal meaning corresponds to the visible world. If one was to proceed to the incorporeal world of real existence must start with the visible (literal meaning), but then must proceed further.

Abraham arrived at a true cosmo-theology in contrast to a mere 'material' cosmic view by his 'awakening' as if from a deep sleep and learning to 'see' reality with the 'eye of the soul' (*Abr*. 70; *Somn*. 1. 165; *Spec*. 1. 49; *Leg*. 1. 38). Philo's metaphor of the 'sleep of the soul' is similar to the concept found in Aristotle's *Eudemus* (Bos 1998: 84).

The Middle Platonists and Philo

One of the most controversial issues in modern Philonic research deals with the issue of whether Philo was a Middle Platonist. Further what is the nature of Philo's relationship with Middle Platonism? Did Philo himself contribute to Middle Platonist thought? The questions defy simple answers and a number of scholars have dealt with the problem.

The Middle Platonists are mainly represented by such figures as Plutarch (c. 45-125), Gaius (around c. 120), Calvenus Taurus (around c. 145), Albinus the pupil of Gaius (around c. 150), Celsus (around c. 165) and Galen (129-c. 200). Apart from the Middle Platonists another important group operating in the same period were the Neopytha-goreans, which included such figures as Moderatus of Gades (around 60 C.E.?), Nichomachus of Gerasa (around c. 120), Numenius of Apamea (around c. 150) and others. As noted by Tobin it is important to note that the Middle Platonists did not form a coherent systematic family of philosophers. Tobin notes that if we speak of Middle Platonists, we should speak of a family, since many of these authors had diverging views (Tobin 1993: 148). It is also important to note that Philo came quite early in the history of Middle Platonism (Tobin 1993: 149).

The Middle Platonists considered themselves to be the true and loyal Platonists, and adhered to a strict dogmatic Platonism rejecting skeptical and esoteric interpretations of Plato. Plato should be interpreted only via other passages of Plato. Eudorus formulated this hermeneutical principle in his statement *to de ge polufwnon tou Platwnos <ou poludoxon>* (Stob. Ecl. 2.49. 25). However, some terminology and

concepts of Aristotle, the Stoics and the Pythagoreans are found in their doctrines. The Middle Platonists themselves were flexible in regard to their doctrines. The Middle Platonists would take over Stoic or Aristotelian views if they were convinced that these views can be reconciled with Platonic thought. This is the case with regard to the ten categories and the theology of the unmoved mover, which are attributed to Plato.

In contrast to Plato, who separates abstract philosophical principles (the Ideas, the Good, the One) and the theological entities (the Demiurge, the cosmic soul, the gods of myth), the Middle Platonists brought both the theological entities and abstract philosophical principles together and fused them into theologia, the highest form of knowledge. The piety accompanying this theologia is of an intellectual kind.

The most marked concerns of the Middle Platonists centered on the doctrine of providence, the theory of creation and man's place in the cosmos, all issues which are also important in Philo. There is further a marked theocentrism in Middle Platonism.

Both Philo and the Middle Platonists display a heavy use of the *Timaeus*. The Middle Platonists also resemble Philo in their integration of other doctrines in their elucidation of Plato.

The most important aspects from the *Timaeus*, which are utilized by the Middle Platonists, consist of (1) the doctrine of the three principles-God, the ideas, matter. (2) A highest god who is a transcendent nous and who creates indirectly (one thinks of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover) via the second god i.e. the rational part of the cosmic soul. Thus, Plato's Demiurge is divided into two parts. (3) The ideas serve as a paradigm for the cosmos and all its natural parts and are considered as real transcendent entities. (4) The Ideas are located in God as his thoughts and creation occurs when God "consults" his thoughts. (5) Plato's receptacle is understood as the quality-less substrate out of which the cosmos is formed and is understood under the influence of the Aristotelian *ὕλη* and the Stoic *ousia*. There is a slight tendency of the identification of matter as evil. (6) Even if a literal creation is denied a creationalism is expounded. (7) Endless debates on whether the genesis took place in time. In this regard there was a division between the literalists (Plutarch, Atticus) and the non-literalists (the majority). (8)

God's providence is affirmed and any attribution of evil to God is rejected (9) The cosmic soul is slightly modified and understood in terms of the Stoic Logos. It is made rational by the creating god. (10) A hierarchy of beings with an interest in demonology is introduced and there is indecision whether to accept the doctrine of the fifth element (11) While the tripartite character and trilocation of the soul is retained it is affirmed that the soul is essentially constituted by two parts the *logikon* and the to *alogon*. (12) The doctrine of the *telos* is summed up in the Platonic slogan of *omoiwsis Thew*.

In terms of the *Timaeus* Runia shows it is possible to arrive at a fourfold division of the doctrinal positions of the Middle Platonists (i) a naive Soicizing reading of the *Timaeus* (*apud* Diogenes Laertius); (ii) a literal reading of the *Timaean* cosmogony, in which the Demiurge brings an irrational reading of the Timaean cosmogony in terms of two gods (Albinus, Apuleius, Taurus); (iv) a non-literal reading of the Timaean cosmogony in relation to a divine hierarchy of three gods (Numenius, and later Plotinus). As is more or less obvious these opinions diverge on a number of accounts from Philo's exposition of the Timaeus in his interpretation of the Mosaic account.

In Middle Platonism one of the central issues is the relationship between God as source and first cause of physical reality and the world of Ideas as its intelligible pattern and model. Usually the solutions offered centered around the fact that the Ideas are thoughts of God.

The Middle Platonist position on the Ideas and God is found especially elaborated in Arius Didymus' Epitome of physical doctrines. This book is paralleled in Albinus Didaskalios. During Philo's time the term εἰκών could mean both image and model (Willms in Runia 1986: 163). The Middle Platonists regarded the ideas as Gods thought, whereas Plato left the relationship between the Demiurge and the model undefined.

Plato's image of the Demiurge model lies especially in the terminology of visual terms, whereas for the Middle Platonists and Philo, it attains a more physical character in the sense of the seal and imprint (Runia 1986: 163). The model, containing the entire plan of the cosmos is imprinted on the pre-existent ὕλη to form the κόσμος αἰσθητός. In this context the *Logos* is the archetypal seal (*Ebr*. 133, *Migr*. 103, *Fug*. 12, *Somn*. 2. 45, *Spec*. 3.207 etc.).

Runia compares Philo's account of the "creation" of the κόσμος νοητός on "day one" (*Opif.* 16-25) with the doctrine of God found in the *Didaskalikos* of Albinus. According to Albinus the *nous* is superior to the soul and superior to the potential *nous* is the *nous* in actuality. The first god is higher than this *nous* (the νους του συμπαντος ούρανου)and he is the cause of the *nous* in actuality. The first god, as highest *nous*, is unmoved, but moves the cosmic *nous* through being the object of desire. The first god is always in a state of actuality and reflects on his own thoughts; his actuality is thus the Idea. He is good and is eternal and ineffable. He is the cause of all things and therefore can be called the Father. He orders the cosmic mind and the cosmic soul by looking to himself and his own thoughts. The cosmic mind, following gods orders brings to order the whole of nature in the cosmos. Albinus attempts to reconcile Plato with Aristotle and in paragraph 14. 3 of his work Plato's Demiurge is split in two. The highest god represents the Demiurge as cause of creation and Father (and also, in the post-Platonic development, as thinker of the ideas). But his creative activity is limited to raising the cosmic soul from sleep and ordering its *nous* (i.e. the cosmic *nous*), so that the *nous* receives the ideas, by means of which the διακόσμησις of the cosmos can occur. Thus the demiurgic "dirty work" of creation, performed in the *Timaeus* by the Demiurge, is carried out by the cosmic *nous* in Albinus' interpretation. The postulation of *two gods*, a supra-cosmic *nous* and a cosmic *nous*, is not acceptable to Philo. "The *τύπος* imagery which Philo, combining the *Timaeus* and the psychology of Tht. 191c-192a (Plato via Plato), uses to describe the process of creation, is closely paralleled in Arius Didymus and Albinus" (Runia 1986: 489).

In the earlier tradition of Middle Platonism we find a system, which centers on two principles, God and matter. In an early fragment Theophrastus attributes to Plato the view that God is equated with the Idea of the Good (Fr. 230): (Plato… made the study of first philosophy (=metaphysics) his chief concern, but also devoted himself to the appearances and took up the study of nature, in which he wished to make the principles two in number, the substrate as matter, which he names "all-receiver", the other as cause and mover, which he assigns to the power of God and the power of the Good.

In Diog. Laert. 3.67-80 another early source we also find two principles θεός-νους and ύλη. In this source the Ideas are intelligible exemplars of physical things and are accorded a subordinate position to God is equated with the Good. This is also similar to the work of Timaeus Locrus where we also have a system of two principles and he speaks first of two αίτίαι (νους-θεός and άνάνκα) and then of two άρχαί είδος and ύλη. Here the author uses Idea in the singular and subordinates it to God the first cause.)". There is no trace of the doctrine of the two powers in Philo, possibly due to his strict monism with dualist tendencies (Runia 1993: 139).

The early phase of Middle Platonism, which was characterized, with the doctrine of the two principles was replaced around the first century C.E. with a new doctrine of three principles. This is shown in Aetius (around 50 C.E.) who writes: "Plato the Athenian, son of Ariston… (posits) three principles: the god, matter, the idea. God is the mind of the cosmos; matter is the prime substrate underlying becoming and destruction; the idea is the incorporeal being in the thoughts and representations of the god". (Πλάτον ‘Αρίστωνος ‘Αθηναίος…τρεις άρχάς, τόν θεόν τήν ύλην τήν ύλην τήν ίδέαν. Εστι δέ ό θεός ό νους (του κόσμου), ύλη δέ τό ύποκείμενον πρωτον γενέσει καί φθορά, ίδέα δ' ουσία άσώματος έν τοις νοήμασι καί ταις φαντασίαις του θεου), (Ps.Plut. *Placita Philosophorum* 1.3, 59.8 Mau.).

In Alcinous (Albinus) the Ideas are παραδειγματική άρχή, standing beside God and matter: "Examined in relation to God the idea is his thinking; in relation to us it is the first object of thought; in relation to matter it is a measure; in relation to the sense-perceptible cosmos it is a model; in relation to itself it is a being (or substance)" (έστη δέ ή ίδέα ώς μέν πρός θεόν νόησις αυτου, ώς δέ πρός ήμας νοητόν πρωτον, ως δέ πρός τήν ύλην μέτρον, ώς δέ πρός τόν αίσθητόν κόσμον παράδειγμα, ώς δέ πρός αύτήν έξεταζομένη ουσία (parag. 9, 20.14 Whittaker). He continues: " Since the first mind is supremely fair, it is necessary that the object of thought that subsists in him be supremely fair also. Nothing is more fair than himself. Therefore he always thinks himself and his own thoughts, and this activity of his constitutes the idea (έπεί δέ ό πρωτος νους κάλλιστος, δεί καί κάλλιστον αύτω νοητόν ύποκεισθαι, ούδέν δέ αύτου κάλλιον. Εαυτόν άν ουν καί τά έαυτου νοήματα άεί νοοίη, καί αύτη ή ένέργεια αύτου ίδέα ύπάρχει).

Here we can detect the influence of Aristotle's concept of the unmoved mover, which presents the context of the Ideas as Gods thoughts. Alcinous then turns to his Platonic context when he speaks of the φυσικός τόπος (natural realm).

Of course, in the earlier doctrine of two principles the Ideas are subordinated to the two principles, whereas in the doctrine of the three principles, the Ideas are gaining a certain degree of independence. Runia suggests that the latter scheme would be better formulated as "the Ideas as objects of Gods thought" (Runia 1993: 136).

The development of these doctrines has resulted in two questions, which preoccupied Middle Platonist thought. The first questions dealt with the issue of the location of the Ideas and further what was the status of the Ideas in relation to God.

Interpreting the statement "day one" in Genesis, Philo seems to adhere to the Middle Platonist understanding of the genesis of the cosmos (Runia 1993: 137). Philo seems to go even further than the Middle Platonists in relation to his doctrine of *pre-creational reflection* (Runia 1993: 137). Hints of precrational reflection are also found in Nichomachus of Gerasa who lived around 100. In his *Introductio arithmetica* Nichomachus of Gerasa writes: "And this (the method to learn first) is arithmetic, not solely because we said that it existed before all the others in the mind of the creating God like some universal and exemplary plan, relying upon which as a design and archetypal example the creator of the universe sets in order his material creations and makes them attain to their proper ends, but also… (1.4.2), (ἔστι δέ αὕτη ἡ ἀριθμητική, οὐ μόνον, ὅτι ἔφαμεν αὐτήν ἐν τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου θεοῦ διανοίᾳ προϋποστῆναι τῶν ἄλλων ὡσανεί λόγον τινά κοσμικόν καί παραδειγματικόν, πρός ὅν ἀπερειδόμενος ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουρ-γός ὡς πρός προκέντημά τι καί ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα τά ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ἀποτελέσματα κοσμεῖ καί τοῦ οἰκείου τέλους τυγχάνειν ποιει…. Further he writes: "All that has by nature with systematic method been arranged in the universe seems both in part and as a who-le to have been determined and ordered in accordance with number, by the forethought and the mind of him that created all things; fo the patter was fixed, like a preliminary sketch, by the domination of number preexistent in the mind of the world-creating God, number conceptual only and immaterial in every way, but at the same time the true and the

eternal essence, so that with reference to it, as to an artistic plan, should be created all these things, time, motion, the heavens, the stars, all sorts of revolutions" (1.6.1), (πάντα τά κατά τεχνικήν διέξοδον ὑπό φύσεως ἐν τω κόσμω διατεταγμένα κατά μέρος τε καί όλα φαίνεται κατά ἀριθμόν ὑπό προνοίας καί του τά ὅλα δημιουργήσαντος νου διακεκρίσθαι τε καί κεκόσμηναι βεβαιουμένου του παραδείγματος οίον λόγον προχαράγματος ἐκ του ἐπέχειν τόν ἀριθμόν προυποστάντα ἐν τη του κοσμοποιω θεου διανοία, νοητόν αὐτόν μόνον καί παντάπασιν αυλον, οὐσίαν μέντοι τήν ὄντως τήν ἀίδιον, ἵνα πρός αὑτόν ὡς λόγον τεχνικόν ἀποτελεσθη τά σύμπαντα ταυτα, χρόνος, κίνησις, οὐρανός, ἄστρα, ἐξελιγμοί παντοιοι).

It is apparent from the above account that the author emphasises the doctrine of the pre-existence of the model by the use of the prefix προ-, which appears four times in the account. However the author does not specify whether the Idea was created or whether it was pre-existent (A similar ambiguity is apparent in Atticus fr. 9. 37 Des Places where we have the phrase πρότερον νοησαι).

In terms of Philo, Philo states that "God struck out in advance" (*Opif*. 16, πρεξετύπου), the *kosmos noetos*. This however does not solve the problem whether Philo understood the kosmos noetos to be eternal or created. Philo clearly implies that as the model or the Logos the kosmos noetos is eternal.

In one passage Philo emphasises the supreme position of the Idea, suggesting the eternity of the Idea. Philo writes: "Moses… understood that it was most essential that among the things that exist there be an active cause and a passive object, and that the former is the mind of the universe, supremely pure and undefiled, superior to excellence and superior to knowledge, and even superior to the God itself and the Fair itself, whereas the passive object was without its own source of life and movement…" (be careful there is something weird in the translation), (*Opif*. 8).

Runia believes that Philo defers from Middle Platonists in his stress on God's transcendence. Runia writes: "Where I believe that Philo departs from his Middle Platonist colleagues is in his very deliberate placement of God "above" the noetic cosmos in the Logos (the distinction between the king and the architect in the image at *Opif*. 17-18)"… "Gods being is not exhausted by his relationship to created

reality via the Logos… Philo's conception of divine transcendence is not so much "hierarchical" (i.e. involving more than one level of deity) as "aspectual"… It is also not prompted by logical considerations, but rather through an awareness of the overwhelming superiority and sublimity of the Divine Being" (Runia 1993: 139).

One of the fundamental doctrines of Philo is the doctrine of the Logos. Philo's understanding of the Logos is highly original and seems to be unparalled in Middle Platonist thought. The doctrine of the Logos was researched in early Middle Platonism, but later was abandoned. The Logos is the image of God, the highest of all beings who are intellectually perceived, the one closest to God, the only truly existent (*Fug*. 101). This image, the *logos*, also serves as the paradigm or model for the ordering of the rest of the universe (*Somn*. 2.45), The logos is the archetypal idea in which all of the other ideas are contained (*Opif*. 24-25), But the logos is not simply the image or paradigm according to which the universe was ordered, it is also the instrument (ὁργανον) through which the universe is ordered (*Cher*. 127; *Spec*. 1.81), The *logos* is both the power through which the universe was originally ordered and the power by which the universe continues to be ordered.

Tobin notes that by the time of Middle Platonism there was a concept of an intermediary reality between God and creation and that Philo was the first to define this intermediary reality as the Logos (Tobin 1993: 149). The interpretation of the Stoic Logos as an intermediate reality in the intelligible realm took place in the early stages of Middle Platonism. Eudorus of Alexandria may have referred to the demiurgic combination of the Monad, which represented form, and the Dyad, which represented matter, as the though (logos) of the essentially transcendent God, the First or Supreme One (Tobin 1993: 149). The logos as an intermediary figure also appears in the *Poimandres* 10-11, which uses material from the *Timaeus* and *Genesis* (first and second century C.E.). Plutarch in his work also mentions the Logos as an intermediate figure (c. 50-120 C.E), (De Is. et Os. 53-54, 372E-373C). In Plutarch's work the logos is identified with Osiris, who serves as the intelligible paradigm for the world and who ordered and made manifest the material world.

An important issue, which relates to the question of Philo's relationship with Middle Platonism rests on the existence of Platonic commentaries. It is generally agreed that Platonic commentaries circu-

lated in Philo's time, although the issue whether these commentaries were full-lengthened remains an open question.

Philo's manner of formulation, choice of terms, use of illustrations, displays knowledge of exegesis of the *Timaeus* as practiced by contemporary Platonists (Runia 1986: 489). Philo for example uses formulas of the so-called prepositional metaphysics, which were largely based on an analysis of the *Timaeus* (Runia 1986: 489). In Middle and Neoplatonist thought prepositional phrases were frequently used to express the causes required for an object (and especially the cosmos to come into being). One of the most important three phrases in this regard are the three ἀρχαί- by which (ὑφ' οὐ, efficient cause), towards which (πρός ὁ, formal cause), out of which (ἐξ οὐ, material cause).

There are some differences between Philo's exegesis as for example displayed in the *Allegorical Commentary* and the exegesis of the Platonic commentaries. Philo's exegesis of the Mosaic text leads him to various digressions. The method of etymologizing is also absent from the Platonic commentaries (Runia 1986: 504). Also absent from the Platonic commentaries are the symbolical, psychological and ethical allegories (Runia 1986: 508). One exegetical mechanism employed by both works is arithmology (Runia 1986: 504). Further one important difference, lies in the fact that Philo always refers to exegetical predecessors and colleagues in *anonymous terms*, while Platonic commentators refer to a number of Platonist scholars, who are carefully listed and named (Runia 1986: 505).

It is clear that Philo uses many doctrines of Plato in his writings and doctrines which have affinity with Middle Platonist developments. However, it remains a question, of whether Philo's use of these doctrines would warrant a designation of a Middle Platonist or Platonist for Philo. It is certain that Philo did not engage in the standard problems of Middle Platonist thought, or in other words he was not a member of the Middle Platonist "discussion club". In terms of self definition, one might add that Philo might have viewed himself as a Platonising exegete of Scripture. That he was a middle Platonist is a modern conclusion.

Another important fact, is that while Philo uses many of Platonic doctrines and indeed praises Plato, Philo's loyalty to Plato is not systematic or consistent. Some difference between Plato's doctrines and

Philo can be noted. Thus Philo refuses to accept the doctrine of the two or three principia and Philo associates the creators goodness with the doctrine of grace. Further Philo rejects the doctrine of metempsychosis and replaces it with allegorical explanation. Philo certainly respected Plato, but he was certainly not loyal to Plato. Some scholars would not agree with this statement. Winston states: "what greater devotion and loyalty could Philo show towards his beloved Plato than to read his Platonic convictions into the Mosaic Torah?" (Winston in Runia 1993: 128). Winston also suggests that the allegorical mode of interpretation is of such a nature that it creates a new system of thought purely by imposing a new interpretation on a given text. Since this interpretation does not have to follow scriptural lines, this interpretation actually creates a new system or new text. However Runia writes that: "For Philo non-literal interpretation is *explication of* the text, not *imposition on* the text, no matter how we may wish to view it" (Runia 1993: 129). One consequence of Philo's' use of Plato and other Greek philosophical doctrines was that in the mind of later rabbis he was viewed skeptically that in his defense of Judaism he actually undermined Judaism.

Tobin points to the "emic" and "etic" analysis as a useful method in characterizing Philo. "An "emic" analysis is an analysis of phenomena in terms of internal structures of a particular system" (Tobin 1993: 150). "An "etic" analysis is of phenomena considered in relation to prede-termined general concepts" (Tobin 1993: 150). In the "emic" analysis of things Philo would not be considered a Middle Platonist, since he affiliates himself with Moses and not the Platonic or Academic *airesis*. However, in terms of an "etic" analysis he could be called a Middle Platonist, since he reflects many of the basic positions associated with more general category of Middle Platonism (Tobin 1993: 150).

Even if one considers Philo not to have been a fully fledged Middle Platonist, it is clear that this tradition did have some influence on Philo's enthusiastic reception of Plato within the context of the Judaic world view (Runia 1986: 527).

Philo and Scepticism

There are echoes of Scepticism in Philo. Philo used some of the Sceptical ideas but avoided Sceptical conclusions. Philo in one passage

even proceeds to overthrow the philosophy of the sceptic Aenesidemus (*Ebr*. 166-205).

In this context one can mention the work preserved on a papyrus, which is called the *Commentary on the Theaetetus*. This work shows an interest in Scepticism and has been apparently used by Philo, who took over some of its Sceptical elements. Philo's exegesis of Gen 15: 11 bears a resemblance to the *Theaetetus* papyrus. Here in this passage we have "Abram (the sage) sitting among the birds (or in other words the dissenting sophists/philosophers) and the bisected pieces of sacrificial meat (couplets of conflicting doctrines)". The sage then is one who sits down and decides which of the various products of the disputant soul have value and which should be thrown away. The sage is here a midwife and judge (Parag. 247 *o maevtikos omu ke dikastikos aner*). Philo transcends the Scepticism here by stating that Moses of course eventually overturns any problems that the sage faces.

Use of Stoic doctrine

Stoic doctrine of eupatheiai which is closely related to Philos concept of "sober drunkenness". Philo emphasises the joy one receives when he draws closer to God. Joy in a sense is the prerogative of God alone. "Homoiosis is not something a human being can bring about through his or her own efforts, but rather comes as a gift from God" (Le Boulluecs in Reydams-Schills 1996: 174). "Philo uses the expression nous alogos (Leg. 2.64) to characterise a mind that does not exert its power (just as the sense are not yet engaged in the activity of sense-perception) in order to capture the original condition of Adam and Eve" (Bouffartigue in Reydams-Schills 1996: 172). "The comparison of this state with childhood once again betrays a Stoic influence, with the claim that children who do not have the full use of reason cannot have virtue or be liable to passions" (Bouffartigue in Reydams-Schills 1996: 172). "The Stoic strand serves Philos allegiance to Scripture and his position, against the Platonists, that gaining perfection is not a matter of a return, but of a turn, in a linear dynamic, towards God" (Bouffartigue in Reydams-Schills 1996: 173).

One of the most important influences on Philo came from the Stoic tradition, although he never refers to the Stoics by name. Philo was especially influenced by the Stoic tradition in regards to his ethics.

When for example Philo discusses the trees in the Garden of Eden, he uses Stoic ethics in his interpretations (*Legi.* 1.56-62). Thus the various trees in this garden represent various virtues and their corresponding activities. These acts are perfect (*katorthomata*) and those that 'philosophers call' *kathekonta*. The tree of life is nothing else than generic virtue. Further, the four rivers that flow out of Eden (*ibid.* 63) represent the four (Stoic virtues) of prudence, temperance, courage and justice (Long 1997: 199).

It is especially in his portrait of the 'wise man' that Philo echoes Stoic themes. This is shown by the maxim that thoughts, words and actions should be in harmony with each other a doctrine found in Plato and later Stoics (D. Winston, "The Philonic Sage" (Hebrew), Da'at (Summer 1983), 9-10 in Cohen 19), (see Democritus, *Tritogenia* (where the name of the goddess is allegorically explained as meaning right mind, speech and activity), Plato, *Statesman* 498e in Winston 1991: 9-10). Philo re-iterates this maxim in his statement speaking about Moses: "He (Moses) exemplified his philosophical creed by his daily actions. His words expressed feelings, and his actions accorded with his words, so that speech and life were in harmony, and thus through their mutual agreement were found to make melody together as a musical instrument", (*Mos.* 1.29). It is possible to speculate that this maxim was really more of a common feature among various philosophical systems of antiquity. Philo would probably agree with the Stoic view, that Virtue alone led to happiness (Dillon 1977: 146).

The Stoic concept of knowledge *kataleptike phantasia* is another theme adopted by Philo (Dillon 1977: 145). Philo gives the definition of knowledge in *Congr.* 141: knowledge is "a sure and certain conception (*katalepsis*) which cannot be shaken by argument". Together with this Stoic definition (*SVF* I 68), Philo must have taken over the entire Stoic concept of knowledge (Dillon 1977: 145).

As with other philosophical systems Philo does not adopt all concepts from the Stoics. In this regard Philo could never agree with the Stoics in including theology under physics (Wolfson 1948: 146).

Where Stoic doctrine did not accord well with the testimony of the Bible, Philo transforms it or rejects it. This is especially seen in such Biblical concepts as repentance, pity and others. The Stoics would reject concepts such as repentance or pity in God. In regards to repentance Philo writes: "to do no sin is peculiar to God; to repent, to the wise man"

(*Fug*. 157; cf. *Virt*. 177, *Leg*. 2.60). Philo ascribes pity (*eleos*) to God. The stoics regarded pity as a species of *lipe* or distress, which was one of the four primary passions (*SVF* 1.213, 3. 394, 413-16; cf. Seneca *Clem*. 2. 4ff), (Winston 1990: 9).

In other instances, Philo is able to ascribe characteristics to God by use of Stoic doctrine, which he would not be able to do if he merely based himself on the Jewish tradition. The Stoic concept of *evpathie*, wholesome or rational emotions allowed Philo to ascribe certain emotions to God, which otherwise he would have been reluctant to do (Winston 1990: 7). These wholesome emotions consisted of *vulesis* (wishing, or rational desire), *evlavia* (watchfulness or caution), and *chara* (joy), (Winston 1990: 7). Philo uses at least two of these concepts to designate God. Philo speaks of God as being kind and benevolent and beneficent (*Opif*. 81, *Mut*. 129, *Abr*. 137). Benevolence formed part of *evnia*, which according to the Stoics was part of the variety of *vulesis* (Winston 1990: 7).

Philo and the mystery religions

A notable proponent of the theory that mystery religions formed an important influence on Philo was Goodenough. Goodenough believed that, while Philo assimilated many elements from later Platonism and Pythagoreanism, these religions themselves, have already absorbed much of the components of mystery religions, which spoke of a mystical ascent (Goodenough 1962: 14). Philo's allegory was one of the means of approaching the aim of the mystery religions. Already the rhetoricians used allegory as a means of inspiring fear, wonder and a sense of mystery. This is seen in works from Demetrius and Hermogenes (Leopold 1983: 157).

The mystery religions of Philo's day were attractive since they could be attached to any religious system of the day including of course Judaism. The mystery religions enabled one to depart from his material constraints in pursuit of immaterial truths. Similarly Philo departs from Judaism in his assertion that the Spirit must be released from the flesh and return to God. The mystery rite enabled humans to access the immaterial and the traditional myth was allegorised so that it preached the divinity breaking down the barriers between it and humans and enabling humans to approach it.

According to Goodenough, Philo could have rejected the pagan cultus associated with the mystery religions but could retain much of its conceptuality and therefore preserve its attractiveness (Goodenough 1962: 139). Thus, Moses was transformed into a person linking heaven and earth. Further man's salvation consisted of an approach to the immaterial reality (Goodenough 1962: 140). One can state that in other words allegory in Philo was not there to reveal the deeper meaning but the "mystical" meaning. The literal laws represented a lower mystery in contrast to the allegory of the Laws which enabled one to enter the higher mystery.

Goodenough discerns two principle motifs of mystery religions i.e. the "great mother" and the "light stream" in Philo. The god-head provides the light stream, which descends down and is able to transform the initiate into the mystery and thereby providing him with the means of uniting with the godhead. In terms of the "great mother" Philo uses this motif also, as is shown by for example Sarah, who was

the "virgin mother" and the "great mother" since she was true wisdom and hence virgin.

The careers of the principal figures in Jewish history, such as Moses, Abraham, Isaac and others became climactic elements in this 'Jewish mystery'. These figures according to Philo had been given the final vision of Reality thanks to the divine Powers. These figures however, not only are holy but since they are the 'royal priesthood' they can mediate and bring others to share in the same experience they had (Goodenough 1962: 141). The paramount figure however, in this regard is Moses, who is a link between man and deity as no other figure in the Scripture.

Scholars generally agree with Goodenough that Philo used terms common with the Mystery religions, such as initiation, illumination, and perfection. However, it is less clear to what extent was Philo influenced by the belief systems of these religions.

Pascher developed a similar theory to Goodenough's. Pascher believed that Philo's metaphors and allegories could be understood within a soteriological system, which argued that one was firstly reborn as a Logos and then one was again reborn as god (Pascher in Mack 1984: 235). The principle allegory relating to the Logos was to be found in the High Priest as the Logos and the principle allegory relating to the god stage was that of the ascent-vision (Pascher in Mack 1984: 235). Subsequently both these allegories were combined in the King's Highway which was an allegory on the Exodus story.

Philo and Judaism

Judaism and the law of Nature

When Rome had triumphed over the classical world, with it triumphed the Greaco-Roman culture. Within this new situation, Judaism had to enter into a dialogue with this predominant culture. This dialogue was necessitated by a number of reasons. Thus Judaism needed to justify itself within this new framework both to its adherents and to the outside world. Further the rights of the Jews needed to be ascertained. Philo's project had a double consequence, which could be termed apologetic. In one respect Philo wanted to show the religious value of Judaism and to an extent its superiority. In another respect Philo involved himself on the practical level of ascertaining the rights of the Jewish people, especially in his native Alexandria.

An important part of Philo's apologetic and religious enterprise was the identification of Jewish Laws with the concept of the Law of nature. The Law of nature was a Greek concept often appearing in ancient thought. In his writings Philo often uses the phrase "the unwritten Law of nature" a term which also appears in other ancient writings. Initially there were two separate concepts in Greek thought. That is on the one hand the "unwritten Law" and on the other the "Law of nature". In Philo and Hellenistic thought (as especially exemplified by the Stoics), the concepts of the "unwritten Law" and the "Law of nature" were fused. In Philo this new concept "the unwritten Law of nature" was further identified with the Jewish Law.

In earlier periods the "unwritten law" was considered to be superior to the "written law" and had a divine and eternal value. When Aristotle, Sophocles and Socrates spoke of unwritten law, they were referring to Laws and norms, which were valid in all societies and therefore were of a superior quality. These universally valid laws were at first not identified with any cosmic or natural Laws. These earlier "unwritten" Laws were of a *social* kind even if they were universal (Najman 1999: 65). So when Antigone (450-460) appeals to the "gods" unwritten and secure practices" which "live not just now and yesterday, but always forever", the appeal is to a social norm which is eternally binding" (Najman 1999: 65). Later due to the Stoics this superior divine unwritten law was identified as "natural".

Philo and the ancient Greeks stressed the rational character of the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature is the same as the law of reason, and since human beings are capable of reason they are capable of following the law of nature. Since right reason is the perfection of human beings, it follows that if someone transgresses the law of nature he is committing a crime against human nature. According to Philo Abraham followed the Law of Nature precisely because he was "reasonable". Philo writes: "*Right reason is an infallible law engraved not by this mortal or that and, therefore perishable as he, nor on parchment or slabs, and therefore, soulless as they, but by immortal nature on the immortal mind, never to perish. So, one may well wonder at the short-sightedness of those who ignore the characteristics which so clearly distinguish different things and declare that the laws of Solon and Lycurgus are all sufficient to secure the greates of republics. Athens and Sparta, because, their sovereign authority is loyally accepted by those who enjoy that citizenship, yet deny that right reason, which is the fountain head of all other law, can impart freedom to the wise, who obey all that it prescribes or forbids* (Prob. 47-49).

The law of nature was an important concept of ancient Greek thought and had been usually set as a kind of universal principle transcending various local and civil laws and from which these particular laws gained their justification. In this regard Cicero writes: "*I see that because custom is so corrupted such behaviour is neither thought dishonourable nor forbidden by statute and civil law. It is, however, forbidden by the law of nature. For there is a fellowship that is extremely widespread, shared by all with all (even if this has often been said, it ought to be said still more often), a closer one exists among those of the same nation, and one more intimate still among those of the same city. For this reason our ancestors wanted the law of nations and the civil law to be different: everything in the civil law need not be in the law of nations, but everything in the law of nations ought also to be part of civil law. We, however, do not have the firm and lifelike figure of true law and genuine justice: we make use of shadows and sketches. I wish we would follow even those! For they are drawn from the best examples of nature and truth*"(Off. 3. 69).

The concept of the Law of Nature was related to the conceptual framework already current in pre-platonic philosophy. In this regard there were two important terms in pre-platonic philosophy *Nomos* ("law") and *physis* ("nature"). *Nomos* belongs to our world and reflects

the endeavour to find some order in activities, customs and morality. *Fysis* also deals with orderliness, rational and reasonable but although related to *Nomos*, it belongs to the world above man. In a sense *Nomos* is an imitation of *Fysis*. In discussing this issue, we have to realise the distinction between an idea and its realisation. In a sense all that we encounter in our world is an imitation of an "idea" in the world above us. In this regard *nomos* is also an imitation of *fysis* understood as an idea.

Greek Jews called the "Pentateuch" the *Nomos*. Philo calls the book of Genesis the "*nomos physeos*", the nomos of nature. The pre-Mosaic patriarchs lived by *physis*, whereas the laws of Moses are the *nomos*. According to Philo, while Moses' Laws were only nomos and not physis as such, still they reigned supreme over any other nomos in the pagan world.

In relation to the Law Philo often uses the term diatheke. This is in line with the general tendency in Jewish-hellenistic writings and prayers to assimilate diatheke with "law", "ordinance" (especially in translations from Hebrew) (Schwemer 1996: 67-109). The word diatheke can also be understood as "last will", or "testament" in Philo. Diatheke means the spontaneous fulfilling of the Law of Moses.

According to Koester Philo merges God and physis into one (Koester in Sandmel 1979: 121). *Physis* is the principle by which God rules the creation. Philo uses the same adjectives for God as he uses for *physis*. "The Father and Maker of the world was in the trues sense also its lawgiver" (*Vit. Mos.*, II, 48).

According to Greek thought written laws were of a lesser status than the law of nature, even if they were closely related to the universal principles of nature. This obviously presented a challenge to the Jews who claimed a divine authority in relation to the written Laws of Moses. Philo dealt with this issue and not only claims special authority for the Jewish Laws due to their antiquity but further argues that the Jewish Laws were a most perfect copy and reflection of the Law of nature, hence their universal authority. This is especially prominent in Philo's interpretation of the Genesis account.

Philo wrote that the Law of Moses was the most perfect copy of the Law of Nature (*Mos.* 2.12-14). There was according to Philo a connection between the Law of Moses and the virtues (*Mos.* 2.9-11). Philo states that

Moses shows the transgressor punished by nature, which again confirms that the Mosaic law is identical to the law of nature (*Mos*. 2: 52-53). Najman believes that even though Philo identifies the Mosaic Laws with the law of nature even in Philo we see the characteristically ancient Greek preference for what is *inscribed in the soul* over what is *written* on stone, paper or any physical surface" (Pl., *Phdr*., 276a), (Najman 1999: 65).

Philo writes: "*That Moses himself was the best of all lawgivers in all countries, better in fact than any that have ever arisen among either the Greeks or the barbarians, and that his laws are most excellent and truly come from God, since they omit nothing that is needful… Moses is alone on this, that his laws, firm, unshaken, immovable, stamped, as it were, with the seals of nature herself, remain secure from the day when they were first enacted to now, and we may hope that they will remain for all future ages as though immortal, so long as the sun and moon and the whole heaven and universe exist*" (*Mos*. 2: 12-14).

Philo implies that the Mosaic Laws are not only equal to the natural Law but that the natural Law is embodied in the Mosaic written Law. The Mosaic law is "stamped, as it were, with the seals of nature itself" (*Mos*. 2: 14). The notion that the written Law can have the same significance and authority as the Law of nature was an unthinkable notion to the ancient Greeks. In this regard Philo did not concern himself on issues of the transmission of the written Law. Philo simply identifies the Law with the Law of Nature and does not dwell on the mechanics of transmission (*Hypoth*. 6. 8-6.9). Philo does not argue that Jewish superiority is due to their antiquity, but rather the idea of Judaism contains all other ideas (*Mos*. 1. 21-24).

Philo also implies that the written Laws of Moses were a certain concession to the human race, since it was incapable of reaching the ideal of the concrete embodiment of the Natural laws in one's life. The Patriarchs on the other hand embodied the law of nature in their lives and did not require the written Laws as such, since they themselves embodied the Law of nature. Philo writes: "*So, then the man of worth is elder and first, and so must he be called: but younger and last is every fool who pursues the ways which belong to rebellious youth and stand lowes in the list. So much for all this, but to these praises of the Sage, so many and so great, Moses adds this crowning saying "that this man did the divine law and the*

divine commands". He did them, not taught by written words, but unwritten nature gave him the zeal to follow where wholesom and untainted impulse led him. And when they have Gods promises before them what should men do but trust in them most firmly? Such was the life of the first, the founder of the nation, one who obeyed the law, some will say, but rather, as our discourse has shown, himself a law and an unwritten statute" (Abr. 274-276).

Those individuals who are capable of reaching the ideal of the Law of Nature without the necessity of expressive commands are truly blessed. Philo writes: "*Great indeed are the efforts expended both by the lawgivers and by laws in every nation in filling the souls of free men with comfortable hopes, but he who gains this virtue of hopefulness without being led to it by exhortation or command has ben educated into it by a law which nature has laid down, a law unwritten yet intuitively learnt (Abr. 16). Further: "Praise cannot by duly given to one who obeys the written laws, since he acts under the admonition of restraint and the fear of punishment. But he who faithfully observes the unwritten deserves commendation, since the virtue which he displays is freely willed". (Spec. 4: 150).*

A virtuous life is achieved when the laws are perfectly embodied by one's actions. Philo writes: *For if our words correspond with our thoughts and intentions and our actions with our words and the three mutually follow each other, bound together with indissoluble bonds of harmony, "happiness" prevails and this is the most authentic knowledge and wisdom (sofia kai fronesis) knowledge for the worship of G-d, wisdom for the regulation of human life. Now while the commandments of the laws are only on our lips our acceptance of them is little or none, but when we add thereto deeds… deeds shown in the whole conduct of our lives… For who… would not admit that surely that nation alone is wise and full of knowledge (sofon… kai episte-monikwtaton) whose history has been such that it has not left the divine exhortations (theias paraineseis) voided and forsaken by the actions which are akin to them, but has fulfilled the words (tous logous) with laudable deeds?"* (Praem. 81).

Philo stresses the inherent unity of the Law of Nature, the Cosmos, and man's destiny. The person who keeps the Law of Nature will be awarded the more ancient Law of immortal nature (παρέχει τόν ἀρχαιότερον νόμον της ἀθανάτου φύσεως), i.e. the begetting of sons and the perpetuity of the race (Quaest. Ex. II 19). Moses according to Philo wished to show: "*We must now give the reason why he began his*

lawbook with the history, and put commands and prohibitions in the second place… he wished to show two most essential things: first that the Father and Maker of the world was in the truest sense also its Lawgiver, secondly that he who would observe the laws will accept gladly the duty of following nature and live in accordance with the ordering of the universe, so that his deeds are attuned to harmony with his words and his words with his deeds" (*Mos.* 2: 48).

The Law of Nature is in harmony with the Cosmos. In *Opif.* 1-3 Philo writes: "*But the beginning, just as I have said, is astounding. It contains the construction of the cosmos, implying that the cosmos harmonises with the law and the law with the cosmos, likewise the law-abiding man is immediately a world-citizen, governing his actions by the will of nature, accoriding to which the entire cosmos is managed*". Similarly Joesphus writes in *Ant.* 1. 21-24: "*For everything possesses a disposition in harmony with the nature of the universe*".

Philo names certain Biblical commandments as particularly exemplifying the Law of Nature. These include the injunction to produce children, the Law of inheritance, the Law against killing infants at birth… "since to do this would teard down what nature builds up" and a general law against killing (*Decal.* 132).

Philo similarly to Jubilees believes that a system of law existed at the time of creation, which was in its bulk transmitted into the Mosaic Law. However, for Philo the pre-Sinaitic law is identical to the law of nature and therefore accessible to all who use reason, whereas for Jubilees this law is normative only for the Jewish people and is given through revelation to a group of initiates (Najman 1999: 62). For Philo the Patriarchs could live a thoroughly virtuous live by the fact that the encapsulated by their lives the law of nature. For the tradition of Jubilees and other related systems of thought the Sinaitic law was merely the national version of an earlier revelation of the law which was shown to a group of worthy people.

The Law of Nature corresponds to the universal Law by which God is bound. God is bound to this Universal Law not in a subordinate sense but in the sense that the Natural Law corresponds to God who is its most supreme embodiment. Every God's act corresponds to the Law of Nature. Philo writes: "*That the Maker should care for the thing made is required by the laws and ordinances of Nature, and it is in accordance with these that parents take thought beforehand for children. He that has begun by*

learning these things with his understanding rather than with his hearing, and has stamped on his soul impressions of truths so marvellous and priceless, both that God is and is from eternity, and that He that really is, is One, and that He has made the world and has made it one world, unique as Himself is unique, and that He ever exercises forethought for His creation, will a lead a life of bliss and blessedness, because He has a character molded by the truths that piety and holiness enforce"(*Opif.* 172).

There are indications in Philo's thought that there were certain Laws, which had a dominant role or encapsulated the aim and meaning of the particular laws such as for example the Decalogue. In *De Specialibus Legibus* (IV 133-135) we can read: "*Enough then of this…but we must not fail to recognise that just as each of the ten separately has some particular laws akin to it having nothing in common with any other, so there are some common to all which fit in not with a particular number such as one or two, but in a manner of speaking, with the Decalogue as a whole*". Further: "*These are the virtues of the universal value; for each of the Ten Commandments separately and all in common drill and inculcate* (See LSJ s.v. aleifw, "youths undergoing gymnastic training") *phronesis (wisdom) and dikaiosyne (justice) and theosebeia (worship of G-d) and the rest of the company of virtues-combining good thoughts and intentions with health-giving words, and words with actions of true worth-so that the soul, being well attuned in all its parts may sound the melody of life of impeccable harmony and accord. Of the queen of the virtues, eusebia and hosiotes (piety and holiness)*, (A *hendiadys*- i.e. the expression of a concept by two words connected by *and. Cf. Inter alia* Philo Dec. 119, as well as Plato *Euthyphro* 12e) *we have spoken earlier and also of phronesis and sophrosyne (wisdom and temperance). Our theme must now be that whose ways are close akin to them, that is dikaisyne (justice)"*.

Colson understood the sentence "*These* are the virtues of the universal value" (par. 134), (*ai koinwfeleis aretai*) as implying universal virtues, whereas Heinemann understood them to be equated with the Mosaic Laws. In this regard a more likely scenario is suggested by Cohen who believes that the sentence refers to both the Mosaic Laws and the universal virtues and that Philo artfully equates the "Greek virtues" and the "Mosaic virtues" (Cohen 1993: 10). In this regard the sentence "virtues of universal value" is a Hellenistic idiom.

The above statements indicate that Philo attempted to show that to live a "virtuous life" in terms of Greek thinking can be achieved by ordering one's life in accord with the precepts of the Mosaic revelation. This is pretty much in line with ancient thinking, which tended to link virtue with law and saw no contradiction between the obeying laws and leading a virtuous life. Thus in Aristotle we read In Aristotle, *Nic.Eth.* II 1,1103b1/7, and V 2,1130b23/25 (trans. Rackham, LCL, cf. Also Nic. Eth. X 9,1179b32: "*And it is difficult to obtain a right education in virtue from youth up without being brought up under right laws*"): (1103b) *Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. This truth is attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action-this is the aim of all legislation… this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad one*". (1130b) "*For the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the actions that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct displaying the various particular virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular vices*". In the ancient world philosophy, was looked upon as *"the acquisition of that knowledge which leads to the good life"*.

As Philo so other ancient sources regarded certain virtues to be the epitome of virtues or to have a prominent position. In Plato's *Rep*. IV 427ff. 433b, Prot. 361b and elsewhere the four virtues *wisdom (phronesis)*, *justice (dikaiosyne)*, *temperance (sophrosyne)* and *courage (andreia)* were considered *"the virtues" par excellence*. But Plato also sometimes included *holiness (hosiotes)* in the list of virtues (which then number five)- e.g. Prot. 330b and 349b. Aristotle also on occasions enlarges the list of the "principal virtues" (Cohen 1993: 16). Aristotle and Plato often suggested a virtue, which reigned supreme over other virtues, and equated various virtues which each other. (a) *Laws* I 631, "virtue"… was the aim of the giver of the law, …*wisdom* (*phronesis*) is chief and leader… (b) *Protagoras* 361b: all things are *knowledge* (*episteme)*, including *justice (dikaiosyne)* and *temperance (sophrosyne)* and *courage (andreia)*. At the base of Plato's philosophy was the assumption that *knowledge* or *wisdom* (the first "virtue" in Philo's list at the beginning of parag. 134) was the epitome of all the virtues (Cohen 1993: 16).

Philo regarded the three most important virtues to be *the worship of God* (*theosebeia*), *wisdom* and *justice*. Of these three Aristotle regarded

"justice" to be the epitome of "virtue itself" (see e.g. *Nic.Eth.* V 1, 1129b26-1130a10 where *inter alia* we read (And cf. Similarly, *id.id.* V 2, 1130b 6-7): (1129b31) Justice then in this sense is perfect virtue, …This is why *justice* (*dikaiosyne*) is often thought to be *the chief of virtues*… and we have the proverb-"In *justice* is all virtue found in sum", (*Theognis* 147)… (1130a7) *Justice* (*dikaisyne*) in this sense then is not a part of virtue, but *the whole of virtue*". In terms of the Platonic tradition, the eminent position among the virtues was reserved for *wisdom* (*phronesis*). Thus Philo combined the Mosaic supreme virtue with the supreme virtues of the Platonic and Aristotelian positions.

Philo wanted to show that Judaism contained all the virtues. In this regard there is a similarity between Josephus and Philo. In Josephus we read: "For he (Moses) did not make a religion a department of virtue, but the entire complement of virtues- I mean justice, temperance, fortitude and mutual harmony… departments of religion" (*Contra Ap*. II. 170- translation quoted according to H. St. John Tackeray, in the Loeb edition, except that Cohen 1993: 12 has rendered *talla* as "the entire complement of"). Using philosophical understandings of virtue and 'discovering' them in Judaism notably Moses, Philo is saying that following the Jewish God, is actually doing nothing else but worshipping according to Hellenistic philosophy.

The universal significance of the Mosaic laws is precisely brought about by allegorical interpretation. According to Philo, an interpretative tradition derives its worth to the degree that it can demonstrate how the Mosaic laws confirm with the universal law of nature. Thus an oral interpretative tradition based solely on its antiquity is not considered important by Philo (Najman 1999: 71).

This idea leaves Philo to create his own interpretation, without bothering to confirm such an interpretation by appealing to some ancient or respectable authority. He interprets on ocassion the Mosaic law on his own by using his "love of knowledge to peer into each of them (i.e. sacred messages) and unfold and reveal what is not known to the multitude" (Spec. 3.6).

What the allegorical method of interpretation clearly shows, according to Philo, is the fact that all the Greek philosophical truths and other non-Jewish truths were already expressed in the Jewish Scripture. Philo is able to claim that Hellenistic concepts are found in the Bible,

because firstly he transforms classical concepts into anonymous conceptual form and thereby is able to claim authorship for these anonymous forms where ever he likes. By observing their customs and precepts as encoded in the Bible Jews have attained non-Jewish philosophical truths. Philo writes: "For what comes to the adherents of the most esteemed philosophy, comes to the Jews through their laws and customs, namely the knowledge of the highest and most ancient Cause of all and the rejection of the deception of created gods" (*Virt*. 65. Cf. Also *Spec*. 2. 164-67).

Philo was not alone in his enterprise of ascertaining that the truth of Hellenistic philosophy is found in other religions (in his case Judaism). Evidence from Neoplatonists such as Numenius of Apamea, Chaeremon of Alexandria and Plutarch of Chaeronea shows that these individuals also embarked on a task of showing by means of the allegorical method that truths found in various oriental religions (such as the Egyptian) are similar or identical to the truth of the Neoplatonist systems of thought (Sterling 1993: 111). Philo can thus be seen as part of an ancient project of syncretism and apologetics, which was occurring in some parts of the ancient world.

In this respect Plutarch of Chaeronia who uses etymology, moral and physical allegory writes: "Since this would deprive other people who do not have a Nile or Buto or Memphis of great gods. But all have and know Isis and the gods with her: even though some only recently learned to address them by Egyptian names; they have known and honoured the power of each from the beginning (377c-d. Cf. Also 351c-e, 354b-c, 369b-d, 376a), (Sterling 1993: 107).

Moses as the primary philosopher

The subordination of philosophy to Judaism is accentuated by Philo's treatment of Moses, who is the supreme philosopher. Moses according to Philo preceded the classical authors in time and surpassed them in wisdom (see *Mos*. 1.21). Moses was the inspiration for the insights of the pre-Socratic Heraclitus (*QuGen.* 3. 5) who stole from Moses "like a thief" (*QuGen*. 4. 152).

Moses is both a philosopher and the recipient of divine revelation and knowledge. Thus Philo claims: "(Moses) had both reached the apex of philosophy and had been taught by oracles the most significant and

essential aspects of nature" (*Opif*. 8). Philosophy and revelation are in harmony, since "the cosmos is in harmony with the law and the law with the cosmos" (*Opif*. 3; cf. Also *Opif*. 143; *Mos*. 2. 48-49; *Praem*. 23; *Contempl*. 2). Moses can be characterised as the greatest of all philosophers, since he not only had the highest philosophy but also lived according to its precepts in a complete manner (*Mos*. 1. 18-29, esp. 29, 48, 66; *QE* 2. 20).

Philo confirms Moses as a true Hellenistic philosopher, since he does not argue that the knowledge which Moses attained was of a higher non-rational kind. On the contrary the knowledge acquired by Moses was very similar to the one attainable by philosophers (Runia 1988: 99). Moses encoded this higher knowledge into the Pentateuch. Philo writes: "Moses has set before us, like some well-wrought picture, a piece of work beautiful and godlike, a model (*paradeigma*) for those who are willing to copy it (*mimesthai*)… Happy are they who imprint, or strive to imprint, that image (*typos*) in their souls" (Mos. 1. 158-59). By reading the Pentateuch one impresses Moses' living law on one's soul so that the "substantial realities" represented by scriptural language become "graven, though on stone (*steliteumata*), on the heart of the wise" (*Conf*. 74).

Moses and God do not have the usual rational emotions. Moses is thus the closest of all people to God. Moses receives a mind to mind communication from God at Sinai. In this understanding Philo is indebted to the Middle Platonic tradition which saw Plutarch describe Socrates' (*On the Sign of Socrates*) sign as being based on mind to mind communication (Winston 1990: 15).

The centrality of Moses in Philo's thought may suggest that Philo was close to 'divinising' Moses. That others were capable of divinising Moses in Alexandria is confirmed by the fragment of a play called the *Exagoge* written by a certain Ezechiel, who was probably a Jew. This play is preserved in Alexander Polyhistor and Eusebius. The play is written in Iambic trimeters and deals with the Exodus of Jews from Egypt. The play makes quiet a number of interpretative additions to the Biblical text, which also could be found in Midrashic texts (some also occur in Philo's *De vita Moysis*, like for example, the reference to Moses' royal education in II. 36-8, elaborated in great detail in *Mosi*. I. 18-24), (Runia 1988: 49). In this play Moses seems to be deified by virtue of the

fact that he sits on the throne of God. This play and the role it accords to Moses shows that Philo was probably not unique in his understanding of Judaism.

In some passages Philo does call Moses God. These passages are found in *De mutatione nominum*, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (42-4) and others. In calling Moses God Philo seems to be following the tradition of Exodus 7: 1 and Exod. 20: 21. In Exodus 7: 1 we read "Behold I send you as god to pharaoh". Some scholars have argued that Moses according to Philo occupied an intermediate position between God and man (Meeks in Runia 1988: 53). Runia disagrees that Philo's references imply a divinity of Moses. Rather Moses is represented either as a philosopher-king (cf. *Mos.* 2. 2, where Philo paraphrases *Rep*. 473c-d), a (Stoic) *spudaios* (parag. 157) or a priest-prophet (Runia 1988: 55). In these roles Moses can be a *para- deigma* for his subjects (Runia 1988: 55). In the *Quod omnis probus liber sit* Philo is portrayed as on the one hand philosopher-ruler and *kosmopolitis*, and on the other as priest-prophet (Runia 1988: 60). In the former capacity he receives a portion of the cosmos and the latter a portion of the God (Runia 1988: 60). Here there is an implication that Moses is somehow 'higher' than a priest or ruler, since he combines both offices. Certainly Philo would have none of the Stoic apotheosis of the sage.

While in *De mutatione nominum* Moses is given the same title as God, this does not mean that he is been deified. God has no proper name as a transcendent Being (*kyrion onoma*), which can tell us some- thing about his essence. Names describing people such as Moses are personal and proper names (*idia ke kyria onomata*) which do tell us something about his nature (Runia 1988: 60).

Philo and the rabbinical tradition

An important issue in assessing Philo is his relation to Judaism in Palestine and Judaism generally. If one was able to establish links between Philo and Judaism in Palestine one can postulate that Philo perhaps adopted aspects of rabbinical exegesis. The issue is complicated by the fact that we do not have a totally clear picture of what was the development in Palestine in regards to Judaism.

One important issue in determining whether Philo was in dialogue with the rabbinical tradition is the issue of his knowledge of Hebrew. If he knew Hebrew the chances of his contact with the other Jewish

traditions would seem to increase, and if on the other hand he did not know Hebrew, the chances of him being in dialogue with other Judaism's seems to decrease. There is disagreement amongst scholars on whether Philo knew Hebrew or not and therefore one cannot make a conclusion on this issue.

An interesting issue related to Philo's knowledge of Hebrew centres around Philo's use of the Tetragrammaton. This issue further illustrates Philo's "hellenisation" of the Judaic tradition. In Philo's works the Tetragrammaton is always rendered as kyrios. This fact has suggested to some that Philo did not read Hebrew and almost exclusively relied on translations of the Hebrew text namely the Septuagint.

In the printed editions of the Septuagint it is stated that the Septuagint generally renders the Tetragrammaton, as kurios and as theos (elohim). However this view has come under attack, since new documents reveal that it was not always the practice of Jews to render the tetragrammaton in Greek manuscripts with the words kurios.

Skehan has reconstructed four stages of the representation of the Tetragrammaton in Greek manuscripts. "*Firstly the representation as Iaw (Greek letters), found in 4QLXXLevb. This rendering probably reflects the Aramaic form wawhejod (presumably to be read as "Yaho") as found in the fifth century B.C.E. Aramaic papyroi from Elephantine; the Greek is attested in Diodorus Siculus, and there are traces of it in early Christian writers. Secondly, there was the writing of the Tetragrammaton in Aramaic Script, as in P.Fouad inv. 266. Thirdly, there was the writing in palaeo-Hebrew script, as in the Minor Prophets Scroll. And finally, there was kurios, which emerges in the Christian copies of the LXX, and is perhaps only Christian usage*" (Skehan 1980: 28-34).

It is possible that Christians who were the main transmitters of Philo's works could have changed an original written Tetragrammaton with the word kyrios. There are indeed occassions were certain Christian interpolations are discernable. Thus in the inferior manuscripts GFHP of Somn. 1.219 we read: ὁ μέν δή μέγας ἀρχιερεύς τής ὁμολογίας, while the MA preserve simply ὁ μέν δή μέγας ἀρχιερεύς. This suggests that a scribe of an ancestor GFHP was tempted by the similarities between Philo and Hebrews to expand Philo on the basis of Heb. 3: 1. However, while these instances ocurr, it seems unreasonable both from the practical and theoretical side to believe that Christians

substituted all the vast references to the Tetragrammaton in Philo with kurios and theos and Philo himself must have referred to kurios and theos in his writings since he refers to the etymologies of kurios and theos (Royse 1991:174).

Philo's text however further confirms the fact that Philo is using the terms κύριος and θεός. For instance, we find κύριος μέν γάρ παρά τό κυρος at *Her*. 23 and similar remarks relating κύριος and κυρος at *Somn*. 2.29, *Ios*. 28, *Spec*. 1.30, and *QE* 2.62 (Royse 1991:174). These comments would not make sense if Philo used the Tetragrammaton.

Origen says explicitly that when a Jew read the written Tetragrammaton, he pronounced κύριος (Selecta in Psalmos 2: 2, PG 12.1104B4-9). This fact is to an extent confirmed by the Hebrew *ketib-qere* distinction. Thus the *qere perpetuum* of the Tetragrammaton as "*Adonai*" shows us that one can see certain letters yet pronounce other letters (Royse 1991:177). This suggests that Philo could have automatically read kyrios when he saw the Tetragrammaton, which would further confirm that Philo did not hesitate to use kyrios as such in his commentaries on Scripture (Royse 1991: 178).

It is clear that Philo used accents in his texts as is suggested by the phrase βαρυτονουμένου του πού εἰ), (*Leg*. 3.51), but this was not always the case with Philo. In some instances he does not use accents, since they were probably lacking in the manuscripts even though they were pronouced. In order to make his pronouciation obvious in an unaccented text Philo needed to write βαρυτονουμένου (Royse 1991:178). Another example is *Det*. 47, where Philo would want to read the reflexive in Gen. 4: 8 (αύτόν for αύτόν- change of accent on the u) he could at least write εαυτον in order to make clear that the αυτον which he doubtless saw in his Biblical text was to be pronounced αύτόν (Royse 1991:178).

Philo's statements in *Mos*. 2. 114 and 2. 132 would suggest that Philo saw the Tetragrammaton untranslated in his palaeo-Hebrew or Aramaic text. While this evidence is insufficient to prove that Philo read the Hebrew Bible in the original, Philo continues the Hellenisation of the Hebrew Bible, since he uses the term *kyrios* in both commentaries and his Biblical texts instead of the Tetragrammaton. Philo would thus seem to be the earliest evidence for this written form (Royse 1991:178).

There is disagreement also amongst scholars on the issue of whether Philo was acquainted with Palestinian halacha or not. Of course again the issue is complicated by the paucity of our knowledge in regards to the development of the halacha in the period of Philo. Thus we are not sure for example whether systems and issues as developed in the Mishnah were already circulating in Philo's period and whether they somehow resembled anything to that found in the Mishnah, which of course was composed much later. Jacob Neusner would lead us to believe that certain pharisaic traditions which were found later were already well in circulation in Palestine during Philo's period. Importantly, these traditions have much in common (at least in regards to structure) with the later traditions (see Neusner's 'Judaism the evidence of the Mishnah'). The codified rabbinical writings from later periods are called oral law and this was possibly the way that they circulated in Philo's period.

Philo certainly refers to such a thing as unwritten law (*agrafos nomos*) in his writings. But the interpretation of what he meant by 'unwritten law' has been subject to debate. Notably did it refer to Greek or Jewish unwritten law?

Cohen has argued that Philo's reference to *agrafos nomos* in *de Spec. Leg*. IV 148-49 refers to Jewish oral law (Cohen 1987: 165). This has been disputed by Martens who argues that Philo is not referring to the *halakah*, but to custom (Martens 1992:43).

The concept of unwritten law was a widespread one in the Greek world. A number of Greek authors refer to unwritten law. Unwritten law in the Greek world could refer to a number of issues including custom, laws not written in a code of law and divine law. For example, Plato discusses unwritten laws as custom in *Laws* 793a-793d. Aristotle had a section on unwritten law as custom. In *Rhetoric* 1374a, 18f Aristotle groups *agrofos nomos* under *idios nomos*. Thus the unwritten law is part of the written city law (Martens 1992: 41).

In *Quis Rer. Div. Her*. 295 Philo similarly refers to unwritten law as custom, when he states that the city law (*nomos idios*) contains written and unwritten law, which is a similar distinction as to that which was worked out by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 137a, 181 (cf. 1368b, 8; 1373b, 1-7) in Martens 1992: 42).

Philo does refer to unwritten law as *Jewish* custom in *Hypothetica* 7, 6, and *Leg. Ad Gai*. 115, where he speaks of *agrafa ethi*, (Martens 1992: 44). Martens however doubts whether this is an inference to the Halakah, but instead could easily refer to the customs of the Alexandrian community (*Leg. Ad Gai.* 115) and the Essenes (*Hypothetica* 7,6), (Martens 1992: 45). Philo also refers to unwritten law as eternal law in *de Abr.* 5, 16, 276; *de Decalogo* 1; *de Virt.* 194, (Martens 1992: 45).

In any event, the rabbis used similar modes of interpretation to Philo. As Philo so the rabbi's interpreted a passage in Scripture by reference to something else. The rabbis did not however, use extended philosophical allegorising as Philo does. An important feature of rabbinical exegesis, which is not found to such an extent in Philo, is that the text and its interpretation is largely Scripture based both in meaning and wording (Williamson 1989: 148). Further, in rabbinical exegesis the Laws are an end in themselves, whereas in Philo they point to something beyond (Sandmel 1979: 83). Rabbinical Judaism is not concerned with a mystical union with the Godhead as Philo is (Sandmel 1979: 83).

Scholars have suggested that a possible parallel between Philo and the rabbis consists of the thesis that all Biblical laws are contained inside the Decalogue. In *On the Decalogue* Philo enumerates and discusses the Ten Commandments. In the work *On the Special Laws* he discusses special laws which he classifies under the Ten Commandments. H. A. Wolfson has argued that the thesis that the Ten Commandments contain all the laws of the Torah is found in rabbinical literature. He based his view on *Cant. Rab.* 5. 14, 2, where it is said that the 613 commandments are implied in the Decalogue (Wolfson 1948: 201). E. Urbach argued against Wolfson's interpretation of *Cant*. *Rab*. 5. 14, 2 stating that the rabbinical passage does not suggest that the Decalogue incorporated the 613 Torah commandments. Urbach writes: "it is not asserted that the Ten Commandments incorporated all precepts in the Torah, only that each commandment forms the basis of interpretations… all the Halakha originated in the Oral Law was, as it were, written beside each commandment" (Urbach 1975: 361).

R. D. Hecht has pointed out that Urbach did not take into account the Targums, especially *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan*, Exod. 24: 12 which states: "And the Lord said to Moses, come up before me to the mountain and be there and I will give you the tablets of stone upon

which are hinted the rest of the law and the six hundred and thirteen commandments which I have written for their instruction" (Hecht 1978: 3-17).

Following the argument one may conclude that Philo develops a notion found in Judaism of Palestine that the Decalogue does contain at least partially the commandments of the Mosaic Laws. But it is also possible to argue that this conclusion would seem logical to any Jew acquainted with the Pentateuch.

Of course, Philo shares with the rabbis the notion that not all laws can be interpreted literally. For example both the rabbis and Philo realised that the passage in Deut. 17: 16 does not make sense in its literal meaning. The passage deals with the law about a king who "shall not multiply horses to himself". Philo comments that this passage is unreasonable since it is in the interest of the king to multiply his horses especially in times of war (*Agr*. 18. 85). So Philo gives an allegorical interpretation. The rabbis similarly realise that the literal meaning is unreasonable and interpreted the passage as referring not the horses of the army, but only to the king's personal horses in his stables (*Sifre Deut*. 158 (on 17: 16), F, p. 105b; HF, p. 209; *Sanhedrin* 21b; *M. Sanhedrin* II, 4). The rabbi's arrived at this interpretation on the basis of the words "to himself".

Another feature which is found in both rabbinical exegesis (both midrash and talmudic exegesis) and Philo is the concern for anthro-pomorphism in speaking about God. In regards to an anthropomorphic description of God in Ezek. 1: 26, a rabbi states (*Genesis Rabbah 27: 1*): "Great is the boldness of the prophets who describe God by the likeness of the creature". The tractate Berakoth has a general rule for anthropomorphism: "The Torah speaks according to the language of man" (*Berakoth* 31b). Philo as will be seen later, realises like the rabbi's that anthropomorphic language is used as an instrument for human understanding. The rabbis, as Philo, conclude that anthropomorphism is a pedagogical device of the Scripture. Thus "we describe god by terms borrowed from his creations in order to cause them to sink into the ear" (*Berakoth* 31b).

There could be some connections between the rabbinical tradition of gematria (interpretation of numbers) and Philo's gematria. Both the rabbinical tradition and Philo agree that there is something magical

about numbers, but they differ in their processes of inference (Sandmel 1979: 23).

In any comparisons with the rabbinical tradition we have to keep in mind the fact, that what Philo set about doing was not similar to what the rabbi's would have set about doing. Philo set about on a task of incorporation of foreign elements into his interpretation, whereas, the rabbis set about interpreting on the basis of logical deduction, which closely based itself on Scripture. Wolfson argues that Philo's interpretation if not during his lifetime than certainly later converged with rabbinical interpretation. It is possible that even if Philo did not use the Greek allegorical method, his works would nevertheless betray a philosophical character (Wolfson 1948: 138). Wolfson argues that later when Palestinian Judaism came in contact with Greek philosophy, they also took over many of its features in their allegorical method (Wolfson 1948: 138). And this later development has similarities with Philo.

It is difficult to ascertain whether Philo would concur with the rabbis in that by studying the Torah, one may gain God's gifts (Grabbe 1991:156).

Writers such as Nikiprowetzky and Borgen believe that Philo's exegesis in his Commentaries is similar to that practised in the Synagogue (Borgen 1997: 37). This argument has been generally accepted and it would probably provide a fruitful parallel point between Palestinian exegesis and Alexandrian exegesis, since in both traditions the synagogue and its rituals must have been similar.

The project of interpreting Scripture and discovering hidden meanings was not limited to Philo. This is especially so in the case of Jewish mysticism. While there often seems to have been opposition to mystical notions in the rabbinic tradition this is not always the case and some of the great rabbis were mystics. The kabbalist Jacob b. Sheshet insists that "it is a mizvah for every sage to innovate in the Torah according to his capacity" and he concludes his teaching on the Tetragrammaton with the comment: "Do not think this is far-fetched. If I had not invented it in my mind, I would say it was transmitted to Moses at Sinai" (in Winston 1993: 142). Libermann comments on a passage of Merkabah Shelemah (Lieberman 1974: 13) "He who does not know how to make new deductions (*kainotomesai*) will die, and he who knows how to make new deductions will be summoned at the end

of the days to the world to come, and in the words of BT Baba Metzia 86a: Rabbah b. Nahmani was summoned to the celestial academy, i.e. in order to decide the controversy in matters of leprosy". In the works Song Rabbah 1.11 and Pesiktah Rabbati, piska 14.9, states that Solomon had three hundred parables to illustrate each verse of Scripture, and one thousand and five interpretations for each parable, computing to a total of three million fifteen thousand interpretations for every scriptural verse.

Kabbalistic midrash is even less constricted. R. Eleazar of Worms, for example, in his Sefer ha-Hokhma (1217) interprets Genesis in numerous ways and he mentions the 73 "gates of wisdom" which are 73 ways of midrashic interpretation. "The nature of the midrashic form facilitated the acceptance and integration of the Kabbalah in Jewish culture" (Dan in Winston 1993: 144).

The rabbinical tradition certainly devised sophisticated rules in interpretation. Thus Hillel devised seven hermeneutic rules in interpretation. (1) *Kal wa-homer*: inference *a minore ad maius*; (2) *Gezerah shawa*: influence by analogy; (3) *Binyan ab*: reconstruction of a family based on a passage; (4) *Binyan ab mish shene kethubim*: reconstruction of a family based on two passages; (5) *Kelal u-feret u-feret u-kelal*: the general and the specific viceversa (6) *Keyose bo bemakom "aher*: explanation by means of another similar case; (7) *Dabar ha-lamed me'inyamo*: deduction through the context (Hamerton-Kelly 1976: 49-50). While the traditions surrounding Hillel were codified at a much later date than Philo's period, it is reasonable to assume that these traditions could have gained momentum in Philo's life.

Philo and the Mishnah

It is possible to compare the Mishnah and Philo. However, obviously, this kind of enterprise is difficult in many respects not least because the Mishnah dates to a much later period than Philo and as was suggested we are not certain as to what kind of form if any did the Mishnah have in Philo's period. Any comparisons between Philo and the Mishnah must take into account the specific structure and nature of the Mishnah. The Mishnah is a work of interpretation. Its focus is not to derive a theological system or theological answers. However, com-

paring the Mishnah with Philo is fruitful since even if there are problems, it does enable us to clarify and understand Philo's exegesis.

The Mishnah arrives at its interpretation by using a philosophical method already found in Aristotle and which attempts to explain things be reference to their place in the natural and accessible world.

Similarly to Philo, the Mishnah's starting is the Pentateuch. The Mishnah believes that all creatures and things are related to each other and therefore can be grouped according to the particular relationships they have amongst themselves. The principle of the Mishnah believes that the many form one thing and that the one yields the many (*Keritot* 1: 1, 2, 7, 3: 2, 4), (Neusner 1991;197). "The species point to the genus, all classes to one class, all taxa properly hierarchised then rise to the top of the structure and the system forming one taxon" (Neusner 1991:197). All things point to God. The message of the Mishnah is compatible with the Neoplatonic belief of unity of all being and its hierarchical nature (Neusner 1991:198). This Neoplatonic belief is set about by an Aristotelian method (Neusner 1991:199). Philo's understanding of God's role would possibly be compatible with the Mishnah's concept. However, Philo of course does not proceed in his interpretation by means of categories and categorisation.

Philo's methodological structure seems to be different from that of the Mishnah's. To use a generalisation the Mishnah's interpretation is literal. Here literal means that the Mishnah's interpretative manner focuses on the concrete natural qualities of things and not on hidden features or deeper meanings. In this context Neusner writes: "The Mishnah's philosophers compose their taxonomy by appeal to the indicative traits of things, rather than to extrinsic considerations of imposed classification, e.g. by reference to Scripture", (Neusner 1991: 202). "The philosophers whose system is set forth in the Mishnah appeal to the traits of things, deriving their genera from the comparison and contrast of those inherent or intrinsic traits" (Neusner 1991: 202).

The Mishnah's authors starting point is the revealed truth. Then they proceed to classify this revealed truth according to the characteristics of things and natures of things. One similar aspect in this enterprise with Philo, is that on occasions Philo also attempts to explain Scripture, by referring to other passages in Scripture or classifying the

passage according to the system of Scripture, but this is not always the case in Philo.

Philo and the Midrash

If one is to use G. Porton's definition of a midrash, then one would argue that Philo is a hellenising midrashist. G. Porton writes: "In brief I would define *midrash* as a type of literature, oral or written, which stands in a direct relationship to a fixed, canonical text, considered to be the authoritative and the revealed word of God by the midrashist and his audience, and in which the canonical text is explicitly cited or clearly alluded to" (Porton in Runia 1987: 117).

There are a number of types of midrash including *targums* which are Aramaic translations or paraphrases to rabbinical midrash. Stein distinguished between two types of haggadah, on the one hand the haggadah which interpreted by allegorising and the haggadah which embelished by 'historisising' (Stein in Mack 1984: 237). Stein further believed that the Palestinian historisising haggadah tradition was the basis for the later allegorical haggadah characteristic of Hellenistic Judaism (Stein in Mack 1984: 237). Philo's writings contain both the 'allegorical' and the 'historisising' forms of interpretation as can for example be seen in the treatise 'De Abrahamo' (*ibid*.).

Interestingly, haggadic elements do appear in other Jewish Hellenistic authors (Sandmel 1979: 133). One must also give due attention to the fact that a lot of haggadah originated outside of Palestine. Apart from the Ps. Aristeas and the LXX, we have the works of Artapanus, Demetrius (Grabbe 1991: 162).

Some scholars have postulated numerous similarities between Philo and the midrash tradition both in Palestine and elsewhere. N. G. Cohen believes that Philo's works are part of the mainstream Jewish midrashic tradition (Cohen 1995: 8-10). Borgen argued that both Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism shared an oral haggadic tradition about the manna (Borgen in Mack 1984: 238). Hamerton-kelly showed how Jewish and hellenistic elements combined in the treatise *De agricultura*. The Hellenistic element is found in the *diaresis*, whereas the Jewish aspect is represented by the midrash. In case of the midrash the technique of *gezerah shawai* (inference by analogy) was used. The *gezerah*

shawa is of course one of the exegetical principles of Hillel (Hamerton-Kelly in Runia 1987: 108).

Others are sceptical of the possible relationship between Philo and the haggadic traditions. Certainly an important issue in comparing Philo with midrashic traditions is methodology. A number of scholars developed various guiding principles in any comparison with Philo and the haggadah (Bamberger, Grabbe and others). Grabbe points out that one must be careful in ascribing haggadic elements in Philo by basing himself on parallels. For example while it is true that the number seven occurs in Philo and in the *Midrash Tadshe*, there is no reason to create a link, since arithmology was a popular feature in the ancient world (Grabbe 1991: 153). Further, Grabbe points out, that a lot of interpretative results of Philo, can be arrived at independently by other Jewish traditions, since there was probably no other interpretation possible in a given text. Any comparisons that are made are hampered by our little knowledge of the development of haggadah.

Sandmel argues, that while some motifs between Philo and the haggadah do overlap, Philo's haggada never takes the form of anecdotal narratives (Sandmel 1979: 133). Further, one can argue that the central emphasis of haggadah is to comment on small units of Scripture and these commentaries are considered a whole in themselves, whereas in Philo the commentaries are related to a central ideal or theme, which does not find its fulfilment in a small unit such as a sentence (Sandmel 1979: 133).

One such overlap between Philo and the rabbis is for example their portrayal of Ur as a centre of astrology and idolatry (Sandmel 1979: 133). However, the motif which saw Abraham in the idol shop of his father is lacking in Philo (Sandmel 1979: 133). Another feature missing in Philo is the rabbinical narrative anecdotes (Sandmel 1979: 133).

There are a number of exegetical features shared by Philo and the haggadah. These include the use of secondary texts, interpretation of a main Biblical lemma and verbal parallels. This is illustrated by the following two examples of midrashic exegesis.

In the first chapter of the tractate *Pisha*, of the *Mikilta* of Rabbi Ishmael an exegesis of Ex. 12: 1 is given. Here we have a citation of a Biblical verse or lemma followed by an explanation. This is followed by an objection (similar to the exegetical *aporia* used by Philo), (Runia

1987: 118). The objection takes into account other Biblical texts and their possible relation to the text is explained. The response then is also given by means of Bible texts (Runia 1987: 118). The tractate does not invoke many secondary texts and Philo's protreptic themes are lacking (Runia 1987: 118).

In the midrash *Genesis Rabbah* a similar procedure is followed as in the previous midrash, but there are some differences. Here the chapters xxvii and xxix comment on the same passage in Scripture as Philo does in *Gig. Deus.* Here the main Biblical lemma is quoted and subsequently another Biblical text is quoted which on first glance has nothing to do with the main text (Runia 1987: 119). However, later on the connection is made and an important feature is the use of verbal parallels, which is an important Philonic feature (cf. Xxvii parag. 1-2), (Runia 1987: 119). However, the interpretation leads Philo and the rabbis' into separate directions. Philo understands Noah's found grace in terms of metaphysics (*Deus* 107f.). The rabbis' on the other hand make the grace into a concrete event (parag. 4 *ad fin.*), (Runia 1987: 119).

Philo and a pre-Philonic wisdom allegory

Mack argues that there could have been a Jewish Hellenistic pre-Philonic tradition of reading the Mosaic books through wisdom allegory. The Mosaic Books then became a story of wisdom searching for Israel and Israel searching for Wisdom and the figures in the Scripture became identified as types (Mack 1991: 27).

This early tradition of wisdom allegory seems to be confirmed by works such as the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach, the Wisdom of Solomon and exegetical works by Aritobulus (Mack 1991: 27). This early focus on Wisdom could have subsequently gave way to various other interpretative possibilities and specialised substitutes of Wisdom (such as *logos, epistemi, fysis, pnevma, psyche*), (Mack 1991: 27). Mack identifies some remnants from an early focus on the figure of wisdom still current. These include wisdom identifications for women, rivers, paths, signs, births and so on (Mack 1991: 27).

Moses in this scheme can be understood as himself integrating Wisdom. To delineate the relationship between Moses and Wisdom, the Alexandrian exegetes introduced another concept as a counterpart to Wisdom in the form of the Logos (Mack 1991: 28). This designated

Wisdom's presence in the world. The wisdom motifs which enhanced Moses' status are the ascent vision, exaltation and holy marriage (Mack 1991: 28). Moses' prophetic capacities lay in the ascent vision. The exaltation posited him as the ruler of the world and the holy marriage signified his high priesthood (Mack 1991: 28).

Other devices in Philo according to Mack can be traced to Jewish Wisdom *mythologoumena*. Mack writes: "His picturesque manner of imagining creation as a 'generation', his assumption of the tension between the hidden and the revealed when treating manifest phenomena as symbols, his view of the quests for knowledge as dialectical (to end both in finding and in being found) and his description of all transformations as disclosures of the inversionary relation between life and knowledge- all can be traced to Jewish wisdom mythologoumena" (Mack 1991: 26).

Mack's argument for a pre-Philonic wisdom tradition is possible, however, it remains to be established to what extent this is indicative of Jewish practices, since the works that usually carry this motif are heavily influenced by Hellenistic thought. Further, while the wisdom allegory could have been a pre-Philonic feature in Jewish exegesis this does not mean that it was the principal one. Any such analysis must also take into account the fact that the term 'wisdom' is notorious and has a great deal of various meanings and functions in the ancient world.

Jewish apocalyptic thought

An apocalyptic tendency can be detected in Philo's *On Rewards and Punishments*. Philo commenting on Moses' sermon in Deuteronomy 28 introduces statements of an apocalyptic character. Philo writes: "Wicked will be punished", "Crops will be destroyed", "Rain will be withheld and "Dust from earth and from heaven will choke and destroy whole cities (*Praem*. 133). However, this state will be reversed and after the destruction "the land so long roughly handled in the grip of intolerable violence shown by the inhabitants will begin to take breath and raise its head" (*Praem*. 153). Some scholars such as Borgen believe that Philo is referring to a Messiah when in *Praem*. 95 he refers to a man who "shall come forth… leading his host to war". Mack observes that in light of *Mos*. 2. 263-299, Philo is not referring to a Messiah but speaks of a single figure in terms of Israel as a whole (Mack 1991: 33). In other words in

terms of idealism, the one and the many are interchangeable in Philo (Mack 1991: 35). However, given the overall evidence of Philo, especially concerning Moses, one would argue that Philo was prone to accenting individual salvific figures.

Mack believes that Philo's apocalyptic nuances are different from those which could have circulated in Philo's time. This is supported by a number of typical features of apocalyptic literature which are missing in Philo and his apocalyptic tendency as seen in *Praem*. 163-172. Thus, we do not have an independent treatise dealing with apocalyptic features in Philo, typical motifs of condemnation and vindication which are found in much apocalyptic literature are missing and an interest in the temple as the centre for these events is also missing (Mack 1991: 37).

Philo and Gnosticism

As is well known, gnostics were those who "knew" the way to God through personal illumination. Gnostics were strictly opposed to everything material. The Gnostics scorned the material, since they could see that it is manifestly evil. The creation of the world was attributed to the Demiurge and not to God. Philo has some affinities with Gnosticism in so far as he views sceptically this material world as something lower than the intelligible world and the soul as something superior to the body. Recent research has shown that Gnosticism was a pre-Christian movement, which came from the Orient as a competitor of Christianity. While there are various traditions in Gnosticism it possible to arrive at a basic framework of the Gnostic myth. According to this myth there is a divine, unknowable first principle, which through the contemplation of its own self generates a second principle. This second principle in turn produces other emanations (*aeons*), including four "luminaries" (containing the heavenly prototypes of Adam, Seth, the "seed of Seth," and another group that goes under various names). The last of the aeons to be produced is Sophia, who finds herself in conflict with the first principle, since she seeks to gain knowledge of the First Prinicple in an inappropriate way. Her punishment is that she is cast out of the Divine realm. Sophia produces a rather malevolent offspring, which is called the Demiurge, who is often called Ialdabaoth. Ialdabaoth produces other offspring, who together with Ialdabaoth seek to gain the divine power located in his mother Sophia. In order to gain the Divine power

in Sophia, Ialdabaoth and his other offspring produce the material world together with the human race. Sophia seeks to gain the lost divine power, which has now been dispersed in the human race. The human race in turn awaits a divine Saviour, who will come and give them knowledge about their true origin and show the way how to return to the divine home. This divine Saviour is often identified as Jesus Christ.

The Gnostics expanded on theological notions developed in Plato's thought, which centre around the archetype, model concept and expaned on Plato's ideas regarding the creation. It is obvious that Plato struggled with his theology of the creation and left many questions, which created many questions in later thought. In Gnostic thought the Demiurge is turned into a more evil principel than is the case in Plato. To an extent Gnostic thought saw a greater inadequacy between the copy and the original than Plato did. The defficiency between copy and original can only be bridged by the Divine power itself, represented by a kind of divine concept of Adam.

In any discussion of Gnosticism it is necessary to realise the problem of definition, since Gnosticism usually subsumes a diverse number of religious, philosophical, theological concepts under its heading. At a conference held in Messina Italy, it was proposed that the term *gnosis* should designate pre-Christian stage of this movement, while gnosticism, should be reserved for the second century phenomena (published in *Le Origine dello Gnosticismo* Leiden, 1967). Hans Jonas would not classify as gnostic "a Gnosticism without a fallen god, without benighted creator and sinister creation, without alien soul, cosmic captivity and acosmic salvation, without the self-redeeming of the Deity-in short: a Gnosis without divine tragedy will not meet specifications" (Jonas in Sandmel 1979: 137).

In terms of the relationship between Philo and Gnosticism Pearson writes: "Philo has been understood by some scholars as a Gnostic, indeed as the first Gnostic, or at least heavily influenced by Gnosticism. Alternatively, he has been taken as representing a stage in the development of Gnosticism, or even as a formative factor in certain mythic-philosophical systems of second-century Gnosticism. In general, more recent scholarship has tended toward the latter alternative, preferring to view Philo as representing a kind of "pre-Gnostic" pattern of religious thought rather than a full-blown Gnosticism" (Pearson 1984:

295). "If by "Gnosticism" we mean the classic systems of the second century Christian Gnostics, then Philo is definitely not a Gnostic. If however we widen the definition, and speak of Gnosis, then there is a sense in which he could be called Gnostic" (McL. Wilson 1993: 92). The important writer on Gnosticism Hans Jonas placed Philo within the context of Gnosticism.

As suggested by Simon, if there are any "Gnostic affinities" in Philo these lie more in the field of anthropology than cosmology. Thus man is mortal in respect of his body, immortal in respect of his mind (*Opif*. 135), every man is allied to divine reason in respect of his mind, but in the structure of his body is allied to the world (*Decal*. 134, *Det*. 83f). The affinities are even closer when we turn to what Philo says about the body: the natural gravitation of the body pulls down with it those of liffle mind, strangling and overwhelming them with the multitude of the fleshly elements (*Spec*. 4.114). The body is wicked and a plotter against the soul (*Leg*. 3.69), of itself a corpse and a dead thing (cf. Gig. 15), a composition of clay, a molded statue, carried as a corpse from birth to death (*Agr*. 25, cf. *Leg*. 3.69, *Migr*. 21), a dwelling place of endless calamities (*Conf*. 177), a foul prison-house (*Migr*. 9). Mind is in the body as a prison (*Ebr*. 101). The business of wisdom is to become estranged from the body and its cravings (*Leg*. 1.103f). Thus Philo's contrast between man and God reflects the basic Gnostic dualism. Jonas believes that Gnostic elements in Philo are characterized by Philo's use of the term ἀρετή "virtue". This is suggested by Philo's understanding which is implied in certain passages that the soul has no goodness of its own and that virtue comes from above a concept, which departs from the Stoic-Platonic concept of virtue and seems to be a reflection of Gnostic and Jewish motifs (Jonas 1954: 38). However Jonas' view has been criticised and it seems that Jonas had wrongly interpreted some of Philo's passages.

Simon notes: "that the limits of the Philonic "Gnosticism" are set by the recurring refrain in the biblical Creation story "and God saw that it was good" (see *Opif*. 21, *Leg*. 3.78, *Spec*. 1.96, cf. *Ebr*. 30, *Migr*. 220), (Simon in McL. Wilson 1993: 90). Philo can refer to the cosmos as son of God (*Spec*. 1.96, cf. *Ebr*. 30, *Migr*. 220).

Philo has a different understanding of the concept of the Demiurge than is prevalent in Gnostic thought. In Philo the lesser demiourgoi are

angels or agents of the supreme Gods, who stand in the middle between God and lesser beings. Thus these demiourgoi are a concept protecting God from concepts of evil. The Gnostic Demiurge is a force that stands against the supreme God, who wants to usurp supreme rule.

An important writer who used the allegorical method of interpretation was Valentinus, who was born around 100 C.E. in Phrebonis, a coastal town in the Egyptian Delta. Later Valentinus moved to Rome. While this writer lived after the period of Philo, it is important to mention him in this context, since we can see how the allegorical project developed by Philo was further expanded by Gnostic writers such as Valentinus. Valentinus taught in Alexandria at the same time as the Christian philosopher Basilides. A homily called the *Gospel of Truth* remains from Valentinus as well as a few fragments. Valentinus applied the allegorical method of interpretation to a number of texts, which included various Christian texts, and Gnostic texts as well as other religious writings.

Dawson insightfully writes about Valentinus' allegorical project: "Not only is Valentinus different from Philo and Clement because he erases the line between text and commentary, as interpretation becomes new composition; his mode of allegorical interpretation is also distinctive because it is authorized by his claim for personal authority" (Dawson 1992: 128). It is important to note that Philo never doubts the authority of Scripture and never blurs the line between his commentary and Scripture. However, there was an a tradition of allegorical exegesis which interpreted texts in such a way that these interpretations became themselves new compostions or authoritative texts.

The New Testament in a certain sense can be understood as the interpretation of the Old Testament, which results in the creation of a new composition, which forms the New Testament. As shown by Dawson this can be shown on the following examples. Thus the words of Genesis state: "In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. But the earth was invisible and unfurnished, and darkness was over the deep, and the Spirit of God moved over the water. And God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good; and God divided between the light and darkness. And God called the light "day", and the darkness he called "night". And there was evening and there was morning, the first day (Gen. 1.1-5, LXX).

Using allegorical interpretation, Philo interprets the above text as referring to the creation of the intelligible universe and not the material universe as such. Philo writes: "First, then, the maker made an incorporeal heaven, and an invisible earth, and the essential form (*idea*) of air and void. To the one he gave the name of "darkness", since the air when left to itself, is black. The other he named "deep", for the void is a region of immensity and vast depths. Next (he made) the incorporeal essence of water and of life-breath (i.e. *pneuma* or "spirit") and, to crown all, of light. This again, the seventh in order, was an incorporeal pattern (*paradeigma*), discernible only by the mind, of the sun and all luminaries which were to come into existence throughout heaven. (*Op*. 29).

The Christian writer goes a step further than Philo, interpreting the Genesis text, as only a part of a new and comprehensive story linked to Jesus Christ. We read in John's Gospel: "In the beginning was the Word (*logos*), and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of human beings. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. He came for testimony, to bear witness to the light, that all might believe through him. He was not the light, but came to bear witness to the light. The true light that enlightens every person was coming into the world (John 1.1-9).

Valentinus' interpretation of Gnostic myths results in a new theology or concept. Here we can see what was implied above, in that in Valentinus interpretation gains a certain degree of independance and an existence of its own. In the work the *Reality of the Rulers* Valentinus re-interprets the Genesis account to argue that the fruit of the tree of knowledge, which was eaten by Adam and Eve resulted in the fact that Adam and Eve realized the defficience of their own knowledge. Valentinus writes: "*And the carnal woman took from the tree and ate; and she gave to her husband as well as herself; and these merely animate beings ate. And their imperfection was shown forth in their lack of acquaintance; and they knew that they were naked of the spiritual element, and took fig leaves and bound them upon their loins* (RR 90.13ff). In the Gospel of Truth Valentinus continues his interpretation with the following words: "*It is to the perfect that this, the proclamation of the one they search for, has made*

itself known, through the mercies of the father. By this the hidden mystery of Jesus Christ shed light upon those who were, because of forgetfulness, in darkness. He enlightened them and gave them a way, and the way is the truth, about which he instructed them. For this reason error became angry at him and persecuted him. She was constrained by him, and became inactive. He was nailed to a tree and became fruit of the father's acquaintance. Yet it did not cause ruin because it was eaten. Rather, to those who ate of it, it gave the possibility that whoever he discovered within himself might be joyful in the discovery of him. And as for him, they discovered him within them-the inconceivable uncontained, the father, who is perfect, who created the eternity. (GTr 18.11-34). Thus Jesus according to this interpretation repairs the state of things, and offers true knowlegde to the human race.

As pointed out by Dawson an interesting feature of Valentinus' interpretative work is that fact that interpretation does not occur on a linear plain. Thus for example when Philo interprets the events of the Bible, who does so more on a linear plain, that is by commenting in a kind of chronological succession the events recorded in the Bible. In this line of thought today's events or the events in Philo's time are a part of a certain progression. In contrast to this linear kind of interpretation, Valentinus does not really have a pronounced concept of time and his interpretation has a certain circular value transcending time and events do not occur in a linear sequence of time but are in a sense happening all at once, where one ceaeses to record a sequential nature of the history of salvation (Dawson 1992: 149).

It is possible to argue that in Valentinus language gains a more positve role than in Philo. In Philo language is just a kind of imperfect medium, which is utilized in order to point to some deeper reality, which itself can never be fully grasped or correspond to the language which it is represented by. However, in Valentinus langauage gains a more greater role in its capacity to designate the truth. This is seen for example in Valentinus' treatment of the role of the name. Thus the name Jesus Christ or Son is not just a kind of pedagogical device enabling us to partly understand the divine entity or person of Jesus, but the name Jesus itself has the power or fully corresponds to what it signifies. The result of this kind of thought is obvious. It is possible that one reason why the allegorical method of interpretation was not so popular in later Christian circles, is that Christian theology moved to a concept which

gave langague and its capacity to designate divine realities a greater role. It is as if the reality of the Divine Jesus having a human hypostasis contributed to a greater positive role accorded to human expressions including language. In other words why interpret or seek secrets if the reality of God abided amongst us in our own natural constitution.

Philo and Christian Thought

Introduction

While there is no evidence that Philo was in any active contact with Chrstianity or Christian communities during his life time, it is adamantly certain that Philo's writings excercised an important influence on later Christian thought.

It was through Christian writers that most of Philo's works survived. Recent research has shown that it was the library of Caesarea, which played a dominant role in the preservation of Philo's works. It is possible that it was Origen who stocked the library at Caesarea with Philo's works when he left for this city in the year 233.

Various Church Fathers show a great regard for Philo and his works. Speaking of the events concerning Caligula, Eusebius speaks about Philo: "*In his time Philo became widely known as a remarkable man of culture not only among our own people but also among those originating from the outside. He was a Hebrew by race, inferior to none of the distinguished people in office in Alexandria. The quantity and quality of his hard work on the theological and ancestral branches of learning is evident to all. It is not necessary to say anything about his ability in philosophy and the liberal learning of the outside world since he, especially in his zealous studies of Plato and Pythagoras, is reported to have excelled all in his generation*" (Eusebius, *HE* 2.4.2-3 transl. Sterling 1999: 1).

Jerome included Philo among "the ecclesiastical writers" (De viris ilustribus 11;) and Eusebius believed that he converted to Christianity (Historia Ecclesiastica 2, 17, 1). Interestingly Eusebius writes that when Philo went to Rome, he met St. Peter (*Ecclesiastical History* II, 17: 1).

Apart from the respect that Christian Fathers displayed for Philo, there is also wide evidence that many aspects of Philo's thought and exegesis was used by Early Christian Fathers. Of course Philo's influence on the respective Fathers varied. There are certain Fathers, which include Clement of Alexandria and Origen, which testify to a rather strong influence of Philo. But even later Fathers display certain parallel features with Philo's thought. These would include such figures as Gregory of Nyssa, Basil the Great (see for example *C.Eun*. 1. 13), Augustine and others. In drawing any comparisons with the Fathers and Philo one has to realize that there were certain theological and

philosophical commonplaces which were widely circulating among Christian writers, so it is not always easy to determine whether a given concept was adapted from Philo or from some other writer.

It is possible to forge a linke between the dissemination of Philo's thought and the incipient catechetical school in Alexandria. On a number of occasions Eusebius mentions a "didaskaleion" of Alexandria. In connection with Pantenus he writes: "*At that time a man most famous for his learning, whose name was Pantenus, headed the course of studies (διατριβή) of the faithful there (i.e. Alexandria), since, from an old tradition, a school (διδασκαλειον) of sacred words existed among them*" (Hisst. Eccl. 5.10.1).

While it is difficult to reconstruct the early history of a catechetical school in Alexandria where questions pertaining to philosophy, the Bible and theology where discussed there are indications that there was such a school in existence from a very early period and that it evolved in a continous line marked by Clement of Alexandria and Origen (van den Hoek 1997: 71). Eusebius' account of the activities of the school namely Clement's catechetical training seems to be justified. There is a certain reluctance in writers such as Clement of Alexandria, to use the designation σχολή, διατριβή or αίρεσις to designate his Church, undoubtedly due to concerns that this terminology would evoke comparisons with pagan philosophical traditions (van den Hoek 1997: 75).

Many scholars have postulated that Alexandrian Christianity was heavily indebted to Alexandrian Judaism (see for example Klijn 1986: 114-75). While this may have been the case in the earlier periods i.e. before the Jewish revolt (115-117) it must have been less true for the later periods due to the particular historical circumstances surrounding the Jews (van den Hoek 1997: 80). However, one may argue that the Jewish influence was strategic exactly in the incipient phases of Christianity, where basic formulations and Christian self-understanding were strategic interests. Philo may have made the job easier for Christian Fathes seeking to establish themselves as a theological and philosophical system on par with their pagan neighbours. Philo's link between the Jewish Scriptures and the Mosaic Law may have been instrumental in the process of Christian self-definition. In a sense Philo may have inspired Alexandrian Christian authors by the simple fact,

that he showed the way how it is possible to reconcile the Bible with Greek hellenistic philosophy. It was from this philosophical environment that the Fathers sought concepts expaining Chrisitanity.

It is certain that Biblical exegesis in such writers as Clement of Alexandria and Origen was incredibly sophisticated with complex debates regarding such issues as the use of comma's and minutae oddities in the text. Van den Hoek writes: "The tradition of meticulous reading and interpretation is a very characteristic feature of Alexandrian Christian writing" (van den Hoek 1997: 82). In this regard the early Christian exegetes may have been inspired by rabbinical exegesis.

Philo's popularity with Christian Fathers, is linked to the popularity of Platonism in the Patristic tradition. Thus, Philo exemplified how the Platonic tradition could be incorporated within the Mosaic framework. Fathers, who discovered valuable concepts in Plato could thus build on a tradition, which linked Platonic thought with the Biblical account. The Christian Fathers further expanded on this Philonic enterprise and linked many concepts of Plato with the Gospel tradition and theology. Scholars such as E.P. Meijering have suggested that one of the reasons why Plato was so popular in Philo and the Patristic tradition, was due to his ontology, i.e. his emphasis on the immutability of God, his eternal existence and his constant care for creation (Meijering 1968: 186-189). Runia has expanded on this idea and emphasises the concept of Gods transcendence in Plato as an important aspect in determining his popularity in Philo and the Christian Fathers (Runia 1995: 143-160). Gods transcendence is a prominent theme in Gregory of Nyssa. It is interesting to note that both Plato and Aristotle was not utilized in the early tradition of Arabic philosophy represented by the Asharitic school of Mutakallimun and instead opted for a system emphasising divine omnipotence and an atomistic theory of the natural world.

Later in Christian circles the Timaeus was a popular account in displaying that Christianity and Scripture were not irreconcilable (see Justin Apol. 1. 59.1, Cl. Alex. Str. 5. 94. 1, Eus. PE 11.9, 23, 30 etc.). Philo's influence is strong on Christian theologians and apologists of the second to fourth centuries C.E. In certain cases we can detect a certain dependence on Philo by these writers. In terms of Justin Martyr we are not sure whether he had direct access to Philo's writings, but his

understanding of true philosophy "which was sent down" from heaven resembles Philo's ideas (Dial. 2.1). This is also the case in regard to the Philonic theme of manna as the Logos. As emphasized by these authors the Greek philosophers certainly glimpsed part of the truth, but only part.

However Philo's views also to an extent influenced the way that Christ was understood and it is possible that his views may have contributed to the emergence of Arianism as well as Docetism (Mortley in Runia 1986: 551).

Certainly there are differences between Philo and the Patristic tradition. Thus spirituality becomes a prominent feature in the Fathers. Spirituality was an important feature in Philo, but he nevertheless is not so eager to expand on spirituality in his writings. Of course, in the Patristic tradition the Christ Logos becomes central. In this regard it is important to note that Philo's conception of the Logos as an intermediary between the world and God possibly paved the way for the Christian theology of Jesus as the Logos, who as the God made human serves a mediatory role between God and the world. Philo was less dogmatic than the Fathers, stating that his work or interpretation should not be understood as final, whereas the Fathers, stressed the unity of truth and Orthodoxy. Whereas for Philo the language of philosophy or "reason" occupied a central role, philosophy in the patristic tradition serves a subsurvient role.

Sellin ventures to derive the following complexes from Jewish-Hellenistic thought as represented by Philo. *(1) "The replacement of the human nous in the pneumatic through the pneuma, wisdom, the Logos or Christ. Here the Platonic concept of ecstatic possession looms in the background. (2) Presupposing a basic local meaning of "in Christ" Sellin appeals to the Philonic conception of the Logos as place (topos), not only of the ideas, but also as refuge for the sage. The Logos is compared to the head of the whole body, which recalls the idea of the body of Christ in Colossians and Ephesians"* (Sellin 1996: 7-27).

Some authors have suggested that Philo could have influenced the Christian idea of Orthodoxy and apologetics, with his emphasis on Judaism as "Orthodoxy" and his apologetic project. Philo seems to even create a tradition of creeds as can be seen in his passage in De opificio mundi where Philo offers five essential doctrines in our understanding

of the human destiny: that God exists, that He is One, that he created the cosmos, that this cosmos is unique just like the Maker, and that he exercises providence on what he had made. Goodenough has called this passage "the first creed in history" (Goodenough 1940: 43).

One of the developments in Christian thought was the linking of Jesus with the Mosaic Law. While in Philo the Mosaic Law was central in Christian writers the centrality of the Law is replaced by Christ who further subsumes the Law into his person. This is seen for example among other places in John 5: 39-40, where Jesus takes over the role given to the Scriptures. We read: "*You search the scriptures, because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they that bear witness to me; yet you refuse to come to me that you may have life*". A similar idea is found in *Abot* 2, 8: "*He who has acquired words of Torah has acquired for himself the life of the world to come*".

Just as the study of Scriptures brought one to God according to Philo and rabbinical tradition so now, the worship of Jesus brings eternal life. In Matt. 18: 20 it is written: "*For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them*". A parallel though is seen in *Abot*. 3: 3, where we read: "*When two sit and there are between them the words of Torah the Schechinah rests between them*".

Apart from the identification of the Law and Jesus, Jesus is identified with Israel in its potential relationship with God. Just as Israel is the one who see's God, John affirms that Jesus is the only person who had a vision of God (John 6: 46).

The traditional Jewish eschatological views, dealt with a linear understanding as suggested by passages such as Micah 4: 1 and Isaiah 2:2, when the world would end after a certain linear number of events. Somehow this view was modified into a view, which emphasised the other worldliness of the eschatological hope. That is that the blessed world or state is already available to those that die.

Christian allegory

Philo's use of allegorical interpretation excercised a profound influence on certain Christian Fathers. The allegorical method of interpretation in terms of Christianity was developed into a new form, which is called typology. Allegory and typology are complex forms of representation, while metonymy, and synechdoche are simpler forms.

The allegorical method of interpretation was especially popular with Clement of Alexandria and of course Origen. There is no coincidence therefore that it is these two authors that exemplify the most extant influence from Philo. However, especially in the later Church Fathers we see a certain scepticism in relation to the allegorical interpretation. Thus for example Photius criticizes Philo for over allegorising and forcing the Biblical text into allegory. Photius states that he read a number of Philonic treatises and credits Philo for importing the allegorical method into the Church (*Bibliotheca* parag. 105). Augustine had also expressed some reservations regarding the allegorical method. Opposition against Christian use of allegory was also a common feature in pagan writers who wrote against Christianity, such as Porphyry, who attacked the way Christians used the Bible. In terms of Porphyry the irony is that he himself employed the allegorical method in his work *De Antro Nympharum* (see for example 13.102-12).

It is important to realise that there is a difference in Philo's under-standing of allegorical interpretation and the allegorical interpretation as exemplified in the Fathers. Philo is not an "exclusive exegete" in the sense that he does not state that his exegesis is the correct one or that there are "correct exegesis" of Scripture that all can share. In fact what we see in Philo is the constant "incomplete" character of any exegesis. Exegesis corresponds to one's spiritual level and is dependant on one's ability of perceiving the truth. We can speak of exegesis of exegesis. On the other hand for Christian authors everything to a certain extent is "obvious" now. This obviousness deals with the person of Christ. With Christ there is no deeper meaning that one needs to uncover. The Christ event does not possess the kind of elusiveness and secrecy of the Mosaic Laws.

It also needs to be emphasise that Philo is aware of the limits of allegorical interpretation and by no means suggests that the literal laws loose their purpose. Thus in Christian theology, the Old Testament to an extent looses its purpose in role, since it is transcended by Jesus Christ.

Philo re-affirms that it is necessary to obey the letter and the spirit of the law. The body is important for Philo and is the primary means for communication. Those who despise the external observance are "…*as though they were living alone by themselves in a wilderness, or as though they had become disembodied souls, and knew neither city nor village nor household*

nor any company of human beings at all…”. External observation makes communication possible and helps us “gain a clearer conception of the things of which they are the symbols”, and prevents “*the censure of the many and the charges they are sure to bring against us*” (i.e. Jews), (*Migr*. 89-93).

While being guilty of generalisation, it is possible to state that allegory was more prevalent in Alexandria than elsewhere. In Antioch, typology was more preferred than allegory. Typology is also called figural interpretation and deals with identifying figures and events in the New Testament in the Old Testament. The figures and events in the Old Testament function as models and prophecies (τύποι, figurae) of events and personages in the New Testament. Hamerton Kelly writes about typology: “Its salient features are (1) the text has at least three points of reference- to its own context, to the context of its anti-type in the New Testament, and then, as a result of the coming together of type and anti-type, to the realm of the divine, (2) there is a conncection between events and persons in one biblical text and events and persons in another (3) the earlier passage itself signifies itself and the later passage (4) the later passage involves and fulfils the first, (5) in both passages the events or persons take place in real time, (6) the “spiritual” event in this interpretation is the comprehension itself of the connectedness between the passages which points them both to the divine referent, (7) the unity of the Bible lies in this internal correspondence of themes, events, and persons which is the signature of the divine self-disclosure” (Hamerton-Kelly 1991: 57).

It is possible to argue that in Christian terms typology forces the text to convey an allegorical meaning, since otherwise the text looses sense. Thus the Old Testament does not make sense on its own, but only in reference to the New Testament.

Allegory is limited to searching hidden meanings of any given text. Typology on the other hand has a more global function, since it searches for historical patterns in God’s redemptive work. According to Origen one first had to be liberated from bondage to types before one could find the truth of allegory. “We must not consider the historical to be types of the historical, nor the somatic of the somatic”, but rather the somatic of the spiritual and the historical of the noetic” (Origen *Comm.* On John 10: 18, GCS 10 189. 28). Thus in allegory the meaning arises

immediately from the text whereas in typology from the text and the anti-type.

The contemporary theory of representation that is scientific realism or "objectivism" holds that symbols or signs correspond to objects in the real world. We deal with symbols in our relation to the world, but these symbols do not have an independant reality of their own. The things in the real world are not affected by being symbolically represented.

In the early Heideggar, the text was considered a mythic garb beneath which was a message of the particular human condition. The text without its myth reflected a particular existential situation and offered by means of grace a possibility of transforming that situation.

Bultmannism locates the deeper meaning of the text in a philosophical system. Philo believed that by means of studying the text ones intellect rises to God. Bultmannism only requires the voluntarism of faith and discounts intelectual means of rising to God.

The biblical theology movement whose central category was sacred history (*Heilsgeschichte*) had a relation to typology in the sense that it emphasised the unity of the Bible. This movement emphasised the fact of Gods acts in history, and that his activity can be recognised since, it has the divine imprints. As suggested by Lampe who was a member of this movement, the historical events in the Bible take a primary role, since they show concrete acts of God, whereas the philosophical and aesthetic questions should assume only secondary role. Here tradition is qualified by reason. Thus certain things were preserved because they were "reasonable". The very survival of a certain tradition testifies to its "reasonableness".

The post structuralis analysis postulates that apart from the subjectivity of the author other elements came into the text. "These elements include trans-temporal cultural dimensions and that these trans-temporal dimensions are not metaphysical in the traditional sense" (Hamerton-Kelly 1991: 60).

Hamerton-Kelly undertook to analyse Philos allegory according to the theory of the hermeneutic of the cross or the theory of sacred violence, which was originally propounded by R. Girard. Hamerton Kelly notes: "

"*As an anthropological theory Sacred Violence disloses something about the human world that implies something about the divine. It focuses on the*

category of the Sacred. The phenomenology of the primitive Sacred discloses the generative level of all culture, and thus also of the Bible. The Sacreds double valency of threat and succor is the two-fold force of transfigured violence that gives form to human institutions. Violence begins as the rivalry of acquisitive mimesis, as two desires imitate each other in pursuit of the same object, and develops into the conflictual mimesis of surrogate victimage, when the rivals spontaneously turn from rivalry with each other to a common hostility to a single surrogate. Having killed the surrogate victim they experience the blessed unanimity of the lynch mob, and seek to perpetuate it as the ongoing ethos of community" (Hamerton-Kelly 1991:63).

In other words a particular community derives its meaning when after a conflict of various parties, a certain person is found who attracts the attention of all other members who were previously fighting and these then turn on this individual and kill him. After they kill him, they originate a common sense of belonging or community.

The rite of sacrifice is then an institutional means by which the original moment of conflictual *mimesis* is renewed. Prohibition forbids the renewal of the acquisitive mimesis that let to the need for this victim in the first place. The myth propounds the view that the killing was a necessary thing.

Once the mob or the group kills the victim. They stand back and realise that this victim died as a substitute for anyone of them. Since if the conflict did not stop any other persons or groups could have died. Thus later instead of seeing the victim as a product of the groups violence the group blames the victim for the violence. This denial of group violence and the blaming of the victim is a form of moral denial, which identifies the group and according to the theory allegory and typology serve to perpetuate this moral denial.

The victim later becomes a certain god, since if he stoped by his death the violence of the group he must be very powerful and can even come back from the dead to exercise vengeance. This myth of the violent god becomes the new myth an idol is made and in a sense is a shield against the acknowledgment of moral responsibility.

This theory can be applied to the cross. The Gospel is a writing that reveals the moral responsibility of those that killed the victim. Thus especially in Pauls writing we can see how Paul reveals this ancient mechanism and accuses it for what it is. Paul suggests that the old Law

is the instrument of this violence, where the groups violence and responsibility are attributed to the victim (*Gal*. 2: 16-21, 1 Cor. 2: 6-9 Hamerton-Kelly 67). Thus Christ dying on the cross reveals this ancient situation. Paul uncoverd this by means of his own religious experiences. Paul before he converted also attempted to attribute violence to the victim and cover his moral responsibility. Once he converted who took this moral responsibility from the victim to himself (Hamerton-Kelly 1991:67).

According to this theory then, Philo's allegorical interpretation aims to bring about something positive about the Jewish people whereas Paul's typology and allegory brings out the true condition of the person the dire and bad situation of the person and the deception perpetrated by allegory which blames the victim (Hamerton-Kelly 1991: 68). Borgen suggests that Philo is a champion of the Sacred violence myth, since he tries to place the responsibility of the group to someone else. The group is not responsible for violence but rather is the victim of the violence of someone else"*the censure of the many and the charges they are sure to bring against us*"), (*Migr*. 89-93).

However, typology and allegory cannot by solely blamed for prolonging the myth of Sacred violence. In its positive aspect allegory and typology attempts to find the truth beneath the text but the product is decisive here. Thus, whereas Philo discovers by allegory a new myth beneath the old myth, Paul discovers by typology and allegory the entire reality of the violence (Hamerton-Kelly 1991:68).

It is possible to state that the Old Testament itself already has some passages which tend to reveal the myth and reality. For example the story of Solomons judgement is such a pre-figuration of the cross (Girard in Hamerton-Kelly 1991:69).

Further the story of 1 Kings 3: 16-28 is another example. Here the judge stops the violence before it culminates in the victimage of the child. However, the second harlot (the type of Christ), refuses the shedding of blood and thus breaks the cycle of Sacred violence.

Philo and the Gospels

Various parallels can be drawn between Philo's thought and the Gospels. In this regard the most notable comparisons were made with the Gospel of John and the letters of apostle Paul, such as for example

the epistle to the Hebrews. Comparisons between Philo and the Gospels have to take into account the fact that there are wide-ranging theories as to the nature of the Gospels and their composition, which makes comparisons more complicated. Whereas the Synoptics display some parallel materials with the Rabbinic tradition in terms of parables and pithy folk statements these are absent in Philo and John (Sandmel 1979: 158).

Shuler has argued that the Gospels are carried in the spirit of the *encomium* (Shuler vol. II, 87). The encomium is a useful mechanism in proclamation style writings. The encomium utilises the forms of comparison (sygkrisis) and amplification (aukusis). These techniques are used in order to enhance the status of the given subject. As such the encomium is seen for example in Matthews Gospel.

There are traces of encomium styles in Philo's works. A typical example is found in the work *De Vita Mosis*. The work displays abundant evidence of amplification and embellishment. The work glorifies Moses and embellishes him. Thus Philo writes: "*I purpose to write the life of Moses, whom some describe as the legislator of the Jews, others as the interpreter of the Holy Laws. I hope to bring the story of this greatest most perfect of men to the knowledge of such as deserve not to remain in ignorance of it; for, while the fame of the laws which he left behind him has travelled throughout the civilised world and reached the ends of the earth, the man himself as he really was is known to few. Greek men of letters have refused to treat him as worthy of memory, possibly through envy, and also because in many cases the ordinances of the legislators of the different states are opposed to his*".

Shuler has argued that there are also many encomium elements in the Gospel of Matthew. Similarly to Philo in the Life of Moses, Matthew emphasises the illustrious background of Jesus and his ancestry. Just as in Philo's account so in Matthew word and deed are rendered important (Math. 4: 23 and *Mos.*, 1.20, 1.29 1.155-6), (Shuler vol. II, 99).

Philo and John

In comparing Philo and John the evangelist, one immediately recalls the famous prologue to the Gospel, with the Logos theme. Of course John identifies the Logos with Jesus Christ. As was hinted in Philo the Logos has a distinctive mediatory role between God and man.

It seems as if the Christian theologians initiated a new development and identified this rather abstract mediating principle of Philo with the concrete historical person of Jesus Christ.

There are of course numerous opinions on the origin of John's Gospel and on the character of the Gospel. Some scholars believe that John's prologue was based on a hymn and that the account of St. John the Baptist was an addition. Still others such as Borgen argue that John's Gospel is an independent writing in the tradition of Jewish exegetical traditions. One can state that the Gospel of John is composed of both written and oral traditions

John incorporates various sources and traditions in his Gospel and classifies them according to the interpretative tradition present in his community and background. These traditions could have consisted of a written and an oral form, which fall into the narrative and the discourse material. There are indications in the Gospel that there are traditions which are presupposed. Thus the baptism of Jesus is pre-supposed in John 1: 33, the imprisonment of John the Baptist is referred to in 3: 24 the institution of the Lords Supper is presupposed in 6: 51: 58, and Jesus prayer in Gethsemane is alluded to in 18: 11b, etc., cf. also the reference to the many signs, 20: 30-31).

John emphasizes or selects certain points which were deemed central and around which the interpretative tapestry was concentrated. The important points in this regard are the passion narrative and the end of Jesus' ministry or the beginning of Jesus' ministry. Mark's account similarly places the passion narrative and the beginning of Jesus' ministry in a position of importance. Philo's treatises *To Flaccus* and the *Embassy to Gaius* can also be characterized as passion narratives. This is so since Philo in these treatise seems to be writing theologically interpreted history.

When John wrote the Gospel he summarized the various traditions which were available at that point of time and which were deemed relevant to the overall purpose of the community and the author. This activity may have continued further even after John's work was finished and there are indications in John 21 that new items were inserted. That these items were inserted at the end of the Gospel points to the overall integrity of the Gospel.

Borgen understands the prologue primarily in the context of an exegesis on Gen. 1: 1. Borgen writes: "The Prologue of John deals with creation and before, in the form of an exposition of Gen. 1: 1-5, applying these ideas to the appearance of Jesus Christ. It is therefore probable that John reflects a Jewish thought-pattern in which that which came into being, at creation or before, was regarded as a preparation for a latter time" (Borgen 1987: 80). There seem to be indications, that Jewish exegesis interprets Gen. 1: 1 ff as also referring to events preceding creation. Thus the Jerusalem Targum, which has similar features to the Prologue of John writes: "*Two thousand years before He had created the world, He created the Law; and prepared Gehinnom; and the garden of Eden* (Jerusalem *Targum* on Genesis 3: 24 in Borgen 1987: 81).

John begins a new tradition of identifying the Logos with a hypostasis, a meaning, which is new in the Jewish context. In this regard we have to be careful in making any associations between Logos and the word *Memra* used in the Targums. While *memra* means word it does not have any philosophical connotations. Another important fact is that the Christian community not only identified the Logos with a hypostasis but worshiped it. This is of course in contrast to Philo's thought, where Philo did not imply any worship of the Logos (Hurtado 1988). According to *Gen*. *Rab*. 3: 3, the "word" is the uttered word of God and not a hypostasis. As pointed out by some scholars, Philo could have been a bridge between the Jewish tradition, which strictly understood the "word" as the uttered word of God and Christian traditions represented by John, which identified the "word" with a full hypostatic meaning. This is suggested in *Somn*. I: 75), where Philo writes: "*for the model was the Word of His (Gods) fullness-(namely) light, for he says "God said, let there be light" (Somn. I: 75). Thus Philo identifies the Logos with Light. "The invisible light perceptible only by the mind has come into being as an image of the divine Logos* (*Opif*. 31)".

As hinted the Logos in Philo can attain personalistic features, such as in *Conf*. 146, where he associates Logos with concepts from the story of the creation, as "Gods First born, the Logos". "*He is called "the beginning"-"Logos"-"the Man after His (Gods) Image*".

In John the Logos not only acquires a personalistic appearance, but is understood in the context of light. Further the Logos was an instrument at creation, which is similar to Philo's understanding of one

of the functions of the Logos. Just as Moses brought the primordial light down from heaven so according to John, the primordial light makes its appearance at the coming of Jesus (John 1: 9).

Philo in certain instances seems to draw a relationship between the Logos and the Son. Thus the Logos is called the firstborn Son (*Conf*. 146). In John the only Son (*John* 1: 14; 3: 16.18). The Son see's with the Logos (John 1:1,14 and *Conf*. 146, cf. The heavenly wisdom in *Leg*. All I: 43. Thus both John and Philo at times characterise the Logos as the Son of God.

In Philo any identification of a person as the Son of God is subsumed into the relationship with the Logos. In *Conf*. 146 and *Leg*. *All*. I: 43 we read: "*But if there be any as yet unfit to be called a Son of God, let him press to take his place under Gods first-born, the Word, who holds the eldership among the angels, their ruler as it were. And many names are his, for he is called, "the Beginning", and the Name of God, and His Word, and the Man after His image, and "he that sees", that is Israel… the sublime and heavenly wisdom is of many names; for he calls it "beginning" and "image" and "vision of God"*.

While John does not use the concepts of the intelligible world and the sensible world, this kind of idea is present in his writings. Thus John does not speak about such concepts as rebirth, bread, water on a literal basis but as the true rebirth, true bread, true water and so on.

It is possible that John uses the light motif in contrast to darkness or to a primordial fall. A primordial fall seems to be implied in John. The light and life, which were lost at the fall, make their appearance in Jesus. The possibility of a fall is implied in the fifth verse of John's Gospel. That Jesus as the light is coming suggests that before people were living in darkness. Just as the light descended on humanity at the Law-giving at Sinai, so the Light now descends no humanity in the person of Jesus Christ (John 1: 9). The forced removal of light is suggested by the word *καταλαμβάνειν* in John 1: 5, which means, "seize", "overcome", in an undesirable or hostile manner. There seems to have existed a Jewish tradition which also spoke of a primordial light which was removed by a fall.

As was stated above, Philo implies that Moses when ascended, he entered into heaven (See *Mos*. I: 158). Philo is not alone in this regard, because the same thought is found in Josephus (*Antiq*. III, 96), Pseudo-

Philo (*Antiq. Bib.* 12: 1) and Revelation (*Rev.* 4: 1). Philo writes: "*For he was named god and king of the whole nation, and entered, we are told, into the darkness where God was, that is, into the unseen, invisible, incorporeal and archetypal essence of existing things. Thus he beheld what is hidden from the sight of mortal nature, and, in himself and his life displayed for all to see, he has set before us, like some well-wrought picture, a piece of work beautiful and godlike, a model for those who are willing to copy it*" (*Mos.* I: 158). In the rabbinic tradition the ascent of Moses is linked to that of Elijah (*Mek. Exod.* 19: 20).

John in his Gospel employs the ascent motive, but also a descent motive. Jesus is the one who ascended and descended. The notion of a descent is a rare theme in the Jewish tradition and in *Mek. Exod.* 19: 20 there is a rejection of the view that the heavenly doxa can descend. However, in some forms of Jewish exegesis there are hints of Moses ascending and descending (see *Somn.* I: 140-143, *Gen. Rab.* 68: 12). Philo hints at a descending role for Moses, when he interprets the events at Sinai, where God drew Moses near Him (Deut 5: (27).31 ("*Stand here with Me*"), and appointed him god over earthly things. In this sense Moses also descends in a certain way (Borgen 1987: 105).

The idea of God's descent is suggested in Exodus (*Exod.* 19:20; 34; 5). The idea of God's return is implied in the commentary *Exodus Rabbah* (*Exod. Rab.* 42: 5). Philo may have transferred the idea of God's descent and return to the person of Moses (*Sac.* 8-10). We can view John as standing within this ascent and descent tradition within Jewish exegesis, into which he brought the new development that the ascent and descent was accomplished by the person Jesus (*John* 3: 13-14). Again Philo would be a bridge between the earlier Jewish tradition and John.

John suggests in verse 6: 46 that the ascent of the Son of Man referred to at 3: 13 refers to an prior to the descent. The Son has been with God prior to being sent to the earth. Just as the agent is sent with a commission so Jesus was sent from God. "I came not of my own accord, but he sent me" (John 8: 42).

An "ascent to heaven" can also mean to God's enthronement in the Judaic tradition. Heaven in this regard is the throne of God (See 1 *Sam.* 2: 10 (26) LXX, *Ps.* 47: 6 (37), LXX 46: 6, *Ps.* 68: 19 (28), LXX 67: 19). It is possible that John understood Jesus' ascent into heaven as the Son of Man in the context of such an enthronement (See John 3: 13).

The idea of God ascending and descending is also found in *Numeri Rabbah*. "*Who hat ascended up into heaven*" (*Prov*. 30: 4) alludes to the Holy One, blessed by He, of whom it is written, "*God is gone up amidst shouting*, etc.*" (*Ps* 47: 6). "*And descended*" (*Prov*. 30: 14) bears on "*And the Lord descended upon Mount Sinai*" (*Exod*. 29: 20)", (Borgen 1987: 110).

Borgen believes that the *Son of Man* phrase in John 3: 13 seems to be a fusion of ideas from the Sinaitic ascent and *Dan* 7: 13-14 (Borgen 1987: 111). "The background of John 3: 13 in Dan. 7: 13-14 is seen both in Johns use of the terms ὁ υἱός του ἀνθρώπου and ὁ οὐρανός, and in the employment of words from Dan 7: 14 in John 17: 2, where the pre-existent installations in office is mentioned" (Borgen 1987: 111).

Similarly to Moses at the burning bush and at Sinai, the Christian undergoes a birth. This tradition of birth is also found elsewhere in Jewish exegesis. *Cant*. *Rab*. 8: 2 reads: "I would lead thee; and bring thee: I would lead Thee from the upper world to the lower. I would bring Thee into my mothers house: this is Sinai. R. Berekiah said: Why is Sinai called My Mothers House? Because there Israel became like a new-born child…" (Borgen 1987: 113).

As was hinted in Moses occupies a central aspect in Philo's thought. Some scholars have suggested that Moses practically functions as a god in Philo. This seems to be inaccurate given the evidence. However, Moses is the agent between man and God par excellence in Philo. In Christian thought of course, Jesus occupies the central role as an agent between God and man and further Jesus is identified as a God, although in this regard the theology of Jesus and his divinity underwent a difficult evolution.

One can argue that the concept of the agent between God and man in Jewish thought already carried certain divine connotations. This is implied by various rabbinical passages, which of course date to a later period than Philo or Jesus, but suggest that this thought was already present earlier. Thus it appears that there was a basic principle that "an agent is like the one who sent him" (See *Mek*. *Exod*. 12: 3; 12: 6; *Ber*. 5: 5; *B Mes*. 96a; *Hag* 10b; *Qidd*. 42b, 43a; *Menah* 93b; *Nazir* 12b, etc.). The fact of the agent being like the sender was usually meant in terms of function or the judicial aspect, but later rabbis, believed that the agent was identical to the sender. *Qiddushin* 43a formulates this mysticism in the following way: the agent ranks as his masters own person.

In legal terms the agent had full responsibility over his or her masters affairs and had to complete his mission (See *Erub* 31b-32, *Qidd* 2: 4 and *Ter*. 4: 4). In *Qam* 70a we read: "Go forth and take legal action so that you may acquire title to it and secure the claim for yourself". The legal rights of the agent over his master's interests is seen in the statement: "This is the will of him who sent me, that all that he has given me". Similarly "Go and give heave-offering", the agent should give heave-offering according to the house-holder's mind".

Halakah also specifies that the agent has to report to his sender: In *Y. Hag* 76d: "Behold we send to you a great man as our *shaliach*, and he is equivalent to us until such time as he returns to us". Through the messengers of God the presence of God is actualised. In *Mek Exod*. 12: 1 we read: Thy messengers, O God, are not like the messengers of human beings; for the messengers of human beings must needs return to those who send them before they can report. With Thy messengers, however, it is not so, …withersoever they go they are in thy presence and can report: we have executed thy commission". *Gen. Rab*. Writes: the sender is greater than the sent.

The above statements imply that there was a current of thought, which suggested that the agents of God had certain divine connotations. Of course these statements can be viewed in metaphorical terms. However one can argue that they have a metaphorical meaning, but it can be argued at the very least they do suggest a close relationship between God and his agent.

John in discussing the relationship between the Son and God seems to build on a similar tradition, which discerned a close affinity between the agent and the sender. In John 12: 44 we read: "*he, who believes in me, believes not in me but in him who sent me*". "The saying in John 12: 44 is a very close parallel to the saying by the king in the quotation from Siphre: "you have not spoken concerning my servant but concerning me" (*Siphre on Num*. 12: 9).

John makes the identity between the Son and the Father in several ways. One formula is "*I and the Father are one*" (10: 30) and another formula is "*the Father is in me and I am in the Father*" (10: 38 cf. 14: 10-11 and 17:21-23).

In accordance with the sender/agent tradition, Jesus hints at a superiority of the Father. This is seen in John 13: 16: "*a servant is not greater*

than his master; nor is he who is sent greater than him who sent him". John 6: 44 writes: "*No one can come to me (i.e. the agent) unless the Father who sent me (i.e. the sender) draws him*". Just as the agent upon completing his task returns to his master so Jesus will return to the Father: John 13ff writes: "*Jesus, knowing that the Father had given things into his hand, and that he had come from God and was going to God… etc*" (13: 3).

There are indications in the rabbinic tradition that the agent has the right to appoint other agents. *Qidd* 41a writes: "an agent can appoint an agent". Similarly Jesus states at the end of his mission: "*As thou didst send me into the world, so I have sent them into the world*" (John 17: 16).

John's exegesis

It is clear that the Gospels as a whole or John did not engage in an exegetical enterprise. That is they did not write commentaries on Scripture. Rather there purpose was to discuss the role and importance of Jesus. Thus the Gospels are not commentaries on Scripture but are only loosely related to Scripture. While Philo on many occasions diverges from the text of Scripture in his Commentaries, it is clear that the Scripture always forms the necessary backbone for his interpretative work. The Gospels are different in this regard and while we may find Scriptural passages in the Gospels, they do not constitute a full underlining backbone of the Gospels. It is possible to state that exegesis in the Gospel tradition receives a new dimension, since the Scripture is referred to contemporary reality and the concrete works of an individual named Jesus. However, there are exegetical techniques and exegetical opinions, which we do find in the Gospels, even if they are employed as a general context for Jesus' message.

It is obvious that the initial proclamation of Jesus occurred in the Synagogue. This was undoubtedly done by the various Christians in a commentary form on particular Scriptural passages and therefore possibly continued in the same commentary form, as was the custom of the Synagogue. In this regard Jesus was an exegete himself, since he also commented on the Scriptures during his ministry. Jesus challenged the contemporary interpretations of the Old Testament and its message. Jesus referred to the various themes of Scriptures including the view of God, the patriarchs, the twelve tribes of Israel repentance and others. An obvious example is Jesus challenge of the interpretations of the

Sabbath. Even in Jewish non-Christian circles Jesus was only viewed as a teacher. In this regard the characterisation of Jesus as a rabbinical teacher may go a bit to far, as is suggested by some scholars.

In terms of John's Gospel there are indications suggesting the use of Midrashic exegetical techniques as well as targumic elaboration's of the Old Testament (Borgen 1987: 153). In terms of midrashic exegesis one can not for example verse 6: 31-33. Here John employs an exegetical contrast, which is a pattern, found in the Palestinian Midrash. In this verse John quotes an Old Testament passage which is followed by an exegetical contrast (Borgen 1987: 122). This contrast can be followed by an explicative statement as is found in Philo, the Midrash and John 6: 33. John expands the meaning of the Old Testament text he quotes and gives a different reading (in contrast *Mek*. on *Exod*. 16: 15, *Quod det* 47-48). The pattern of John 6: 41-48 follows the pattern of exegetical debate as found in Philo and the midrash (Borgen 1987: 123).

If one compares John 6: 41-48, *Mek on Exod*. 12: 2 and Philo *Mut* 141a, 142b-144 one discerns that they follow a similar exegetical pattern. This pattern includes: 1) a quotation from the Old Testament 2) the interpretation of the quotation from the Old Testament 3) objection to the interpretation 4) repetition of the interpretation and elaboration 5) solves the problem and gives an explanation (Borgen 1987: 125).

Vermes discerns two stages in exegetical development. The first stage is called by Vermes "pure exegesis" while the second stage is called "applied exegesis". In the first stage the Midrash functioned as a device in eliminating the obscurities of a text (Vermes 1970: 221). The second stage is marked by exegesis which takes into its fold customs and other social contexts and the point of departure was always the Biblical text. Vermes' view is in itself illustrative, but has its deficiencies. Of course if one takes into account the use of Biblical texts as the criterion for discerning exegetical patterns one is not going to progress very far, since even the most complex exegesis' and therefore later types of exegesis according to Vermes, have some relation to the Biblical text.

Philo states that when the Jewish community of the Therapeutae meets, the president discusses certain issues arising out of the Scriptures or solves a question raised by someone else (Vita Cont. 75). It seems that there was no conflict in Jewish expository activity between the form of homily and dialogue (Borgen 1987: 139).

Philos exegetical techniques have been compared to Johns exegesis of the Old Testament such as John 6: 31-58 in the Discourse on bread from heaven and John 5: 17 where Jewish exegetical debates on Gen. 2: 2-3 are reflected. Thus John may be drawing on an exegetical tradition, which was also utilized by Philo.

In both John 7: 22-23 and 5: 17 dealing with the issue of healing on the Sabbath ("My Father is working still, and I am working") we can discern a parallel with halakhic exegesis. The parallel to John 7: 22-3 is found in rabbinic sources, such as in Tos. Sabb. 15: 16: "He supersedes the sabbath for one of his members, and shall he not supersede the sabbath for his whole self?" (Also B. Yoma 85b). Verse 5: 17 presupposes a widespread Jewish exegetical debate, which deals with the issue that God never stops working. His issue must have already been raised by Aristobulus and is found in Philo.

Rabbinic exegesis specified that it is not forbidden to carry about something in ones house during the Sabbath. Gods homestead is the upper and lower worlds and He may thus be active within it without coming into conflict with the Sabbath (*Gen*. R 30: 6), (Borgen 1991: 214). Philo reading the Septuagint notices that Gen. 2: 2-3 reads κατα έπαυ-σεν not ἐπαύσατο. Thus the text means "caused to rest", not "rested", for He causes to rest that which, though actually not in operation, is apparently making, but He himself never ceases making" (*Leg*. 1.5-6). Thus according to Philo even the meaning of the Seventh Day implys that God who has no origin is always active. "He is not a mere artificer, but also Father of the things that are coming into being" (*Leg*. 1. 18). "*All created beings are dependent and really inactive in all their doings*" …the *number seven… Its purpose is that creation, observing the inactino which it brings, should call to mind him who does all things invisible*" (*Her*. 170).

This same logic as in Philo seems to appear in John 5: 1-18. God can work on the Sabbath and so also his Son. The providential activity of the Son and God abbrogate the observance of the Sabbath and the healed person can ever go away and carry the mat without abrogating the law and therefore not working, since the Son told him to do so (Borgen 1991:214).

Philo advises to be careful with the axiom that God works on the Sabbath and he writes: "*It is quite true that the Seventh day is meant to teach the power of the Unorginate and the non-action of created beings (cf. Gen.*

2: 2-3). But let us not for this reason abrogate (λύομεν) the enactments laid down for its observance, and light fires or till the ground or carry loads or demand the restoration of deposits or recover loans, or do all else that we are permitted to do as well on days that are not festival seasons. Why, we shall be ignoring the sanctity of the Temple and a thousand other things, if we are going to pay heed to nothing except what is shown us by the inner meaning of things. Nay, we should look on all these outward observances as resembling the body, and their inner meaning as resembling the soul, so we must pay heed to the letter of the Laws. If we keep and observe these, we shall gain a clearer conception of those things of which these are symbols, and besides that we shall not incur the censure of the many and the charges they are sure to bring us".

Of course, while the logic of Philo and John is the same in analysis of the abrogation of the Sabbath, there is a difference. Whereas, Philo defends the abrogation of the Sabbath on the basis of a general principle of Gods providence, John defends the abrogation by means of the historical person Jesus.

It is thus possible that there was a pre-Johanine tradition of debates, in which there were fractions of Jews debated the issue of not observing the sabbath in certain conditions and the early Christian community simply took over the crux of these debates (Borgen 1991:216).

Philo and Acts

Philo's account can help to resolve some of the issues and problems arising from the account found in Acts.

Acts states that the Apostles "speaking in tongues" were admired by some but mocked by others in the crowd. "But others mocking said, "They are filled with gleukos" (13). Peter makes an opening speech: "Men of Judea and all who dwell in Jerusalem, let this be known to your, and give ear to my words. For these men are not drunk, as you suppose, since it is only the third hour of the day; but this is what was spoken by the prophet Joel…(vv. 14-16). Acts suggest that gleukos is inebriating. The issue is why did not the writer of Acts simply refer to wine or to strong drink as in similar cases such as I Samuel 1: 14 and Isaiah 28: 7"?

Peter admits that the apostles are indeed drunk and are full of gleukos, but this drunkennes is not of the usual kind but rather the state they are in is a result of the Lord (not the usual bartender) having

poured out (vv. 17, 33) His holy spirit, in accordance with Joels prophecy.

This view is confirmed by the fact that gleukos is an appropriate metaphor for the spirit, which is confirmed by the Septuagint Job 32: 19, where gleukos appears as the image Elihu uses of the spirit of God within him, which he can no longer restrain, but rather forces him to speak (Schwartz 1991:268). In this passage *yayyin* is translated by gleukos, the only time when the Septuagint does not use the word *oinos*. The translator therefore took the image of grape-juice which has begun to ferment- "the point is not that it is intoxicating, but that it must be vented- and therefore departed from the usual practice" (Schwartz 1991: 268). In both Acts and Job gleukos is used in association with people forced to speak by the Holy Spirit. Thus the term is used in association with the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Peter therefore does no deny that the apostles are filled with gleukos, but that this gleukos is of a divine character (Schwartz 1991:268). Acts associates the spirit with the glukasmos which according to Joel, will run freely in the end of the days.

The above observations are confirmed by Philo, who attests to the fact that people seized by the Holy Spirit are comparable to drunkards. Philos *sobria ebrietas* motif is well known.

Philo and Paul

Just as with the Gospel of John notable parallels can be discerned between Philo and Paul both in terms of ideas and exegesis. In the case of the epistles of Paul it is in the field of exegesis where the parallels are most marked. Paul displays affinities with both Philo and the rabbinical tradition in terms of exegesis. Winter argues that Philo and Paul could be called sophists by virtue of having a rhetoric education, but they are not sophists due to theological reasons (Winter in Hay 1996: 165).

In terms of exegesis one such example can be seen in the letter to the Galatians where Paul deals with the issue of contradiction in Scripture (*Gal*. 3). The rabbinical technique of solving the problem of contradictions in Scripture was to preserve the words in their different contexts, but usually one meaning was given priority. In this way Philo solves the contradiction between Num 23: 19 that God is not like a man and Deut. 8: 5 that he is like a man. In line with rabbinic tradition Philo

defends both meanings and solves the problem by saying that Num. 23: 19-God is not like a man-is the basic principle-while Deut. 8: 5-God is like a man- is a statement which should be viewed as a pedagogical device enabling man to comprehend God.

Paul in Galatians 3 faced a problem where he formulated the problem of faith and works by discussing the contradiction he saw between Hab. 2: 4 "He who through faith is righteous shall live" and Lev. 18: 5 "He who does them shall live by them". Paul solves the problem by stating that Hab. 2: 4 gives the basic principle of justification by faith in Christ, while Lev. 18: 5 concerning the works of the law has a subordinate role with the Mosaic Law and is a temporary arrangement until the time of the coming of Christ.

Paul applies typological exegesis as can be seen in the letter to the Hebrews. For example the practices as were held in the Tabernacle in the wilderness came into perfection in Christianity. Philo merely allegorises the Tabernacle. In Hebrews, Christ supersedes the imperfect Tabernacle. Borgen rather than using typological exegesis in the New Testament of the Old Testament prefers the term "thought-models employed in the New Testament", (Borgen 1987: 166).

There are certain parallels between Paul's theology and thoughts in Philo. In both Philo and Paul the Jewish patriarchs are awarded great honour. The Patriarchs are ideal. The laws that followed the Patriarchs are not awarded the same status as the Patriarchs are. In Philo's thought the laws do to their "imperfect" nature needed continuos correction which was carried in the spirit of commentary. However, the underlining thought, which is prominent in Philo is that the laws together with the Patriarchs constitute the ultimate means to salvation. Philo writes: "*at any rate for more than two thousand (years) they have not changed a single word of what he (Moses) wrote but would even endure dying a thousand deaths sooner than accept anything contrary to the laws and customs which he had ordained*" (Apol. Iud. 6: 9). Similarly to Philo, Paul also considered the laws as imperfect, but in contrast to Philo, Paul did not believe that the imperfect nature of the laws can be simply corrected by interpretation, but only through Jesus Christ, who transcends the laws.

Sandmel interestingly notes that the difference between Paul and Philo lies in the fact that Philo was a intense philosopher in the sense that he seriously studied philosophical texts, whereas, Paul while using

philosophical terms, has a superficial approach to philosophy (Sandmel 1979: 149).

Paul's theology is more dramatic than Philo's. For Philo the goal of observing the laws is Platonic tranquillity and harmony, whereas for Paul the purpose is salvation. Paul believes that merely following the laws will not bring salvation. One may equally argue that while Philo is a true philosopher, while not a philosopher is an existentialist, since he judges these matters on the concrete existential experience of man. The dramatic aspect of Paul's thought can further be illustrated by the existence of an apocalyptic element in II Corinthian's. In Philo generally there are little indications of apocalyptic thought.

However, both Philo and Paul attempt to solve the problem of God's immanence and transcendence. Even Philo needs some sort of mediator between God and man. Thus in both authors we find the concept of the Logos. In Paul of course this Logos is identified with Jesus Christ. In Colossians one reads that Christ is "*the image of the invisible God, the first born of all creation, for him all things were created, in heaven and earth, visible and invisible… In him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell…*" (1: 15-20).

The Logos in Philo is a kind of metaphysical a-historical principle, whereas for Paul, the Logos is a concrete historical person. Stating this, however one has to keep in mind that Moses occupies a very pronounced role as a mediator in Philo and is allegorically identified with the Logos. It is also possible to argue that in some respects Philo denies history, especially due to his treatment of certain biblical aspects with an ahistorical emphasis due to the allegorical method. Of course the New Testament is adamant and very strict on the fact that the Jesus event took place within history.

While it is difficult to postulate a doctrine of the incarnation in Philo, it is true that in his work *Abr.* 118, there is an indication that the three visitors who appeared to Abraham had some relationship with incarnation. Philo speaks of them as divine beings incarnate as men. Some hints of docetism in Philo appear, when Philo argues that the three angels appearing to Abraham only seemed to eat. (Abr.107-18). Some form of an incarnation theory might be inferred from the fact that Philo understands the patriarchs as *nomoi empsychoi*, "laws incarnate in men".

The letter to the Hebrews presents Christianity as the religion, which was foreshadowed in Judaism. If Philo were a Christian we might argue that he would treat the New Testament as within the intelligible world while the Old Testament as belonging to the sensible world. The "laws" would be sensible since they are impossible to fulfil.

Paul and Philo display a certain contempt for the body, while of course not going as far as to deny the positive aspects of the body. The soul is superior to the body. In this regard we can equate Paul's term spirit, with Philo,s term intelligible world (Sandmel 1979: 150). Sandmel notes Philo was a rationalist, whereas Paul believed in "forces" in the world, such as the devil and so on. We also have to keep in mind that similarly to the Christian beliefs, Philo rejected encratism (excessive self-mortification).

An interesting parallel can be drawn between Philo's understanding of the Law and Paul's understanding of the Law. In this regard there is a certain difficulty in the interpretation of Rom 10: 4 in regard to the word τέλος. Does this term mean that with Christ the Law came to an end and therefore had no validity? Or deos it mean that Chist is the goal of the Law and therfore the Law does not loose its validity? Or does it mean that Christ is he "completion" or "consummation" of the Law, that is, a combination of the first two meanings so that in Christ the Law is both completed and comes to an end?

In Rom 9: 30-31 Gentiles do not pursue (μή διώκοντα) righteousness but nevetheless obtain it while Israel pursues (διώκων) the law of righteousness but does not attain it. In Rom 10: 3 his fellow Jews, being ignorant of the righteousness of God, seek (ζητουντες) to establish their own righteousness. Israel sought a goal but did not attain it; Gentiles, however, while not pursuing that goal, did obtain it. Both the basic contrast and the langauge of Rom 9: 30-32a, then, clearly parallels Rom 10: 2-3. The reason why the Gentiles attained righteousness is given in Rom 9: 32a: Israel pursued it not through faith (ουκ έκ πίστεως) but through works (άλλ᾿ώς έξ έργων).

It is possible that Paul builds on Philo's concept of the law of nature, to which according to Philo the Mosaic law corresponds. Thus the gentiles by following the law of nature can according to Philo attain righteousness. The term *Dikaiosyne* reflects the reality of the higher mind controlling the lower mind and the senses. The *nous hegemon*, the higher

mind, possessing reason, enables a man to live by the law of nature. This, according to Goodenough, is the context for the words of Paul in Romans 7: 21-23 as Goodenough presents them: "I find then the law that, to me who would do *ton kalon* (the beautiful), evil is present. For "I" delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my *nous* ("mind") and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members" (Goodenough 394). Of course Paul goes further than Philo, for he ascertains that it is not sufficient to live under the laws of Moses, but that it is necessary to live in the eschatological Spirit (See *Gal*. 3: 2).

Philo numerously uses the word telos in his writings. One of these contexts in which Philo uses telos is the context of seeking and striving toward a goal. For example, in Post. 21 Philo claims that we must rejoice at the lovers of God in their quest (άναζητουσι) fo the Existent One, for, even if the goal (τέλος) is missed the quest (ζήτησις) itself for the Good and the Beautiful is sufficient to give a foretaste of gladness.

The metaphor is found also in *Agr*. 91 and *Sacr*. 112-17. In *Leg*. 3. 47-48 Philo writes: "*For if you are seeking (ζητεις) God, O mind, go out from yourself and seek diligently (άναζήτει); but if you remain amid the heavy encumbrances of the body or the self-conceits with which the understanding is familiar, though you may have he semblacne of a seeker, yours is not the quest for the things of God. But whether when you seek you will find God is uncertain, for to many He has not manifested Himself, but their zeal (ή σπουδή) hs been without success all along. And yet the mere seeking by itself is sufficient to make us partakers of good things, for it always is the case that endeavors after noble things, even if they fail to attain their goal (telos), gladden in their very course those who make them. Thus it is that while he bad man, who shuns virtue and hides himself from God, takes refuge in his own mind, a sorry resource, the good man, on the other hand, who runs away from himself, returns to knowledge (έπίγνωσις) of the One, thus winning a race (δρόμον) and proving victor in this grandest of all contests (άγώνισμα)*". What is noteworthy in the above passage is the fact that Philo identifies the telos as lying outside the considerations of the body. It is possible to speculate that Paul could have been inspired by Philo's imagery, and identified the Mosaic Law with the body, that needs to be transcended in order to attain God and righteousness.

In another context of the use of the word telos Philo speaks of the goal of the Law (*Decal*. 50, 73, 80; *Virt*. 15) as well as of the lawgiver (*Deus* 61, 67; *Spec*. 1.345; *Plant*. 49). In *Migr*. 128-43 he writes: "*This is the goal (telos) extolled by the best philosophers, to live in accord with nature; and it is attained whenever the mind, having entered on virtues, path, walks in the track of right reason and follows God, mindful of His injunctions, and always and in all places recognising them all as valid both in action and in speech*" (*Migr*. 128). "To follow God is, then, according to Moses, that most holy man, our goal (telos), as he says elsewhere too, "thou shalt go in the steps of the Lord thy God" (*Deut*. 13: 4, (*Migr*. 131). "This is the goal (telos) of the way of those who follow the words and injunctions of the Law, and march in whatever direction God leads the way" (*Migr*. 143).

Philo employs the image of the athlete in his description of the soul's progress towards God. In this regard it is imteresting to note that the term of the athlete competing to reach God is a favourite theme in later Christian Fathers and is also found of course in Paul.Philo writes: "*If, however, as he goes on his way, he neither becomes weary, so that he gives in and collapses, nor grows remiss, so that he turns aside, now in this direction, now in that, and goes astray missing the central road that never diverges; but, taking the good runners (ἀγαθους δρομεις) as his example, finishes the race (τό στάδιον) of life without stumbling, when he has reached the goal (τέλος) he shall obtain fitting crowns and prizes. Are not the crowns and prizes just this, not to have missed the goal (telos) of his labors, but to have obtained those aims of good sense that are so hard of attainment? What, then, is the goal (telos) of right-mindedness? To pronounce on himself and all created being the verdict of folly; for tthe aim of knowledge is to hold that we know nothing, He alone being wise, who is also alone God*" (*Migr*. 133-4).

There are indications of an ethical understanding of a proselyte in Philo. This is of course a pronounced feature in Paul's thought (See *Gal*. 5: 13-14). In *Quaes Exod*. II: 2 we read: "*proselyte is not the one who has circumcised his uncircumcision, but the one (who has circumcised) his desires and sensual pleasures and the other passions of the soul…*" Rom. 2: 28-29 states: "*For he is not a Jew who is one outwardly, nor is circumcision the circumcision outwardly in the flesh. But he is a Jew who is one inwardly, and circumcision is circumcision of the heart, by the spirit and not literal…* "Paul further writes: "*So, if a man who is uncircumcised keeps the precepts of the law, will not his uncircumcision be regarded as circumcision?*" (Rom. 2: 26).

Given Paul's stance it appears that nevertheless there were certain Jews who believed that Paul did not actually abolish circumcision (Borgen 1987: 223). Paul's opponents objected, that Paul actually preached circumcision, since they assumed that the statement in Galatians: "*Having begun with the Spirit, will you now complete with the flesh?*" (*Gal*. 3: 3).as meaning that circumcision would naturally follow (Oepke in Borgen 1987: 257). The traditional view in Biblical scholarship is that Paul was opposed by Jewish Christians who were faithful to the law of Moses (for example W.G. Kummel), (see *Gal*. 5: 13-6: 10). W. Schmithals believes that Paul argues against gnostics, who practised circumcision and further had libertinistic attitudes (Schmithals in Borgen 1987: 241).

There could have been a significant confusion in these matters in the early Church. Since this sprang from the very basis of the Christian message. While Paul argued that Christ transcended the Old Testament he did not give a great indication as to how the Christians should behave in this new state of things. While he gives various ethical guidelines how people who live in Christ should behave he did not give a full key to one's relationship with the previous laws or to any new requirements stemming from one's life in Christ.

While Paul rejected the bodily circumcision, he transferred the ethical circumcision on a new platform, namely on the platform of the cross. He adhered to an ethical understanding of circumcision and transferred this understanding on the level of the cross (Borgen 1987: 258).

It is possible that the initial phases of Christian missionary activity followed similar models to Jewish proselytism. Recent archaeological evidence from synagogues in the Diaspora has yielded abundant information regarding the existence of large non-Jews associated with the various synagogues, who could even occupy administrative positions in the synagogue. Further, there were various degrees of one's association with the Jewish faith ranging from sympathy to full proselyte status. A similar situation could have existed in Palestine itself. Of course the various communities had their differences.

Christian missionary activity could have been effective especially among Jewish proselytes and sympathisers, especially if one realises that the Christian message as conveyed by figures as Paul carried with it

the notion of the total transcending of the centrality of the Jewish nation understood in ethnic terms.

In comparison with the Gospel Philo does not lay such a strong emphasis on mission. However, both Philo and the Gospels have a "universalistic" character, since both convey that the Jewish God is central to all humanity. Thus the Gospel and Philo appeal to the universal condition of humanity and conclude that all people can have a share in Gods plan. In this context Philo emphasises the role of Moses, who is a teacher of not just the Jews but of all nations.

One of the differences between the Gospels relationship with new converts and Philo is that Philo rejects any notions that the new converts are not obliged to fulfil some or all of the Jewish cultic prescriptions.

In contrast to the Jewish reality of conversion where one broke away from his past and community Paul in Ephesians suggests that the Gentiles were not required to break away from their past and family (Eph. 2: 11-22). It is reasonable to assume that in practice Paul's understanding of becoming a Christian, practically entailed the severance of past connections.

The Christian missionary movement had a similar basis as the rabbinical and Philonic context, except that in the Christian tradition the aspect of the parousia was added. This is seen for example in 1 Thess. 1: 9-10: …how you turned to God from idols, to serve a living and true God, and to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead, Jesus who delivers us from the wrath to come".

Philo and Clement of Alexandria

Clement of Alexandria is one Christian author who has a close relationship with Philo. In his theological enterprise Clement uses a great deal of material from Philo. The most notable parallels between Philo and Clement can be drawn in Clement's work the *Stromateis*, which means "patchwork". Of course Clement does not solely rely on Philo but uses a variety of ancient sources. In many of his ethical teachings Clement seems to rely on various sources including Aristotelian sources, Chrysippus and others. However Philo's influence is paramount.

The *Stromateis*, which presents us with the closest parallels between Clement and Philo was an attempt on Clement's behalf to compile a systematic theology, which would incorporate Christian ideas and Greek philosophy. Chadwick notes: "*Yet he was not the first to approach this mediating task; he had been preceded by the Jew Philo, who had paved the way of Hellenisation for Christian thinkers*" (Chadwick 1967: 139). Later Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose and the Cappadocian fathers all used his work.

Clement's dependence on Philo has been commented on by a number of scholars. However, similarly to the relationship between Philo and Plato, interpretations vary in regards to the degree of Clement's dependence on Philo. Some scholars argue that Clement heavily relies on Philo in terms of exegesis and theology whereas others argue the opposite view. Of course there are modifications between these two extreme positions. One of those scholars arguing for a strong dependence of Clement on Philo is Heinisch, who concluded that Clement totally relies on Philo in his exegesis of the Old Testament (*Der Einfluss Philos auf die älteste christliche Exegese*, 1908). Mondesert reached the opposite conclusion in his *Clement de Alexandrie* (1944) and argues that in terms of exegesis there is little dependence of Clement on Philo, but that Clement is dependent on Philo in terms of philosophy. An important difference between Clement and Philo, according to Mondesert is that Philo is less interested in historical matters than Clement. In contrast to Philo, Clement has a central concept of history or salvation history.

Wolfson also dealt with the issue, but in regard to Wolfson's work, interpretation is difficult, since Wolfson concludes that many Christian authors were dependant on Philo (see Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, 1956).

Lilla characterises Clement as an eclectic albeit with segments of independent thought. Lilla writes: "*He wanted to transform his religious faith into a monumental philosophical system, to which he allotted the task of reflecting the absolute truth*" (Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria, a study of Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* 1971: 232).

An important aspect in determining Clement's relationship with Philo is the use of "Christian doctrines" in Clement. These could point to the degree of dependence and independence of Clement. In this context Mehat understands Clement's work as a recapitulation, where certain themes are modified according to the theological Christian framework or philosophical trend (A. Mehat, *Etude sur les "Stromates" de Clement d Alexandrie* (*Patr. Sorb.*7, 1966).

Lilla sees a direct parallel between Philo's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology (*De Congressu*) and Clements view as shown in Str. I 30, 1-2. Lilla further suggests that Philo and Clement have an identical definition of philosophy and wisdom. This definition is that "wisdom is the knowledge of divine and human things". Further Lilla states: "*In Middle Platonism Albinus expounds practically the same views: in perfect agreement with Philo and Clement, he maintains that philosophy consists in longing for wisdom, defines wisdom as "scientific knowledge of divine and human things", and considers theology as the highest part of philosophy*" (Lilla 1971: 59). However, this definition is philosophical commonplace and Clement could have used it from a different context independently of Philo (Van den Hoek 1987: 18).

According to Lilla, Clement seems to parallel Philo when he equates ἀπάθεια with ὁμοίωσις as the ultimate objective (Lilla 1971: 103-117). Van den Hoek suggests that this is not the case and that Clement goes a step further than Philo. Clements idea of ἀπάθεια does not correspond with Philos usage. "*Philo links ἀπάθεια and ἀπαθής to the soul, the νους or noetic things, τά ἀγαθά, φρόνησις, διάνοια, or to the σοφόι as personification of these concepts*" (Van den Hoek 1987: 17). The words can also be used in a less pregnant sense as "unharmed" by diseases or disaster. Philo never links it to God as Clement does; cf. Str.

II 40,2; 72,1; IV 151,1; VI 73,6; 137,4 Van den Hoek 1987: 17). According to Lilla, Clement has the logos intervene directly in the process that moves towards ἀπάθεια and ὁμοίωσις. Lilla believes that Clement went further in his Platonism than Philo and that he should more be judged in gnostic terms (Lilla 1971: 181). Further, that while Clement describes matter μή όν, Philo calls matter ουσία, which again suggests that Clement is reflecting a more advanced Platonism (Lilla 1971: 193, 195, 196, 226, 230).

It is possible to discern between the approaches, which dominated scholarship in comparing Philo and Clement. On the one hand there was the approach which might be called the "systematic approach" where passages were taken out of context and compared and there was a tendency to discern patterns forming a coherent philosophical system (Van den Hoek 1987: 19). Another approach, which was used, can be termed a literary approach (Mehat), where authors discern literary units in the *Stromateis* (van den Hoek 1971: 19).

In the following analysis a translation is given in which italicization designates the words taken over from Philo by Clement. A word of acknowledgement needs to be given to van den Hoek, since in the following analysis her work served as a useful starting point.

Clement and philosophy

Clement reveals his understanding of philosophy in the passage dealing with The Hagar and Sarah Motif (*Str*. I 28-32). Here, Clement argues that in contrast to certain Christian opinions, which argue that one should strictly adhere to matters of faith, philosophy is a legitimate discipline and has a positive role. To illustrate this point Clement uses various images, such as the sower, farmer and others. Thus, the role of philosophy can be stated in the parable of the sower; while there is only one sower, as the ages go by, various different plants can emerge from his various seeds (*Str*. I 37, 1ff). Philosophy and culture is compared to showers; the rain falls everywhere on good and bad land and the growth therefore can be rich or meagre; both weeds and grain spring up. Philosophy should not have central importance, but certainly has an important role, since it leads people to reflection and prepares them for comprehending the truth (*Str*. I 20,3; 80,5; 99,1). In terms of Philo's and Clement's attitude to philosophy Osborn writes: "*While Philo moves from*

philosophy to that wisdom which is law, Clement moves from philosophy and law to the wisdom which is Christ" (Osborn vol. ?).

In the beginning of chapter 5 of the *Stromateis* Clement announces: "*Thus before the advent of the Lord, philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for justification, and now it becomes useful for piety, being a kind of preparatory training for those who reap the fruit of faith through proof by argument*" (*Str*. I 28,1). He writes further: "*For just as the law brought up the Hebrews, so this (philosophy) brought up the Greek world to Christ. Philosophy, therefore, is a preparation, paving the way for him who is perfected in Christ*" (*Str*. I, 29,9).

Clement believes that philosophy just as the wall described in Proverbs protects wisdom (*Str*. I 28, 4; Str. I 100,1). While philosophy should no occupy one for too much time, it has its role. Similarly to Philo, Clement also uses the Hagar and Sarah story, to illustrate this idea. The image of servant and mistress is used to show the relationship between the encyclical studies, philosophy and wisdom. In Str. I 28,4 Clement writes: "Now says Solomon: "Defend wisdom and it will exalt you, and it will shield you with a crown of pleasure" (*Prov*. 4: 8a.9b). for when you have *strengthened* it with a wall by *philosophy*, and with right expenditure, you also will keep it unassailable by *sophists*". A similar idea is found in Philos *De Agricultura*. However as Marrou pointed out, philosophic tradition since the time of Plato and Isocrates onward, continuously invoked the idea that dialectics or philosophy is a protection against rhetoric.

Clement illustrates his belief in the worth of secular knowledge to prepare one to fully appreciate Christ by introducing the quotation from Philo in *Str*. I 29, 10: "*For already some, ensnared by the charms of handmaids, have despised their mistress philosophy and have grown old*, some of them in music, some in geometry, others in grammar, most of them in rhetoric".

Clement writes in *Str*. I 30, 1-2- *Congr*. 79-80: "But as *the cycle of studies contributes to philosophy*, their mistress, *so also philosophy* itself *co-operates for the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the study* <of wisdom> *and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes*. Wisdom is therefore mistress of philosophy, as philosophy is of preparatory education. For if *philosophy* promises us *control of the tongue and the belly and the parts below the belly*, and if it is to *be chosen on its own*

account; it will appear more worthy of respect and of more authority *if practised for the honour* and knowledge *of God*.

The theme and wording is very similar to Philo in *De Congressu*. From this example it can be seen how Clement adapts Philo's work by means of paraphrase and literal quotation. However, as noted by van den Hoek, this theme and many others may be a commonplace and Clement might have chosen it because it was a commonplace and may have struck a note in his audience (van den Hoek 1987: 32).

In *Str*. I 30, 4 Clement writes: "By Egyptian the world is designated allegorically". Philo associates the encyclical studies with the Egyptian Hagar (*Congr*. 20ff). Preparatory schooling is associated with the sensible world or $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\sigma\varsigma\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\eta\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, which are only perceived by the senses. Sense perception, which is a bodily part of the soul is riveted to the vessel of the soul, and this soul-vessel is symbolically called Egypt. In contrast to Philo Clement does not equate Egypt with $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$ but instead with $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\sigma\varsigma$. This is not clear why. There is a comparable passage in *Str*. V 7, 4, where Clement, in opposing sensible and spiritual reality, does speak about earthly body, $\gamma\epsilon\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma\ \sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$. Here he writes that we apprehend sensible objects with the body and spiritual objects through the intellectual faculty. "An explanation for Clements substitution of "world" for "body" in our passage could be that $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$ in isolation (that is, not in the context of the antithesis sensible-spiritual) evokes a different meaning that the word often has in Clement: as body of Christ or the spiritual body representing the Church" (van den Hoek 1987: 35). "Following a tradition that goes back to the New Testament, Clement can use *kosmos* here with the meanings "world of evil", transitoriness and hostility to God" (van den Hoek 1987: 35).

On the other hand $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$ in Philo is just the term from which connotes the faculty from which passions, lusts and all manner of evil may derive, while in his admiration for the unity, the beauty and the perfection of the universe, the word *kosmos* cannot have this pejorative sense (van den Hoek 1987). D. Runia is struck by the fact that the Platonic concept $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha\ \tau\sigma\upsilon\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\sigma\upsilon$ is rarely heard in Philo (Runia, Philo PGs. 142,4). This strengthens the supposition that for Philo the word *swma* is strongly connected to the terrestrial realm.

In *Str*. I 31, 2-4 and other passages Clement discounts the role of the concept of virtue, which is such a prominent feature in Philos *De*

Congressu. Instead Clement substitutes the concept with wisdom. Thus here, where Philo states that Abraham pursues the virtue that comes through instruction, Clement substitutes wisdom for virtue.

According to Philo true wisdom points to true piety and the knowledge of God as its ultimate objective. This process is reflected in the word that came to Moses. Wisdom in Clement is connected with Christ. Wisdom now in Clement is not linked to the law but to Christ. Clement judges issues in relation to Christ and in relation to time, i.e. whether they are before or after the advent of Christ (van den Hoek 1987: 46). Law and philosophy are ranked together since they belong to the earlier phase. "They are necessary before the advent and useful but not indispensable after it" (van den Hoek 1987: 46).

Clement accentuates that wisdom is a gift of grace. Clement writes: "Something else may also have been shown by the three patriarchs, namely that the seal of knowledge, which consists of nature, education and exercise, is sovereign" (*Str*. I 31,5). Here, the seal of knowledge possibly means Baptism as a seal or the answer of the person who is baptised is considered a seal, which confirms the act. This leads to knowledge and then to perfection through learning ability and training (van den Hoek 1987: 40). In Str. I 31, 6 we read: "You may have also another image of what has been said, in *Thamar sitting at the cross-roads and presenting the appearance of a harlot*, on whom the *studious* Judah (whose name is interpreted as "powerful"), *who left nothing unexamined and uninvestigated*, looked; and *turned aside to her*, preserving *his profession towards God*".

In contrast to Philo Clement to a degree devalues the Mosaic Law. The Law for Clement is not an end in itself as more or less it was for Philo, but is a preparatory stage for knowledge and wisdom. According to Philo if one follows and knows the law one can achieve as far as it is possible the knowledge of God. For Clement the Law is subordinated to the Christological dimensions. In this regard Clement does not interpret the Law exclusively as a prefiguration of Christ. However, both Philo and Clement see a need to allegorise the Laws.

Philo placed the encyclical studies, philosophy and wisdom, expressed through the Law of Moses, in an ascending series. For Clement philosophy is valued as a preparatory phase. It is possible that "Clement stands in a Jewish apologetic tradition in which the polemic

elements are stressed much more strongly than they had been in Philo" (van den Hoek 1987: 47). However Clement uses the material to suit his own purposes.

Clement and Moses

Similarly to Philo Clement emphasizes the role of Moses. An argument appears similar to Philo's where Plato was a disciple of Moses. In this regard they may have been an earlier apologetic tradition, stressing the role of Moses as teachers of nations, the Egyptians, the Phoenicians and the Greeks (van den Hoek 1987: 49). In *Str*. I 150, 4-5 we read: "And Numenius, the Pythagorean philosopher, writes explicitly: for what is Plato but Moses speaking in Attic Greek? This Moses was a theologian and prophet, *and as some say, an interpreter of sacred laws*". However it is also important to note that for Philo, Moses has a given centrality, whereas for Clement the central role is transformed from Moses to Christ.

There is another passage in the *Stromateis*, where Orpheus, is given the title of theologian (*Str*. V 78,4). In Liddell and Scott we have two meanings of the word *theologos*: a) one who discourses of the gods of poets such as Hesiod and Orpheus, of cosmologists like the Orphics, of diviners and prophets, and b) theologian equals Moses. Clement uses the term in both meanings, while Philo uses the term twice in reference to Moses. Amongst Christians theologian was a designation, which became widely used only in the fourth century.

Clement repeats the story of Moses being sent as a baby in the basket on the river as it is re-told in Philo (*Str*. I 151-152). Clement follows Philo often word for word (VM I 5-17). Philo tells the story with great verbosity and a sense for detail and great feeling. His account is like a midrash comparable to that of Flavius Josephus in his story of Moses in the *Antiquitates Judaicae* (Ant. Jud. II 217ff). Philo develops the story as a divine plan, and Flavius Josephus develops this story even further stressing divine intervention. These emphasis are absent in Clement. Clement even acknowledges that in his story of Moses life he draws on Philo. In *Str*. I 153, 2-3 we read: "Having reached the proper age, he was taught *arithmetic and geometry, rhythm and harmony as well as metrics and music by those who excelled in these arts among the Egyptians, and in addition, philosophy, which is conveyed by symbols, which they point*

out in hieroglyphics. The rest of the usual course of instruction, Greeks taught him in Egypt, a royal child as he was, as Philo says in his Life of Moses".

Philo stresses that the Hebrews learned piety (εὐσέβεια) from the events they witnessed. This theme is missing in Clement who instead speaks of the power of God, which is learned painlessly by the Hebrews (*Str*. I 156,3-157, 1- VM I 60, 143, 146).

Both Philo and Clement list a Stoic commonplace which reads "… in accordance with which, namely, good opinion, some have called law, right reason, which prescribes what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done" *Str*. I 166, 5 (VM II 4). Some scholars believe that Clement took over this Stoic definition from Philo. Lilla, (page 75) agrees with this and sees Philo s intermediary in the use of ὀρθός λόγος. Lilla proceeds from the idea that Clements definition of νομος is identical with that of Philo because in both authors the Mosaic Law is merely a manifestation of the divine logos. A spark of this logos is left in the human mind; in defining φρόνησις Clement resorts to Stoic terms similar to those he used in clarifying *nomos*. Since *fronesis* is an intellectual activity and reason derives directly from the divine *logos*, the functioning of *fronesis* can be described by terms usually appropriate to *nomos*, as Lilla indicates (Lilla pg. 76). Lilla discovers the same views in Philo and Clement; he points out, however, that similar definitions are available in the works of others (p. 76, esp. Note 2).

Clement divides Moses "philosophy" into four segments: the historical, legislative, liturgical and theological part. In *Str*. I 176, 1(2), (Philos parallel-VM II 2; 46f) he writes: "The Mosaic philosophy is accordingly divided into four parts: into the historic part, and that which is strictly called the legislative part, which two properly belong to ethics, and the third part, which relates to liturgy, belongs to physical science, and, above all, in the fourth place the theological part, the vision, which Plato says belongs to the truly great mysteries, while Aristotle call this species metaphysics".

In this regard Clement substitutes Philo's last category of prophecy with theology, and interrelates the four categories with a tripartite scheme of Platonic origin, which is divided into ethics, physics and dialectics. He connects the historical and the legislative part with ethics, the liturgical part with physics. The theological part, which he first identifies with spiritual vision, is linked in the following passage with

Plato's dialectics and the called true dialectics. Stahlin observes that there is no literal borrowing from Plato and that Andronicos should be substituted for Aristotle (van den Hoek 1987: 61).

Philo devotes an entire book to Moses and Moses has a central importance to Philos thinking. Often Moses is presented as the ideal man or the ideal ancient man. It is difficult to judge the presence or non-presence of a messianic element in Philo. Wolfson states that if there is a messianic element in Philo, it is connected more with the victory of the Mosaic Law in the world than with the person of Moses (Wolfson 419). However, Moses does have the function of mediator between God and man in Philo. We can argue that in Clement the mediatorship role is taken over by Christ.

Philo attributes certain historically unjustifiable functions to Moses, such as king or high priest. However, as a perfect man Moses embodies all possible functions in his life. Clement adds further titles, such as friend of God, just and holy. Clement often appropriates many of the various functions and titles of Moses as found in Philo to Christian ends. The role of the high priest (ἀρχιερεύς) is used by Clement especially in reference to Christ or the *logos*.

For Clement in contrast to Philo, Moses is not a perfect model for these functions. Clement says that *if* we find these qualities in Moses, then we may trully call him wise (*Str*. I 168, 4). In contrast to Philo who wanted to make a synthesis between the Mosaic account of creation and various philosophical elements, Clements interest is not cosmological. Clements point of orientation is spiritual vision or contemplation, the *thewria*. This orientation appears once again at the end of this passage, when Clement has Moses function as a teacher of Plato in dialectics. For Clement, the aim of true dialectic, which is connected with true philosophy, is to ascend to God: that is to the God of the cosmos and to the knowledge of divine and heavenly affairs van den Hoek 1987: 67). This knowledge leads to real wisdom, which is a godly power (van den Hoek 1987: 67). Possibly relying on the *Assumptio Moysis* Clement presents Moses' earthly end as an assumption and burial (van den Hoek 1987: 200).

The Law and the Virtues in Clement and Philo

Philo wrote four treatises on virtues (courage, humanity, repentance, nobility) of which the treatise on humanity is the largest. From the treatise on humanity Clement took over all the prescriptions. The concept of humanity ($\varphi\iota\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\iota\alpha$) appears to have come into prominence in Platonism and in the Stoa by way of popular ethics. This concept gains a particular significance in Hellenistic Jewish writings but is mentioned only once in the New Testament (in *Tit*. 3: 4). Philo takes over the concept of *filanthropia* trying to integrate it into a larger context. Similarly to Josephus, Philo tries to show by means of the concept of *filanthropia*, how the Mosaic laws relate to humanity and its needs.

Similarly to Philo, Clement stresses that piety teaches us to worship God. The Law is an instrument that teaches piety. In *Str*. II 78, 2-3 (*Virt*. 34-35) we read: "It is then clear also that all the other virtues described in Moses supplied the Greeks with the starting point of their moral system; I mean courage and temperance and prudence and justice and endurance and patience and dignity and self-restraint; and over and above them, piety. With reference to piety, it is clear to every one that it teaches *to worship and honour the highest and oldest cause*; and the law itself puts justice and wisdom into the mind in an educative process, by abstinence from sensible idols and *attachment to the creator and father of the universe; from this notion as from a spring,* all intelligence increases".

Philo believes that the unallegorised law incorporates the totality of the virtues and leads to a dynamic movement to knowledge. Virtues while representing different concepts are interchangeable. On the other hand knowledge is set supreme in Clement. The law and virtues which are in the law are a condition to step to a higher point which is knowledge. In order to stress this point Clement needs to allegorise the laws. Philo on the other hand in the case of the laws does not need allegory (van den Hoek 1987: 115).

While Clement emphasises the role of knowledge or *gnwsis* this is not so prominently accentuated in Philo. Further Clement seems to value knowledge higher than the virtues. Van den Hoek notes, that in the Philonic borrowings Clement often replaces virtue with knowledge, while in Philo the two had equal value (van den Hoek 1987: 229).

However, for Clement knowledge is not purely of an intellectual kind but is closely associated with the heart and head. But it is possible

to state given the role of the rational ideas that both Clement and Philo are protagonists of a rational type of spirituality.

Clement adheres to the conception found in *De Virtutibus*, according to which the highest part of the soul, called either *logike psuche, logikon* or *egemonikon* directs the human being to know and imitate God.

In *Str*. II 87, 2 Clement seems to equate all virtues to the level of *άγάπη* and implies that there is no need in distinguishing between the virtues. Clement develops the concept of agape, love for ones neighbour (*Str*. II 86,7; 87,2). Clement expands this concept with synonyms like *χρηστότης*. This word is defined by Clement as undivided (*άμέριστος*), undistinguished (*άδιάκριτος*) and communicative (*κοινωνική*).

While in Philo one often has the impression that he does not specifically dwell on particular manifestations of one's spirituality, in Clement there is a greater emphasis on "concrete" action. Thus for example Clement extensively discusses martyrdom, which attains significance in Clement's system of thought and is a concrete manifestation of one's conversion to God.

Clement addresses the issue of the assimilation of man to God. It is possible to see a new emphasis in early Christian authors in relation to our journey to God. The early Christian authors emphasise the restraint and control of the emotions as a necessary aspect of the possibility of assimilation to God. In this regard Clement is no exception. In contrast to this tendency Philo uses the theme of the soul which desires immortality.

In one passage he strongly paraphrases from Philo. Clement writes: "…we are prepared for conduct of life that follows God consistently, *becoming like* the Lord as far as possible for us, mortal in nature as we are. And this is being just and holy with prudence; *for the divinity needs nothing* and suffers nothing; and for this reason it is not, strictly speaking, self-restraint; for it is never subject to emotion, over which it has to exercise control, while our nature, being full of emotion needs self-control; thereby disciplining itself to need nothing, it tries according to its condition to approximate the divine nature. *For the good man, who has few words, stands at the boundary between immortal and mortal nature, he has wants because of his body* and his birth itself but is taught by rational self-control to have few needs" (*Str*. II 80, 5-81,2- (*Virt*. 8.9).

Clements words κατά τό δυνατόν show how carefully Clement touches on the concept of *homoiosis* (van den Hoek 1987: 75). "He says that, "as far as possible for us", we assimilate ourselves to the Lord, and he adds the further qualification, "mortal in nature as we are" (van den Hoek 1987: 75). "The restriction "as far as possible" (*kata to dunaton*) derives from an important text of Plato that lies behind Clements treatment here (*Theact*. 176ab), (van den Hoek 1987: 76). Unlike Philo, Clement combines *homoiosis* with the Stoical concept of the *apatheia* of God and stresses the human subjection to the πάθη. In *Str*. II 97, 2 –*Virt*. 168-172 Clement adds to the passage about the imitation of God a verse from the gospel of St. Matthew: "He is the greatest in the kingdom who shall do and teach (Mt. 5: 19)".

The fear of God according to Clement has a positive effect (*Str*. II 32-40). The Law in this context is not arbitrary. It has a pedagogical value. It educates us for Christ (*Str*. II 86, 3-4-*Virt*. 95f). Philo on the other hand stresses that the Law orders us. Both Philo and Clement emphasise the humanness of the Mosaic Law (*Str*. II 90, 1- 91, 1 (*Virt*. 116.119) concretely teaching how one should behave towards ones neighbour. One should help the beast of ones neighbour and so on. These laws are designed to create a just society, and general well being among men. Clement expands and states that also the law that educates to Christ is essentially good and humane. "The transition in Clement is formed by τί δέ, and the subject of the sentence is not Moses, as in Philo, but the *Lord*, who teaches *us*, while *we* are trained to pray for our enemies" (van den Hoek 1987: 91).

Obedience to the Law will liberate one from the bondages of evil. We read: "*These are symbols: the hands of action, the heart of volition, the mouth of speech. Beautifully, therefore, has this word been spoken* about penitents; "*You have chosen God today to be your God, and the Lord has chosen you today to be his people". For him who is eager to serve the Existent, being a suppliant, God adopts to himself*" (*Str*. II 97, 3-98,2 – *Virt*. (171-172) 183-185). Here Philo talks about *metanoia* and calls for conversion from disobedience to obedience to the law, which according to the words from Deuteronomy is not far off, not too high, nor at the other side of the sea, but nearby in our mouth, hand and heart.

As already hinted Clement also links the Old Testament Laws with the Gospels message. Thus in *Str*. II 94, 3-5. *Virt*. 145ff. Clement com-

bines the Old Testament text of the ox treading out the corn with the Gospel passage in which the labourer is worthy of his wages.

Both Philo and Clement utilise the concept of the σωμα των γραφων. According to Clement it is composed of the λέξις and the ὀνόματα, which are opposed to the διάνοιαι (van den Hoek 1987: 200). "In Philo, the basic idea is presented in terms of the opposition between a σωμα that is composed of τάς ρητάς διατάξεις and a ψυχή that is its invisible comprehension. This interpretative structure, which is passed on by Origen to later periods and which was to play such an important role in hermeneutics, must have been borrowed by Clement from Philo, in so far as available evidence indicates" (van den Hoek 1987: 200).

Commenting on husbandry Clement writes: "This image of husbandry may be taken as a mode of instruction, teaching that we ought to eradicate the suckers of sins and the barren weeds of the mind, which spring up alongside the productive fruit, until the shoot of faith has matured and grown strong. For in the fourth year, since time is also needed to instruct the person firmly, the quartette of virtues is consecrated to God, while the third stage already borders the fourth abode of the Lord" (*Str*. II 95, 1- *Virt*. 150 and *Str*. II 95, 2-3- *Virt*. 156-159). From Clements time it is known that the instruction of faith could have taken three years, which was followed by a shorter time (van den Hoek 1987: 100).

A notable feature in Clements understanding of one's journey to God is his emphasis on Gnostic terms. While Clement preserves the rationality of Philo in terms of one's assimilation to God he does introduce various other "non-rational" and mystical concepts. Thus the one who progresses to God is the Gnostic. Clement writes: "This is the Gnostic, who is after the image and likeness of God, *who imitates God as far as possible, deficient in none of the things which contribute to the attainable likeness*, practising self-restraint and endurance, living righteously, reigning over the passions, *sharing* what he has as far as he can, and doing good both in word and deed" (*Str*. II 96, 3-97,1 – *Virt*. 165-168).

An important factor is the use of arithmology in Clement, which is linked to various issues. Arithmology is also an important feature in Philo. In *Str*. VI 107, 2 Clement compares the ranks of heaven with the Church hierarchy, and it is concluded that the Church ranks are imitations of the angelic glory. This includes the grades of bishops,

presbyters and deacons. The number three appears prominent. The link between the number three and the abodes is also apparent in Str. VII 40,4, in which Clement speaks about the union of the Gnostic and God through prayer. "He says that those who are experienced in the threefold hours for prayer (the third, sixth and ninth hour), also know about the triad of the holy abodes".

In terms of the Gnostic ascent there are two phases marked by Clement. The preparatory stage marked by the instruction of faith and the second stage moving into the Gnostic perfection of faith (*Str*. II 96, 1-2). Clement attaches great importance to the number eight, which is the case also of the Gnostic traditions as represented for example by Valentinians. In Clement the number eight signifies the day of the Resurrection, to the eighth heaven, to the eighth day and also to the summit and terminus of repose and beatitude.

The Temple and the High Priest's vestments

Clement describes the temple and the vestments of the high priest. He often views these elements in symbolic terms. The backbone of this interpretation is formed by Exodus 26-68. In his symbolic interpretation Clement seems to be following a tradition, which is marked by Philo and Flavius Josephus (van den Hoek 1987: 116). This theme is further taken over by the Epistle to the Hebrews, where of course the High Priest is identified with Christ.

In his interpretation of the temple and the High Priest Philo expounds a cosmological understanding. This in a way is natural given Philo's theme of the macrocosm and microcosm distinction. In this context mankind as the most important product of creation is compared to a sanctuary. The first sanctuary is the cosmos whereas the second sanctuary is the human soul.

On the other hand Clement does not dwell on cosmology as Philo does. Clement stresses the Christocentric nature of human existence. The faithful ascend to Christ who transforms the current existential dimensions. Similarly Christ descended so that this ascent is made possible.

"Cosmology is presented but transformed since the creative power of the *Logos* is simultaneously the redeeming power of Christ" (van den Hoek 1987: 118). While Philo concentrates on the cosmological

dimension, that is the position of things, Clement on the contrary is interested in the ethical dimension, that is, the spiritual hierarchy of people, i.e. some who are more close to God and others who are further away. Thus when Philo speaks of the divisions of priests he is mainly concentrating on different roles and tasks that the priests have.

Not surprisingly Clement views the High Priest in Christocentric terms. Elaborating on Leviticus 16, on the theme of the entrance of the High Priest, Clement interprets the High Priest as Christ who becomes visible to the world by the creative power of the Logos and by his coming into human being. At the same time, the high priest represents the Gnostic who moves upward to an unceasing contemplation. Philo views the High Priest primarily in Mosaic terms (*VM* II 66-187).

Clement writes about the outer structures of the temple: "In the midst of the covering and the veil where the priests were allowed to enter was situated the altar of incense, as a symbol of the earth placed in the middle of the cosmos, from where the vapors came. And that place intermediates between the inner veil, where on prescribed days the high priest alone was permitted to enter, and the eternal curtain surrounding it, accessible to all Hebrews; they say it is the symbol of the intellectual and sensible world. The covering then, as a barrier against popular unbelief, was stretched over the five pillars, keeping back those in the surrounding space" (*Str.* V 33, 1-3- *VM* II 101). The elements in the outer temple then, are according to Clement markers of the hierarchy of things and beings.

Clement's hierarchical view of reality is reinforced by a quote from Plato, which he will also supplant with St. Paul's. Clement writes: "Cast your eyes round and see", says Plato, "that none of the uninitiated listen. Such are they who think that nothing else exists but what they can hold tight with both hands bud do not admit as part of existence actions and processes of generation and the whole of the unseen". For such are those who cling only to the five sense. Inaccessible to the ears and similar organs, however, is the perception of God". Clement connects the five columns of the tabernacle as the five loaves known in the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves and fishes, and then with the five senses (*Str.* V 33,4- *VM* II 81). "Clement elaborates the idea that the Son is πρόσωπον of the Father became flesh for the five senses; he is

the logos who voices the specific character of the Father" (van den Hoek 1987: 125).

The various markers and features of the temple have a symbolical value mirroring our progression towards God. "Back to the veil of the entrance into the holy of holies there are four pillars, a sign of the sacred tetrad of the ancient covenants. Furthermore there is the mystic name of our four letters, which was affixed to those alone to whom the adytum was accessible; it is called Jahwe, which is interpreted as "Who is and shall be". Among the Greeks too the name of God contains four letters. He alone will come into the intellectual world who has become lord over his emotions, reaching the knowledge of the ineffable and ascending above every name that is made known by the sound of a voice" (*Str*. V 34,4-7- *VM* II 114).

The candlestick according to Clement is a sign of Christ who centres around him all creation shedding light over all. The golden candlestick has another enigma of the sign of the Christ, not only by its form but also by its casting light at many times and in many ways on those who believe and hope in him and look at him through the service of the "first-created" beings. And they say that the seven eyes of the Lord are the seven spirits resting on the rod that springs from the root of Jesse". "*The candlestick*, too, was place *to the south* of the altar of incense, which shows *the motions of the seven light-bearing stars that perform their revolutions towards the south*. For three branches rose *on either side of the candlestick* and on them were *lights; since* also *the sun, like the candlestick, set in the middle of the other planets dispenses the light to those above and below it according to a kind of divine harmony* (*Str*. V 34, 8-35,2- *VM* II 102. 103).

According to Clement "this radiance is made possible because of the service of those who are first created; he means the so-called "*protoctistes*", higher spiritual beings, who are put in a hierarchy above angels and archangels and contemplate the Son directly as the face of the Father" (van den Hoek 1987: 129). In *Apoc*. 5: 6, the lamb with the seven horns and the seven eyes represents the seven spirits of God sent out into the earth (cf. *Apoc*. 1: 4). In *Zech* 4: 2.10, which had already been of influence on the Apocalypse, the seven-branched candlestick is called the seven eyes of the Lord (van den Hoek 1987: 129). The candlestick is watched by believers who share in its radiance. As noted by van den

Hoek Philo's cosmological ideas are turned into vehicles of the history of salvation (van den Hoek 1987: 130).

Clement proceeds to describe the vestments of the priest. "The cap on the head is, then, a sign of most absolute power; and otherwise we have heard it said: "The head of Christ is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (*Str*. V 37, 1- *VM* II 117.118). The variegated stone represent ways of salvation according to the rank of the members of the spiritual body.

In *Str*. V 38, 2- *VM* II 130, *VM* II 122 we read: "Moreover there was a chestpiece (*peristetion*) consisting of the *ephod* (*epomis*), which is the symbol of work, and the *logeion* (*logion*); the latter indicates the *logos* and is the symbol of heaven, made by the word, and subjected to Christ, and the head of all things, inasmuch as it moves in the same way and in the manner. As the Lord is above the whole world, even above the world of thought, so the name engraved on the *petalon* has been regarded as being "above all rule and authority"; and it was inscribed with reference both to the written commandments and the sensible manifestation (of Christ). It is the name of God that is expressed; since the Son works, seeing the goodness of the Father, being called God Saviour, first principle of all things, which was modelled after the invisible God, the first and before the ages, and which moulds all things that came into being after it". Stahlin mentions that the distinction between chestpiece (*peristethion*) and *logeion* is based on a misunderstanding since both words describe the same object (Stahlin in van den Hoek 1987: 139).

The High priests actions symbolise the human drama, which is parallel to the tension between the sensible and noetic world. Both Clement and Philo strongly accentuate the division of the cosmos into the sensible and noetic world. The emphasis on such a division, which has a hierarchical sub-tone later, decreased in Christian writers. The High Priests actions symbolise the progression of the believer from sensible realities to higher realities culminating in the person of Christ. In this context Philo calls the ark a symbol of the noetic world (*VM* II 104).

Clement describes the actions of the High Priest in the following way: "So the high priest, putting off his consecrated robe- the world and the creation in the world are consecrated by him who assented that what was made was good-, washes himself and puts on the other tunic,

a holy-of-holies one, so to speak, which is to accompany him into the *adytum*. It signifies, as seems to me, that the levite is also Gnostic as the chief of the other priests-those bathed in water, and clothed in faith alone, and receiving their own individual abode- himself distinguishing the objects of the intellect from the things of the sense, rising above the other priests, hasting to the entrance of the noetic realm, to wash himself from the things here below, not in water as formerly one was cleansed on being enrolled in the tribe of Levi, but already by the Gnostic Word. Here the Word functions as ultimate gateway to the noetic realm. It is possible to see the marvellous conflagration of the Logos term with Christ or the Word. Beginning with Philo, the Logos continually assumes an increasing role as the intermediary reality between the sensible realm and the higher realm. In Clement as in Christian thought this evolution reaches its climax with the identification of the Logos with Christ. In Clement furthermore the term has Gnostic connotations.

Clement continues: "But purified in his whole heart and having directed his mode of life to the highest pitch, grown beyond the size of the ordinary priest, briefly, being sanctified both in word and life, and having put on the bright array of glory, and having received the ineffable inheritance of that spiritual and perfect man, "which eye has not seen and ear has not heard and which has not entered into the heart of man", having become son and friend, he is now replenished with insatiable contemplation face to face. For there is nothing like hearing the Word Himself, who by means of the Scripture inspires fuller intelligence. For so it is said, "And he shall put off the linen robe that he had put on when he entered into the holy place and shall lay it aside there and wash his body in water in the holy place and put on his robe". But in no way, as I think, the Lord puts off and puts on by descending into the realm of sense, and in another, he who through Him has believed puts off and puts on, as the apostle intimated, the consecrated stole. Thence after the image of the Lord, the most appropriate were chosen from the sacred tribe to be high priests, and those elected to the kingly office and to prophecy were anointed" (*Str*. V 39, 1-40, 4). The act of putting off the robe is re-interpreted in the Christ descending-ascending motif. This descending act of Christ is an inspiration for us to ascend to higher realities as is symbolically represented by the High

Priests putting of the rich vestments on putting on the linen cloth. The higher realm in Clement is at times described according to the Gnostic perspective as ceaseless contemplation and at times as eternal rest, in which the highest spiritual beings reflect the divine reality.

Man's journey to God

Both Philo and Clement emphasize that the truth is not easy to grasp or comprehend. God according to Clement and Philo is difficult to grasp. However both authors diverge in their understanding on how this truth can be reached. Clement writes: "And in continuation he alludes also to the spiritual things, when he continues: "What is hidden or manifest I have known; for wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me". You have in brief the program of our philosophy. The learning of these branches, when pursued with right conduct, leads through wisdom, the artificer of all things, *to the Ruler of all, something that is difficult to grasp* and *apprehend, since it always recedes and withdraws from him who pursues it.* But he who is far off has come very near, oh ineffable marvel: "I am a God who draws near", says the Lord. He is remote in essence, for how could what is begotten have ever approached the Unbegotten, but very near in *power*, by which he holds all things in his embrace. "Shall one do things in secret, and shall I not see him?, Scripture says, for *the power* of God is always present, *taking hold* of us through the faculty of contemplation, beneficence and instruction. Wherefore *neither is he* ever *in some particular part, since he contains all and is not himself contained by anything*, either by limitation or by section (*Str*. II 5,3-6,4-*Post*. 5-18).

The way of the Gnostic is marked by the possession of peace and attainment of truth. "*Shifting*, changing and turning away is *congenial* to falsehood, as are *calmness* and rest and peace to the Gnostic" (*Str*. II 46,2-52,4- *Congr*. 83-106; *Post*. 22-29).

While Philo stresses contemplative knowledge as a means of attaining God he does recognise other avenues. These include Gods powers (*Post*. 14,20) and the divine words (*Post*. 18). These powers in their formative (ποιητικός) and corrective (κολαστήριος) aspects take hold of mankind (van den Hoek 1987: 151).

In Philo's view the universe has nine parts which are hierarchically structured from the celestial realm to the terrestrial. The ideal man

jumps this hierarchy to the tenth position. The numbers ten and one form a pairing because the tenth is simultaneously the perfect multiplicity and the One, namely the Creator. On the other hand Clement does not have the stress on the monos as Philo does. He does not stress the descent but man's ascending. Thus the reciprocal movement and the equalisation of one and ten is, therefore, dispensed with. Whereas in Philo the goal is somewhat vague, Clement stresses the knowledge of God as the main goal of the Gnostic.

According to Clement the ascent to God is possible through faith and knowledge (*γνωσις*) of the truth. Philo has the opposition between God and creation, while Clement the opposition between gnosis and false gnosis.

In both Philo and Clement we find the familiar stress on the necessity to detach oneself from the bodily and sensual passions. In doing so Clement evokes examples of ancient philosophers who reached the same conclusions. "Now the sacrifice which is acceptable to God is unwavering detachment from the body and its passions. This is the real, true piety. And it might be that, on this account, Socrates rightly calls philosophy the practise of death. For he who neither employs his eyes in the exercise of thought nor draws anything from his other sense, but uses pure mind itself to apprehend things, practices the true philosophy. This is, then, the import of the five years of silence prescribed by Pythagoras, which he enjoined on his disciples: that, abstracting themselves from the objects of sense, they might with the mind alone contemplate the Deity… It was from Moses that the eminent Greeks drew these philosophical tenets. For *he commands burnt offerings to be skinned and divided into parts*. For the Gnostic soul must be consecrated to the light, striped of the hide of matter, devoid of the frivolousness of the body and of all the passions, *which are acquired through vain and lying opinions*, and divested of the lusts of flesh. But most men, *clothed with what is perishable like snails, and rolled all round in a ball* in their excesses, *like hedgehogs, entertain the same ideas of the blessed and immortal* God as *of themselves* (*Str*. V 67,4-68,3-*Sacr*. 95-100).

The difficulty of finding and reaching God is implied in Clement's and Philo's commentary of the Genesis text. Clement elaborates further on Philo's interpretation of the place of Gods abode, which is inspired by the words of Genesis. Discovering Gods "place" is indicative of

a spiritual journey that one undertakes. In this statement there is an inherent paradox, while God is everywhere and is not confined to a place we have to embark on a pilgrimage to find the place of God's abode or in another words discover God in everything that surrounds us. "Again: *Abraham, when coming to the place that God told him of, looking up on the third day, sees the place from afar*". For the first day is that which is constituted by the sight of good things, and the second is the desire of the soul for the best; on the third, the mind perceives spiritual things, for *the eyes of understanding are opened* by the teacher who rose on the third day. The three days may be the mystery of the seal, by which one believes in Him who is really God" (*Str*. V 71,5-74,1-*Post*. 14,20; *Somn*. I 64-66).

In *Somn*. I 61, Philo interprets the word τόπος, basing himself on the phrase ἀπήντησε τόπω from Gen. 28: 11, but reinforcing his ideas with other biblical texts in which the word occurs. Philo distinguishes between a place which is filled by material form (σωμα), then the place of the divine word (ὁ θειος λόγος), which is filled by God with incorporeal powers (ἀσώματοι δυνάμεις), and finally the place of God himself. According to Philo this is called "place" because God contains everything and is contained by nothing; in that sense He himself is a place (van den Hoek 1987: 170).

The Genesis text obviously poses a contradiction, since how can one reach a place and see it from afar. Philo gives a hierarchical interpretation of "place". Thus "place" first means the divine logos and then God before the logos (*Somn*. I 65). The person who reaches the first (*logos*) under the guidance of wisdom only sees the second (God) from afar. This particular person is incapable of comprehending God and only sees him in a distance (*Somn*. I 66). However man on his journey is guided by God's helpers, which are the *logoi*, which heal and train people (*Somn*. I 60). Philo also mentions the divine *logos* in the singular as a divine helper on man's journey (*Somn*. I, 71).

Of course any spiritual advancement in Clement is linked to Christological terms. While Philo placed the emphasis on the contemplation of God, in Clement this emphasis is shifted more to the persona of Christ. In its final phase the soul progresses through sanctification to a divine abyss or infinite opening: τό ἀχανές ἁγιότητι

(*Str*. V 71,3; cf. *Str*. V 81,3, where the abyss is called *βυθός*)", (van den Hoek 1987: 172).

Knowledge of God and the doctrine of God

It is interesting to note that the concept of "knowing" God if it all is not such a prominent concept in the Pentateuchal tradition. In this regard Philo's stress on the knowledge of God is to an extent a new elaboration. Similarly Clement's idea of "knowing God" seems to build on this tradition and in Clement's case has an intimate relationship with his stress on Gnostic ideas. Clement stresses that the Divinity cannot be known by what it is, but only in what it is not (*Str.* V 71, 3). "The ultimate unity or objective achieved through the process is not conceived as a localised point (*σημείον*) but a position in thought" (van den Hoek 1987: 171). Clement has a more abstract concept of God than Philo and often the issue revolves around the knowledge of God. Honour and service to God are played down by Clement in favour of rational knowledge. Clement uses some of the terminology found in Philo to expand his own thought. As Philo so Clement stresses that it is impossible to know God and we can come close to God only by means of his power, the *δύναμις*, which is given by the Son as a gift of knowledge.

Both Philo and Clement are sceptical in one's ability to know God or adequately characterise Him. Just as Philo had done so Clement interprets the various anthropomorphisms as pedagogical devices and as devices which should be interpreted in an allegorical sense. We cannot ascribe to God any of the attributes of our creaturely existence. "But is has escaped their notice, though they be near us, *that* God *has bestowed on us ten thousand things in which He does not share: birth, being Himself unborn; food, He wanting nothing; and growth, He being always equal; and long life and happy death, He being immortal and incapable of growing old. Therefore* let no one imagine that *hands and feet*, mouth and eyes, *going in and coming out, anger* and threats are said by the Hebrews to be *passions of God*. By no means! But that some of these expressions are used more sacredly in an allegorical sense, which, as the discourse proceeds, we shall explain at the proper time". Concerning anthropo-morphic language in Philo and Clement van den Hoek writes: "Philo has linked the anthropomorphic way of speaking about God in the Bible

with the philosophical problem of the possibility (or rather impossibility) of knowing God… In this sense, he was Clement's predecessor, since it is along this same line that Clement has proceeded" (van den Hoek 1987: 219).

Clement as Philo adhered to the notion that God never ceases creating, an idea which already appears in Aristobulos (in *Eus*. *P.E. XIII* 12,11). Philo speaks of *poiein* (Leg. I 5) and Clement of *agathoergein* (*Str*. VI 141,7). Aristobulos further in *Eus*. *P.E*. XIII speaks that everything is created at once, but the various days are mentioned because of order. Clement expands on Philo and Aristobulos in that he argues that not everything is similar in value, an observation lacking in Philo and Aristobulos.

The powers, which were elaborated in Philo, are reduced in Clement to one power, which is centred on Christ.

Whereas in Philo the concepts of φύσις and God are closely linked and treated as equivalents, Clement avoids associating φύσις with God. Philo's close association of φύσις with God is the consequence of his view that the cosmos reflects God's work and is the primary vehicle of God's revelation. The cosmos reflects the divine *logos* and as noetic reality the cosmos *is* the divine *logos* in its creative power. If one contemplates the cosmos one can proceed to the farthest limits of the contemplation of God. The soul is linked to the cosmos in its capacity as a microcosm mirroring the macrocosm. Philo stresses that the law reflects the harmony of the cosmos. The law has an active dimension, since it was present in the creational process.

While Philo avoids linking *fusis* with God it does not necessarily imply that he rejects Philo's doctrine. In one passage Clement denies that salvation comes from nature (*Str*. II 10,2; 115,1-2; IV 89,4 and Exc. 54-57). Clement's avoidance of the term *fusis* in this context may have been the consequence of Clement's polemics against the followers of Valentinus and Basilides in which the *pneumatici* will find natural salvation (van den Hoek 1987: 226).

Clements use of Philo

It can be concluded that Philo's purpose is more apologetic in his writings. He defends the Jewish Laws from charges of particularism. Clement's purpose on the other hand is more polemical. This is marked

by the use of the first person plural in Clements writings (See *Str*. II 81, 3; 82,2; 86,4; 90,1; 96,4; 100,1). For example, Clement introduces his polemical theme by stating that the law educates for virtue; the verbs $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega$/$\pi\alpha\iota\delta\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ and $\delta\iota\delta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\omega$ are employed for this end (van den Hoek 1987: 112). In the first pair of words we have a hint of the Pauline idea that the law educates unto Christ (van den Hoek 1987: 112). Van den Hoek writes about Clements adaptation of Philonic ideas: "When Clements adaptation is held up to the light of its Philonic source, it becomes evident that Clement uses Philo's treatises entirely in service of his own objectives: that is, to show within a Christian polemical situation directed against Marcion and his followers that law and faith cannot be detached from one another" (van den Hoek 1987: 114). Osborne similarly concludes that "so far from plagiarizing, Clement is forcing Philo into a new mould" (Osborne vol. 116). Where Clement's project and Philo's converge it is in the defence of the value of philosophy, albeit Clement's defence is more pronounced due to the works aims and context.

While there are a lot of philosophical similarities in Clement and Philo it is also possible that they were using philosophical commonplaces or drawing on a widespread philosophical tradition, perhaps even using a philosophical anthology (van den Hoek 1987: 214).

Just as Philo, so Clement locates the ideas in the nous and that the nous is God (Str. 4.25.155.2), (Cher.49). The Human nous was darkened but can be enlightened through the Word Jesus. "For the image of God is his word, the true son of nous, the divine word and archetypal light of light, while the image of the word is the true man, the nous which is in man, who is therefore said to have been made "in the image and likeness of God', made like the divine word by inner wisdom and thereby made rational (ibid. 10.98.4).

While Clements work appears as a cut and paste work, Clement is an original thinker and presents his own ideas and uses Philo to serve his own ends. Clement at times also addresses his source, which indicates that he is critical of his source and does not take over everything indiscriminately. The "implied dialogue may take the form of a conjunction or an adverb that turns the borrowed material into a hypothesis rather than an assertion" (van den Hoek 1987: 216).

While in many cases Clement uses the same biblical quotations as found in Philo, on other occasions, Clement avoids using the Biblical quotes that Philo cites. Thus for example Clement does not quote the citations where the word *kremannumi* (to hang or be uncertain) appears, and which designates great misfortune: *Deut*. 28: (65), 66; "your life shall be hanging before your eyes", and *Deut*. 21: 23; "he who hangs on a tree is cursed of God". Obviously in a Christian setting this would appear awkward.

Sometimes we have the impression that Clement interprets a Biblical verse even more thoroughly than Philo does as in the case of *Str*. II 96, 3 where he interprets the verse of Leviticus even further than Philo.

God is very active in Philos narrative parts. This is not so much so in Clement. Both writers are more close in the non-narrative parts, when the philosophical background is more prominent.

In terms of Clement's and Philo's exegesis Osborn observes: "Clement's noetic exegesis makes reliance on plain parallels with Philo less appropriate. For what binds Clement to Philo is their common tradition of noetic, diairetic exegesis" (Osborne vol. 122).

In his description of the Life of Moses Clement engages in a traditional type of Jewish biblical interpretation. Burton Mack calls this type of interpretation the encomium, "…a kind of description of the patriarchs which retells the biblical story in such a way as to minimise or overlook offensive traits or deeds and idealise those which can illustrate certain virtues".

Clement occasionally does not display a systematic method in his borrowing techniques from Philo. Thus for example Clement does not often follow a given passage in Philo from beginning to end, but instead chooses a passage from the middle of the treatise and than proceeds to use another passage found in the beginning of Philo's treatise (van den Hoek 1987: 107). Clement often detaches sentences from their context in Philo, and therefore his work is often difficult to follow, and that is why without simultaneously reading Philo, Clements work might seem fragmented.

The technique where one jumps backwards to the beginning of a treatise from which one is borrowing may have a psychological or practical explanation if one author wants to use another's text, the book or scroll will be taken and leafed through (van den Hoek 1987: 216). In

searching for a passage that an author wanted to use the author could be struck by another passage which he just found interesting (van den Hoek 1987: 216).

Generally it can be concluded that the borrowings usually stay in the same sequence as they are found in the original source (van den Hoek 1987: 43). Further, the borrowings take a subordinate position to Philo's own themes (van den Hoek 1987: 43).

Many scholars have concluded that Philo had a copy of Philo's work at hand, which is suggested by the literal and sequential borrowings. It seems that Clements Stromateis would be incomprehensible without having at hand Philo as an underlying text (van den Hoek 1987: 215). Van den Hoek suggests that the *Stromateis* could have been a kind of teacher's notes, which could have functioned independently, since they are well composed and polished writings (van den Hoek 1987: 215).

Due to the fact that now is all "clear" thanks to the person of Jesus, the exegesis of the Mosaic Law is less important in Clement as it is in other Christian writers. This does not mean that Clement disposes of exegesis as such. As Philo, Clement is a firm adherent of the allegorical method of interpretation. Clement believes that allegory carries the text to a new spiritual dimension. He believes that often it is necessary to read the Laws through an allegorical interpretation, since this transcends the Laws to reach their true meaning and dimension. Often for Clement the hermeneutic is to be found in Christ himself who Himself transcended the Laws. Clement can allegorise with a short formula (See *Str.* II 81, 2; 81,4; 88,2; 93,1; 94,5; 95,1; 98,2) or in a more extensive form (See *Str*. II 96,1/2; 99,3). For example in terms of the short example in *Str*. II 81, 4 Clement alludes to martyrdom in connection with courage and in regard to the more extensive example we may note *Str*. II 96,1-2 where he makes a link occasioned by the numbers three and four, with the time of preparation and accomplishment of faith. In a few cases, Clement explains the borrowing with an etymology or though that he may have derived from a different passage in Philo (See *Str*. II 84,5; 86,3; 88,2).

Not all early Fathers agreed with Clement's interpretation of the Bible. Clement stands in opposition to Tertullian and Irenaeus in terms of Biblical interpretation. Tertullian and Irenaeus rejected endless

questions regarding Scripture (Irenaeus Haer. 2.26), (Tertullian De anima 2.7). Clement on the other hand insisted on the use of logical reasoning in the expounding of Scripture and the dialectic of question and answer (Str. 1.29.45). The dialectic should find the akolouthia of Scripture. Tertullian rejected overt philosophising and claimed that Biblicist controversy, never achieved anything but pains in the belly and in the brain (Praescr. 16.2). Victory was either nonexistent or uncertain (Praescr. 19.1).

Philo uses the term *doxa* as "honor of" the one God through which the Hebrews are united with an indissoluble bond. Clement uses the word in a less emphatic way as "notion" or "opinion".

Just as Philo argued that it is necessary to use exegesis in order to uncover the spirit of the Bible so Clement argued that one must search out the hidden *nous* of the sayings of Jesus. Clement even suggests that the simple sayings of Jesus are deceptive in their simplicity and in fact have deeper meanings which need to be uncovered (Quis dives salvetur 5.2).

Similarly to Philo, Clement usually has a biblical starting point, which is followed by an allegorical interpretation usually taken over from Philo, which in turn is followed by interpretations from other sources or compiled by Clement himself (van den Hoek 1987: 216). In this regard the links between the ideas and images is not clear and appears vague, usually centring on a specific number (van den Hoek 1987: 216).

An important reason for Clements use of Philo is also Philo's use of Biblical texts. Clement furthermore uses Biblical texts, which are otherwise not found in other Christian writers, which seems to confirm Clement's dependence on Philo.

Van den Hoek concluded that "Clement employs Philo for biblical interpretation on a total of 61 occasions; this corresponds to nearly half of all borrowings (49 per cent)", (van den Hoek 1987: 221)."The second main stream is formed by borrowings that focus on philosophical or theological concepts" (van den Hoek 1987: 222). "They amount to 59 of the 125 instances" (van den Hoek 1987: 222).

In terms of the evidence from the *Stromateis* Van den Hoek writes: "*It seems fair to say that the interpretation of Scripture has been Clements most important focus of attention in the writings of Philo… Next in impor-*

tance are a number of philosophical and theological concepts, of which the concept of God was the most strongly represented… In this last category as well, half of the cases have biblical connections… The total of borrowings involving biblical quotations or biblical reminiscences, in fact, proves to be three-quarters of the total, and the importance of a biblical background for Clements selection could hardly be more strikingly evident" (van den Hoek 1987: 223).

The etymological meaning is often widened by Clement usually due to Christological concerns. Isaac, who is connected with *to automathes* in Philo, is enlarged by Clement to become a type of Christ. Abraham is not only called *pistos* but also *dikaios*. Clement also takes over various etymologies that often have a classical origin and of course Philo was a rich source for these.

Generally it can be said that Clement displays three modes of borrowing from Philo. In the first mode, Clement verbatim repeats imagery and Biblical texts from Philo (See *VM* I 23). The second mode is represented by texts with a certain degree of similarity with Philo's texts (See *Str*. II 78-100, which is similar to *De Vertutibus*). The third mode consists of texts, which have little relation to Philo's intentions or writings. These texts usually focus on specifically Christian interpretations. In this regard Clement can also use terms which are specifically products of his own thought, such as the term *epopteia*, which does not appear in Philo and Clement seems to be a pioneer of this term.

Philo and Origen

Another author exhibiting a strong influence from Philo is Origen. Origen was to employ the allegorical method of interpretation very liberally in terms of Biblical interpretation. Of course, Origen fell into disfavour among later Fathers partly due to his theology. Origen's use of Philo undoubtedly was influenced by Clement's use of Philo. However, Origen himself admired Philo and could have drew much inspiration from his writings.

Parallels between Philo and Origen can be drawn in exegetical practices as well as in terms of themes and imager. Philo often inspires Origen in his exegesis of a given text. This inspiration can result in Origen further expanding the insights of Philo mainly in a Christocentric framework. The task of comparing Origen and Philo is an extensive one and not yet completed. Scholarship working in this area has established firmly that Origen did rely on Clement in a number of aspects. Of course in terms of exegesis itself various parallels can be drawn.

Origen mentions both Philo and Aristobulos by name and claims that the works of these authors were very popular (*Cels*. 4. 51 (CW Ch.R). Origen even recommends Philo (*Cels*. 6.21 (GCS SC Ch). In one instance Origen writes about Philo quoting his work: "*And Philo in many of his works on the law of Moses, which are so highly regarded among intelligent people says in a book which he entitled On that the worse is accustomed to attack the better that it is better to be an eunuch than to rage after illicit intercourse*" (*Mat*. *Com* 15. 3 (GCS).

In certain instances Origen presents Philo's allegorical interpretation or ideas in practically identical form, while in other instances the dependancy is less clear. Origen of course uses extensively allegory in his interpretations.

Origen's use of Philo could have partly been bridged by Clement. Thus a popular theme appearing in Philo and Clement is the allegory of the Hagar and Sarah story. Here Hagar represents preparatory training, which should be concluded with the study of philosophy and wisdom represented by Sarah. Similarly Origen presents Greek philosophy as preparatory training (τις των πρό ήμων) for Christianity (*Ep. Greg.* 1; *Congr*. 79-80), (CW).

In certain passages while Origen refers to Philo's interpretation he does not agree with it. This is the case with Philo's interpretation of the creation of the world in six days. Philo argues that the Creator did not need any length of time to create the world, and that the six days is only to serve for pedagogical reasons and to indicate order whereas creation took place simultaneously. Origen quotes this interpretation but does not agree with it (*Gen*. *Cat* B (PG 12, 97BC); (Opif. 13, 67 (R)).

One element in common between Origen and Philo is the extensive use of etymologies. Both authors utilize etymologies in order to arrive at interpretations. This is especially in relation to Biblical names and characters.

Another element which is popular in both authors is arithmological speculation in the Pythagorean manner. For example Philo and Origen comment on the number six. Six is the most appropriate number in relation to the ordering of things. Philo comments that the number has two equal halves; its half forms a triad, its third a dyad, and its sixth a monad. The number six is formed by the multiplication of its female and male parts, female being equal, male being odd. Origen has a similar interpretation of the number six arguing that its two parts are equal, and that it is formed by adding 1+2+3 and also by multiplying 2 and 3. (*Io*. *Com* 28. 1 (GCS); *Opif*. 13).

On occasions Philo and Origen quote and interpret Old Testament texts, which are only rarely quoted by other Christian writers up to the time of Origen, which again suggests that Origen was basing himself on Philo.

The text in Gen. 30: 42 speaks of Laban having an unmarked flock (ἄσημος) while Jacob's flock was marked (ἐπίσημος). Philo concludes that unmarked means an ignorant and uneducated soul. Origen provides a similar interpretation concluding that "being marked" applies to either different "ways of life" (ἤθη) or to different "nations" (ἔθνη) that are governed by the word of God. Here Philo and Origen use the same text, which is rather uncommon in the Christian writers before Origen's period (*Cels*. 4.43; *Fug*.9 (CW), (van den Hoek 49).

Origen is the first Christian to quote the Biblical text Gen. 24: 63 ("Isaac went out into the plain to meditate towards the evening"). Philo interprets this text in line with the view, that the conversation will be with God and that in order to converse with God one needs to be free

from earthly cares. Origen gives a similar interpretation implying that if one was to have a conversation about divine things one should not be entangled with earthly affairs (*Gen*. *Cat*. (PG 12, 120B); (*Leg*. 3. 42-43 (CW add.).

Both Philo and Origen comment on the unusual text of Num. 16: 47-48 (17: 12-13 LXX). This text concerns Aaron who stands between the living and the dead. In Philo's interpretation Aaron is the sacred word, which is located in between holy and impious thoughts, or as shown in another version as that one who progresses amidst the wise and the foolish. Referring to predecessors Origen gives an identical interpretation to that of Philo commenting that the dead are understood as dead in their sins, while the living abide in the works of life. (*Num*. *Hom* 9. 5 (GCS SC) *Her*. 201 (CW R).

One of the most literal citations by Origen of Philo's text can be seen in relation to Philo's interpretation of Moses' speech in Num. 27: 16-17. Here Philo enacts a discussion concerning Moses' succession; thus rhetorical questions are posed by bystanders: "What do you say, Lord, Do you not have legitimate sons? Do you not have nephews? At best, elave the rule to your sons, for they are naturally the first heirs in line, but if you deem them unfit, leave it to your nephews'. Origen has a similar rhetorical setting: "What are you dealing with (or speaking) Moses? Do you not have sons, Gersom and Eliezar? Or, if you have any doubt about them, does your brother not have sons, great and distinguished men?". While some of the details in this passage vary between Origen and Philo the parallel is almost identical and is based on the same biblical text (*Num*. *Hom*. 22. 4; *Virt*. 59 (CW vdH).

Philo and Origen give a similar interpretation of Det. 13: 5 ("You shall walk after the Lord, your God"), which according to Philo means the compliance of the soul with God's ordinances (Cels. 7. 34 (Ch), Migr. 131 (CW).

There are notable parallels between Origen and philo in terms of cosmology. The creation of the world is compared by Philo with the work of an architect who designs plans and then executes them. Origen links the creational story with the prologue of the Gospel of John (1: 4) and as Philo had done speaks of models (τύποι) of the architectural plan (*Io*. *Com* 1.114 (GCS SC), (*Opif*. 17-18).

Philo writes that after creating the incorporeal world God created the firmament (στερέωμα) which had corporeal qualities, since the body is naturally solid (στερεός). The firmament or "heaven" (οὐρανός) being body-like is in contrast to the noetic and incorporeal. Origen has a similar interpretation, which also appears in Clement (*Gen. Hom*.1.2 (GCS); (*Opif*. 36 (CW).

In terms of the worlds creation Philo questions how certain interpreters interpret the beginning of creation in a temporal sense and Philo states that time came into existence either during creation or after it. Origen similarly states that the beginning of the world was not something temporal. Calcidius seems to confirm dependance of Origen on Philo stating: "but Origen shows that he is persuaded by Hebrew's that a temporal begining is out of the question, and that there was neither any time before the adornment of the world nor changes of day and night, in which spaces of time hae been measured out (Calcidius, In Plat. Tim., 276). The Hebrew here is Philo, since his name is mentioned directly afterwards (*Gen. Hom*. 1.1 (GCS SC); (*Opif*. 26).

The sentence in Gen. 1: 2 "there was darkness above the abyss" is interpreted by Philo as referring to the air which is over the void (the empty space in the cosmos). Origen mentions the words "outer darkness" (σκότος ἐξώτερον) in connection with his commentary on the parable of the talents (Mt. 25: 14-30). Origen links "outer darkness" with the creation account. In this regard he mentions a predecessor who said that darkness and abyss were outside the cosmos. In relation to the Gospel text Origen writes: "if there is darkness above the abyss, and this then is outside the cosmos, as some say; accordingly the villians of the whole cosmos are being thrown out into that abyss, while nothing gives light to the things outside the construction of the whole cosmos" (*Mat. Com*. Ser 69 (GCS); *Opif*. 32 (R).

Around the time of Philo there was a tradition of discussing the arrangement of spheres in heaven and the ascent of the souls. Clement also stands in this tradition (see *Str*. 2. 51, 7. 56-57). Commenting on Jacob's ladder (*Gen*. 28: 12) Philo gives an account of the heavenly spheres, which extend in heavenly rings from the sphere close to the earth to that of the moon. The sphere which is closest to the earth is inhabited by incorporeal souls, some of which descend into bodies while others rise up. The whole universe is occupied by various living

beings. Origen writes that after death the saints depart to a place called Paradise by Scripture, which is called by Origen a "lecture hall" or "school" for the souls (*…quem paradisum dicit scriptura divina, velut in quodam eruditionis loco et, ut ita dixerium, auditorio vel schola animarum…*). That person who has a pure heart and mind will progress more rapidly through the various "mansions". Here there is a linguistic explanation, which is possibly conditioned by the Latin translation specifying that : "…mansions, which the Greeks called "spheres"-i.e. globes-but which divine scripture names "heavens" (*…mansiones quas Graeci quidem* σφαίρας id est globos appellaverunt, scriptura vero divina caelos nominat), (*Princ* 2. 11.6 (GCS), *Somn*. 1. 134ff.). The them of ascension and descension, which is already found in the account of Jacob's Ladder (Gen. 28: 12) was to become a popular feature amongst the Fathers suggesting an interpretation in terms of the Christological ascension and descent of Jesus.

In relation to the fifth day of creation Philo writes about the five senses. Sense-perception separates us from animals and inanimate objects. The five sense include vision, hearing, taste, smell and touch. The objects of sense-perception include: colours, sounds, savors, perfumes and experiences dealing with touch such as softness and hardness, hot and cold, smoothness and roughness. Origen states that God is not accesible to sense-perception (cf. Clement, *Str*. 5.33.6). According to Origen each sense has a special ability for its function: sight is connected with colour, shape and size; hearing with voice and sound; smell with vapors, both pleasant and unpleasant; taste with flavors, found in things hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and smooth. Origen's and Philo's treatment of the senses has an Aristotelian background (see *De Anima* 422f). Aristotle argues that sense-perception is the main means of acquiring knowledge. While in terms of senses we cannot establish a certain dependance between Origen and Philo, we can see here how both authors use Aristotelian categories of senses and his idea of the co-ordination of the senses in a Platonic environment; they follow the lines of Plato by drawing a sharp contrast between sense perception and thought (van den Hoek 2000: 108).

Apart from similarities in cosmological interpretation, Origen has a similar understanding of the make up of man. As was hinted Philo contrasts man as understood in the physical sense being modelled

through the earth and man as the image of God. The man in the physical sense is sense-perceptible (αἰσθητός), participates in quality (μετέχων ποιότητος), consists of body and soul, is either man or woman, and is mortal. The latter man is a kind of idea (ἰδέα), type (γένος) or seal (σφραγίς), noetic, incorporeal, neither male nor female, incorruptible in nature. To support his interpretation Philo uses both Gen. 1: 26 and Gen. 2: 7 interchangeably in which case either of the texts can be used to support the interpretation of man in the physical or heavenly sense. Origen similarly writes, that man can be understood as created (factus) or being modelled (plasmatus) and further writes that the man creating in the image of God is "our" inferior man, invisible and incorporeal, incorruptible and immortal. Calcidius in this regard follows Philo closely and earlier on mentioned Origen and it is likely that his use of Philo came via Origen (*Gen. Hom* 1. 13 (GCS); *Opif.* 134 (CW).

In order for one to be worthy of the world one has to confirm to the divine image in his mind and be transformed into a small cosmos. The vestments of the priest represent the cosmos. Origen compares the tabernacle of God with the soul. Here Origen comments on Philo's passage: "*for if, as some before us have said, this tabernacle has the shape of the whole world and each of the individual people can have a likeness of the world, why cannot also each individual accomplish in himself the form of the tabernacle*". While Philo does not strictly compare the tabernacle of God with the soul, but rather discusses the soul as the image bearer in the context of the interpretation of the high priests vestments, Origen clearly was inferring to Philo (*Ex. Hom* 9.4 (SC); *Mos*. 2. 135 (vdH), (van den Hoek 58).

Philo interprets the designation of "elder" in the Scriptures (πρεσβύτερος) as not necessarily implying old in terms of age, but in terms of wisdom (…πρεσβύτερος ἐλέχθη ὁ σοφός). Thus Abraham while shortlived, is called "elder" (Gen. 24: 1). Similarly Origen comments that certain predecessors have noticed that being old in Scriptural terms does not designate age but wisdom. He supports his observation by using the same arguments and cites the same text from Num. 11: 16 as Philo does. He also refers to Moses and Abraham as Philo had done (Ios. Hom 16. 1 (GCS SC); Sobr. 16-18 (CW R).

Interpreting Gen. 6: 2 ("and when the angels of God saw the daughters of men" …), Philo states that the angels were souls that descended from higher regions to be incarnated into bodies. Commenting on the same text Origen mentions a predecessor although without definite terms ("some have understood that the descent hinted at the way down of the souls into bodies, interpreting "daughters of men" in a figurative way as an earthly tent (*Io. Com* 6. 217; *Gig*. 12 (CW R).

In Philo's thought the Pharaoh usually was interpreted in terms of the things pertaining to the body and sensual pleasure. Commenting on Gen. 40: 20 Philo discusses the celebration of the Pharaoh's birthday, which according to Philo stirs up passions and desires. Pharaoh's birthday is then allegorically connected with perishability. Origen quotes the same biblical text, and mentions predecessors and criticizes those that celebrate their birthdays in immoderate ways. Origen hints at a dependance on Philo when he writes: "one of our predecessors noticed Pharaoh's birthday, recorded in Genesis, and stated that it is the wicked person who, loving matters of birth, celebrates his birthday. We, however, who take our starting point from that person (i.e. Philo), do not find a birthday celebrated by a righteous person in any scriptural passage (*Mat*. *Com* 10. 22 (GCS SC); *Ebr*. 208-209), (CW R).

Just as the Pharaoh was associated with pleasure and the body, Philo gives an etymology of Egypt, which represents it as an image of bodily pleasures. Departing from Egypt equals departing the life of sensual pleasure into the life of virtue (see for example *Migr*. 18, *Her*. 316). Origen writes that the departure from Egypt can be understood in two ways "as already often has been said both by predecessors and by us". Origen further continues to give an interpretation similar to Philo's contrasting the darnkness of sins with the light of understanding and earthly intercourse is opposed to a spiritual disposition (*Num.Hom* 26.4 (GCS SC), *Migr*. 18, *Post*. 155 (vdH).

Origen similarly to Philo views anthropomorphic language as a pedagogical device and which does not reflect the realities of God. According to Origen anthropomorphic language is used due to human weakness (*Gen*. *Hom*. 4. 5 (GCS); *Conf*. 134). Anthropomorphic language is an educational tool according to Philo. Similarly doctors can lie to their patients in order for them to benefit, since if a patient hears the

truth he may be discouraged from further benefits. Origen has a similar example of the doctor and patient. The creator is like a doctor lying to his patient. The parallel is very close between Philo and Origen when direct discourse is utilized (*Ier. Hom* 20.3 (GCS); *Deus* 65 (CW).

It is not surprising that Origen uses strong Christological terms as a hermenetuical key in his interpretations. Thus as with Clement of Alexandria, various interpretations which are similar to Philo are coloured in Christological terms. This is seen for example in relation to the interpretation of Lev. 10: 8-10 in both authors (the injunction to Aaraon to go up to the altar soberly). Philo states that the nature of true priesthood means a dual abstinence from wine but also from moral aberrations. The priesthood points to the spiritual altar of incorporeal virtue. Origen's interpretation is different to that of Philo, mainly due to the fact that Origen concentrates on Christological terms. However, Origen's use of such concepts as virtue, the distinction between sobreity or virtue and drunkeness or vice (see also *Ebr*. 23), the sobriety of the mind, the contrast of the body and soul, mystic perception carry a distinctly Philonic flavour (*Lev. Hom*. 7. 1 (GCS SC); *Ebr*. 127-131).

Augustine and Philo

Augustine names Philo specifically in his work against the Manichean Faustus (around 398), desribing him as *vir liberaliter eruditissimus, unus illorum, cuius eloquim Graeci Platoni aequare non dubitant* (one who belongs to the Jewish camp, a man of exceedingly wide learning, whose style the Greeks do not hesitate to equate with Plato's), (*C. Faust.* 12.39). However, Augustine also criticises Philo stating that Philo's main mistake was not to interpret the Old Testament in a Christocentric manner.

There are indications of some parallels between Augustines exegesis and Philo's. Thus for example both Philo and Augustine interpret and link the verses of Exodus 3: 15 and 3: 14. This link between these verses is only found in Augustine and does not appear in other Christian Fathers, thereby suggesting a influence from Philo. However, in comparing Augustine and Philo we must realise that a long period separates these authors, and it is difficult to determine if in various instances Augustine is influenced directly from Philo or whether this influence is rather through the mediatorship of a different Father or writer.

A popular motif which Augustine utilises and which is also a popular theme in Philo is the Hagar and Sarah motif. However this motif was popular in a variety of authors. Already Galatians 4: 24-26 uses the images of Hagar and Sarah, which represent tht two Tesaments. In his exegesis of Hagar and Sarah Paul utilises similar exegetical techniques as Philo. Augustine converted these two into cities and in this image seems to come close to Philo (Pablo Martin 284).

Another comparison between Augustine and Philo can be drawn by Revelation 3: 12 and 21: 2. In this regard Pablo Martin writes: "Here we have to do with an idea that has antecedents in Judaism, that Augustine receives enriched by the exegesis of Tyconius, but with antecedents in Philo Somn. 2.250" (Pablo Martin 284). "But the Philonic elements in Augustine amply exceed the limits of these New Testament traditions" (Pablo Martin 1991:284).

Philo and the Trinity

It hardly needs to be mentioned that Philo's understanding of the Logos and its mediatory role as well as cosmological divisions could have influenced later Fathers in the formulation of the Trinitarian dogma. Even if there was no direct influence of thought, it remains highly likely that Philo's formulations together with other philosophical concepts from Hellenistic philosophy facilitated the later conceptualisation of the Trinitarian dogma in philosophical terms drawn from the Greek philosophical environment.

In this regard one may mention an interesting reference to Philo is found in the Church Father Isidore of Pelusium, who mentions Philo in his letters. Isidore of Pelusium was a priest of the Church of Pelusium to the east of the Nile delta. He came into a sharp conflict with the bishop Eusebius, due to the fact that Isidore was appalled at the immorality of the local clergy. He retired to the desert. He was possibly born in Alexandria around 365-375 (as we can conjecture from his letters). He probably was educated to some degree in Alexandria.

What is interesting in Isidore's account is that he suggests that Philo implies the theology of the Trinity in his writings, even if Philo did not come to a precise formulation. Isidore mentions Philo's doctrine of the Logos as a God as one of the steps towards a theology of the Trinity. As was hinted above Philo's doctrine of the Logos as God was a truly original development and may have influenced early Christian theology in its ready identification of the historical person of Jesus Christ with the Greek philosophical concept of the Logos.

In one of his epistles Isidore writes: "*I admire the truth for the way in which she has induced the souls of intelligent men even to combat the preconceived opinion they have of their own doctrines. For the teaching of the truth has embedded the concept of the holy Trinity so clearly and lucidly also in the Old Testament for those who wish to observe it that Philo, though a Jew and a zealous one at that, in the writings which he left behind comes into conflict with his own religion. When he examines the words spoken by God, "in the image of God I made man (Gen. 9: 6)", he is constrained and compelled by the truth also to recognise the divine Logos as God. What is the case? Even if he calls him who is coeternal with the Father "second", and "higher than number and time", failing therein to reach precision, (10) nevertheless he did gain*

a conception of another person. And not only did this happen to him in this instance, but also when he attempted to interpret the expression "God and Lord" he gained a conception of the most royal (or highest) Trinity". Isidores letter to Paul (Ep. 2.143=Ep. 643 Evieux translation Runia).

Isidore also writes in this letter that the reason why the doctrine of the Trinity was not revealed outright to the Jews in the Old Testament was that the Jews would not comprehend it and would slide into polytheism, which was there constant temptation. Further he writes: "*The assumption of different natures is Hellenic, the assumption of a single person or hypostasis is Judaic. To extend the hypostase to the holy Trinity and contract them into a single being is absolutely true and orthodox doctrine*". One can say that Philo also believed in the gradual revelation of the law. The term prosopon is of course unknown to Philo, as the terminus technicus term for persons of the Godhead. Sometimes Philo speaks in biblical terms of oracles coming ἐκ προσώπου του θεου (e.g. Mut. 13, 39).

Later Gregory of Nyssa, believed that certain Neo-Arians exploited Philo's writings, since they adhered to notions of the ontologically superior Godhead (Runia vol. iv, 69). Runia writes: "The schema that Gregory has in mind is the same used later by Isidore of Pelusium, that the truth of orthodoxy stands midway between the error of Hellenic polytheism and Judaic monotheism, with the Christian heresies deviating to the one or the other side" (Runia vol. iv. 69). There is a tendency in Ambroses writings to correct Philo's view of the subordination of the Logos to the Godhead (Savon 1977: 118-139).

Christian Mystical theology and Philo

In terms of mystical theology a number of Christian authors display similar concepts as Philo does. These have to do with the journey of the soul to God and the goal of the spiritual journey of humankind.

Certain Christian writers emphasise the intellectual nature of the soul's goal. Thus the goal is knowledge of the divine realities. In this regard they come close to Philo's thought. An intellectualist understanding of the soul's journey is stressed in Origen's thought. According to Origen our relationship with God is of a cognitive character. The mystical union of the soul with the Logos results in the "light of knowledge" for Origen (*Cant*. 3; GCS 33.202.27-203.2). Origen also mentions a joyful and loving personal contact with God as the goal of the soul it is to "touch the hem of his garment", to "take him in our arms" as Simeon did, and find in him our "peace" (*Hom*.15 in Lc 1 (GCS 49.93f.).

In the work *De principiis* Origen writes that the "vision" of the incorporeal God which is offered to the "pure heart" is "to understand and to know him with the mind" (*Princ*. 1.1.9). The union with God is the end of the natural desire of the human being to know the causes of things (*Princ*. 2.11.4). Paul's sentence "being with Christ" is interpreted by Origen as the knowledge of the secretes of the visible world and the answers to questions springing from the Scripture or in other words a heavenly "school for souls" (*Princ*. 2.11.4).

Origen further interprets Paul's phrase, "God will be in all" (1 Cor. 15: 28) in terms of the perfection of the human knowledge of God: "He will be "all" in every individual in this way: that whatever the reasonable mind, purged from all stain of vice and thoroughly cleansed from the cloud of evil, can feel or understand or think, all will be God, nor will he then feel anything else but God, but he will think God, see God, hold God, and God will be the shape and measure of all his movements" (*Princ*. 3.6.3; Cf. *Hom*. 27 in Num. 12 (GCS 30.273.21-25; 275.11-13).

Gregory of Nyssa similarly to Philo and Origen ascertains the utter unknowability of God's nature: "*This is the Being in which, to use the words of the Apostle, all things are formed… It is above beginning, and presents no marks of its inmost nature: it is to be known of only in the*

impossibility of perceiving it. That indeed is its most special characteristic (ἰδιαίτατον γνώρισμα), that its nature is too high for any distinctive attribute (παντός χαρακτηριστικου νοήματος ὑψηλότεραν), (Eun. 1.373 (GNO 1.137.1-8; tr. H. Wace, NPNF 2.5 (1892), cf. V.Mos. 2.234 (SC 1 bis, 266): "*The proper characteristic (gnwrisma) of the divine nature is to lie beyond every characteristic*").

"The allegorical interpretation of Moses Midianitic sojourn in Gregorys and Philos De vita Moysis is compared in order to illustrate the different exegetical approach of both authors" (Dihle 1996: 329-335). "Their exegesis of Ex. 33 too has a different focal point: according to Philo God grants Moses a prophetic vision of the noetic world, according to Gregory man reaches perfection by never attaining the end of his striving" (Dihle 1996: 329-335). "In this text Gregory come closer to Platos Phaedrus than later Platonism" (Dihle 1996: 329-335).

In chapter I 3 of the *Mystical Theology*, Dionysius the Areopagite presents the ascension of Moses and his entry into the darkness as the model for every mystical ascent.

Just as was the case with Philo, so in Gregory of Nyssa Moses is the par excellance exampleof an "ascent" experience towards God. Moses ascent is a model for Christians in their aspiration towards God. According to Gregory of Nyssa the desire to penetrate the mysteries of the divine being are an aspect of the intellects dynamism. After Moses had conquered all obstacles, through ascetic practice he was "led on to the ineffable knowledge of God (τή ἀπορρήτω ἐκείνη θεογνωσία), (*V. Mos*. 2.152 (SC 1bis, 202.5f.). The contemplation of God does not involve any sense perception, but is a kind of "climb" into complete darkness, where all our concepts have to be done away with. Gregory writes: "Scripture teaches… that religious knowledge comes at first to those who receive it as light. Therefore what is perceived to be contrary to religion is darkness… But as the mind progresses and, through an ever greater and more perfect dilligence, comes to apprehend reality, as it approaches more nearly to contemplation (θεωρία), its sees more clearly what of the divine nature is not to be contemplated. For leaving behind everything that is observed, not only what sense comprehends but also what the intelligence thinks it sees, it keeps on penetrating deeper, until, by the intelligence's busy activity (πολυπραγμοσύνη), it gains access to the invisible and the incomprehensible, and there it sees

God. This is the true knowledge of what is sought; this is the seeing that consists in not seeing, because that which is sought transcends all knowledge, being separated on all sides by incomprehensibility as by a kind of darkness. Wherefore John the sublime, who penetrated into the luminous darkness (en two lampro gnosfo), says, "No one has ever seen God", thus asserting that knowledge of the divine essence is unattainable not only by human beings but also by every intelligent creature" (V. Mos. 162f. 210.7-212.13; tr. A. J. Malherbe and E. Ferguson, Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York 1978) 95 (altered).

The process of moving towards God entails a self-transcendence actualized through love and knowledge, which is called by Gregory epektasis, "moving beyond (oneself)" (*Hom*.6 in *Cant*. (GNO 6.173f.). True knowledge entails the growth beyond the knowledge we already have: "This truly is the vision of God: never to reach satiety in the desire to see him. Rather, by looking at what one can see, one must always allow one's desire to see more be kindled anew. Thus no limit could interrupt growth in the ascent to God, since no limit to the Good can be found, nor is our increase of desire for the Good brought to an end because it is satisfied" (*V. Mos*. 2.239 (SC 1bis. 270; tr. Malherbe and Ferguson 116 (altered).

The vision of God entails a growth in virtue and the annihilation of passions: "The Lord does not say it is blessed to know something about God, but to have God present within oneself. "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God"… By this we should learn that if a person's heart has been purified from every creature and all unruly affections, he will see the Image of the Divine Nature in his own beauty… hence, if someone who is pure of heart sees himself, he sees in himself what he desires; and thus he becomes blessed, because when he looks at his own purity, he sees the archetype in the image" (Beat. 6 (PG. 1272 B: tr. Graef, 148f (altered).

Gregory of course links our progression towards God with Jesus Christ. Our human characteristics (ἰδιώματα) are repaired through the union with Christ. It is through Jesus Christ that we can now fully participate in God. The believer through an "ascent" is transformed into the characteristics of God through the transformation of our idiwmata.

Gregory adopts the famous Philonic theme of "sober drunkenness" to describe the mystical knowledge now available to humankind through the works of Jesus Christ. In terms of Christ Gregory writes in his treatise *On Perfection*: "He who is beyond all knowledge and understanding, the ineffable and unutterable and inexplicable one, has himself become an "image of the invisible God" out of love for humanity, that he might make you once again into an image of God; his purpose was that he might be formed in you in his own form, which he has taken up, and that you might once again be shaped through him to correspond to that form of the archetypal beauty, and so become what you were from the beginning" (GNO 8/1.194.14-195.5), (translation Daley vol ?).

As observed by Daley, "Gregory succeeds in combining Philo's emphases on God's radical inconceivability with Origen's Christo-centrism" (Daley vol. 8). While employing concepts of knowledge in our ascent to God Gregory in fact transcends the concepts of knowledge, since he argues that any penetration of the mysteries of God entails a moving beyond the cognitive faculties and simply resting in God through grace.

In terms of of the concept of passions, some Christian Fathers display influence from Greek thought and possibly also from Philo. For example in the letter to the priest Zosimus (Ep. 3.81=Ep. 881 Evieux) Isidore writes: "*And then there is Philo, a man reputed, on account of the sublimity of his language, to be either the disciple or teacher of Plato, for it has been said concerning them that "either Plato philonised or Philo platonised"*. Isidore further writes: "*Just as the person who turns from the better to the worse is moved, so the same happens to him who turns from the worse to the better. Passion is a term for change*"

Isidores letter divides the passions (πάθη) into good and bad. Passion is identifed with turning (τροπή). Good passions occur when one turns from the worse to the better.

In regards to the passions we must distinguish between the Stoic and Platonic positions. The Old Stoa associates passion with turning (τροπή) or change in the pneuma, i.e. passion occurs when the soul loses its proper tension through faulty judgment of the rational faculty (cf. *Diog*. *Laert*. 7.158 (not in SVF 3), Cl. Alex. *Str*. 2.72.1 (=SVF 3.422), (Runia 1991:315). The Stoics did not believe in the existence of good

passions but only in εύπαθειαι. When one attains the ideal of άπάθεια, he does not succumb to feelings of pity or compassion. If one turns to the right tension the passions cease, while if he turns to the wrong tension the passions occur.

It was a mark of Middle Platonism to attribute the passions to the irrational part of the soul. In this regard Middle Platonism was influenced by the Posidonian revision of the Stoic theory. At Alcinous Did. 32.1 πάθος is defined as κίνησις άλογος ψυχης ώς έπί κακω ή ώς έπί άγαθω (irrational motion of the soul as if to something good or to something evil)", (Runia 1991:315). The passions are further divided into the tame (pleasure, anger, pity etc.) and the wild (ridicule, Schadenfreude, misanthropy). In Platonism the ideal is often not άπάθεια but μετριοπάθεια, although some Middle Platonists incline to the more rigorous Stoic view. Platonists closer to Isidores time distinguish between μετριοπάθεια in the social realm and άπάθεια in the contemplative realm (cf. Porphyry Sent. Ad intell. 32)", (Runia 1991:316). In Porphyry the trope is connected to the τροπή and such turning is a matter of the body (to which the irrational soul is connected) and not of the incorporeal rational soul" (Runia 1991:316).

In Philo's thought the trope of the soul is almost always a negative event (cf. Leg. 2.33, 83, Sacr. 127, Mut. 239, but at Sacr. 137 τό ήγεμονικόν πολλάς πρός έκάτερον τό τε ευ καί χειρον τροπάς λαμβάνον)", (Runia 1991:316). While Philo is a supporter of *apatheia* for the sage and God he is prepared to acknowledge "good" passions such as mercy and hatred of evil (Runia 1991: 316).

Philo and the allegorical method of interpretation

The meaning of allegory

Philo's allegorical treatises are mostly represented in the *Allegorical Commentary*. However, allegorical exegesis also occurs in the *Exposition of the Law* the *Quaestiones* and other treatises. Interestingly Philo also wrote treatises which due to their Greek philosophical literary form and structure were classified as 'philosophical treatises'. These are five in number. Here also belongs the disputed treatise *De aeternitate mundi*.

The following discussion will focus on the allegorical method. The structure and character of the allegorical method will be commented upon. Further, the context of the method will be discussed. This context includes the possible influences both Greek and Jewish on Philo's exegetical methods and his religious-philosophical background which influenced his exegesis.

Philo mainly applies the allegorical method of interpretation to the Pentateuch. The Pentateuch is understood by Philo to be a revelation by God mediated by Moses. The other books of Scripture (prophets, Psalms and proverbs) are of a lesser quality in terms of their revelatory nature. As was hinted it is one of the basic premises of Philo that one can attain greater knowledge by the study of the Pentateuch than one would be able to by the study of philosophy. Similarly to the philosopher who recalls intelligible Ideas beyond the world of sense and matter, the author of the Scriptures was also able to recall these Ideas. Philo drew heavily on the Septuagint and believed that it is an accurate translation and its translators had the same inspiration as the authors of Scripture itself. This belief shows how Philo was dedicated to Hellenism. The Septuagint translators, "became possessed, and, under inspiration, wrote, not each several scribe something different, but the same word for word, as though dictated to each by an invisible prompter", (*Vit. Mos. II. 37*).

The author of the Scripture was a man to whom "nothing is unknown", since he possessed "a spiritual sun and unclouded rays to give him full and clear appehension of things unseen by sense but apprehended by the understanding (*dianoia*), (Spec. Leg. IV. 192).

Allegory is a complex form of representation. Apart from allegory, Philo also used to a smaller extent the technique of typology, which is

related to allegory. On its most basic level allegory searches for hidden meanings in passages and words. This notion is found also in the rhetorical tradition and Heraclitus. In Philo these hidden meanings have a spiritual character. The allegorical meaning has a number of levels including the cosmological, ethical and the spiritual. Typology also searches for spiritual meanings, but typology has another step before it embarks on allegory. Thus, typology searches one text in order to find the meaning of another text and then proceeds to allegory (Hamerton-Kelly 1991: 59). Origen stated that one 'must be liberated from bondage to types before one could find the truth of allegory', (Hamerton-Kelly 1991:59).

Various scholars have produced specific definitions of allegory and on this basis then proceed to argue whether Philo was really an allegorist or not. According to Goulet allegory consists of three elements: symbol, an explanation and a *tertium quid* as referent (Goulet in Runia 1989: 591). "Abraham as *patir eklektos ikus* (symbol, indicated by the etymology) thus represents the mind of the sage (explanation) because it is in control of reasoned speech (referent)", (Goulet in Runia 1989: 592). According to Goulet's definition of allegory, Philo's allegory is really more of a literalist enterprise, since symbol and explanation are not properly kept apart. This is shown for example in the account of the Mosaic creation where it is taken to refer to an actual event (Goulet in Runia 1989: 592). Further, Philo does not maintain a one-to-one correspondence between symbol and explanation (Goulet in Runia 1989: 592). Whatever the case, it seems that Philo is an allegorist if one is to take into account the basic meaning of the term. Language is connected to techne, the lower kind of knowledge, whereas episteme involves intuitive knowledge that can bypass language and the spoken word (Kweta 1988).

Philo often refers to allegory as *ypomonia*. It is a "method dear to men with their eyes opened" (*Plant*. 36). On occasions Philo can use the adverb 'symbolically' to introduce allegorical exegesis. Some examples of Philo's allegories can be now listed. For example in Scripture, God's "hands" represent divine power (Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 8. 10. 7-9) God's "standing" refers to the establishment of the cosmos (*Praep. Evang.* 8. 10. 9-12), God's "voice" means the establishment of all things (*Praep. Evang.* 13. 12. 3).

Philo writes: "*The exposition of the sacred scriptures treats the inner meaning conveyed in allegory. For to these people the whole law book seems to resemble a living creature with the literal ordinances for its body and for its soul the invisible mind laid up in its wording. It is in this mind especially that the rational soul begins to contemplate the things akin to itself and looking through the words as through a mirror beholds the marvellous beauties of the concepts, unfolds and removes the symbolic coverings and brings forth the thoughts and sets them bare to the light of day for those who need but a little reminding to enable them to discern the inward and hidden through the outward and visible* (Contempl. 78).*

Some scholars such as Williamson believe that Philo did not produce allegories of high quality, especially since on many occasions he took over 'insights' from other allegorists (Williamson 1989: 146). One such example is *Sacr. AC* 19ff, which is an exposition of Deut. 21: 15-17, where a man has two wives one hating him and the other loving him. Philo interprets this as saying that similarly each of us has two wives, one that we love which is Virtue and the other which we hate and which is Pleasure. Pleasure is described as a harlot. Virtue warns humans to be careful of Pleasure and gives 150 vices which could destroy man. Virtue only offers hardship, but hardship will lead to liberation. Philo probably bases this interpretation on the fable of Xenophon ascribed by him to Prodicus, where Heraclitus encounters virtue and vice (Williamson 1989: 146).

Philo distinguishes three uses of allegory in his native Alexandria. Thus, there were the literalists who rejected allegory altogether, then there were those who accepted both the literal interpretation and the allegorical one and lastly there were those that rejected a literal approach in favour of allegory. Philo himself took the 'moderate' approach and adopted both a literal and an allegorical approach.

The literal meaning of the text is a fully valid reality in Philo's interpretation. The spiritual meaning and the literal meaning of the Law form a harmonious duality. The allegorical meaning and the literal meaning are mutually defining polarities. Philo writes: "So in both our expositions, the literal as applied to the man (*he… rhete hos ep' andros*) and the allegorical as applied to the soul (*he di' hyponoion hos epi psyches*), we have shown both man and soul to be worthy of our affection" (Abr. 88). The non-literal meaning of the text deals with the moral education

of the soul and also deals with the order of the cosmos. Just as we both need the body and the mind to think, so we need the letter and spirit of the Law to lead a life in God. Thus we can see that for Philo, neglecting the literal meaning of the text is not only wrong, but it also has spiritual effects. In *Migr.* 89-93 Philo writes: "Those who despise the external observance are '…as though they were living alone by themselves in a wilderness, or as though they had become disembodied souls, and knew neither city nor village nor household nor any company of human beings at all…". Observing the external requirements of the Scripture helps us "gain a clearer conception of the things of which they are the symbols". In the treatise Abr. 147 Philo states that the literal reading is "the natural and obvious rendering of the story as suited for the multitude" and that the allegorical reading is "the hidden and inward meaning which appeals to the few who study soul characteristics rather than bodily forms".

In the *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin* and the *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum* Philo uses the expression *to rheton* (what the text actually says), when he refers to the literal meaning of the text (Williamson 1989: 159). The deeper meaning is often referred to by the phrase *to pros dianoian* (the meaning addressed to the mind), (Williamson 1989: 159). Although Philo respected the literal reading he nevertheless stated that "All or most of the law-book is an allegory" (*Jos. 28*).

Philo is fully conscious of the fact that if one lost the historical context and reality of Biblical stories and characters, then of course the Jewish Scriptures would loose their purpose and the Jewish nation would be an illusion. Thus Philo for example emphasises that the towns that Abraham entered really existed.

As shown by Philo's exegesis of some passages, Philo's stress on the plain meaning of the text can be even more forceful than the rabbinical exegesis of the same passage. One such example is Lev. 24: 20b which reads: '*ka'aser yitten mum ba'adam ken yinnaten bo*, "The injury he has inflicted upon a person shall be inflicted upon him. The second occurrence of *natan be* is interpreted by the Mishnaic rabbis to mean compensation, since the verb *natan* often means 'pay' (e.g. Exod 21: 19, 22, 23, 30, 32; detailed by the rabbis in b. B. Qama 84a), (Milgrom 1997:82). Other commentators disagree that the verb *natan* refers to compensate (thus Saadiah basing himself on Exod. 21: 22 and Ibn Ezra

also basing himself on Exod. 21: 22), (Milgrom 1997:82). The literal reading *talion* had one out even though the rabbis tried to avoid it (b. B. Qama 83b-84a), (Milgrom 1997:82).

Similarly Philo, basing himself on a plain meaning of the text defends the reading *talion*: He writes: "For to tolerate a system in which the crime and the punishment do not correspond, have no common ground and belong to different categories, is to subvert rather than uphold legality (*Special Laws* 3. 181-82). Philo understands talion in a literal sense and believes it is applicable to property (including animals and people) and is restricted to wilful acts", (Milgrom 1997:82). Philo's reasoning corresponds to the plain meaning of the text when he understands talion in a literal sense and when he believes it is restricted to wilful acts (Milgrom 1997:82). In regards to its application to property Philo's reading also fundamentally corresponds to the plain text, except for the fact that damage to property is assessed monetarily (Milgrom 1997:82).

However, Philo does not agree with those who argue for a literal interpretation of Scripture only, since literalism also presents many dangers. This is especially seen in a literal reading of anthropomorphic passages. Literalism may lead to Epicurean impiety and Egyptian atheism and to mythology found in Greek literature (cf. *Decal. 76; Spec. Leg. 1.79; Migr. Abr. 76*). Philo writes: "Nature has not made idle superfluities". Philo criticises those who oppose allegorical exegesis as men who "are themselves, too, in some sort astray (like the man in Gen. 37: 15 who wandered on the plain), owing to their inability to see clearly the right way in matters generally", (*Det. Pot. Ins. 22*).

On some occasions Philo relativises the literal meaning and therefore avoids its constraints. This he does by playing down the concrete personal identity of biblical characters. For example, concerning Genesis 24, 66 (Abraham's servant "related to Isaac all the things which he had done"), Philo asks: "Why, when (the servant) had been sent on a mission by one person (Abraham), did he give a response to another?". By reading allegorically, Philo discovers that Abraham and Isaac are "one and the same thing, that is, (one is a symbol) of taught virtue, (the other) of natural (virtue)", (Dawson 1992: 100).

On occasions such as in *Abr. 131*ff and 147 Philo exhorts his readers not to halt at 'the natural and obvious', but 'to press on to allegorical

interpretations and to recognise that the letter is the oracle but as the shadow to the substance and that the higher values therein revealed are what really and truly exist", (*Conf. Ling.* 190).

A given passage can be interpreted both in a literal and an allegorical way. In this regard Philo can use a number of terms or phrases when he makes the transition from the literal to the allegorical meaning. For example in Abr. 217, after Philo referred to the "actual words of the story", he then goes on to discuss the meaning of the story for those who are ready to pass "from the literal to the spiritual" (the spiritual being here the *ta noeta*, which are perceptible by the intellect), (Williamson 1989: 160).

It is interesting that even when Philo explains a passage by means of allegory he still wants to hold on the literal meaning regardless (Wolfson 1948: 126). Thus the three angels appearing to Abraham, were at the same time real angels and at the same time metaphysical truths (*Abr.* 22, 107 ff; Gen. 18: I). Sometimes as in Abr. 131 Philo can state that a particular meaning is supported both by a literal reading and an allegorical reading.

A narrative of Scripture can be interpreted in a number of allego-rical ways, which can be seen in Philo's interpretation of the double creation account in Genesis. The first passage (Gen. 1: 24) refers to the creation of the *genera* and the second creation account in Gen. 2: 19 to the creation of the *species* (*Leg. All. II.* 12-13). Both the *genera* and the *species* are "originals of the passions" and the various "species of passion". Further, the Scripture refers not to animals, but to animal passions of man.

Philo can give a number of interpretations of a given text without directly specifying that one interpretation should prevail. This aspect is found in rabbinical interpretation but also in the Hellenistic sources, such as the multiple etymologies in Cornutus (Mack 1984: 243).

Philo often inserts diatribes in his allegories. These are protreptic passages which directly appeal to the reader. They are not found in the midrash.

In Philo, allegory also remedies contradictions in Scripture and illumines Scripture where it does not provide enough information. This is shown in the case of the difficult passage in Genesis 4: 15: "He… that slays Cain shall loosen seven punishable objects". Philo observes, that

this passage involves deeper meanings in order to be legible (*Det*. 167). Using Stoic concepts Philo launches into a discussion of the seven irrational parts of the soul, which are subject to the eighth part (the mind) represented by Cain. The seven loose their power and become subject to punishment when the eighth part is destroyed. This meaning is further enriched by the appeal to another scriptural passage, which is linked to this passage by the word seven. Thus the flood story is recalled which describes Noah or "the reasoning faculty" selecting "from among the clean beasts seven, male and female" those to be saved (Gen 7. 2). The Stoic interpretation is confirmed by another Scriptural passage. The passage illustrates that on certain occasions Philo was justified in his allegorical interpretation.

Philo's allegorical treatment of a passage gives full credit to the grammatical and literal context of a particular passage. Philo is careful not to impose an 'esoteric' interpretation on a Biblical text without that interpretation having an intimate link with that passage both in grammatical terms and in its textuality. One such example of this concern can be seen in Philo's exegesis in *Abr*. 99-102. Philo here, notes an allegorical reading of Genesis where Abraham represents the mind (*nous*) and Sarah represents virtue (*arete*), (*Abr*. 99). Philo sees a problem here, since virtue (*arete*) is active and masculine and yet the word here is grammatically a feminine noun (*Abr*. 101). Philo notes, that this problem may be due to the "deceptiveness of the nouns" (*Abr*. 101). One therefore has to distinguish here between the grammatical feminine form and the allegorical male referent ("virtue itself"): "If any one is willing to divest the things (*pragmatai)* of the terms (*klesis*) which obscure them and observe them in their nakedness in a clear light, he will understand that virtue is male" (*Abr*. 102-) even though male virtue is denoted by the feminine *arete*, itself represented by the female Sarah.

Philo stressed, that the allegorical method has its limitations and cannot allow us to gain knowledge of the essence of God. In Poster. C. 1-32 (I-X) Philo sets out his doctrine that one can never know the essence of God. Philo writes: "But the holy guide (Moses), it seems to me, even before he begins his investigation, appreciated its uselessness". "That he did so is shown by the fact that he beseeches the Existent One himself to become his informant and revealer of his own nature". Philo is elaborating on the doctrine that we can only know god

to that extent to what he wishes to reveal himself. "For he says "Manifest thyself to me" (Exod. 33: 13, LXX), indicating quite clearly thereby that there is not a single created being competent by himself to acquire knowledge of God in respect of his essence" (16). However, God is not only transcendent but immanent and this stimulates Philo to formulate the doctrine of the *Powers*.

The work of allegory or its products are limited and never ending just as the human progress towards God is constant but never-ending. Philo writes: "The *quest of the Good and the Beautiful*: this quest is one in which even *the lovers of God* who undertake the fruitless quest of *the Existent One* find joy, despite their lack of success in finding him"… "They rejoice because the quest itself, *even if the good be missed is sufficient to provide a joyful foretaste*" (ibid.).

The person living outside of God's presence is in the country of Tossing (*Poster. C.* 22-32). Philo writes: "It is worthwhile to look at the country into which the he betakes himself when he is once far from the presence of God". It is called "Tossing". "By this name the lawgiver indicates that the foolish man, under the blow of impulses devoid of stability and firmness, is subject to tossing and tumult, like the sea driven by contrary winds in the winter season, and has never even a single glimpse of calm or tranquillity", (ibid. 22). The foolish man lives in the land of Nod, which is similar to the verb "to toss" and where Cain resided.

In Philo we have an interesting combination of Biblical theology with typical Platonic concerns in regards to the state of the world and language. Together with other philosophical traditions, Philo recognises that there is something wrong with the material world and our ability to reflect truth. What sets Philo apart from these authors is that Philo grounds his explanation for this state of affairs on a purely Scriptural basis, namely on the story of creation. Philo's account explains why we need instruments, such as the allegorical method in order to hint at 'real' reality.

Philo creates a kind of theology of original sin. He distinguishes between the immaterial and material Adam, both of which had different abilities. Most importantly, immaterial Adam had a capability of language which we no longer possess, as we are descendants of material Adam. Philo, following the tradition of the pre-Socratic Heraclitus and

Plato's *Cratylus*, believed that language is mimetic or representational, that is that words directly correspond to their subject matter.

Prelapsarian immaterial Adam had a capacity to directly identify the true, correct and peculiar names (*idiotetai*) of things (*hypokeimena*), (*Op.* 149). Thus, the names (*kleseis*) that pre-lapsarian Adam gives to things (*pragmata*) and bodies (*somata*) denote and match also their essence (*physeis*), (*Op.* 150). The objects that Adam perceives emit physical "presentations" (*phantasiai*) embodying their essential natures which enter Adam's sense organs and imprint themselves on his mind. Philo in depicting Adam's perception and naming seems to be using Stoic concepts and terms (Dawson 1992: 84). The Stoics distinguished between non-apprehensible (*akataleptikai*) and apprehensible (*katalepti-kaii*) presentations (Dawson 1992: 85). Non-apprehensible presentations are those which do not proceed from a real, existing object, or because they are so indistinct that they fail to agree with or correspond to the object from which they proceed (Dawson 1992: 85). In this regard the presentations perceived by Adam were apprehensible. In this interpretation there is a mutual interdependence and harmonious correspondence between language and physical reality.

Needless to say, the post-fallen material Adam does not seem to have preserved his capacity to create a perfectly mimetic language even though the naming occurs just after the creation of material Adam's. Since the material Adam is made of material and does not correspond to the ideal immaterial Adam who can name things "correctly" Adam is easily tricked by the serpent who deceives the woman by exploiting language's semantic indeterminacy (Dawson 1992: 88). The serpents words do not correspond to the essence of things. Similarly, the Bible is not a record of names corresponding to the essences of things, but contains, sentences, propositions and statements that are ambiguous. Philo in contrast to Jewish theology believes that the fall really occurred before material Adam was even created. Therefore, the story of Adam's fall looses much of its theological value.

The descendants of material Adam are unable to see the nature of each (thing), (*ten hakastou physin idein*), due to the darkness covering creation (*Ebr*. 167). While we like Adam have the ability to perceive the impressions (*phantasiaii*) of things, we receive different impressions from the same objects at different times and therefore we do not possess

certain knowledge and judgement and our judgement of these things is variable (*Ebr*. 170), (Dawson 1992: 91).

It is Moses who in contrast to all other human beings retains the knowledge which was available to the ideal Adam. However, while Moses possesses this knowledge he is still limited by the post-lapsarian language and consequently the meaning of the words remains hidden behind the imperfect language. Since God is unknowable and language is not representationally reliable Moses cannot use language in a literal or proper sense to represent divine realities. Before language can be used it must be treated. Of course therefore we have to use the allegorical method to come close to the real meaning of words. Philo's use of allegory thus receives its justification from a curious combination of Platonic theology and Scripture.

Allegory and Anthropomorphism

Together with the rabbi's and the Stoics (Cicero, *ND* 2. 70) Philo shares a concern for anthropomorphic and anthropopathic statements about God. Philo interprets the anthropomorphism as a reference to the "powers" of God which are active in the world or to the order of creation itself (Mack 1984: 257).The anthropomorphism's cannot be taken literally and must be interpreted in an allegorical way, since God is beyond any such descriptions.

Similarly to the rabbis, Philo sees anthropomorphism as a pedago-gical device and a mechanism of enabling us to speak about God. Anthropomorphism's are here to train the spiritually ill prepared readers, "who have made a compact and truce with the body" (*Deus* 56). Philo does not have the strong defensive reaction against "unfitting" (e.g., *Mut. I60)* literal meanings as is found for example amongst Hellenistic critics of the poets (Dawson 1992: 106). Even when Philo uses words such as "monstrous" (*atopos*) and "inappropriate" (*aprepis*) he does not use them in order to condemn the text itself but only the absurd readings or readers of the text (Dawson 1992: 7). However, Philo does find it necessary to safeguard the monarchy and transcendence of God by explaining the anthropomorphic passages of Scripture. In *Deus Imm. 62*, Philo understands the words in Num. 23: 19 to mean that God is not to be likened to anything perceptible by the senses.

There are a number of passages which provide us with Philo's interpretation of anthropomorphic passages and their apologia. In *Poster*. *C*. 1-12 Philo writes: "And if god has a human face it follows necessarily that he must experience human passions". Further, "But if this is true and Cain goes out from God, it follows that there are some portions of the universe deprived of God". This latter passage illustrates Philo's concern of how to interpret God moving around. He quotes the passage and asks whether the passage should be interpreted *figuratively* (*tropikoteron*).

Another anti-anthropomorphic apology is found in Leg A 11 I 43-44. Commenting on Gen. 2: 8, Philo explains, that the Garden of Eden is actually Wisdom and that God does not till the soil and does not plant pleasances. Further, God is not limited by space. Philo writes: "For not even the whole world would be a place fit for God to make His abode, since God is His own place, and He is filled by Himself, and sufficient for Himself, filling and containing all other things in their destitution and barrenness and emptiness, but Himself contained by nothing else, seeing that He is Himself One and the Whole" (*PLCL* I 175).

Inspiration and allegorical interpretation

It is important to realise that in Philo there is a strong link between one's spiritual disposition and the kind of allegories one arrives at. This has something to do with his theology discussed above. While the method of allegorical interpretation remains the same, the products of the interpretation are dependant on the interpreters spiritual enlightenment and potential. This feature is a distinctive element in any mystical forms of religious practice. Indeed the link between spirituality and allegory could be a defining feature of Philo and the tradition which probably existed in his period. It is precisely this spiritual character of Philo's exegesis that marks it as distinct from other types of exegesis. In order to be inspired one needs to have a spiritual disposition. He or she must be open to the Word of God. This openness is precisely achieved if one is not distracted by sensual concerns.

It is important to realize that Philo does not use interpretation to arrive at eschatological conclusions regarding events in his own day. While Philo does use interpretation to explain events in his own period, this is not a marked feature and purpose of his allegorical enterprise.

We cannot compare Philo's mode of interpretation with certain Christian groups in the modern world, which use interpretation of the Biblical text primarily to arrive at prophetic pronouncements regarding events in today's world. Philo's understanding of inspiration may have strongly influenced the Church tradition of inspiration. There are similarities for example between Paul's presentation of Moses in 2 Cor. 3: 7 and the Philonic Moses (Murphy-O'Connor in Wan 72).

There is some scholarly discussion regarding the issue of how Philo understood the role of the person undergoing inspiration. Many scholars have argued that Philo similarly to the Greeks believed that inspiration was a complete annulment of the personality of the prophet, who is reduced to a pure vehicle of Gods word and a pure instrument of his will. This view was challenged by some scholars such as for example Burkhardt who believes that this view is based on a relatively small number of passages. Burkhardt points to a number of passages which imply that the inspired author is said to be engaged in an "effective collaboration" with God (Burkhardt 1988). Human reason is not cancelled during inspiration but is rather transcended.

Philo in a number of passages indicates his own expereince of inspiration. In one passage Philo writes: "*I am not ashamed to describe in detail my experience which I know from having experienced it numerous times. Sometimes, planning to approach the usual writing of philosophical teachings and knowing exactly what must be composed, I found my mind barren and sterile and ended without accomplishment, chiding my mind for its self-conceit and bein astounded by the power of the Being, on account of whom the wombs of my soul are both opened and closed. At other times, approaching it empty, I suddenly became full when thoughts are showered and sown invisibly from above, so that I was seized in Corybantic frenzy by divine inspiration and was ignorant of every thing, place, people around me, words spoken, words written. For I obtained expression, thought, enjoyment of light, a keenest vision, a pellu-cid distinction of such things as if they were displayed in visible forms*" (*Migr*. 34-35), (transl. Wan 57).

As shown in the above passage Philo is fully aware that inspiration is totally dependant on the grace of God. Unless God inspires one's thoughts, it is not possible to arrive at meaningful interpretations. This inspiration has a unexpected quality. As is hinted in the passage below, an escape to ascetical practices does not gaurantee that one will be

inspired. Philo writes: "*For I myself many times, leaving kinsfolk, friends, homeland and going into the wilderness to consider something worthy of contemplation (τι των θέας ἀξίων), I would gain nothing. Instead, my mind scattered and bitten by passion, would withdraw to diametrically opposite matters. Sometimes, however, even in a full crown I would achieve quietude of mind, after God has dispersed the psychic crowd, all the while teaching me that it is not differences in location in God, energizing and leading the carriage of the soul to wherever he chooses, that effects the superior and the inferior* (*Leg*. 2.85).*

Philo often alludes to an inner incomprehensible voice, which guides him. This voice does not have a rational character. Following an interpretation the Cherubim and flaming swords Philo writes: "*But there is a higher thought than these. It comes from a voice in my own soul, which oftentimes is god-possessed and divines where it does not know. This though I will record in words if I can. The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His highest and chiefest powers are two, even goodness and sovereignty*" (*Cher*. 27). This divine inspiration has of course the potential to bring one to the level of immaterial Adam and his linguistic ability.

In another passage Philo writes: "*The watchful pen of Moses has recorded this my soul's condition', going on to say that the story of the patriarch shows that mortals enter into God's presence when they recognise their nothingness*" (*Her*. 30). Philo also specifies in paragraphs 31-38 that one must receive God's grace for one to be productive.

A typical feature of mystical spirituality is its exclusiveness in the sense that not everyone is on the same spiritual level and not everyone can therefore produce the same insights. Thus insight can be an individualistic feature and the 'allegorical products' that one arrives at are dependant on the effort one brings into his relationship with God. The insights can often not be understood by the multitude. Philo writes: …Irradiated by the light of wisdom, and am not given over to lifelong darkness. So behold me daring, not only to read the sacred messages of Moses, but also in my love of knowledge to peer into each of them and unfold and reveal what is not known to the multitude" (*Spec*. 3. 1-6).

The kind of insight that an interpreter receives when interpreting a passage is similar to the insight and ecstatic feeling that the prophets or Moses had when they composed the Scripture. Gaining this similar insight to writers of the Bible enables one to reach the correct intended

meaning of these authors. When one acquires the disposition of Jeremiah or the other prophets "natural ecstasy and divine possession and madness fall upon us", and the "human light sets", while the "divine light" dawns and rises (*Rer. Div. Her. 264*). This is usually what occurs in the "fellowship of the prophets" (*ibid. 265*).

In allegorically interpreting the text we entertain the same mental faculty which enables us to know God or the invisible forms. In *Abr.* 119 Philo writes: "Spoken words contain symbols of things apprehended by the understanding only". Further: "The literal meaning of Scripture accessible to the superficial reader, corresponds to the world of sense-perception; the truth accessible to allegorical interpretation is truth related to the timeless world of Ideas". Allegorical interpretation transcends the boundaries of time, since the experiences of Israel are actually also our experiences. In *Praem. Poen. 61-5*, Philo speaks of the 'houses' of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Their descriptions and qualities correspond to the three types of the soul and their different kinds of behaviour.

Those who use the allegorical method are "men with their eyes opened" (*Plant. 36*). In *Gig. 54*, Philo refers to men who use the allegorical method as those who removed from themselves created things and of "mere opinion", which is like a veil or wrapping and with naked minds are ready to approach God. The man is now ready to approach the "invisible region" and becomes "not only one of the congregation of the initiated, but also the hierophant and teacher of divine rites, which he will impart to those whose ears are purified".

Intellectual inspiration is just part of the overall gifts of salvation one may receive on his journey to God. In Philo, interpretation and 'personal morality' are intrinsically linked. Intellectual inspiration are tokens of the divine presence here and now (cf. *Fug*. 138-142, *Praem*. 121-24). Due to the spontaneous and volatile nature of inspiration Philo also seems to imply that he himself could be wrong and that readers should not be expected to accept all that he says. There are a number of texts in Philo which emphasise the epistemic limitations of the exegete in his task of decoding the wisdom contained in the books of the sage Moses (for example cf. *Opif*. 72, *Cher*. 55, *Decali. 18* etc.). On certain occasions Philo expresses uncertainty in his interpretation. This he may write:

"Perhaps this may be said" or even "I am puzzled" (Opif. 72-73, 132,157; *Det*. 156; Migr. 172; *Decal*. 18; QG 4. 152), (Hay 1991:42).

Philo implies that his audience must also consist of exegetes who are interested in the deeper meanings of Scripture and in this regard Philo often uses the first person plural in introducing allegorical interpretations (Hay 52). Philo exhorts his readers to see the various meanings in the Scripture that he himself sees and has recovered (e.g., *Leg*. 2.9, 79; 3. 16, 47, 51, 55; *Congr*. 180), (Hay 1991:52).

Scholars such as Cazaeaux emphasise that it was Philo's intention that both the exegetes, the exegetical readers and even the character commented on are all experiencing the exegesis and its meaning (Cazaeaux TC 262 in Runia 1984: 215). A. Jaubert also emphasised Philo's treatises as experiences of the soul (A. Jaubert, *La notion d'alliance dans le Judaisme* (Paris 1963, 377-442, 438 in Runia 1984: 220).

Various types of allegory

It is possible to identify certain elements (like for example a certain theme or aim of the allegory) in a given allegory and therefore identify its character based on this identification. The following 'types' of allegory have been identified by various scholars. However, the list is not conclusive and of course will be subjective since the type of allegory which one identifies, depends on one's subjective techniques of classification. The following allegories are some of the main ones that can be identified in Philo.

Ethical allegory and psychological allegory

As the names 'ethical' and 'psychological' imply the allegories of these types refer to aspects of the soul and the human mind and also deal with man's progression to God and his relationship with God. The Stoics already developed ethical and physical allegory, and Philo is working within this existing tradition (Leopold 1983: 158).

An example of ethical allegory which is based on the division of men into *favli*, *prokoptontes,* and *telii*, can be seen when Philo interprets the text where Moses is given as a god to Pharaoh (Exod. 7: 1). This text is allegorised by Philo in terms of the relation between the wise man and the fool (e.g. in *Mut.* 19) or between the perfect mind and the mind in charge of the earthly realm (e.g. in *Sacr.* 8-10), (Runia 1988: 64).

An example of psychological allegory can be seen in the exegesis of the text of Gen. I: 26 in *Opif*. 69. Here we deal with Moses' statement that man was created *kat' ekona theu kai kath' omoiosin*. Philo writes: "But no one should represent the likeness in terms of bodily form; for God does not have a human shape, and the human body is not god-like". In this context the 'image' is the mind, which is the dominant part of the soul. The human mind is modelled on the archetype single mind. Just as the creator occupies a dominant position in the universe, so the human mind occupies the dominant position in the body. Philo writes: "For it is apparent that the place that the great Ruler occupies in the whole cosmos is occupied by the human mind in man…" (*Opif*. 69).

Due to this allegorical interpretation Philo is prepared to call the mind "divine" or "god-like". The Biblical foundation for this is found in Gen. I: 26-7 and 2: 7, which are expounded in *De opificio mundi* and *Legum allegoriae*.

Commenting on Gen. 2: 7, Philo continues his psychological allegory by suggesting that here the relationship between God's *pnevma* and the human soul is that of a part and whole in contrast to a model and copy. Man's *nous* is part of the divine Logos. In this regard, Philo seems to be following Stoic doctrine, which understood the logos as *pnevma* pervading the entire cosmos, but also partly present in man (Runia 1988: 67).

The Logos as a divine hypostasis has both an immanent and transcendent aspect. The transcendent aspect is manifest in its role as place of the noetic cosmos in the process of creation (*Timaeus*) and the immanent as the Logos is the maintainer of the created cosmos (cf. Plato's world-soul or the Stoic Logos"), (Runia 1988: 72). The model-copy relationship of the soul would correspond with the transcendent mediator role of the Logos, whereas when Philo speaks or the part-whole relationship of the soul he is thinking of the immanent mediation role of the Logos (Runia 1988: 72).

The Reasoned allegory

Mack has drawn attention to what he calls a 'reasoned' allegory. This however, is a subjective characterisation of an allegory which some would not identify as a type of allegory. The reasoned allegory is characterised by listing 'reasons' for a particular interpretation of a text

"which frequently consist of various syllogisms of analogy and association, or some analogical correspondence to some schema with which he may be working" (Mack 1984: 260). "The 'logic' intended by the correspondence is indicated also in the very frequent usage of *aitia, gar* and *epidi* to develop the correspondence or to introduce further analogies".

An example of the reasoned allegory is in Migr. 216-255. The Biblical text is given: "Abraham travelled through (*diodevse*) the country as far as the place of Shechem, to the lofty oak tree (Gen. 12: 6). Philo asks the question: "Let us consider what 'to travel through' means". Philo replies: "It is characteristic of the Love of learning (*to filomathes*)". Philo lists the reasons for the correspondence: "Love of learning pries into everything, explores all material and immaterial things, and follows its quest through its own country to foreign parts". A number of examples are listed: "Merchants, traders and seekers after wisdom are all questers". Philo then addresses the application to Psyche: "Travel then through man… Travel again through the universe…". Philo elaborates that attaining learning is not easy and expounds on the symbolic meaning of Shechem ("shouldering" equals 'toil') and the oak (which symbolises *paideia*). The discussion of Shechem introduces the introductory text again and enables another reasoned allegory to begin.

The Identification allegory

The Identification allegory does not give a reasoned account in its interpretation as the 'reasoned allegory'. It is called 'identification allegory' since it simply identifies one figure with some other concept or figure (Wisdom, Logos, *dynamis, arete* and *physis*) and continue the discussion in line with this interpretation (Mack 1984: 260).

An example of 'identification allegory' can be found in *Conf*. 62-63. The text is "Behold a man whose name is the rising" (Zech 6: 12). Philo notes on the awkwardness of the literal designation and explains that the "man" is the *eikon*. The identification is made on the basis of the name 'rising'. The newly discovered term *eikon* is then interpreted.

Encomium and paraphrase of the Biblical text

Just as Philo is reserved about anthropomorphic statements about God, so he often faces the difficulty in interpreting certain offensive and

embarrassing features and traits in Biblical figures, such as for example the Patriarchs. In order to counter the offensive nature of these accounts, Philo uses the device called encomium, which is basically a retelling of the Biblical account. This device is not a 'strong interpretation', since there is no tension or contrast between interpretation and the Biblical text. An example of the encomium is found in *De Abrahamo* 91-98. Philo here comments on Gen 12: 10-20 which deals with the story of Abraham and Sarai in Egypt and the danger of the Pharaoh violating Sarai. Philo heightens the danger of Sarai being violated by the Pharaoh so that the subsequent intervention of God would appear more dramatic. The virtues of Abraham and Sarai were also accentuated. The Encomia are the basis for Philo's Exposition series. In the Exposition series Philo sometimes wanted to distinguish between the encomium and the allegorical interpretation of a patriarch. In order to do this he used the terminology of *to ryton-to pros dianion* (Mack 1984: 259).

Philo can often use the device of retelling and paraphrase in his interpretations. As such these devices can be linked to allegorical interpretation, but they can stand alone. A passage can also be explained without reference to any question being formulated. A biblical passage which shows to illustrate a given theme or interpretation can also be supported by other biblical subordinate texts (Borgen 1997: 45).

Philo's rewriting of Biblical material can be seen in the treatise *Exposition of the Laws of Moses*. Here, Philo rewrites Mosaic laws, which are linked by transitional statements. The transitional statements carry Philo's original contribution.

Philo's paraphrasing can be seen in relation to his exegesis of a passage in Deut. 27: 11-13. Here the theme deals with curses and blessings, which are an important part of Deuteronomy. The passage deals with Moses dividing the twelve tribes into two groups. One of these groups was to assemble on one mountain (Gerizim) and pronounce blessings, while the other group was to assemble on another mountain (Ebal) to pronounce curses. Philo's paraphrase of the text culminates with the interpretation that curses and blessings are equal in number, "and that praise given to the good and censure given to the bad are equally beneficial" (*Praem. i79-162*; *Heres*. 177), (Borgen 1997: 40).

Biblical passages can also be used as examples which consist of people or events which would illustrate Philo's interpretative goal. Philo lists a number of Biblical examples which include Adam, Noah and Abraham in *Virt*. 198-210. The thesis of *Virt*. 198-210 deals with unworthy children of excellent parents. Philo writes: "That he (Moses held nobility *to evgenes*) to depend on the acquisition of virtue and considered the possessor of virtue and not anyone born of highly excellent parents is noble, is evident from many examples" (198). Philo then proceeds to list examples supporting the thesis. First he lists examples which are common to all humans: "Cain, son of Adam and Eve, cf. Gen 4: 1-16 (*Virt*. 199-200): "The Sons of the earth-born were of high birth". "They sprung from the first bridal pair". "One of the sons murdered his younger brother". Philo continues by listing the examples peculiar to the Jews. "Abraham's many children and Isaac, cf. Gen. 25: 5-6 (*Virt*. 207): Abraham was father of many children, begotten with three wives, but only one inherited the patrimony". However in reverse, Philo notes there were examples of bad parents producing honourable offspring as was the case with Abraham (*Virt*. 211): "Abraham, cf. Gen. 11: 31-23: 6 (*Virt*. 212-19): "Abraham son of a father who was a po-lytheist, was transformed and became the standard of nobility for all proselytes". Philo reaches a conclusion (226-27): "I doubt indeed if any more mischievous doctrine could be produced than this, that avenging justice will not follow the children of good parents if they turn to wickedness, and that honour will not be the reward of the good children of the wicked, thus contradiction the law, which assesses each person on his own merits and does not take into account the virtues or vices of his kinsmen in awarding praise or punishment".

Philo can support his exegetical goal by rewriting a Biblical event and a Biblical law. One such example is Virt. 51-174. The theme here is philanthropy. Moses' philanthropy is illustrated by events from his life and selections from the Mosaic laws. Philo in his interpretation of Moses also draws on some observations made in his *On the Life of Moses* and then a selection of laws on the kindness to be shown to others is listed. The people to whom kindness must be shown are for example fellow Israelites (parag. 80-101), animals (parag. 125-47) and others.

Josephus also presents the Jewish laws as indicative of Philan-thropy (*Ag. Ap*. 145-56). Similarly to the outline presented in Virt. 51-174

and *hypothetica* 8. 6. 1-7. 19 Josephus begins by an account of Moses and the events surrounding the Exodus (*Ag. Ap*. 2. 157-63), (Borgen 1997: 48). Josephus and Philo share other similarities, which suggest they were drawing on a common Jewish tradition (Borgen 1997: 49).

Division of Philo's allegorical exegesis

Philo does not like to constrain himself to a particular standard allegorical structure. However, his allegories do have certain features, which are more or less canonical in his treatises where he uses the allegorical interpretation. A typical feature of these allegories is the main biblical text or lemma, upon which Philo comments and which to an extent sets the theme of a particular interpretative exegesis. A further important feature is the secondary Biblical text, which is invoked often to support a particular interpretation of the Biblical lemma and which itself can then create an 'excuse' to develop another theme. The secondary text itself can be interpreted. Runia calls the exegesis of the main text the *primary exegesis* and the exegesis of the secondary text as *secondary exegesis* (Runia 1984: 238).

Philo's interpretations are circular in nature, since Philo returns constantly to the main text even though he often entertains fairly lengthy digressions. These digressions have often led scholars to doubt the systematic nature or clarity of Philo's interpretations.

In Philo's Allegorical Commentary, the citation of secondary texts in support of the main text fluctuates and is not even. In some treatises the role of secondary texts is important while in others the secondary texts seldom appear. Thus in *Legum Allegoriaei* Philo seldom invokes other secondary material, whereas in *De agricultura-De plantatione-De ebrietate-De sobrietate* Philo makes a hundred page commentary on two Scriptural verses, often quoting secondary material (Runia 1984: 239).

It can be said that Philo's exegesis consists of four procedures: (1) main biblical lemma citation (2) paraphrase or brief comment on this lemma (3) invocation of secondary biblical material explaining the main lemma and (4) return to the main text (Runia 1984: 239). According to Runia the transitions between the main and subordinate texts can have a *verbal* character or a *thematic* character (Runia 1984: 239).

The *verbal* mode of transition consists of words or phrases which are shared by the main text and the secondary text (or even between

two secondary texts) and which therefore forms the basis of its invocation (Runia 1984: 239). The *thematic* transition as its name implies consists of the main text sharing with the secondary text (or again two secondary texts) the same theme or the other text can serve as illustrating a theme (Runia 1984: 240). Of course the verbal transition contains the second transition, since if texts share words or phrases with each other, then according to Philo they will also share a theme (Runia 1984: 240). The reader can often discern the motivation behind the transition and therefore the exegesis has a *concatenated* structure (Runia 1984: 245). A clear break only occurs when Philo returns to the main text.

The following elements are typically found in many of Philo's exegesis' of a main biblical lemma. These procedures can also be used to analyse a smaller unit such as a secondary biblical text. (The analysis is taken from Runia 1987: 122).

   (a)   introduction (or transition from preceding chapter)
   (b)   citation main biblical lemma
   (c)   initial observation (often *quaestio* or objection)
   (d)   background information (necessary for allegory)
   (e)   detailed allegorical explanation
   (f)   example/comparison/illustration/contrast
   (g)   allegorical application to the soul (often 'diatribe')
   (h)   proof or witness
   (i)   conclusion or return to the main biblical lemma

The point c of course entails a number of elements which can be used in a discussion of the text. These include: report of an objection (*Deus* 21); making a distinction (*Deus* 86) or establishing contrast (*Gig.* 1); making a grammatical observation (*Deus* 141); outline of a diaresis (*Gig*. 60); *laudatio* of the lawgiver (*Gig*. 58) and others (Runia 1987: 123).

An example of Philo's exegesis can be quoted in the form of the treatise *De mutatione nominum* which consists of a verse by verse exegesis of Genesis. In *De mutatione nominum* (Parag. 1-38) Philo gives a commentary on Gen. 17: 1-22, which deals with the story when God appeared to Abraham when he was ninety-nine years old. Philo begins by quoting the initial biblical lemma which is: 'Abraham was ninety-nine years old, and the Lord appeared to Abraham and He said to Him, I am your God' (Gen. 17: 1). This lemma gives rise to five problems or

aporiae which are implicitly formulated (Runia 1988: 74). The first one in this case is the question of the significance of the number ninety nine and its relation to Abraham. *Aporiae* (to road to understanding is blocked) appear because the exegete faces obstacles in his quest to understand the text. They have a positive element since they show that the meaning lies deeper (Runia 1988: 75).

Philo's interpretation shows that the foundation of the treatise lies in the division of men into 'worthless' (*favli*), 'progressing' and 'perfect' (doctrines familiar with Stoic ethical theory). Abraham sees the Lord by means of the noetic activity of the soul's eye. Philo's thesis is that God cannot be properly named, since God is *o on* (Ex. 3: 14). But humans need to call God somehow, so for this purpose they can call him *kyrios o theos* (Lord God) as if it was his proper (legitimate) name (parag. 12 *didosi katachristhe os an onomati tu kyrio*). In this context Philo quotes the secondary text of Exodus 3: 15, which according to him supports this interpretation. The secondary Biblical text which Philo lists not only illuminates the main Biblical lemma but can also anticipate the next lemma to be discussed.

Philo also provides an *a fortiori* argument which states that there is no wonder that God does not disclose his name since the angel with which Jacob wrestled also did not disclose its name (Gen. 32: 30). In this case the angel has a proper name but did not disclose it. According to Philo the *logosi* have both a *personal* and a proper name (*idion ke kyrion*), (Runia 1988: 78). He also distinguishes between the 'indescribable' (*aritos*) God and the *logos* who is 'not described' (*u ritos*), (Runia 1988: 78).

Philo solves gradually all the *aporiae* that he set himself. One such *aporiae* is solved by showing that God does not appear to Abraham as Being, but in the guise of his ruling power, which is indicated by the designation and name *kyrios*. Being (*to on*) does not belong to what is relative (*pros ti*), but exists *qua* Being (*I on*) and thus we see how the personal (I am) God of the Jews is associated with Aristotelian and Platonic concepts (Runia 1988: 80).

The directive idea behind this text is that whereas God is unchanging and steadfast man is subject to change (Runia 1988: 82). This fact is of course displayed by Philo's exegesis and theology of names. Due to this difference between creature and God, God in order to reach

the creature introduces improper or illegitimate names of himself in order for the creature to be able to reach God. God introduces an particular improper or illegitimate name to a particular person according to that person's spiritual level and comprehension (Parag. 60-129). Hence the name of the treatise *De mutatione nominum*.

Philo and the rhetorical tradition

As was hinted Philo uses a number of terms and structures associated with Greek rhetorical theory. Some scholars such as Mack argue, that Philo displays a large scale adaptation of Greek rhetorical structures. On the other hand others doubt that Philo is making a large-scale adaptation of rhetorical elements to his allegories (see Leopold 1983: 155). In any event, rhetorical criticism is becoming a popular feature in the treatment of Philo's works.

Mack's optimitic view concerning rhetorical cricitism can be seen in the following statement: "*Rhetorical criticism… allows a text to be read both ways. It can plunge a writing back into its social setting, not only to be used as a window for viewing other social facets, but as a social factor of significance itself… Rhetorical criticism may be in fact the most promising form of literary criticism for the task of reconstructing Christian origins with social issues in view*" (Mack 1990: 93). A similar optimistic view is seen in Botha who writes: "*A reading from a rhetorical perspective compels the interpreter to reflect consciously and explicitly on the implications of the rhetoricity of the text. It is a way of reading "between the lines". It brings to the fore the implicit and unspoken/unwritten values which underpin the argumentation. By bringing this to the surface, the act of interpretation moves beyond a mere linguistic or normal literary analysis of the text*" (Botha 1994: 187-188). Further: "*rhetorical criticism: "studies discourse primarily as argumentation, as social interaction, and not only as communication, or the transmission of information*", (Botha 1994: 186).

The study of rhetoric has undergone a revival in recent years mainly due to the studies of Perelman. In this regard it is viewed primarily in terms of an argumentation theory. Argumentation pre-supposes the dialogical nature of discourse. "Consequently, rhetoric presupposes intellectual contact between an emitter and the receiver and seeks to persuade, convince and provoke agreement with the constant awareness that the *logos* is essentially formal as an apophantic (categorical and declaratory) reality and a coherent expression of thought" (Nicol in Alexandre 1999: 25).

Perelman defines argumentation: "Argumentation is generally spoken or written discourse, of varied dimensions, which combines a large number of arguments with the aim of obtaining agreement from

an audience on one or more these" (Perelman in Alexandre 1999: 25). "Its objective is not to deduce the consequences of certain premises, but to provoke or strengthen agreement from an audience on the these submitted for their approval" (Perelman in Alexandre 1999: 25).

Brandt defines argumentation as "the establishment of a convincing connection between two terms" (Brandt 1970: 24) and stresses the importance the form of an enthymeme takes as a simple argument or as the central element of a globalizing structure in giving order to the argumentative *corpus*, without determining its intervening strategies. Thus an argument is "logical in its basic structure," although it does not strictly follow the argumentative sequence of scientific logic, since it normally has to "adapt itself to persuasive strategies" (Brandt 1970: 70). "In the *confirmatio* it moves, or seems to move, from a general topic to a conclusion, going through explicative, justificatory or probatory reasoning; or rather, through a "structural enthymeme" which, in turn, can be analyzed in sub-structures of a logical and psychological nature" (Brandt 1970: 70).

The aspect of persuasion in rhetoric has received further attention. Botha writes: "Wuellner aptly summarizes what has been said about modern conceptions of rhetoric, by pointing out that four features can be distinguished as the characteristics of modern rhetoric": (1) the turn toward argumentation; (2) the focus on a texts intentionality or exigency; (3) the social, cultural, ideological and values embedded in the arguments premises; (4) emphasis on seeing stylistic techniques as means to an argumentative end and not as merely formal and ornamental features" (Botha 1994: 127).

There is no doubt, that Philo displays facets of the rhetorical tradition. However, their are diverging views among scholarship as to the extent of Philo's use of rhetorical categories. Alexandre argues that as Philo was an eclectic in his use of philosophy so he was an eclectic in his use of the rhetorical tradition (Alexandre 1999: 18). Further that Philo "assumed the formal methods of argument recommended in Greco-Roman handbooks of rhetoric and used these selectively and creatively in is commentary; that the development of his exegetical themes reflects the formal structure of a complete argument; that there is a great affinity between his argumentation strategy and the philosophical rhetoric defended by Cicero; (Alexandre 1999: 18). To

properly situate and define rhetoric it is necessary to determine its relations to dialectic (Alexandre 1999: 24).

Ancient theories of rhetorical discourse
The Platonic Theory of Argumentation

Plato's relationship with rhetoric is subject to debate. This is partly due to the fact, that Plato himself did not precisely define his relationship with rhetoric. Some commentators argue that Plato was fundamentally opposed to rhetoric. On the other hand others argue that Plato drew a line between "legal rhetoric" and "factual rhetoric" and that he despised the latter. Scholars such as Black argue that Plato was opposed only to the rhetoric of the sophists. Whatever the case, it remains certain that Plato did not believe that rhetoric can be divorced from philosophy and believed that dialectic was the only means of ascertaining the truth.

Floyd Douglas and Ray Anderson emphasize that Plato in the Phaedrus is in favor of a rhetoric which has a philosophical-psychological dimension (Douglas and Anderson in Alexandre 1999: 34). Thus Plato emphasized the psychological aim of rhetoric.

The Aristotelian Structure of Rhetorical Argumentation

The rhetorical theory of Aristotle excercised a strong influence in later centuries. Aristotle combined various techniques of rhetorical argumentation into a new system. Aristotle displays Platonic tendencies in his rhetorical theory and similarly to Plato emphasizes the psychological nature of rhetoric, in which the enthymeme plays a vital role. Aristotle associates rhetoric with dialectic and stresses the rational and logical nature of argumentation. Aristotles techne retorike is characterized as "relishing Platonic tendencies with sophistic-Isocratic doctrines" (Riposati in Alexandre 1999: 39).

Aristotle introduced the concept of pisteis as a means of rhetorical persuasion. Pisteis is further divided into pisteis atechnoi, extrinsic or non-artificial means of persuasion, and, the pisteis entechnoi. The pisteis entechnoi relate to the subjective ability of the rhetor combining the elements of the listeners pathos, the logos of the speech and the orator's ethos.

Pistis as such means "belief", "confidence", or "trust". Pistis is the result of a syllogism or induction. Aristotle not only uses the term pistis as "belief" but also the logical process which leads to this belief (enthymeme or example), or to the material sources of belief (logos, ethos and pathos), (e.g. 1.2 1355a6 and 9.1367b30; e.g. 1.2. 1356b6-8 and 2.20 1393a21-24), (Arnhard 1981: 38).

The fundamental vehicles of argumentation and vehicles of proof are the enthumema and the paradeigma. Rhetorical argumentation can be inductive or deductive. If inductive it is based on a set of examples leading to a general conclusion. If deductive it assumes a form similar to that of a dialectical or demonstrative syllogism. Inductive argumentation displays a paradigm. Deductive argumentation the enthymeme (Rhetorica I, 2, 8).

The enthymeme is an istrument of deductive reasoning being an adaptation of deductive logic and which operates with an argument, which is based on what is true to the majority of people. While the enthymeme appears to be a true syllogism, in contrast to scientific modes of proof it also relies on persuasion and not only on scientific demonstration even though, judging from the definition in *Analytica Priora*, it should be said that it can be logically valid and produce certain as well as probable knowledge (Rhetorica I, 1, 11-14).

The conclusion or premise of an enthymeme is a maxim. Aristotle states, that its value is based on two facts: it summarizes universal truths based on age-old popular wisdom and it injects in the speech the ethical power necessary for its persuasive effectiveness (Rhetorica II, 21, 15-16).

In terms of comparison Aristotle uses the terms paravole and eikwn. Paravole normally carries the sense of "illustrative comparison" or "analogy". Eikwn, here comprehends all the types of stylistic composition (Cf. M.H.McCall, Jr., Ancient Rhetorical Theories, p. 24-32, 53). Eikwn, or imago can aslo be understood as a type of example (Rhetorica II, 20) analogically developed and structured (Alexandre 1999: 141).

Categories of Argumentation in Anaximones Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
The work Rhetorica ad Alexandrum represents the sophistic tradition of rhetoric. The author of this work lists the three genres of orato-

rical discourse and then lists the various species, which are subdivided into: exhortation, dissuasion, encomium, vituperation, accusation, defense and investigation (1421b-8-11).

Latin tradition

A Complete Argument According to Rhetorica ad Herennium

It is especially from later works, that we can gain a picture of the development of rhetorical theory from Aristotle to Cicero. This is case with the work *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

From the Hellenistic period rhetorical theory has undergone certain changes, which for example resulted in the omission of the ethos and pathos as forms of persuasion in the argumentative process and did not recognize the basic importance of the enthymeme and example in the pistis (Alexandre 1999: 58). On the other hand, it increased the number of categories in the process. The number of parts in the techne retorike went from three to five: euresis, taxis and lexis, as well as upokrisis and mneme (Alexandre 1999: 58).

The Rhetorica ad Herennium treats the development of the tractatio, which develops a theme and thesis in seven parts. The tractatio adheres to the following points: (1) *res-* the exposition of the theme; (2) *ratio-* the reason or reasons justifying it; (3) *pronuntiatio-* a reaffirmation of the theme or its expression in a new form, accompanied or not by the respective reasons; (4) *contrarium-* an argument taken from the opposite; (5) *simile-* an analogy; (6) *exemplum-* an illustrative or authoritative example; and (7) the *conclusio* (Alexandre 1999: 60).

Cicero

In line with Platonic thought Cicero believes in a full co-operation between rhetorical theory and philosophy. In this regard he criticizes Socrates in his work De Oratore for creating a break between philosophy and rhetoric. A good rhetorician should be well versed in philosophy and vice versa.

In his treatment of the argument, Cicero displays a greater degree of systematization and formalism a development which is already hinted in the work *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Alexandre 1999: 63).

In De Inuentione, Cicero classifies arguments into probable arguments, irrefutable arguments and necessary arguments. The necessary

arguments take on the form of dilemma (*complexio*), of enumeration (*enumeratio*), or of a simple conclusion or inference (*simplex conclusio*). Probable arguments are signs, probabilities, judgments of opinion or comparisons, and preferably take on the form of an epichirema. Quintilian mentions the Ciceronian division of arguments into classes, *inductio* and *ratiocinatio*, similarly to the Greeks who divide them into paradeigmata and epicheiremata (Institutio Oratoria V, 11, 2-3). Cicero uses the term *ratiocinatio* to emphasize logical and coherent reasoning.

Cicero was a pioneer in the development of the theses form, which constitutes the basis of a *ratiocinatio*, epichirima or syllogism. The theses can use the method of *in utramque partem* to treat a general proposition and having a tripartite structure of *proemium*, arguments for and against.

Quintilian represents a further development of the Latin theory of rhetoric. Quintilian collected many of the early writings in his work, and some consider him to have heavily indebted to Cicero. He lived around 40 C.E., but is still important in regards to Philo, since he furnishes a lot of information regarding earlier authors.

To Cicero, *ratiocinatio* corresponds to *epicheirema*; and Quintilian, in translating *sullogismos* as *ratiocinatiuus*, invokes the affinity that exists between the syllogism and epichirema (Institutio Oratoria V; 10, 6).

Philo and rhetoric

There is no doubt that the rhetorical tradition flourished in around Philo's time in Alexandria as is attested by numerous papyroi. Thus Philo could have ample possibilities to study rhetorical sytems. He undoubtedly did so, since he was well-versed in Greek thought. This is confirmed by Philo himself when he writes that he studied grammar, which in Greek higher education had a significant component of philosophy and rhetoric (Congr. 74).

In terms of Philo's use of rhetorical categories Alexandre writes: "Philos knowledge of rhetorical theory is directly or indirectly expressed, sometimes in his use of accurate technical vocabulary and his many observations on the genres of persuasive discourse, sometimes in critical digressions on issues relating to the value of a healthy rhetoric and to the danger of sophistic perversion" (Alexandre 1999: 98). Alexan-

dre believes that Philo's use of rhetoric concentrated on the formal structures of argumenation.

"As we know, the object of deliberative rhetoric is to exhort or persuade, while that of forensic rhetoric is to accuse or defend and that of the epideictic is to praise or to censure" (Alexandre 1999: 160).

The argumentative character of rhetorical discourse can be seen throughout Philos exegesis (Alexandre 1999: 176). Alexandre writes: "In its dynamic relationship to the suggested philosophical-theological theme, the rhetorical system affords the commentator an appropriate stragegy for reading, interpretation and exposition. It is a system that, far from being a mere onrnamental artifice, is the basis of his fundamental hermeneutics" (Alexandre 1999: 176).

In his writings Philo displays that he was accustomed to rhetorical formulations. Philo defines rhetoric and its operations (Somn. I, 205), mentions the various types of oratorical discourse (Plant. 130-131), and refers to its parts (Plant. 128, 173-174; Mos. II, 51; et al.)". In terms of Aristotle's thought Philo uses the language of Aristotle and the rule of euresis. Terms such as semeion, eikos and tekmerion, topos, enthumema, paradeigma and paravole are common in his writings. Philo divides pistis into the traditional division of enechoi and atechnoi apodeixeis (Platn. 173-174). Hay argues that "more than half of all Philos uses of pistis give it the sense of "evidence" See Hay 1989: 461-467). Philo similarly distinguishes between an "authentic rhetoric" and a "false rhetoric", the latter being tied to sophistic rhetoric.

Philo speaks of a higher rhetoric, which transmits truth as its aristos ermeneus (Deter. 129). This deals with the issue of a unification of the mind and word and the consequent passing from logos endiathetos to logos proforikos.

Of course Philo stresses the theological-philosophical role of rhetoric and its relationship to the truth and wisdom. He devalues in this context eloquence, we can say for its own sake. Socrates was proud of the fact that he was not eloquent (Apologia 17bd); Moses confesses that he does not have the gift of words (Deter. 38); and the "therapist" interprets the Scripture without any pretension of oratorical brillance (Contempl. 75).

An important term appearing in Philo is emeneia, which in his usage is related to communication and not interpretation as such.

Thiselton argues that the form eremeneia, which occurs in Philo thirty times, as well as the major portion of his compositions and derivations refer to "articulation of thought or meaning in intelligible discourse", sustaining that "the ermenuw form can refer only to the production of articulate speech", in clear sense, and articulated in a rhetorical context (Thiselton in Alexandre 1999: 103).

In his historical writings "Philo not only makes use of rhetoric to interpret the sacred text and to organize a commentary. He also uses it as he develops the argumentative structure of his thoughts, documenting and enlivening his texts by the insertion of discursive and epistolary material" (Alexandre 1999: 158). This is seen in the letter of Agrippa to Gaius Caligula.

Philo strongly criticizes the rhetoric of the sophists. Correct rhetoric serves as a defense and an attack against the sophists. "It is a vital matter, then, for one about to face a contest with sophists to have paid attention to words with such thoroughness as not only to elude the grips of his adversary but to take the offensive in his turn and prove himself superior both in skill and strength (p. 82), (De Migratione Abrahami).

Philo's critique of the sophistic argumentation can also be amply seen in the following passage: Philo writes: "For, just as in medicine there are some practitioners who know how to treat almost all afflictions and illnesses and cases of impaired health, and yet are unable to render any scientific account either true or plausible of any one of them; and some, on the other hand, who are brilliant as far as theories go, admirable exponents of symptoms and causes and treatment, the subject matter of the science, but no good whatever for the relief of suffering bodies, incapable of making even the smallest contribution to their cure: in just the same way, those who have given themselves to the pursuit of the wisdom that comes through practice have often neglected expression, while those who have been thoroughly instructed in the arts that deal with speech have failed to store up in soul any grand lesson which they have learned. It is in no way surprising that these latter should discover an arrogant audacity in the unbridled use of their tongue. They are only displaying the senselessness which has all along been their study. Those others, having been taught, as doctors would be, that part of the art which brings health to the sicknesses and plagues of

the soul, must be content to wait, until God shall have equipped in addition the most perfect interpreter, pouring out and making manifest to him the fountains of utterance (p. 433-44), (Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Solet). Thus the sophists and others like them according to Philo are devoid of any substance, while they may be well versed and artfull in their expressions.

An important feature of rhetorical education was the *chreia*, which was usually a small passage attributed as a saying to some well-known figure, who responded to a particular situation. We can find the *chreia* in the *progymnasmata*, which were teachers handbooks for rhetorical education. While our first extant *progymnasmata* comes from Theon of Alexandria who lived in the first century C.E., it is almost certain that they were already current in the first century B.C.E.

Commenting on the *chreia*, Theon lists exercises (*gymnazein*) which one may perform as follows: (1) Recitation (*apangelia*), (2) Inflection (*klisis*), (3) commentary (*epiphonese*), (4) Critique (*antilogia*), (5) Expansion (*epekteinen*), (6) Condensation (*systellein*), (7) Refutation (*anaskeue*), and (8) Confirmation (*kataskeue*), (in C. Walz, *rhetores Craeci* I, 201-16), (Mack 1984: 87). Theon also suggests that one can use the *chreia* in a thesis form.

Hermogenes elaborates on the *chreia* and emphasises not individual exercises but instead a large elaboration of the *chreia* in thesis form (Mack 1984: 93). Hermogenes writes: *But now let us move on to the next matter, and this is the elaboration. Let the elaboration be then as follows*: (1) *First, in a few words, an encomium of the one who spoke or acted; (2) then a paraphrase of the chreia itself; (3) then the rationale* (H. Rabe, *Hermogenis Opera* 7-8, Translation by Mack 1984: 93). The elaboration could include elaboration from analogy, elaboration from example and so on.

Mack finds similarity between Hermogenes' elaboration and Philo's elaboration as it is in his commentary on Gen. 4: 2. Mack believes that the initial Biblical lemma was treated as a chreia by Philo, and this lemma was then subsequently elaborated upon (Mack 1984: 100). Mack himself admits that it is more difficult in Philo's case to discover the thematic expression of the supposed *chreia* in Philo. Mack writes: "The lemmata of the text, then are *chreia*-like as to their (now assumed) figurality; but they are not *chreia*-like in respect to their lack of thematic expression" (Mack 1984: 101).

Mack sets out Philo's commentary on Gen. 4: 2 (*Sacr. I-4*) as an 'elaboration'. The following analysis of Mack is illuminating. However, as Mack himself states, he had to manipulate the Philonic text and not repeat Philo's amplification and clarification of points, which leads one to the suspicion that the important features of Philo's exegesis such as the secondary biblical texts and others are left out and therefore contribute to a over optimistic parallel. Nevertheless the analysis is interesting.

1. (Brief word of praise). 2. (*Chreia*) "and 'He' 'added' to this that 'she' brought forth' 'Abel' his brother". 3. (Ratio) The addition of one thing implies the subtraction of another. (Rationale) If we must say that "Abel" was "added", we must imagine that "Cain" was "subtracted". 4. (Contrast). "It turns out then, that there are two opposite and contending views of life- (One which ascribes all things to the mind; the other which attributes all things to God. The first is figured by Cain, whose name means "possession"; the second is figured by Abel, whose name means "refers to God"). 5. (Analogy) "Both of these lie in the "womb" of the single soul; but when they are "brought to birth" they are separated". 6. (Example) "This will be shown more clearly in the case of Rebekah, who conceived two natures of good and evil, received a vivid impression of the character of both, and perceived them contending". "She asked God what had happened, and how it might be remedied". 7. (Witness-Authority) "God answered her question by saying two things: "Two nations are in your womb", and "Two peoples shall be separated from your womb" 8. (Epilogue as exhortation) "The second gives the remedy- that good and evil be separated and occupy no longer the same abode". (Epilogue as period) "So, then, when God added the good conviction Abel to the soul, he took away the foolish opinion Cain", (Mack 1984: 103).

The basic underlying insight of Mack is that the main Biblical lemma upon which Philo comments on is like the *chreia*. This is also a statement of a thesis, which is then supported by various elaborations, which include secondary Biblical texts, examples from Scripture which contribute the interpretation and clarification of the text and further serve to develop the theme. Mack argues that the Jewishness of the enterprise lies in the fact that Philo refers to Scripture for his ela-boration.

In an unpublished work H. D. Betz argues that Mack's argument results in an imposition of speech category and genre on Philo who is primarily working in terms of commentary (In Runia 1984: 109). Runia has also criticised Mack's proposal.

An aspect which Philo possibly took over from the speech genre is his tendency to concatenation as is seen in the allegorical treatises. This is suggested by Philo's use of the term *synero*, which Philo uses to designate the composition of a speech (*Congr*. 64, *Mut*. 61, 198, *Decal*. 94, *Spec*. 1.344 etc.) and to describe his own procedure in his treatises (*Congr*. 178, cf. *Virt*. 16), (Runia 1987: 130). However, while Philo took over the *ideal* of the speech genre he did not take over the fixed rhetorical procedures as suggested by Mack (Runia 1987: 130). These would not be suited to the task of an exegete.

Philo in some of his treatises used the thesis form as was used by the Greek tradition. In the Philonic treatises *De aeternitate mundi*, *De plantatione* and Plutarch's *Peri tu poteron idor e pyr chrisimoteron* we find the use of the *Thesis* genre (Runia 1981: 116). Runia defines the thesis genre thus: "The genre of the *thesis io* or *quaestio infinita* can be defined as the treatment of a general proposition by the method of *in utramque partem* on a popular-philosophical level" (Runia 1981: 116). The characteristic of the *thesis* is the 'practice of stringing together long chains of arguments and illustratory material without making any attempt to construct a systematically presented and logically coherent whole" (Runia 1981: 118).

Katachresis

An important device used by Philo is *katachresis*. The term *Katachresis* is a term belonging to the theory of tropes (*tropi*, i.e., non-literal word usage) in Greek rhetoric and grammar. Philo refers to it at least fourteen times (Runia 1988: 85). Runia identifies two developments of this term which includes the 'soft' line, which finds its origin in Aristotle and the hard line (Runia 1988: 83).

Cicero states that Aristotle placed *katachresis* under the term metaphora and the meaning of katachresis had to do with a misuse of language. This is shown for example when we say a 'minute' (i.e. diminished) mind instead of a 'small mind' (Runia 1988: 83).

The Aristotelian-Ciceronian approach is rejected by Quintilian in book VIII of the *Institutio oratoria*. Quintilian argues that katachresis designates a misuse of words in order to represent a meaning '*for which no correct word is available*, such as when we call the murderer of a mother and brother a 'parricide' (which word originally only referred to the killing of a father (*pater*), if we accept *Quintilian's* etymology)", (Runia 1988: 84). A similar definition to this one is given by Tryphon in *Peri tropon* who lived about two centuries prior to Philo. He states that metaphora involves the 'transference of a word from one named object to another named object' (Runia 1988: 84). Katachresis on the other hand moves 'from what is named to what is unnamed (*akatonomaston*)", (Runia 1988: 84). Runia states that here lies the difference between the soft and hard line, and that what often the soft line calls katechresis is often called by the hard line metaphor (Runia 1988: 84).

In the treatise *De Cherubim* 121, Philo argues that the only real citizen is God, whereas people are really foreigners. If they are called citizens it is be the misuse of the word (*katachresi onomatos*). The Stoics claimed that only the sage is a rich man and king. Obviously the words king (*Vasileus*) and rich (*plusios*) is not used in the usual way. Runia argues that it is possible that similarly to Philo, the Stoics defended their paradoxes by stating that the way they used their words was the legitimate way in contrast to the ordinary usage, which although correct, is actually catachrestic (Runia 1988: 85). Philo gives the term a Stoic application at least twice (*Leg*. 3. 86, *Cher*. 121).

Philo on occasions uses the term in the soft way (e.g. *Congr*. 161, *kakosis* meaning not 'chastening' but 'toil'), and he can also use it quite loosely (e.g. at *Decal*. 94, swearing as misuse of God's polyonymous name), (Runia 1988: 85). In the hard line of its meaning katachresis is applied seven times by Philo in relation to our speaking and naming God. Thus the names and speech applied to God is a catachrestic usage and not a legitimate one, since we are applying names and speech to God who is nameless and indescribable (Runia 1988: 85).

Philo's use of catachresis is comparable to that of the Sceptics. Thus the Sceptics also regard many of their own philosophical expressions as illegitimate, that is in the sense that they do not refer properly to revealed facts and therefore use them in a catachrestic way (Runia 1988: 87).

Philo regards catachresis as a necessary evil. At *Mut.* I 12 Runia reads with the direct ms. Tradition, *didomi katachresthe* (Runia 1988: 89). "*I* bestow the possibility of *katachresis*', says God according to Philo.

The treatise *De Vita Mosis* displays characteristics of a rhetorical discourse belonging to the epideictic genre and shows familiarity with eulogistic prose (Alexandre 1999: 110). The work is divided into two parts which ares structured sequentially in five parts: *exordium* (I, 14), *narratio* (I, 5-333), *transitio* (I, 334-II, 7), *confirmatio* (II, 8-287) and *peroratio* (II, 288-291), (Alexandre 1999: 110). The exordium follows the doctrine of the prepon in its structure. The narratio (I 5-333) follows the Biblical text and discusses the life of Moses. In the probatio which is in narrative form, Philo discusses Moses as an ideal king, which is demonstrated in the *confirmatio* (II, 8-287), where Moses has the characteristics of the prophetic, priestly and legislative functions (Alexandre 1999: 112).

The genre of the diatribe is displayed by the treatise Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit: *Discourse on the "liberty of the wise"*, which also falls within the epideictic genre. Kustas observes, that "no one in antiquity ever spoke of the diatribe as a genos", always preferring to speak of it as a "tactic of genre" and a type of amplification integrated within the rhetorical discourse, especially when this is of a judicial nature. Far from being (with reference to Hermogenes definition) "the transcendent objective of human thought", the diatribe becomes reduced to an instrument of the discourse", to a rhetorical strategy of amplification with the principal aim of stirring up emotions" (Kustas in Alexandre 1999: 116). Apart from having an excordium (paragraphs 1-15) and a *conclusio* (paragraphs 152-160) the treatise has an *enumeratio* (paragraphs 152-155).

In the enumeratio Philo displays the credibility of the topic by emphasizing the exalted position of the wise man that achieves control over his passions. This is illustrated by the use of enthymemes, maxims and especially ancient authorities. This follows the doctrine of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum; namely that of a tragic poet, the lyrical Theognis and a humorous formula from Bias of Priene, who reinforces enthymematically the thesis he is recapitulating through a *locus a contrario* (Alexandre 1999: 120).

The *amplificatio* (paragraphs 156-157) is composed by the illustration that it is ridiculous to think that someone is free if he or she is not

a slave. Since real freedom lies in being liberated from passions. Philo further illustrates this by a chreia from Diogenes (Alexandre 1999: 121). Philo continues by attempting to arouse the sympathy and emotions of his readers in the *conquestio* (paragraphs 158-160).

The *conquestio* is followed by the *transitio* (p. 16-20) and *probatio* (p. 21-151). Here the *trasitio* markes the end of the *exordium* and prepares the audience for the *argumentatio* (Alexandre 1999: 123). "The "argumentative situation" which has just been introduced is explicitly stated: "So much for these matters. Let us proceed to the subject of our discourse and give it careful consideration, that we may not go astray, misled by the vagueness in the terms employed, but apprehend what we are talking about, adjust our arguments to it, and so prove our point" (paragraph 16).

"The antithetical formulation which follows defines dieretically the subject of the treatise: "Slavery then is applied in one sense to bodies, in another to souls; bodies have men for their masters, souls their vices and passions. The same is true of freedom; one freedom produces security of the body from men of superior strength, the other sets the mind at liberty from the domination of the passions" (paragraph 17).

The following are arguments, which constitute "apodeictic" reasoning (p. 21-61).

The argument from sovereignty (p. 21-31).

Here in this first part, the structural enthymeme is that the wise man is free because he excercises sovereignty over his passions. This enthymeme is developed micro-structurally according to the model of argumentation defended by the *auctor ad Herennium*, in five parts: *propositio* (p. 21)-the wise man is free from all passions and fears, through his *autopragia*; *ratio* (p. 22)- so, inspired by his desire and thirst for liberty, he learns to resist all sorts of intimidation against his soul, including even the fear of death; *confirmatio*, through additional arguments (p. 23-25) – the man who doesn't allow himself to be intimidated by death and also resists stoically all other evil circumstances is free indeed; *exornatio*, the argument is supported and enriched by the *simile* comparing the wise man to an athlete (p. 26-27), the apothegmatic *exemplum* of Antisthenes (p. 28) and the *res iudicata* of the Jewish lawmaker (p. 29), and *complexio* (p. 30-31)", (Alexandre 1999: 125). "In this final part, Philo summarizes the argument about the sovereignty of the

wise man, reformulating his initial thesis and developing at the same time a complete *argumentatio per ratiocinationem*" (Alexandre 1999: 125). "This argument includes the Platonic analogy of the shephard and the leader in the *propositiones approbatio* and the Homeric metaphor of kins as shepherds of the people" (Alexandre 1999: 125). "In this way he confirms, through a *locus a contrario*, the superiority of wise men as true kings, as opposed to kings of peoples who are in fact slaves of their passions" (Alexandre 1999: 125). Then follows a digression argued and illustrated concerning slavery (p. 32-40). Further arguments follow including the arguments from quality (p. 41-47), the argument from isegoria (p. 48-57), arguments from virtue (p. 58-61), corroborative examples (p. 62-135), examples in hierarchical perspective and with chiastic structures, *and examples amplified by the incrementum* (p. 110-143).

In the examples amplified by the incrementum (p. 110-143), "The courage of the wise man, which the last three examples testify to in such an expressive way, is now cast into strategic relief by means of a new series of examples grouped together in the following gradatio of intensification, proving an unassailable superiority" (Alexandre 1999: 129). A digression follows, which centres on the nobility of freedom and the ignominy of slavery (p. 136-143). Then follow examples in confirmation (p. 137-143) after which there is a return to the main theme.

Another illustration can be made in relation to the treatise "Defense of Judah" (De Iosepho 222-231). This treatise portrays Joseph as the ideal statestman.

In this treatise we can see the thin borderline between narration and proof. Quintilian points out, that the narration is an exposition of that which one wishes to proof and that the proof is actually a verification of that which has been described in the narration (Institutio Oratoria IV, 2, 29). Similarly to Quintilian's description "Judah" firstly establishes a relationship and then proceeds to argue it. The *confirmatio* (p. 226-230) is an appeal which is structured along the lines already displayed in the *narratio* (Alexandre 1999: 133).

The argument which combines passionate involvement with reasoned argument has the following structure: (1) A dual introductory *interrogatio* (p. 226a): "Then, since such our father's feelings, how can we return to him"? How can we look him in the face without the boy"? (2) "An anticipated *commiseratio* (p. 226b-227a), organized in *gradatio* and

including the *ratio* of its final portion: "He will suffer the saddest of deaths on merely hearing that he has not returned, and we shall be called murderers and parricides by all the spiteful people who gloat over such misfortunes. And the chief stream of obloquy will be directed against me, for I pledged myself with many forfeits to my father, and declared that I received the boy as a deposit which I would restore when it was demanded from me". (3) "A new *interrogatio* as a reinforcement (p. 226b-227a), to end this *gradatio* and to introduce the central argument, in the form of a hypothetical sentence in the potential mood (p. 227b): But how can I restore it, unless you yourself are propitiated"? (4) "Finally, the persistent *deprecatio* (p. 227c-230), in which he attempts, on the one hand, to conciliate and encourage the Egyptian governor, in order to assure his favor through the use of the *loci* of humanity, piety and pardon, (Ibid. II, 25), and, on the other hand, to highlight the dignity, virtue, honour and nobility of character of the one who will in the end either be the great victim or the great beneficiary of his final verdict. In the first place, Judah makes an appeal for mercy on behalf of an aged Jacob unable to suffer such a blow. Then, in case this should fail, he offers himself as a subsitutionary ransom on his brothers behalf. Finally, he expresses hope in the judges goodness, sensitivity, and empathy" (Alexandre 1999: 134).

Philo's use of rhetorical categories is also evident in his historical writings. The work Legatio ad Gaium 236-329) Letter from King Agrippa to Gaius Caligula can serve as an example. The work offers the following rhetorical structure: *exordium (p. 276-278), propositio (p. 279a), confirmatio (p. 279b-320) and peroratio (p. 321-329)*, enclosing in the *confirmatio* argumentation in favor of the nation, the city and the temple (Alexandre 1999: 160).

The composition of an epistle around Philo's time included the following basic structure: (1)*prescriptum*, with its *superscriptio*, *adscriptio* and *salutatio*; (2) the body of the letter; (3) and a *postscriptum*, normally autobiographical.

Argumentation of a Thesis

The following examples will deal with the development of an argument in a thesis.

In the treatise Legum Allegoriae (II, 1-3) Philo develops the thesis on the simplicity and unity of nature, a thesis suggested to him by the word monon in Genesis 2: 18). His theses is argued in a similar fashion to the Ciceronian *ratiocinatio*. The *propositio* mediated and conceived by the *locus a contrario*, (p. 1) is sustained by the same *locus* in a chiastic conjunctural structure (Alexandre 1999: 179): "Why, o prophet, is it not good that man should be alone? Because, he says, it is good that the Alone should be alone: but God, being One, is alone and unique, and like God there is nothing. Hence, since it is good that he Who is should be alone-for indeed with regard to Him alone can the statement "it is good" be made-it follows that it would not be good that the man should be alone (p. 1).

The thesis is proved by the *assumptio* (p.2), which supplies elements needed for its demonstration and the consequent explanation of the deciphered term. Its paradigmatic foundation is again articulated antithetically, based on an AB B'A' structure" (Alexandre 1999: 179). "No less lacking in persuasive force, the proof of the minor premise is syllogistically organized in conjunction with the *complexio* (p. 3), which simultaneously provides its conclusion and closes the argument which has just been proven by deduction" (Alexandre 1999: 179).

In the treatise *De Opificio Mundi* (7-12) Philo deals with the creation of the world. Here he uses the argumentative scheme of the *ratiocinatio*. The cause is introduced after being discussed by the *narratio* (p. 7-9a), (Alexandre 1999: 180).

The *propositio* discusses the world in the context of Gods creative and preserving work. Philo writes: "Those who assert that this world is unoriginate unconsciously eliminate that which of all incentives to piety is the most beneficial and the most indispensable, namely providence (p. 9b).

The *approabtio* (p. 10), is utilized in order to support the thesis, which states that a belief in providence logically presupposes a belief in the creation. This is shown firstly by the use of an argument from analogy and then by it's opposite (Alexandre 1999: 181). "For it stands to reason that what has been brought into existence should be cared for by its Father and Maker. For, as we know, it is a fathers aim in regard of his offspring and an artificer's in regard of his handiwork to preserve them, and by every means to fend off from them aught that may entail

loss or harm. He keenly desires to provide for them in every way all that is beneficial and to their advantage: but between that which has never been brought into being and one who is not its Maker no such tie is formed (p. 10).

In the following passage we can see how Philo argues against those who do not see the need for providence. This forms the *assumptio* (11). The *assumptio* in its *approbatio* displays the lack of logic in the opinion that the world did not originate.

Philo writes: "It is a worthless and baleful doctrine, setting up anarchy in the well-ordered realm of the world, leaving it without protector, arbitrator, or judge, without anyone whose office it is to administer and direct all its affairs. Not so Moses, That great master, holding the unoriginate to be of a different order from that which is visible, since everything that is an object of sensible perception is subject to becoming and to constant change, never abiding in the same state, assigned to that which is invisible and an object of intellectual apprehension the infinite and undefinable as united with it by closest tie; but on that which is an object of the sense he bestowed "genesis", "becoming", as its appropriate name. Seeing then that this world is both visible and perceived by the senses, it follows that it must also have had an origin. Whence it was entirely to the point that he put on record that origin, setting forth in its true grandeur the work of God (p. 11-12).

The above passages show a syllogistic rationale, which shows that if the world is eternal there is no need for a divine caretaker who, excercises providence. Without providence there is no order and the world could not be eternal since the objects of the world obviously are subject to change. The only eternal elemetn is the invisible and the intelligible, while the world which is visible and tangible must have had an origin.

Greek and Jewish allegory

It is a well known fact that in his allegorical exegesis, Philo drew heavily on Greek allegorical terms and technique. However, there is disagreement amongst scholars as to the extent of the influence of the Greek allegorical schools on Philo and the sources on which Philo relies. A related issue, which is just as controversial has to do with the influence of Jewish allegorical traditions on Philo. Whatever the case may be, it is correct to state, that in Philo, Greek allegorical technique and Jewish traditions (including any Jewish allegorical traditions) form a unique synthesis.

It has been a long established notion, that Philo in his allegorical technique, drew heavily on the Stoic tradition as especially represented by Heraclitus. This has been recently disputed by some scholars, but still the notion in its essential form stands. More on this will be said later. Philo however, also used other Greek sources such as for example the Pythagorean allegory.

Another important source for Philo's allegorical terms and technique are the Greek schools of rhetoric and philosophy. The ancient authors of Philo's period viewed literature as a form of communication. Therefore they often used terms from rhetorical science in order to interpret literature and engage in literary criticism. Philo follows this notion of viewing literature as a form of communication. There is evidence in Philo of allegorical terms associated with the Greek schools of rhetoric and philosophy. One such example is the term *ainigma* (enigma) in *Som. II. 3* and *4* and in *Leg. All. III. 226* 231. The technical term *ainissesthai* (to have a figurative meaning is also used. In *Som. II 3-4* he says of 'the Vision that appeared on the heavenly stairway" (a dream of Joseph as a boy) that it was "indeed enigmatic (*ainigmatodes*)", though "the riddle (*ainigma*)" was "not in very high degree concealed from the quick-sighted". Philo also uses terms used by Greek secular allegorists. These include the words *deigma* and *hypodeigma* (sign, example), (e.g., in *Poster. C. 122; Conf. Ling. 163; Sacr. AC 120, 139*), (Williamson 1989: 152). For example in *Op. Mundi. 157* he refuses to believe that the early accounts in the book of Genesis are 'mythical fictions'. They are actually, *deigmata*: that is, "modes of making ideas visible".

Dillon has argued that there was a tradition of allegorical exegesis, on which both Philo and the Neoplatonists such as Proclus relied on. Thus, for example Proclus uses the same exegetical procedures as can be seen in Philo. Both Proclus and Philo use the term *theoria* (and often, also, simply as *ta pragmata*) to designate the subject matter of the entire lemma (Dillon 1983: 78). Further, both Proclus and Philo call the details of the text as *lexis* or *ta rimata*, (Dillon 1983: 79). In terms of the familiar *aporiai*, Philo introduces these with terms which are identical to those used in the Neoplatonic commentaries e.g. *axion de skepsasthe* (*LA* I, 2, 42, cf. *Gig*. 1) and others.

In his *Timaeus Commentary* Proclus often disparages the ethical interpretations and Proclus settles rigidly for a "physical" interpretation of the whole *Prooimion* (Dillon 1983: 80). The physical level is allegorical. Philo makes the same progression from the ethical to the "physical level", e.g., *LA* I, 39: *fyzikos men* (actually preceding *ethikos de*) and others (Dillon 1983: 81).

Dillon believes that both Philo and the Neoplatonists (Proclus) drew on the Stoic method of exegesis developed in the last two centuries B.C.E. especially in Crates of Mallos and his pupil Herodikos of Babylon whose work probably formed the basis for the *Homeric Allegories* of Herakleitos (late first century C.E.), (Dillon 1983: 86).

We can discern certain parallels between Philo and the *Anonymous Theaetetus Commentary* which dates to around 50 B.C.E. to 200 C. E., and which contains a Platonist commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*. This work divides the Platonic text into short lemmata which are each commented upon. Similarly to Philo the author invokes other secondary texts (57. 15; 57. 26). However, these do not seem to lead to independent developments as in Philo (Runia 1987: 115).

More important parallels between this text and Philo include: the regular use of the *quaestio et solutio* in order to elucidate the Platonic text (e.g. 8. 27 *zitite un… apokriteon tinin…cf.* 4. 40, 34, 32, 52, 44 etc.), (Runia 1988: 101). "Diverse exegetical techniques, such as: introducing an exegesis with 'perhaps' (29. 27, 35, 21); referring to the master's words with a simple *fisi* (39.9); attention to small details of the text (57. 35, 64. 38); drawing attention to Plato's concision (41. 29); cross-references to other exegetical works of the author (already written 35. 10, 70. 11, promised 48. 9); direct appeal to the reader (58. 39); multiple exegesis,

where the last opinion (the author's) is regarded as the most plausible (35. 13ff.)", (Runia 1988: 102). While the parallels are significant we must bear in mind that in contrast to the commentary's author who uses a didactic sentence-by-sentence exposition of a philosophical work Philo uses the allegorical method.

There are some similarities with the later composition of Porphyry *De antro nympharum*, where the author uses physical and psychological allegory and the *quaestio* method is in evidence (Runia 1987: 116). "Words are etymologised (paragraph 15) and names explained (paragraph 35) with allegorical intent" (Runia 1987: 116). However, the author does not divide his text into lemmata and then does not comment on them one by one.

There is also a similarity between Plutarch and Philo. Plutarch in his exegesis relies on Stoic, Pythagorean and Platonic methods. Both Philo and Plutarch make references to the Pythagorean allegory (*Op.* 100, cf. *L.A.* I. 15). Philo together with Plutarch uses numerological and 'physical' interpretations (Leopold 1983: 164). Numerological interpretations are very common in Plutarch (*De Iside* 373F-374B, 376E-F, cf. *De E* 387F-391E), (Leopold 1983: 164).

As was hinted, while there are similarities between Philo and the Greek schools, there are differences. An important difference between the Homeric exegetes and Philo is that Philo's main essential starting point is to argue that there is nothing mythical in Jewish law (Leopold 1983: 159). Both Plutarch and the Homeric allegorists distinguish between myth and the authority. Thus for example, the Homeric allegorists distinguish between homer and his work and the later myths that were developed on his behalf. Philo rejects myths altogether.

Another difference between Philo and the Greek traditions, is the fact that Philo places great emphasis on the authoritative nature of Scripture as revelation. Philo in this regard follows the text of the Bible very closely. In this context Leopold argues that there is a tendency to avoid the term *ainigma* in Philo, wherever possible. The term is missing from his Genesis commentary and is also absent from *L.A.* I-II (Leopold 1983: 161). Philo rejects any riddle terminology and follows Moses who warns against mortal guesswork and emphasises the trust in God in Numbers 21. 27-30, (*L.A.* III. 225-233), (Leopold 1983: 161). The

mysteries of Moses are not approached through enigmatic utterances (Leopold 1983: 161).

In contrast to the Homeric allegorists, Philo and also Plutarch are more eclectic in their approach and more readily admit controversy (Leopold 1983: 164). Both Plutarch and Philo use the term *eikon* extensively (refers to the religious, mythological or earthly image of a form or idea), (Leopold 1983: 164).

Philo of course, not only utilises terms from Greek exegesis, but he also utilises themes from Greek allegories and myths. What is interesting here, is that Philo transforms the meaning and structure of these Greek traditions to suit his purposes.

As already referred to, Philo understands the Genesis story of Sarah, Hagar and Abraham to refer to the general studies (Hagar) and philosophy (Sarah). Amir notes, that while Philo took over the concept from Greek thought, he nevertheless made some original contributions. Thus, for example in Philo, for the first time the maiden serves the mistress and both are not in enmity towards each other (Amir 1984: 18). Further, Philo's concept that the general studies constitute *propaidemata*, kind of necessary steps and prerequisites that one must take to reach philosophy is also not implied in the Homeric simile (Amir 1984:18).

Another original contribution by Philo is in the concept of Charitas (*ancestors*). Since Protagoras, three virtues (*aretai*) where recognised as important prerequisites to intellectual ascent. These were *physis*, *didaskalia*, and *askesis* (nature, education and practice). These were represented by figures in antiquity, but these figures were impersonal and unspecified. Philo on the other hand identified these virtues with concrete historical persons of the Bible thereby transforming the story and giving it a concrete Jewish expression (*Abr.* 54), (Amir 1984: 20).

Philo on occasions can quote a Greek source and acknowledge it as such, but he changes the 'theology' of the source to suit his needs. For example Philo comments on a "mythical fable" of the Greeks which concerns a certain hero Tiptolemus and which is preserved in Ovid (*Met.* 5. 642ff). This Tiptolemus reportedly sowed corn seed over the earth. Philo on the other hand while acknowledging the Greek concept and source transforms its meaning stating that it is God who provides all sources of nourishment (*Praem*. 8-9).

On other occasions, Philo takes classical takes and quotes them in support of his interpretation. For example, Philo suggests that Cain's evil characteristic is also expressed in Plato: "This truth found noble utterance in the *Theaetetus* (176A-B)", (*Fug.* 63). In another passage Philo quotes Homer by name and makes him support his interpretation and its truth. Philo writes: "The same idea (as the one presented in Scripture) is suggested I think by Homer in the *Iliad* at the beginning of the thirteenth book (13. 5-6), (*Cont.* 17). Of course, by quoting from Classical authorities and using them to support his interpretation, Philo builds prestige for himself and the Jewish Scripture.

One method which Philo uses in his transfer of Greek myths and symbols into Jewish concepts is arithmology (Moehring 1995: 176). Arithmology is one technique which enables Philo to arrive at a synthesis of Jewish and Greek elements.

Some scholars have suggested various elements that distinguish Greek allegorical enterprise from the Jewish allegorical technique. Stein suggested that the Jewish allegory in contrast to the Greek allegory emphasised more the 'ethical' interpretation than the 'physical' (Stein in Mack 1984: 252). A theological principle according to Stein governed the ethical allegory, which consisted of things such as the shematisation between the ethically good and bad, exhortations to imitate examples and others (Stein in Mack 1984: 253). Further, in the Jewish allegory, the object to be interpreted firstly had to be turned into a symbol, before it could be associated with the 'ethical' or 'physical' orders (Stein in Mack 1984: 252). Another mark of the Jewish allegory was to transform the account into a story of the soul (Stein in Mack 1984: 253).

Christiansen believed that Philo was trained in the dialectic technique, which ordered all reality beginning from the most universal categories down to specific phenomena. The difference between Philo and Plato was that Philo began his classification with the Scriptures, whereas Plato began with the world of Ideas (Christiansen in Mack 1984: 252). Christiansen believed that the "allegorical method of Philo may be described as the scholastic means by which the words of the Pentateuch could be taken as symbols for a world of existent phenomena ordered dieretically" (Christiansen in Mack 1984: 252).

It could be argued that in contrast to the Egyptian and Greek allegorical practice, Jewish allegory was more complex. This is so, since

in the Alexandrian Jewish allegory the systems of thought (which provided the reference for the allegory) were not so readily straight-forward and could have consisted of a number of systems of thought being interwoven into the allegory. This is for example in contrast to the Stoic allegory where the allegory had a clear reference to a thought system on which it would base itself (Mack 1984: 254). Understanding the Jewish allegory is complicated because a number of 'traditions' are interwoven into the fabric of interpretation. Therefore it is necessary to discover the Jewish governing idea.

This complexity of the Jewish allegory according to Mack conditio-ned two moments of interpretation (Mack 1984: 255). The first moment of interpretation is the identification and recognition of the Scripture as containing stories of various heroic people, which are paradigms for figures such as the Logos, Wisdom and so on (Mack 1984: 255). The second moment consists of interpreting these figures (as Logos, Wisdom and so on) in terms of 'ethical' and 'physical' categories (Mack 1984: 255). An example here can be given in the figure of Sarah, who is firstly interpreted as Wisdom 'before' being interpreted as 'virtue', (Mack 1984: 255).

Philo and the Stoic allegory

Already the scholars Zeller, Brehier and Leisegang have suggested that Philo's exegetical method drew heavily on the Stoic exegesis of Homeric poems. This has been a long standing notion in scholarship. Long has criticised this notion and argues that Philo and the Stoics have a different type of exegesis.

As was shown above an example of Stoic allegory which is related to Philo's allegory centre's around the "encyclical" studies. Just as Philo had done so the Stoics believed that the "encyclical" studies did furnish one with knowledge, but they did not furnish one with Wisdom (Sandmel 1979: 19). Thus, in regards to the story of Penelope in the Odyssey, the Stoics believed that Penelope's maidens were the encyclical studies and that the suitors of Penelope were the students of these encyclical studies (Sandmel 1979: 20). Penelope on the other hand is true wisdom. The suitors who are diligent students can master the maidens, but are unable to proceed to wisdom herself which is Penelope (Sandmel 1979: 21). A similar disposition to the encyclical studies can be found in Philo in his allegory on Sarah and Hagar. Abraham was married to Sarah in a childless marriage. Sarah offered her maid Hagar to Abraham in order that she produce a heir. According to Philo, Abraham is a student who studies the encyclical studies in the form of Hagar and then must proceed to true wisdom which is Sarah (Sandmel 1979: 21).

There was also the tradition of the Greek Vorlage, as represented by Bion, Aristippus and Aristo Chius, who develop not allegories, but *homoiomata*, which for example agreed that the suitors in the Odyssey are the students, however they would not agree in ranking the Odyssey story as strictly meaning that philosophy should rank above the other studies (Amir 1984: 17).

Long has also argued, that Heraclitus to whom Philo alludes on occasions and uses similar allegories (in his works *Homeric problems-Homer's allegories on the gods*) was not really a Stoic (Long 1997:203). Long identifies Heraclitus' allegory and Philo's allegory as strong allegory, which is characterised by a strong intention of the author to read the text allegorically as opposed to weak allegory where such an author's intention is less visible (Long 1997:203). However, we are not

sure as to the extent of Heraclitus' writings (Royse 1997: 216). This is a factor in assessing Heraclitus' Stoicism.

Long admits that the Stoics used a kind of interpretation which could be understood as allegorical. Thus for example, the Stoics believed that behind the names of the Greek gods lies a deeper meaning and that by means of etymological analysis this deeper meaning could be revealed. After this exegesis it could shown that the names of the gods correspond to their properties or something in the natural world (Long 1997: 200). Thus on etymological analysis we find that Zeus corresponds to 'cause of life' (Long 201, see Plato, *Crat*. 395a-b and Diogenes Laertius 7. 147 (*SVF* 2.1021). Some insight into Stoic interpretation can be gained from the work by the Stoic Cornutus the *Compendium of the Tradition of Greek Theology*. Here Cornutus seems to be advocating an etymological way of interpretation of the names of the Greek gods (Long 1997:204).

Long's argument hinges on whether one would classify etymological interpretation as part of allegorical interpretation. Long believes that this kind of interpretation cannot be called allegorical since the concern of the Stoics was to recover the literal meaning (Long 1997:201). However, one can argue that this is the purpose of allegorical reading. The purpose of allegorical reading is to uncover the true meaning of the text or in other words what we could 'also' call a literal meaning, if by literal meaning we understand something which is clear and understandable. Many would also argue that etymological interpretation is thoroughly a part of allegorical exegesis.

Philo in his works on numerous occasions uses etymological exegesis. This type of exegesis is not used by many authors and is missing in the Neoplatonists. So in this regard Philo would share something unique with the Stoics. Long himself concedes, that something of the Stoics etymological approach can be seen in Philo himself, especially in the passage where Adam gives names to creatures (*De opificio mundi* 148-50), (Long 1997:209). Thus Adam, gave names to the creatures, which correctly corresponded to their character. In the story of Hagar and Sarah, Philo before interpreting the stories, makes a point in enquiring to the etymology of the names Hagar and Sarah, and the etymology as such is an integral part of the interpretation.

As Long concedes there is not enough evidence from the ancient world, which would *limit* the Stoic way of interpretation to a purely etymological exercise (Long 1997:207-208). Further, the Stoics were not some sort of uniform group with a uniform set of principles. There were various Stoics and one such Stoic philosopher Chaeremon who was Philo's contemporary in Alexandria applied allegorical exegesis to Egyptian mythology (Sterling 1993:103).

According to Long, the main difference between Philo and the Stoics lies in the nature of the meaning they recover by means of their interpretation. Philo seeks to uncover a deeper meaning by recourse to *non-evident*, esoteric truths of ethics and metaphysics (Long 1997:206). On the other hand, the Stoics seek to recover a meaning that has a concrete historical relation to particular natural or moral issues (Long 1997:205-206). Importantly, the Stoics according to Long, believed that the ancient authors did not intentionally or unintentionally put their writings in a veiled manner (Long 1997:205). Long writes: "Stoic etymology, then, is an exercise in disambiguation" (Long 1997:209). "It presumes that primeval language was intended to achieve (which it is not to say that it succeded in achieving) a perfect match between the name of things and the contents of the world" (Long 1997:209). In fact, this statement seems to exactly correspond to Philo's intentions as was discussed above in the example of Adam's naming of things. Philo was precisely interested in recovering the literal meaning, or the real meaning behind the language of Scripture.

The Political role of allegory

Philo's allegorical reading in its subordination of classical culture to Scripture must have had some political consequences. By stating that Moses law embodies all the features of Greek culture, Philo must have been making a significant statement in the context of Alexandrian Jewry. Thus in the *Life of Moses* Philo states that the highest Hellenistic ethical ideals were first embodied in Moses and then set into the Jewish laws. Moses therefore wrote laws applying to any true *politeia*. Philo writes that "each element" of the entire cosmos "obeyed him (Moses) as its master" (Mos. 1. 156). Moses is a "world citizen" (Mos. 1. 157).

Philo's work also had an apologetic and missionary character. Philo writes: "I believe that each nation would abandon its peculiar ways, and, throwing overboard their ancestral customs, turn to honouring our laws alone. For, when the brightness of their (the laws) shining is accompanied by national prosperity, it will darken the light of the others as the risen sun darkens the stars" (Mos. 2. 44).

Philo also addressed himself to his fellow Jews and exhorted them to obey the laws of Scripture and therefore preserve their identity. In this line of thought Philo was careful not to reject the literal meaning of Scripture and the various prescriptions. Since the Greek laws are contained in the Mosaic corpus, by obeying the Jewish laws, the Jews were also propagating Greek virtues.

Creation

Here my work begins

Philo's cosmology is an important part of his overall theology and philosophy. Further, it enables us to understand the way Philo viewed Greek philosophy, mainly Plato, who exercised a strong influence on Philo's cosmology. Philo's cosmology also influenced later Christian theology, although in this regard he may have been one of the bridges between Plato and later Christian thought.

Gods goodness

Following Plato, Philo emphasizes that God is good and that the reason of the world's creation lies in the overwhelming goodness of God (*Opif.* 21-23). Philo adopts Plato's preposition that the Cause is good and that the Demiurge is good (demiourgos agathos, Timaeus 29a) and conflates it with the designation of God as "maker and father" (for example in *Opif.* 7, 10, 21, 77, *Conf.* 144, *Heres* 98, 200, 236 etc.), (Runia 1986: 441, 135). Thus the goodness of the Demiurge is fused with the biblical God. Philo seems to adapt his idea of Gods goodness from *Timaeus* 29d-30c. Plato states here: "Let us, then, state for what reason (*aitia*) becoming and this universe (to pan tode) were framed by him who framed them. He was good (*agathos en*), and in the good no jealousy (*oudeis fthonos*) in any matter can ever arise. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself. That this is the supremely valid principle of becoming and of the order of the world, we shall most surely be right to accept from men of understanding (Translation Cornford).

In *Deus* 108 Philo writes: "*if anyone should ask me what was the motive (aitia genesews) for the creation of the world, I will answer what Moses has taught, that it was the goodness of the Existent (e tou ontos agathotes), that goodness which is the oldest of His bounties (presvutate twn charitwn) and itself the source of others*". The association of goodness with the creator God of the Bible was to have enormous influence on future thought, especially on Christian theology. Here we have to distinguish between the Platonic notion of goodness, which has a metaphysical coloring (in terms of excellence) and the Biblical concept of goodness in terms of grace (Runia 1986: 441). The treatise *De Opificio Mundi* would tend to

suggest that Philo has in mind the metaphysical kind of goodness, since he regards God as pure Being. However, the situation is rather more complex. The difference between goodness in terms of grace and goodness in terms of metaphysics is one of emphasis. In order for the metaphysical good to be "good" it necessarily follows that this goodness has to exemplify itself. Thus, one may argue that metaphysical goodness necessarily implies "activity" on the part of God, in order for this goodness to be fulfilled. From this line of thought it is only a small step towards goodness understood as grace, since goodness in relation to grace is a relationship of immanence, or the concrete embodiment of the metaphysical goodness of God.

The relation between grace and goodness is evident in Philo's discussion concerning the origin of creation (*arche genesews*). Philo writes that it "*is the goodness and grace of God (agathotes kai charis tou theou), which He bestowed on the race that stands next after Him. For all things in the world and the world itself is a free gift (dwrea) and act of kindness (euergesia) and grace (charisma) on Gods part* (*LA* 3: 78). "The subjective genitive construction agathotes kai charis tou theou makes apparent that Philo envisions both goodness and grace as attributes of Gods nature" (Frick 1999: 66). (Runia interprets the phrase arche genesews in an ontological sense as the principle of the worlds becoming which is concretely Gods goodness and grace Runia 1986: 97).

God allows human beings to participate in his goodness. This fact is described by Philo with the term charis, "grace", while the acts of that grace are described by the plural charites, "deeds of grace". It is because of Gods will that his goodness becomes actually immanent in the world. There is no compulsion in God, even though goodness, grace belong to Gods transcendent nature to allow creation to share in this goodness (With the exception of the treatise De Sobrietate every other Philonic writing makes reference to Gods willing (voulomai and cognates), (Frick 1999: 68). "God is good and *wishes* to share his goodness, he *wants* to be a bountiful giver (cf. *Mut*. 46)". Plato similarly observes in *Timaeus* 29e, that God although "being devoid of envy (fthonos), (Cf. *Opif*. 21, that God "grudged not (ouk efthonesen) a share in his own excellent nature") He desired (evoulethe) that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself", that is, good. Philo remarks that God of course can do good or evil "but wills (voulomai) the good only" (Spec. 4: 187). The

product of Gods goodness is his willing to create the world (Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of will in Classical Antiquity Berkeley Los Angeles, London, 1982, 90, remarks that Philo almost exclusively uses the words voulesis/voulema, "which denote the intellectual activity preceding action", instead of the terms thelesis/thelema which are mostly used in the LXX).

In the *Tim*. 176 the will is equated with *nous* and *pronoia*. In *Timaeus* 30b-c (Cornford) we read: "This, then, is how we must say, according to the likely account, that this world came to be, by the gods providence (dia ten tou theou genesthai pronoian), in very truth a living creature with soul and reason". In this regard Frick writes: "But far more important is the fact that in this section of the Timaeus we find, conceivably for the first time in the history of Greek philosophy, an intentional link between divine goodness, creation and providence, a feat that serves Philo as the conceptual background for his own view of Gods providence" (Frick 1999: 71).

Plato is hesitant in identifying God's goodness with his essence. In the *Republic* 509b Plato says that "the good itself is not essence (*ousia*) but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power (*epekeina tes ousias presveia kai dunamei uperechontos*)". Philo regards goodness as part of the divine nature, but not transcending it. In *Praem* 40 Philo declares explicitly that God "is better than the good, more venerable than the monad, purer than the unit". In *Deus* 108 Philo writes: "But He has given His good things in abundance to the All and its parts, not because He judged anything worthy of grace, but looking to His eternal goodness, and thinking that to be beneficent was incumbent on His blessed and happy nature".

Philo distinguishes goodness as a cause of things coming from God and goodness as a divine attribute (*Deus* 108, *LA* 3: 105, *Legat*. 5, *Conf*. 180). In *LA* 3: 73, for example, Philo asserts that "God" is the name of the goodness pertaining to the First Cause (*o theos gar agathotetos esti tou aitiou onoma*)" by which he made both animate and inanimate beings" (*Agr*. 129, *aition… monwn omologesai twn agathwn*, *Cher*. 29, *tou aitiou… agathotetos*). In *Opif*. 21 Philo writes: "Now just such a power (dunamis) is that by which the universe (*tode* to pan) was made, one that has as its source nothing less than true goodness (*to pros aletheian agathon*). For should one conceive a wish to search for the cause (*aitia*), for the sake of

which this whole was created, it seems to me that he would not be wrong in saying, what indeed one of the men of old did say, that the Father and Maker of all is good (*agathon einai*), and because of this He grudged not (*ouk efthonesen*) a share in his own excellent nature".

Philo rejects theodicy or in other words the position that God is the cause of evil. In other words theodicy in its physical sense asks the question, if God is good and created the cosmos through his goodness, how is it possible that there are so many disasters and other evils. In its ethical sense theodicy asks how is it possible that there is moral evil in the soul. If God is good there is no possibility of evil in the beginning of the world.

Philo absolves God from any evil when he writes in *Prov*. 2: 82: "When Providence is said to govern the universe, it does not mean that God is the cause of everything, certainly not of evil, of that which lies outside the course of nature, or of any of those things that are not at all beneficial… Violence, rapine, and the like are not caused by the law but by the lawlessness of the inhabitants. The same may be said of the governing of the universe by Providence. It is not that God is responsible for everything, nay, the attributes of His nature are altogether good and benevolent. On the contrary, the unruly nature of matter and that of vice is a product of deviation and not caused by God".

In his rejection of theodicy Philo is dependent on Plato's Theaetetus, which he identifies in his work (*Fuga* 63). Here he cites the expressis verbis the Socratic principle that "evils can never pass away, for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good (*out apolesthai ta kaka dunaton, upenantion gar ti tw agathw aiei einai anagke*). Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature and this earthly sphere" (*Theaetetus* 176 quoted in *Fuga* 63). This passage of course basis itself on the fact that since, there is a concept of good, this implies that there is something that is not good. However, in this respect it implies that evil must exist in order for goodness to reveal itself.

In his disputes against theodicy Philo adapts Stoic arguments. In regards to physical evil the Stoics used four basic arguments in their disputes with the Skeptics. All these arguments are used in Philo (Frick 1999: 144). These are categorized by Barth in the following manner: (1) "*The cosmological argument, according to which evil is explained as part of the*

cosmic order and is experienced by those good and evil, (2) the physical (or mechanical) argument, according to which certain natural disasters are explained as effects cause by matter as an auxiliary result of providence (3) the logical argument, which builds on the Stoic teaching of the paradoxes, according to which evil is the logical counterpart to the good and (4), the ethical (or pedagogical) argument, according to which certain instances of natural evil are justified as a chastisement or a deterrent aimed at the moral improvement of a person" (Barth in Frick 1999: 144).

The Cosmological argument center's on the fact that we always have to view certain natural or other disasters in view of the overall good. Thus while a certain human may suffer from a natural disaster such as a fire, this fire in the overall good helps new forests to grow (See Philo in *Prov*. 2: 86-97). Further for example, while torrents of rain are bad for sailors, they are necessary, since they nourish plants and other organisms and therefore in reality reflect the greater benefit of the human race (*Prov*. 2: 99).

Stoics argued that physical evil could be explained as an auxiliary effect caused by the change of elemental matter. Philo uses the argument in the passage *Prov*. 2: 102 where he writes: "God is in no way the cause of evil, but these things are engendered by changes in the elements (*metavolai twn stoicheiwn*). They are not primary (*proegoumena*) works of nature but consequent to her necessary works, and attendant (*epakolouthouta*) on the Primary" (Translation by Abraham Terian). Philo does not elaborate on the issue whether God is responsible for these secondary effects as the First Cause. Seneca on the other hand replies that God is not all-powerful.

The logical argument already hinted above basis itself on the Stoic axiom of paradoxes where the good is a counterpart to evil. In a fragment of Chrysippus' lost work On Providence we read: "There is absolutely nothing more foolish that those who think that there could have been goods without the co-existence of evils. For since goods are opposite to evils, the two must necessarily exist in opposition to each other and supported by a kind of opposed interdependence" (LS 54Q1 equals SVF 2: 1169 (Gellius 7. 1: 1). In the passage *Gig*. 1-3 Philo writes: "And so it is only natural that the birth of just Noah and his sons should make evident the abundance of the unjust. That is the nature of opposites, it is through the existence of the one that we chiefly recognize

the existence of the other". In *LA* 3: 73 Philo writes: "For it was necessary with a view to the clear manifestation of the superior beings that there should be in existence an inferior creation also, due to the same power, even the goodness of the First Cause" (*LA* 3: 73).

In terms of the ethical argument Philo similarly explains the natural disasters and the like as pedagogical devices, that serve to improve the human race and persuade people to seek virtue.

Philo explains moral evil in the passage De Providentia 1: 89-92, where Philo states that moral evil does not originate out of providence, but because human beings have given up their belief in providence.

In Philo's discussion of the serpent, one gains the impression that the serpent represents an ontological evil power and that it was even created by God. Philo concedes that "the serpent, pleasure, is bad of itself", (*LA* 3: 68), and elsewhere, "doubtless, He /God/ has made the serpent, our present subject, for the creature is of itself destructive of health and life" (*LA* 3: 76). However, given Philo's overall conceptual framework, it is impossible for Philo to postulated an ontological power in opposition to God. In this regard the Greek term used in order to express that the serpent is "bad" is *mochtheros*". This designation has a different coloring to the term "kakia", which denotes an intrinsically evil character. Thus the serpent is not characterized as intrinsically evil, but describes the serpent as wicked in its intentions, villainous (Frick 1999: 170). Philo's statement should be understood in the context of the predisposition of the passions towards evil.

Divine powers

An important part of Philo's doctrine of God consists of the doctrine of the powers of God.

Philo often associates Gods goodness with the doctrine of the divine powers and together with the Divine Logos these express the immanence of God. It has been generally argued that the doctrine of the Powers was a necessary philosophical evolution in Philo in order to reconcile Gods transcendence and his creatorship or in other words immanence. In Opif. 7 Philo makes the connection between Gods activity and the divine powers.

While there are various powers, there are two most important Powers. In *QE* 2: 68 Philo specifies that from the Logos break forth "two powers (*duo dunameis*)", the creative and the royal.

These two principal Powers are implied in the two principal names of God *Theos* and *kurios* (see *Cher*. 27, exegesis of Gen. 3: 24). The name *kurios* indicates God's sovereignty, while the name *Theos* indicates his goodness and creative activity. Being inspired by a voice in his soul, Philo writes: "The voice told me that with the one God who truly Is are two all-high and primary powers, Goodness and Sovereignty. Through his Goodness he engendered all that is, through his Sovereignty he rules what he has engendered, but a third uniting both is intermediating Logos, for it is through Logos that God is both ruler and good" (*Cher*. 27-28).

Regarding the relation of the two primary Powers, the creative and royal (or kingly), (In *Cher*. 27 the creative and the royal powers are called the "two all-high and primary powers") in *QE* 2: 62 Philo writes that "though the powers around God are of the same age, still the creative (power) is though of before the royal one) each has a derivative power, the gracious (or propitious) power – sometimes Philo calls it euergetis or *charisterios* (*Ebr*. 106) or charistike (*Heres* 166)- follows the creative power in that the creator "takes pity and compassion" for what he has made, the legislative power follows the royal power in that the former prescribes both duties (*prostaktike dunamis*) and prohibitions (*apagoreutike dunamis*) incumbent on human behavior" (Frick 1999: 79).

Philo writes in *De Deo* 5 (The Greek words in square brackets are added from Folker Siegerts Greek retrovision from the Armenian) "And

/Scripture/ says that he speaks "from above," who (nonetheless) is in the midst, because the Self-existent has adorned (*diakosmew*) all things through (his) word /logw/, and through his providence (pronoia) they have become both articulate and rational. (Scripture) makes clear in whose midst he is, calling them "cherubim". One of them is consecratedly designated "the Creative Power" and is rightly called "God", while the other (is designated) "the Ruling and Royal (Power)" (or) "Lord".

One of these Powers is constantly associated with Gods creative activity and is given the title *poietike dunamis* or *euergetike/charistike dunamis*. The characteristics of goodness and benevolence are associated with the creative power in a number of texts (see for example *Opif*. 21; *Leg*. 3.73; *Cher*. 27; *Migr*. 183; *Her*. 166).

Apart from the two principal powers, Philo recognizes other powers in hierarchical order. Speaking of the powers as colonies of the divine logos, Philo lists five different powers: "their leader being creative (poietike) power, in the exercise of which the Creator produced the universe by a word (*kath en o poiwn logw ton kosmou*), second in order is the royal (*vasilike*) power, in virtue of which He that has made it governs that which has come into being, third stands the gracious (*ilews*) power, in the exercise of which the Great Artificer takes pity and compassion on his own work, (the fragment is broken of here so the stuff in brackets is conjecture) fourth is the legislative (*nomothetike*) power, by which He prescribes duties incumbent on us, and fifth) that division of legislation, by which He prohibits those things which should not be done" (*Fuga* 95, cf. 103-4, *QG* 1: 57, 2: 68, 75).

Philo further classifies ideas-powers into categories, which include: beneficence, (which includes goodness, mercy, concern, grace, and creativity), authority (including rulership, legislative power, regal power, punishment), *logos tomeus*, "cutting reason", (in the sense of making valid distinctions as opposed to lumping together matters which differ from each other) and the *logos spermatikos*, "seed-bearing reason," (also in the plural), which instigates insights in man.

It is possible to state that the immanence or transcendence of the powers corresponds to their position in the hierarchy of the powers. The most transcendent powers in this respect are the two principal Powers. In *Fuga* 103-4, Philo discerns between powers that are "far removed

from our race", which he identifies as the two primary powers, and the other powers "which he identifies as the gracious and the two divisions of the legislative power.

On the immanent level the powers through the Logos administer the concrete *charites* in creation. This connection between the powers and the *charites* in made in *Plant*. 86, where Philo remarks that God uses the creative power "in virtue of which He bestows benefits".

The association of the powers as concrete manifestations of God's goodness can be seen in the passage *Spec*. 1: 209 where Philo writes: "when we reason about Him we recognize in Him partition and division into each of the Divine powers (*dunameis*) and excellencies (*aretai*). For God is good (*agathos*), He is the maker and begetter (*poietes kai gennetes*) of the universe and His providence is over what He has begotten (*pronoetikos wn egennese*), He is savior and benefactor, and has the plentitude of all blessedness and all happiness".

Furthermore the passage connects goodness, providence and the powers. In *Cher*. 27-28 Philo connects Gods goodness and creatorship, which are united in the creative power. The reference to providence as the care over creation is an allusion to the gracious power.

In one text Philo makes a connection between the two primary powers, the creative and royal and "providential power". In *Legat*. 6 Philo writes of the powers as: "the creative (*kosmopoietike*), the kingly (*vasilike*), the providential (*pronoetike*), and of the others all that are both beneficial (*euergetis*) and punitive (*kolasterios*), assuming that the punitive are to be classed among the beneficial". Although he does not state that "providence *is* a power", he does state that there is "a providential power", he brings thus into close relation the idea of a divine power and providence. When Philo speaks of the providential power, he classifies it hierarchically below the two primary powers. Further the gracious power (*ilews dunamis*) always follows the creative power (*poietike dunamis*).

Whatever the precise relationship between the two primary powers and providence, it is clear that one of the manifestations of the powers lies in God's providential care. In *Spec*. 1: 308 Philo writes: "Yet vast are his /Gods/ excellencies and powers (*aretais kai dunamesin*), he takes pity and compassion (*eleon kai oikton lamvanei*) on the most helplessly in need… He holds their low estate worthy of His providential care

(*pronoia*)… and therefore they are not denied the hope that is greatest of all, the hope in God, Who in the graciousness of His nature (*dia ten ilew fusin autou*) does not refuse the task of caring (*pronoia*) and watching over (*epimeleia*) them in their desolate condition".

The virtues and powers have an intrinsic relationship. Philo believes that the "virtues" cannot be given to humans without mediation of the powers. It is only through the mediating quality of the powers that these virtues can be conveyed to the humans or the effects of these virtues (*Deus* 79. The powers too, as Philo says in *Deus* 77, are unmixed in relation to God himself, but mixed in relation to created beings

Billings points out that in relation to God himself, that is in their transcendent aspect, the powers are the incomprehensible thoughts or ideas of God (cf. *Spec*. 1: 48, *QG* 4: 42) called the virtues of God (Billings in Frick 1999: 86). In their immanent aspect the powers enact God's purpose in creation (Billings in Frick 1999: 86). In this regard the difference between the powers and virtues is one of aspect, since they represent different aspects of Gods nature as thinking acting (Billings in Frick 1999: 86). "The term "power" signifies the immanent exercise of Gods essential goodness in the world, whereas the term "virtue" signifies the "moral" excellence, or the attributes, of Gods transcendent nature" (Billings in Frick 1999: 86). The difference of the terms is thus not in substance but in aspect, since they both constitute Gods thinking acting.

The relationship between the powers and the virtues can be seen in the fact that Philo calls providence both a virtue (*Deus* 29) and a power (*Legat*. 6). This shows the close relation of virtue and power. This is so since in the aspect as virtue, providence belongs to the excellent nature of God which cares for His offspring and creation and that God in His caring displays goodness and graciousness. In *Spec*. 1: 308, Philo says, "vast are his /Gods/ excellence and powers, he takes pity and compassion on those most helplessly in need", in *Moses* 2: 189 and *QE* 2: 61 he speaks of Gods propitious and beneficent (*ilews kai euergetike*) virtues. In the aspect of power providence is characterized by the execution of Gods care in the world. God's providence requires divine activity, which is always the task of the divine powers (Frick 1999: 87). Often when speaking of the virtues Philo associates them with Gods grace or mercy for the world.

Creation

Philo writes: "For it belongs to God to act, and this we may not ascribe to any created being. What belongs to the created is to suffer, and he who accepts this from the first, as a necessity inseparable from his lot, will bear with patience what befalls him, however grievous it may be. He who thinks it a strange and alien thing will incur the penalty of Sisypus, crushed by a vast and hopeless burden, unable even to lift his head, overwhelmed by all the terrors which beset and prostrate him, and increasing each misery by that abject spirit of surrender, which belongs to the degenerate and unmanly soul (p. 77b-78), (De Cherubim).

"For that, it is enough to contrast the "passive" person who abandons himself to the "passive" individual who "reacts" and resists the contrary action, thereby developing an *active passivity*, (Alexandre 1999: 221). "Passivity" thus is transformed into "passion" (p. 76-77), and he who accepts it as a natural and necessary reality will bear with patience the vicissitudes and misfortunes of day-to-day life" (Alexandre 1999: 221). "Sisyphus, who succumbs to the weight of his evils because he resisted the divine sovereignty, is contrasted with an anti-Sisyphus, who is strong enough to mitigate and bear them" (Alexandre 1999: 221).

G. Reale writes about Philo understanding of creation: "for Philo it is in fact not a matter of either-or, but rather of and-and; God for him is both Creator (out of nothing) and Demiurge". The creation scheme adopted by him contemplates two phases: in a first moment God creates the Logos and the Ideas, as well as the unformed matter in the quantity required for constructing the universe. In a second moment God forms and orders unformed matter, through the mediation of the Logos and in conformity with the ideas, and so produces the cosmos. In the "first moment" the activity of God is that of the ktistes, of ktizein, i.e. producing ex nihilo, in the "second moment" the activity of God is that of the Demiurge, or of demiourgein, i.e. forming, informing or giving form to what is unformed" (Reale 1981: 65). Further writes Reale: "Sometimes they can naturally be distinguished logically and ideally, but not chronologically, for "time comes into being only together with the cosmos". Thus there is not doubt that Philo clearly asserts the creation of matter, and the great innovation of Philo lies precisely in this. Plato had introduced the celebrated "three principles" for explai-

ning the world: the Demiurge, the Ideas and the chwra or matter, and he had conceived them as coeternal. Philo transformed the Demiurge into the omnipotent God of the Bible, and made him creator of the other two principles, which he makes use of in order to create the physical world" (G. Reale 1981: 65-66).

Logos proforikos, "as we have already noted, is a notion of Stoic influence (cf. Deter. 126-127), a notion according to which the thoughts and emotions originiating in the nous or the psuche by the logos endiathetos are verbally expressed by means of the logos proforikos" (Alexandre 1999: 199).

Philo writes: "Moses thinks that none ought to turn away either to the right or the left or to the parts of the earthly Edom at all, but to go by along the central road, to which he gives the most proper title of kings highway or royal road; for since God is the first and sole King of the universe, the road leading to Him, being a Kings road, is also naturally called royal. This road you must take to philosophy, not the philosophy which is pursued by the sophistic group of present-day people, who, having practices arts of speech to use against the truth, have given the name of wisdom to their rascality, conferring on a sorry work a divine title. No, the philosophy which the ancient band of aspirants pursued in hardfought contest, eschewing the soft enchantments of pleasure, engaged with a fine severity in the study of what is good and fair (p. 101), (De posteritate Caini). "This royal road then, which we have just said to be true and genuine philosophy, is called in the Law the utterance and word of God. For it is written "Thou shalt not swerve aside from the word which I command thees this day to the right hand nor to the left hand" (Deut. 28: 14). Thus it is clearly proved that the word of God is identical with the royal road. He treats the two as synonyms, and bids us decline from neither, but with upright mind tread the track that leads straight on, a central highway (p. 102), (De posteritate Caini).

Philo's understanding of creation is especially resonant with Platonic doctrine of the Timaeus. However, there are important differences.

Both Plato and Philo affirm that the cosmos is created. God's activity can be either characterized as an act of creation or a process of creation. Philo strongly emphasizes the doctrine of the createdness of the cosmos (*Opif.* 171-172). Plato in the *Timaeus* affirms that the cosmos

is created, since it belongs to visible realities and such realities are created (*Tim*. 28b-c). Plato in the Timaeus 48a states that the creation of the cosmos was a result of the combination of necessity (*anagke*) and reason (*nous*) inasmuch as reason was controlling necessity. In order to support the idea that the cosmos was created Philo uses his own argument, which states that the cosmos cannot be *agenetos*, since this would imply that the cosmos is on the same level as God (*Opif*. 7-10).

God is the cause of all things. In *Cher*. 125 Philo elaborates on causes when he writes: "For to bring anything into being needs all these /causes/ conjointly, the "by which (*to uf ou*), the "from which (to ex ou), the "through which (*to di ou*), the "for which (*to di o*), and the first of these is the cause (*aition*), the second the material (*ule*), the third the tool or instrument (*ergaleion*), and the fourth the end or object (aitia)". Philo specifies his statement: the cause is God, the material are the four elements (*ta tessara stoicheia*), the instrument is the logos of God (*organon de logon Theou*), and the final cause is the goodness of the creator (*agathotes tou demiourgou*)", (Frick 1999: 109

Creation and providence are associated in Philo's thought. This is implied in the Father/Maker terminology. The term Father implies not only a cause but also continuous care of the Father for his offspring. In *Spec*. 3: 189, Philo states that the spectacle of creation was "not brought together automatically (ouk automatisthenta) by unreasoning forces (forais alogois), but by the mind of God (dianoia Theou) Who is rightly called their Father and Maker… also that a Father Who begat them /fixed stars/ according to the law of nature takes thought for his offspring, His providence watching (pronooumenos) over both the whole and the parts". In *Praem*. 42 Philo speaks of certain people who confess that "all these /cosmic/ beauties and this transcendent order has not happened automatically (*ouk automatisthenta*) but by the handiwork of an architect and world maker, also that there must be a providence (*oti pronoian anagkaion einai*), for it is a law of nature that a maker should take care of what has been made". Similarly in the passage *Conf*. 114-15, Philo ascribes the following views to those people who built the tower of Babel. They believe: "either that the Deity does not exist, or that it exists but does not exert providence (*pronoew*), or that the world had no beginning in which it was created, or that though created its course is under the sway of varying and random causation". Seigert writes in his

commentary on *De Deo*, that providence functions as a maintainer of the order of the cosmos and speaks of "cosmic providence" (Siegert in Frick 1999: 115).

Plato's view on the creation of the cosmos was later intensely discussed by philosophers and the issue of whether the cosmos was created or not became a hot point of contention. This issue was further complicated by the inherent ambiguity of the language. The noun "genesis" can mean both "the process of becoming" or "coming into being, creation", so the corresponding adjective *genetos* denotes both "subject to the process of becoming" and "having come into being, having been created" (Runia 1986: 428). The situation is complicated even more if the word *arche* is added in the phrase *arche genesews*, for *arche* can mean both "(temporal) beginning" and (ontologically higher) principle" (Runia 1986: 428).

Philo's language in this regard can also create ambiguity. His statements can also be read in the sense that either the cosmos was created by a creative act of God (in *protological* terms) or that the cosmos has always existed and is continually coming into being, since it is dependant for its existence on a higher being. Any discussion in this regard in relation to Philo's views is bound to skate on thin ice. This is so since creation as an act (in a timeless situation) or continuous creation are very similar concepts in their theological implications. One would tend to argue that due to the fact that the cosmos did not come about automatically, it follows that Philo believes to the temporal genesis of the created cosmos.

Philo defined the male as generally active as the cause, while the woman was essentially passive (Ebr. 73). In regards to conversion Philo writes: "He gave them (the proselutous) equal privilege and equal rank"… "because they have denounced (kategnwkosi) the delusion of their fathers and ancestors"… and joined the "new and godloving politeia" (Spec. 1. 51-53).

Since time is indicated in the sound Platonic view by the movements of the heavenly bodies, it follows, that the doctrine that creation took place in time should be rejected. This must also have been Philo's position. In terms of the protological view it can be said that since God creates instantaneously and simultaneously, it follows that time is not involved and thus that creation is *inceptively* temporal. At

Her. 165 Philo states that before the fourth day of creation there was *aiwn*, thereafter *chronos*. In this regard we also have to realize that the protological interpretation is able to accommodate the idea of perpetual creation, since that even if God created the world in a creative act, it is likely that he will continue to care for his creation.

Philo presents in *Aet*. 52-54 an argument based on the Aristotelian position of the uncreatedness and eternity of the cosmos. If time is *agenetos*, then the cosmos is also *agenetos*. The nature of time is *anarchos kai atelutetos*, there could not ever have been a time when there was no time, since the expressions "ever" and "was" already indicate time. In any event the wording used by Philo seems to encourage the protological interpretation (Runia 1986: 431). "Two important texts, *Opif*. 7-11 and *Aet.* 15, which declare the cosmos to be *genetos* on account of the providential relation between maker and product, father and son, do not necessarily exclude the possibility of a doctrine of *creatio aeterna*, nor do they compel such an interpretation" (Runia 1986: 431).

Even if one alternates between a creation as a continuous act of God or a creation as a one-time event the important fact remains that it is in God's nature to act. In *Cher*. 77 Philo writes: "it belongs to God to act, and this we may not ascribe to any created being". This thesis to an extent relativises debates on creation's genesis, since it in a way guarantees God's immanence and therefore never separates God from the world as is suggested by philosophical ideas, which absolve God from creation.

Dillon observes that when Philo stresses that the world is created, he really is attempting to emphasize that the world is absolutely dependent on God. Dillon writes: "If Philo stoutly maintains that the world is created, that is to establish its absolute *dependence* on God, not its creation at any point of time. Certainly Philo makes confusing noises on occasion, but all he really wants to claim, I would suggest, is that the universe, both physical and intelligible (the *kosmos noetos*), is dependent on God as its *arche*, or first principle, and, in the case of the physical cosmos, that it is continually in a state of coming-to-be, and so (is genetos. What it is not is) *agenetos*, as the Perpatetics would have it, and it is against this position that his polemic is directed" (Dillon in Runia 1993: 134). Runia has a similar position: "The emphasis on createdness

may intend no more than to indicate its ontological dependence on God as creator of all things that exist" (Runia 1993: 138).

Later philosophers who argued that the cosmos has always existed and is in a state of createdness (*creatio aeterna* or *creatio continua*) avoided a literal reading of the *Timaeus*, while those who supported the creation event (although not necessarily in time) took a literal view of the Timaeus. Those who argued against the view that the cosmos was created used three main arguments. The first one can be called a *methodological* explanation. This argument proposed that the cosmogony is introduced as a mere hypothesis and for didactic reasons (Runia 1986: 96). The second explanation-*metaphysical-ontological*- states that the cosmos is *genetos* in the sense that it is continually dependant or being continually created by a higher cause (Runia 1986: 96). The third explanation can be called a physicalistic explanation in that the cosmos is *genetos* if we realize that it is in a constant process of becoming or changing. In this regard Aristotle combated the creationalist movement by asking the question in De philosophia- what was the Demiurge doing before he created the cosmos? Philo used Aristotle's argument against Aristotle himself when he stated that if indeed the cosmos is created eternally, than this decreases the status of God, who is able to exercise only a limited influence over the cosmos and shows that God is inactive. Nor can God exercise providence over the world (*Prov*. 1.6, *Aet*. 83).

Philo does not agree with the Stoic belief of the material immanence of God and Philo sharply separates God from the created order. In Mig. 179 he rejects the Stoic view of the universe "either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole", and in 181 he maintains that Moses did not hold that "the universe nor its soul is the primal God", cf. LA 1: 91.

In *Mut*. 46 Philo writes: "We all know that before the creation of the world God was sufficient unto Himself and that after the creation He remained the same unchanged. Why then did He make the things, which were not? Why, save because He was good and bountiful (*oti agathos kai filodwros en*)".

Philo states that God willed the cosmos to come into being (*Conf*. 16, *Conf*. 175). The world's creation was not the result of some necessity inherent in God. Plato on the other hand states, that the Demiurge

willed that the cosmos be as good as possible (*Tim*. 29e3, 30a2, d3). Thus Philo applies the will to the decision to create the cosmos. Philo following other thinkers believes that God created only one world, since he himself is One (*Opif*. 170-172). Plato assumes that the cosmos came into existence as "a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God" (*Timaeus* 30b). The cosmos due to its possession of a living soul (*psuche*) and reason (*nous*) can be called a macrocosm. This is parallel to the human soul, which is a microcosm (cf. *Timaeus* 44c, in Philo, cf. *Heres* 154, *QG* 4: 188, *Aet*. 26, 74, 94-95. Philo adopts Plato's notion of the *desmos* binding the cosmos together and identifies it with the Logos.

Later philosophy struggled with the notion of the direct involvement of God in creation. Aristotle dissociates his highest god from involvement in the process of creation. Plotinus emphasizes the necessity of creation. In other words, according to Plotinus the world had to be created as a kind of compulsory emanation from God. The cosmos is a necessary (though not unrational) excrescence from the world of higher reality. Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists like Proclus attempted to avoid attributing to God the "work of creation" and delegated creation to a second god (*Procl. in Tim.* 1. 4. 26ff). But this issue was also present in Plato's thought. Thus the Demiurge in Plato delegates the creation of the genera of animals to the lesser Gods or "young gods" as they are called and he himself creates mans divine part (*theion*) and the rational part or *nous* (*Tim*. 41A-42E). This in a way absolves the Demiurge from any "responsibility" for the weak inclinations of man and the sensible cosmos.

In terms of Plato's thought, creation is the work of the Demiurge. Plato introduces the Demiurge in 28a of the *Timaeus*, where the Demiurge is the cause of the cosmos' genesis. Plato states that the creation occurred when the Demiurge created order out of a disordered state of affairs (*Tim*. 30a). In this regard the process is accentuated as one of persuasion and guidance and not of a commanding ethos as seen in the Genesis account (Runia 1986: 140).

According to Plato, the Demiurge undertook the creation of the world, because he wanted everything to be good and resemble himself (*Tim*. 29D-31B). He also gave the cosmos a soul (*psuche*) and intelligence (*nous*). In his act of creation the Demiurge turns to a model. The

Demiurge fashions the world out of a material that is already located at hand.

The Demiurge supplies the cosmos with a soul, which consists of three ingredients-being, sameness and difference- each of which is in an intermediate state between the indivisibility of the noetic world and divisibility of perceptible phenomena (*Tim.* 34B-41A). The Demiurge takes the primal soul-substance and structures it in a harmonic and mathematical way, and then divides it into circles of the same and different, which enable the cosmic soul to carry out its kinetic and cognitive functions. Due to the fact that the circles run perfectly true, it possesses both rational understanding concerning the noetic world and true opinion with regard to sensible things. This results in the cosmos leading a perfectly ordered and rational life for eternity. Philo omits the Platonic account of the creation of the cosmic soul. The expression 'soul of the cosmos' is practically avoided by Philo. The reason of man is not a fragment of this cosmic soul but rather an imprint of the divine image (*Det.* 90). Philo as other ancient authors has a tendency to simplify Plato's account of the composition of the soul.

Plato faced a problem when he described the creation of the cosmos body prior to its soul. Philo had a similar problem in regards to the Genesis account, since he needed to explain, why was the vegetation created prior to the heavenly bodies (*Opif.* 45-46). Philo solved the problem by stating that this was so, in order to teach man not to rely on false truths. Reversing the order of creation teaches man the ontological superiority of God, who is the true cause of things and not for example the heavenly bodies.

Philo frequently uses the Demiurgic terminology to describe the creative activity of God. The word itself means "craftsman" or "manual worker". In *Tim.* 28c3 the Demiurge is called the "maker and father" of this universe. This phrase occurs at least 41 times in Philo (Runia 1986: 108). Plutarch uses three main arguments to explain Plato's designation of the highest God as *patera twn pantwn kai poieten* (Runia 1986: 109): (1) God is the father of all things (2) God is called father in the metaphorical sense of the word (3) Plato distinguishes between coming into being and birth. In the latter process God donates part of himself. The cosmos is a living being who has God as its father

Later Platonists did not see any contradiction between the Demiurge understood as a cause and Aristotelian philosophy of the cause. Similarly to Plato, Philo frequently uses the word o *aitios* to ascribe God and his relation to the cosmos (See *Deus* 56; *Plant*. 64; *Abr*. 78) etc. This regular usage is a result with the combination of the usage of the Timaeus with other Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines (Runia 1986: 104). The influence of Aristotle on Philo's thought can be seen in *Conf*. 123, *Fug*. 8; *Spec*. 2. 5 where Aristotle's concept of the Unmoved Mover is reflected in Philo's terminology. Aristotle's influence is also seen in Philo's concept of the never ceasing activity of God (*Cher*. 87). Philo also takes over Stoic conceptuality where the active and passive principles are both qualifications of the same *ousia* (*Opif*. 8).

Philo stresses that when God rests his rest is not *apraxia*, but an eternal and effortless *energeia*. The Genesis account with God resting is only a pedagogical device to hint at the order or *taxis* of creation.

God's activity ensures that the creation of the cosmos is a never-ending process. That creation is portrayed as taking place in sequence is a way of emphasizing the order or taxis of reality. The order of creation leads one to his or her Creator. By exercising reason, one is able to contemplate the creation and consequently the Creator. The fact that Genesis portrays creation-taking place within a period of time i.e. six days does in no means imply the Creator needed a certain length of time to create. "The creational sequence is not temporal but *structural* (indicating order) or perhaps even *analytic* (analyzing or reconstructing the indissociable)" (*Opif*. 67). Philo's emphasis on the procreationalism of God may have had future influence of on the Christian doctrine of the "begotteness" of the Logos (Runia 1986: 424).

In terms of time Plato writes that time is thus a 'moving image (*eikwn*) of eternity (*aiwn*) proceeding according to number' (*Tim*. 37d5-7). Philo states that time is dependent on the movement of the heavenly bodies (Spec. 1.90). Since time is dependant on the cosmos or the heavenly bodies, it necessarily follows that time is more recent and has an inferior ontological status. Further as emphasized later by Plotinus, time is not an immediate consequence of the movement of the planets, but is dependant on measurement of the movements of the heavenly bodies (*Enn*. 3. 7.7, 12.25). Philo writes: "and in eternity nothing has passed away or is still to occur, but it is only in a state of present

existence" (*Deus* 31-32). An *aiwn* is the *Vios* of both God and noetic cosmos.

In his exegesis of the creation account of Genesis, Philo is hesitant to do away with the Platonic theme of matter even if matter as such is absent in the Genesis account. However, in his treatment of matter he appears to be inconsistent and does not offer much information regarding this pre-creational matter. In *Prov*. 1.22 Philo associates Platonic matter with the water, darkness and abyss of Genesis. Philo's inconsistency in interpreting matter is seen for example in *Plant*. 3 where Philo seems to imply that "day one" refers to the creation of a sense-perceptible cosmos. This is in contrast to his usual exegesis of "day one" as the day when God created the incorporeal world. It is possible that Philo's alternating exegesis of Genesis could suggest that he viewed the text as polyvalent i.e. if looked from different angles the same words could give equally valid meanings (Runia 1986: 156). Therefore the text could at the same time refer to pre-existent matter and the intelligible world. In any event it is certain that Philo adhered to the notion of a pre-existent *ule*. Matter is the *ule* out of which (*ex ou*) the cosmos is formed. Matter has no ontological status of its own and is a kind of pre-product of creation. Philo understands the pre-creation matter as a kind of substratum lying at hand to be formed (*Prov*. 2. 50-51). Later writers attempted to characterize pre-creational matter. Plutarch, Atticus and Numenius sought to explain the pre-cosmic irregular motions by postulating an irrational cosmic soul (Cf. *Plut*. *Mor*. 550D, 1014A-C, 1016C-D, *Att*. *Fr*. 10, 20, 23, 26 etc.). Philo is careful not to ascribe any positive attributes to matter. Philo stresses the total passivity of matter and does not mention any disorderly movement of matter as suggested in Plato's *Timaeus* (*Tim*. 30a).

An important point in this relation is that if one postulates that God created disorderly matter and then later created the ordered world, why would he follow such a process and not create an ordered world straight away (Runia 1986: 289).

Philo writes: "We must think much the same things about God. When he decided to create the megapolis, he first had its forms in mind from which he constituted the noetic cosmos and then made the sense-perceptible cosmos by using it for a model" (Opif. 17-19).

In one of the Hellenistic Synagogue Prayers preserved in the Apostolic Constitutions we read: "You have appointed him a cosmos out of the cosmos. Out of the four elements you molded a body for him. But you prepared a soul for him out of non-being. Your freely gave him five fold sense-perception and set a mind as a charioteer over his sense-perceptions (P 3 (AC 7. 34. 6 /20-21/ see also P 12 (AC 8. 12.16-17 /36-40), (in Sterling 1999: 17). In this prayer the human is the kosmopolites, a phrase that Philo uses. God "appointed him kosmou kosmon" (P 11 (AC 8. 9. 8 /2/, P 12 (AC 8.12.16 /35/), (Sterling 1999: 17). While Philo prefers the phrase Vrachus kosmos, the idea is very similar (Philo, Post. 58, Plant. 28. Her. 155-56), (Sterling 1999: 17). "The second and third lines contrast the corporeal origin of the body with the incorporeal origin of the soul, a common Philonic observation" (Sterling 1999: 17). The third line appears to suggest a creation ex nihilo, which Philo did not expound. This is due to a possible Christian redaction or is simply a formulaic expression devoid of its later Christian meaning.

One of the fundamental premises of Philo's cosmology is the division of reality into the sense-perceptible realm and the intelligible realm. In this he is obviously following Plato (see for example *Plant*. 50, Plato *Tim*. 27d-28a). God has two sons the *kosmos noetos* and the sensible-perceptible cosmos. In his creative action he simultaneously creates the sense-perceptible cosmos out of a pre-existent disorderly matter, thereby initiating time (*Opif*. 13, 28). Philo's interpretation is actually based on the Timaeus account. God has intercourse with Wisdom. Wisdom receives the divine seeds and gives birth to the *aithetos kosmos*. The cosmos does not have the stable character of God, but is in a continuous flux. Some of the parts of the cosmos are in a greater flux than others.

The creation of the cosmos results in the creation of various forms of existence. These are Things that exist (*onta*), (2) Incorporeal (*aswmata*) and Corporeal (*swmata*) (3) Inanimate (*apsucha*) and Animate (*empsucha*) (4) Irrational (*aloga*) and Rational (*logika*), (Frick 1999: 153).

According to Philo's exegesis of "day one" (*Opif*. 16-35, exegesis of Gen. 1: 6-8), it is on this "day" that God created the incorporeal world or the intelligible cosmos. To support his interpretation Philo uses the Greek term *emera mia* (day one instead of first day). In a similar way the clause *ws o peri autes logos menuei* functions in the same way. The last act

of creation is the framing of man on day six (*Opif*. 69-88, exegesis of Gen. 1: 26-31). That the noetic cosmos is created on "day one" clearly implies that this has to be differentiated from other works of creation. The firm stance on the creation of the *kosmos noetos* is an attack on *Tim*. 52a, where Plato asserts that noetic reality is unrestrictedly *agenetos kai anwlethros* (Runia 1986: 427). In this context it is important to keep in mind that there is frequent confusion between the terms "universe" and "heaven" in ancient authors.

Philo believes that it is impossible to describe everything created on the first day because it (i.e., this "day one") includes the intelligible world, and then he ends his comment with the words, *ws o peri autes* (scil. *Emeras*) *logos menuei*. Philo explains that the intelligible world had to be created first, in order for it to provide a model for the physical world (*Parag*. 16, *Opif.mundi*). This physical world is a copy of the first world. To a list of concepts indicated by the terms *noetos*, *aoratos*, *aswmatos*, *anaisthetos*, there is a parallel list consisting of *anoetos*, *oratos*, *swmatikos*, *asithetos*.

There are seven things which were created in their intelligible form. In this regard Philo relies on the Biblical text itself, except that spirit comes after water and not before as in the biblical text (Schwabe 1999 (1931): 108). The Talmud speaks of 10 things, although numbers 8 and 9 do not correspond with anything in Philo and appear to be an addition (Schwabe 1999 (1931): 108). B. Hag. 12a writes "Ten things were created on the first day and they are: heavens (1) and earth (2) tohu (X) and bohu (Y) light (7) and darkness (3) spirit (5) and water(s)6 measure of day (8) and measure of night (9) etc. This numbering corresponds to Philo numbering in his work. Numbers 8 and 9 are Talmudic additions (Schwabe 1999 (1931): 108).

Philo strongly believes in the existence of a plan of creation or in other words the Ideas. Philo believed that God struck out in advance the *noetic* cosmos. God eternally thinks the *kosmos noetos*, which is situated in the Logos. The concept of the *noetic* design used by God in his creative act is taken over by Philo from Plato (Runia 1986: 161). As suggested by Horowitz, Philo most probably understands the *kosmos noetos* to mean something like a schematic plan of a city in the mind of the architect (Horowitz in Runia 1986: 162). The design of the creatures is not planned ahead by means of discursive reason, but is already

implanted in the divine seed as a pattern. In this regard Plato's receptacle is a kind of womb into which the divine seed is implanted. The opposition between the nous and *anagke* in the *Tim*. 48a is not found in Philo. In *Ebr*. 30-31 Philo states that God is the father of the cosmos, the mother is the makers *episteme*, which receives the divine seed and gives birth to the only beloved sense-perceptible son, this cosmos (the other son is the kosmos noetos). This episteme is the Sofia.

Both Philo and Plato expound the model and craftsman idea (*Tim*. 28a-b, 28c-29b). The craftsman looks to a model when furnishing his product. As the creator looks to an eternal model, the product must be good. In contrast to Philo, Plato presents the model as already existing. Philo considers the model as a reflection of the creator god, which leads to the "formation" of the noetic world. Wolfson points out that whereas Philo considers the Ideas as created by God, Plato, regards the Ideas as eternal and uncreated (Wolfson in Sandmel 1979: 97). Plato further believes that the Ideas are in a constant flux, spurring imitations in the sensible world.

In line with Greek thought Philo introduces the concept of thinking as an aspect of divine life. The Bible of course primarily concentrates on the act of making and speaking. "Although Philo does not say in explicit terms how Gods thinking is related to his providential activity of continuous creation, one might surmise that God, by continuously thinking the noetic cosmos in the Logos, enables the Logos continuously to effectuate that the visible cosmos corresponds *kata dunamin* to its intelligible model" (Runia 1986: 441).

Plato in the *Timaeus* 48A-61C introduces the difficult concept of the receptacle. He himself notes this is a difficult concept and Plato uses other names to designate the same concept. The existence of the receptacle is dictated by the existence of the ideas. The sensible world is a reflection of the transcendent ideas, and this reflection has to take place somewhere. This is where the concept of the receptacle comes in. As such the receptacle should not be identified with the primeval chaos.

"*But as someone standing nearest to the truth would say that the central one is the Father of all…, while the two on either side are the powers most senior and nearest to the Being, the creative and the regal…Being flanked, then, by each of his two powers, the central being appears to the visionary mind* (τή ὁρατικη διανοία) *as an image sometimes of one and sometimes of three: one-*

when, purified, it scales the greatest height and, transcending not only the multitude of numbers but also the dyad, that neighbour to the monad, it presses on to the idea which is unmixed and untangled and in need of nothing else whatsoever by itself; of three-when, not yet initiated into the great mysteries, it still celebrates but the minor rites and cannot grasp the Being by itself alone apart from all else except through its activities, either creating or ruling" (*Abr.* 121-122).

In *De Providentia* 1. 6-8 Philo writes: "*For God did not first begin to think and then to create; nor was there ever a time when he did not create, the forms being with him from the beginning. The will of God does not happen later, but is always with him, for natural movements never cease. And so it will happen that he creates by always thinking and gives beginning to being to sense-perceptible things, so that both of them exist together, (namely) the always acting with divine counsel and the giving the beginning of being to sense-perceptible beings*".

In *Opif.* 17-18 Philo attempts to explain where the *kosmos noetos* is located. In order to do this Philo uses the help of an image. He uses the images of craftsman, architect and king. The king instigates the development of a magnificent building. The architect conceives of the design in his head. The architect consults this design or "noetic city" in his head and looks to the materials, which would enable the construction of this city. In an analogous fashion, the *noetos kosmos* has its place in the Logos of the creator. This is not located in the soul or mind of God but in his Logos. The *noetos kosmos* is the first phase of Gods creative act. God of course combines all of the above three functions. He decides to found the city, composes the *noetos kosmos* and executes the plan. These stages are of course not happening in time in terms of successive events.

Philos theory of the Ideas as thoughts of God is not directly found in Plato but is prefigured in Plato. Plato puts the Demiurge on the second place in the ontological scheme and he is inferior to the Ideas, whereas in Philo the Demiurge is put in the first place and is the cause of the Ideas. In Plato the cosmology is expressed by Ideas, Demiurge and matter. In Philo it is God and matter, while the Ideas being ontologically subsumable under God, as products of His noetic activity.

If the Ideas are created by God who thinks them, and if the Ideas are as in Plato, not just entia rationes but true Being which is not subject

to genesis or destruction, we can state that on the level of the supra-sensible non-material reality we have a creation ex nihilo. On the material level we can speak of a creation which is intermediate between creation ex nihilo and demiurgic creation. Plato merely speaks of a semi-creationism, where the formation of the world is nothing more than the ordering of chaotic matter on the basis of the ideal order.

The concept of creation ex nihilo is not found in Greek thought and was contrary to its foundations the Eleatic dictum ex nihilo nihil fit.

In this context many scholars assume that the theory of Ideas is not Philos, and then proceed to find a preceding philosopher from whom Philo could have taken over these theories. But nobody assumes that Philo could have originally produced this theory.

Did Philo create the theory of the Ideas as Thoughts of God.

Radice distinguishes a Platonic tradition promoted by the Jews of Alexandria for the purpose of biblical exegesis and the other entirely Greek (i.e. the tradition which leads to Eudorus and particularly links up with the Old Academy), (Radice 1991:130). Philo represents the culmination of the former tradition and after Philo these two traditions fused into Middle Platonism (Radice 130). Radice thinks that Philo then contributed the theory of the Ideas as Thoughts of God to Middle Platonism (Radice 1991:132).

After Philo the first to speak about Ideas as Thoughts of God was Seneca (in Ep. 65) and apparently considered the theory that the Ideas are thoughts of God as belonging to Platonic exegesis (Radice 1991:132).

Radice writes: "In my opinion Philo can be considered the *catalyst* of Middle Platonic thought, that is to say the *external* impulse that set it in motion (Radice 1991:133).

This fact is also possible since during Philos time the *henological view* (This vies propounds that the highest position is occupied by the One and the Dyad, principles which have been set out in Platos so-called unwritten doctrine) which prevailed ni Plato, the Old Academy and Eudorus recedes into the background. This view is replaced by the doctrine of the Ideas in its new representation, which then becomes the primary feature of Middle Platonism (Radice 133). Radice writes: "Yet this movement seems also partly to develop in a dialectics between the properly Platonic cosmo-theological theory of the three principles (Ideas, Demiurge, matter) and the originally Philonic theory of the two

principles (God and matter), in search of a metaphysically satisfying compromise" (Radice 1991:133). "The point of contention which exists between these two interpretations of Plato and which requires a philosophical compromise concerns the role of God" (Radice 1991:133). "In one he is the creator of the Ideas, in the other he is the imitator of the Ideas" (Radice 1991:133). "Albinus, for example, resolves the question by postulating a hypostatic hiearachy which admits both functions, in a philosophical context which has many links with Philos Mosaic philosophy" (Radice 1991:133). "Atticus, on the other hand, seems to give precedence to the (Philonic) creative function of God" (Radice 1991:134).

Philo believes that the cosmos is populated by numerous hierarchically structured beings, where man forms the middle link. Similarly to Plato, Philo believes that the incarnation of the rational soul entails a loss of cognitive ability that can only partially be overcome in this life. The souls who are not incarnated possess a higher degree of knowledge (see *Aet*. 1; *Spec*. 1.43; *Leg*. 3. 97-103; *Gig*. 31, 60-61, *Deus* 51-68).

Philo in line with the Timaeus and other Greek philosophers does not doubt the sphericity of the cosmos. The virtue of the sphericity of the cosmos is so great that it is impossible but not to attribute this state of affairs to the creator God. Philo relies in his argument on the Stoics, but most prominently on the Timaeus. He writes: "We encounter in the Timaeus of Plato an admirable encomium praising the perfect shape of the sphere and its utility, so that no additional praise is further required (Prov. 2. 53-56).

In *Spec*. 1. 13-14 the cosmos is compared to a *megapolis* which has rulers and subjects. The *archontes* are the stars and planets, the *upekooi* the creatures who dwell beneath the moon. The description of the heavenly bodies as *archontes* was to play a significant role in later Gnostic thought (Runia 1986: 250).

Beauty of the Cosmos

The cosmos as the result of God's creational activity is good and is worthy of admiration. It is a work of art. Philo uses numerous divine epithets to underline the artistic character of the cosmos and its rational structure such as father (*Spec*. 3: 189, *QG* 2: 34), and architect (*Praem*. 42), maker (*Spec*. 3: 189), world-maker (*Praem*. 42), creator, pilot and charioteer (*QG* 2: 34). In line with Plato's Timaeus, Philo expounds various themes of admiration of the cosmos (for example *Deus* 7, *Agr*. 50-54, *Her*. 110-111, 196-200 and others).

However, the study of the cosmos should not be perceived for its own sake. The study of the cosmos is only valid if it leads one to one's creator. Already Plato in the *Republic* (529-531) concluded that the study of heavens is only valid, if it leads to higher knowledge. Philo expands this notion with line with contemporary Platonists and sets this postulate on stronger theocentric lines, suggesting that the study of heavens should lead man to God. This is the true meaning of *thewria*. It follows naturally that if man looks at the creation one is naturally led to the recognition of a Creator God. In the passage *QG* 2: 34 Philo allegorizes (Genesis 8: 6, "What is the "window of the ark" which the righteous man (Noah) opened?") that our senses first recognize that there is "the one true certain Creator" which they report to our reason (logismos) "And this (reason), seeing with a sharp eye both these (celestial phenomena) and through them the higher paradigmatic forms (*ta anwtera paradeigmatika eide*) and the cause of all things (ton apantwn aition), immediately apprehends them and genesis (*genesews*) and providence (*pronoias*), for it reasons that visible nature did not come into being by itself (*ouk automatisthenta*), for it would be impossible for harmony and order and measure and proportions of truth and such concord and real prosperity and happiness to come about by themselves. But it is necessary (*anagke einai*) that there be some Creator and Father, a pilot and charioteer, who both begot and wholly preserves and guards the things begotten".

The cosmos is perfect even if there are various tragic occurrences in it. Philo attributes these disasters not to some uncontrollable forces, but to the activity of God and the reason of retribution. In the *Timaeus* 22a-23c Plato discusses the theory of naturally occurring disasters, which

result in nations loosing various skills and knowledge which they possessed. These disasters result in the loss of these skills and the destruction of civilizations. Philo's use of these ideas is seen in the passages *Abr*. 1-2; *Mos*. 2. 46-47 and *Praem*. 1-2.

The beauty and harmony of the cosmos has led some to the study of astronomy as well as fortune telling (by the term astronomia Philo means on the one hand the science of astronomy and on the other astral fatalism). Philo writes in *De Migratione Abrahami* 176-195: "The Chaldeans have the reputation of having, in a degree quite beyond that of other peoples, elaborated astronomy (*astronomia*) and the casting of nativity's (*genethlialogike*). They have set up a harmony (*armozw*) between things on earth and things on high, between heavenly things and earthly. Following as it were the laws of musical proportion, they have exhibited the most perfect symphony (*sumfwnia*) of the universe produced by a concord (*koinwnia*) and sympathetic affinity (*sumptheia*) between its parts, separated indeed in space, but housemates in kinship. These men imagined that this visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole (*e twn olwn psuche*). And they made Fate (*eimarmene*) and Necessity (*anagke*) divine, thus filling human life with much impiety (*adeveia*), by teaching that apart from phenomena there is no originating cause (*aition*) of anything whatever, but that the circuits of sun and moon and of the other heavenly bodies determine for every being in existence both good things and their opposites. Moses, however, while he seems to confirm the sympathetic affinity of its parts displayed throughout the universe, is at variance with their opinion concerning God".

The term sumpatheia is related to the Stoic concept of cosmic sympathy. The Stoics believed that it possible to forecast events since "all events are causally related to one another, and therefore anything that happens must in theory be a sign of some subsequent effect" (Long in Frick 1999: 123). It is possible to assume that whatever happens in the cosmos will have an effect on the world. *Sextus Empiricus* argued the Stoic position that if the cosmos is one it must mean that it is made with the same elements throughout, which bring about cosmic *sumpatheia* (*Adv*. *Math*. 9: 78 in Frick 1999: 123).

The Stoics argued that God is the cosmos and that the Cosmos is God. "According to Diogenes Laertius (7: 137), the Stoics generally employed the term kosmos in the sense "of God himself" and the idea that the cosmos contains God as its world-soul (Cf. SVF 2: 774) can be traced to Cleanthes who employed the expression *e tou komou psuche* (Cf. SVF 1: 532).

In Mig. 178 and 194 Philo writes that Abraham had to "relinquish astrology (*genethlalogike*), which betrayed it (the human mind) into the belief that (1) the universe is the primal God, instead of being the handiwork of the primal God, and that (2) the courses and movements of the constellations are the causes (*aitia*) of bad and good fortune to mankind".

Philo does not agree with the Chaldean position that necessity and fate are divine, since for Philo God is the only cause of things, and fate and necessity cannot be thought of as divine causal powers. That fate and necessity are divine refers to the Stoic position that "God is one and the same with Reason and Fate (*eimarmene*)", (Diogenes Laertius 7: 135), (The term *anagke* is used by Plato but replaced by the Stoics with the term *eimarmene*).

Philo further writes: "We should not allow the movements of stars to haunt mankind. Now, the so-called zodiacal circle itself is derived from Providence, as we implied in the preceding discussions. "Providence awes by means of these stars, these created beings do her biddings, these recipients which take the cause of their genesis from another. Providence is the cause of all in all. She is the one of whom existence and being are born, in fact, those that are created acknowledge the Creator" (*Prov*. 1: 88, translation Abraham Terian). In the passage *Spec*. 1: 13-20, Philo refutes the notion of astral fatalism that "the sun and moon and the other stars were gods with absolute powers (*einai Theous autokratoras*)" and are responsible for "the causation of all events" (*Spec*. 1: 13). According to Moses, says Philo, the planets do not have "unconditional (*autexousious*) powers" (*Spec*. 1: 14).

Astral fatalism is flawed according to Philo, because "if everything is dispensed at birth, then laws, piety, justice, and the verdicts of judges should be abrogated, since mans will is not free when he does what has been predestined for him. For when the power of self-conduct is denied and every act is attributed to powers of nativity, there will be no glory

in virtue, no besetment of sin, no courage, no sagacity to speak of-everything being done involuntarily (Prov. 1: 82).

Plato thinks of the stars as living beings who are divine and eternal (*zwa theia onta kai aidia*) and which possess intelligence (*fronesis*), (Cf. *Timaeus* 40a-b, cf. *Republic* 508a, *Laws* 821b, 899b), and Aristotle considers the stars as possessing life (cf. *De Caelo* 292a), while the Stoics presume that the fixed stars are a "mighty host of visible gods whose blessedness from of old has been recognized" (*Aet*. 46). Philo states about the stars that they "are souls divine (*uchai Theiai*) and without blemish throughout… each of them is mind (*nous*) in its purest form", (*Gig*. 8). While Philo states that "the stars are visible gods" he places them on a lower ontological level than God. Since they are visible this already suggests their lower position beneath the God who cannot be seen. The stars divinity is due to their possessing a noetic substance and therefore have a most God-like nature of all created beings. (H. Wolfson, Philo vol. 1, 365, remarks about Philo's statement (in *Gig*. 8) that stars "are souls divine (*psuchai theiai*)", that the term "divine" is used by Philo in the special sense of "imperishable".).

The Destruction of the cosmos

Philo assumes the possibility that the cosmos can be destroyed. A hint of Philo's eschatological theories can be seen in the work, *De Providentia*, where Philo stresses that the cosmos can come to an end, which would result in the cosmos returning to disordered matter (parag. 34-36, 89-92). The possibility of the cosmos' destruction follows from the fact that, since it was created by a higher principle it necessarily follows that it "lies at mercy towards its Creator". However, due to the good nature of God this scenario is highly unlikely. In *Decal*. 58 Philo writes: "For the world has become what it is, and its becoming (genesis) is the beginning (arche) of its destruction (fthoras), even though by the providence of God (pronoia tou pepoiekotos) it be made immortal, and there was a time when it was not".

In Philo's view the indestructibility of the cosmos is ensured by Gods providential will. This is hinted in Plato's thought. A second passage that is reminiscent of the Demiurges speech is *Mig*. 181. The creator has made the universe by "invisible powers" which "reach from the ends of the earth to heavens furthest bounds, exercising providence (promethoumenos) that what was well bound should not be loosened". Partly relying on Aristotle Philo in *Aet*. 20-44 sets out arguments in favor of the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the cosmos. Later Christian authors adhered to Plato's belief that the continual existence of the cosmos is due to Gods will, but gave Plato's words a different meaning.

In *Aet*. 47-51 Philo writes argues against the Stoic dogma of periodic conflagration and *palingenesis* of the cosmos. He writes: "And indeed those who propound the doctrines of conflagration and rebirth… fail to observe that in their inconsistent philosophizing they are imposing destruction on providence also which is the soul of the world… For by reproducing this form of argument and applying it to the whole world one can very clearly show that providence itself is also destroyed… Now to say that providence is destroyed is an atrocity but if providence is indestructible the world also is indestructible".

In order to prove that providence is indestructible Philo relies on Chrysippus' premise (*Aet*. 48), "that there cannot be two individuals qualifying the same substance" (Frick 1999: 107). However the precise

meaning of this premise is liable to debate as Colson's extraordinarily long appendix regarding this premise indicates, (Cf. *LCL*, Philo, vol. 9, 528-29). One can rephrase it as follows. One person, called Dion, has all the members of the body, but another person, called Theon, has only one foot. If now Dion has a leg amputated, who has suffered destruction? The answer is that Dion suffered destruction because he has passed over to the defective substance of Theon. "Two individuals cannot qualify the same substratum and so Dion must remain and Theon has been destroyed" (*Aet*. 49). "Philo now applies this premise to the world and providence" (Frick 1999: 107). "The world is complete like Dion, and the soul of the world (equals providence, cf. Aet. 47) is like Theon" (Frick 1999: 107). "If the world suffers destruction it is not destroyed, like Dion, but providence is destroyed, like Theon" (Frick 1999: 107). "The world "has passed over into a lesser state of being" and providence is destroyed because "two individuals cannot qualify the same substratum" (Aet. 51)". "Philo concludes by saying "that providence is destroyed is an atrocity but if providence is indestructible the world also is indestructible" (Frick 1999: 107). In line with this thought, one can speculate that Philo indeed assumes the possibility of the world's destruction, but this is only a partial destruction. For example even though Dion passes over to the defective substance of Theon he has not been destroyed, but only his mode of being has changed. Similarly, while in Christian thought the destruction of the world is implied, even if its meaning varies this destruction is only partial, since the just will continue living. It is not destruction as envisioned in the passage dealing with Noah in Genesis, where one has the impression that God wants to "reverse" totally his creation.

Further, if we assume that goodness is an ontological quality of God, we must assume that this goodness necessarily implies products, i.e. creation. Creation cannot be destroyed, since this would imply that God is not good, because he is not producing works of goodness and therefore God is not good.

Aristotle in his treatise *De Caelo* uses the issue of the destructibility of the cosmos in order to oppose Plato's belief of the generated and indestructible nature of the cosmos. "Whatever is destructible (*ftharton*) must be generated (*geneton*), for it must be either ungenerated (*ageneton*) or generated, but if it is ungenerated we have already said (*De Caelo*

279b-281a) that it must be indestructible *(aftharton)*, and whatever is generated must be destructible, for it must be either destructible or indestructible, but if it is indestructible we have already said (*De Caelo* 281a-b) that it must be ungenerated" (*De Caelo* 282b).

Philo's anthropology

As shown in the Genesis account man is created on the sixth day. Philo is very reluctant to designate any Biblical account as mythical. But in relation to the story of Adam, Eve and the snake, he does not hesitate in calling the account mythical. Philo offers an elaborate exegesis on the creation of man partly influenced by Platonic beliefs. Man's creation on the sixth day is his creation in regards to man as "true man" (pure mind) and man as a *suntheton* or mixture of the rational and the irrational (cf. *Fug*. 71-72, also implied in *Opif*. 69). Presumably the "idea of man" was created on the first day along with the kosmos noetos.

God breathed into man his own divinity (*enepnei*). Man can receive in his mind immortal thoughts since he is molded or struck (*tupwtheisa*) in accordance with the divine paradigm (*Det*. parag. 86-87; see also *Plant*. 16-22). Philo reiterates that man's reason orientates him to the heavens and then to God. Man's destiny is to be like God. Only in relation to his soul or mind man is immortal and resembles God. While entangled in the body mans nous cannot realize its true potential.

The man *kat' eikona theou* and the inbreathing of the divine *pneuma* both refer to man's god-like part, the nous or rational soul (cf. *Det*. 80-86, *Plant*. 18-20, *Her*. 56). "Clearly the divine pneuma is, if not the rational part of the soul itself, the "infusion" which makes that part rational and thus immortal" (Runia 1986: 336). Man is the image of God not in relation to his physical part but in relation to his invisible part his nous (*Opif*. 69). Plutarch remarks that God allows man to share in his own and does not *give* man *nous* and *fronesis* which has similarity with Philo's interpretation of Gods "inbreathing" in Gen. 2: 7.

In this context, the "man according to the image" is the man who reaches his full potentiality and leaves all material cares behind. However, this does not mean that he is part of the noetic world and functions as a paradigmatic example. "Man is called *noetos* because his existence is intellectually apprehended, but also perhaps because he contemplates or even becomes enrolled himself in the noetic realm" (Runia 1986: 338). Philo writes: "God is Archetype (*archetupos*) of rational existence, while man is a copy (*mimema*) and likeness (*apeikonisma*). By "man" I mean not the living creature with two natures, but the highest form in which the life shows itself, and this has received the title

of "mind" (*nous*) and "reason" (*logos*)" (*Det*. 83, cf. *Opif*. 146, *Deus* 47-48, LA 1: 39-41, *Heres* 184-85).

According to Belletti "Man in Gods image" signifies both the Logos and the ideal man. "Man in Gods Image" is man's reason and that there is a difference between the ideal man and sensible man (Belletti 1990: 319). By "man's reason" Belletti means "the reason which is in each of us and which constitutes the "model" and guide for our lives, containing the imprint of the divine" (Belletti 1990: 320).

A number of texts from the *Timaeus* played an important role in the development of the term *eikwn*. These include 29b2, 92c7 and 37d5. These texts deal with the model/image relation between the world of ideas (as model) and the sense-perceptible cosmos. Philo tends to regard the cosmos as the image of its creator. Given the macrocosm/microcosm relationship hinted in the *Timaeus*, it is possible for Philo to conclude that just as the macrocosm is an image of its creator, so man as the microcosm is the image of God (or of the Logos). While Philo does not actually reach this conclusion, in *Opif*. 24-25, when adducing Gen. 1: 27 to show that the *kosmos noetos* is nothing else than the *theou logos ede kosmopoiountos*, he reaches the conclusion in reverse. "If man, as part of the cosmos, is an image of the Logos as God's image, then the cosmos as the whole must also be an image of the Logos" (Runia 1986: 339). In *Her*. 230-236, Philo delineates an analogy between man and the cosmos: man's soul and heaven and man's mind and the outer sphere of heaven.

The material and immaterial structure of the human being results in the pathos of human existence. Man is capable of both good and evil (see Philo's exegesis of *Gen*. 1: 26 in *Opif*. 72-75). Philo similarly to Plato and other philosophers attempts to absolve God from responsibility towards the negative aspect of man in his inclination to moral evil. In order to do this Philo points to the fact that man's creation in Genesis is executed in the plural. The creation of man's soul is the result of the co-operation between God and his assistants. God is the author of the good part of man while the bad part of man is the work of his assistants. Sometimes these assistants are called his powers (*Fug*. 69, *Conf*. 175, cf. *QG* 1. 54) and once the powers are associated with him (*Fug*. 70). Thus God creates the rational part of the soul, while the irrational part of the soul is left to others. This is seen in *Opif*. 72-75, where Philo argues that God and his fellow workers (sunergoi) created man and these fellow

workers are the source of moral evil. In *Fuga* 68-72 these fellow workers are identified as the powers creating the irrational part of the soul, while God creates the rational part of the soul. God assigned the creation of the irrational part of the soul to his lieutenants (*uparchontes*) or inferiors (*tois met auton*) because it is unfitting for God to be the author of vice (*Conf.* 168-83). Philo describes man's rational soul as a mixture (*anakekramenes*) of the better idea and the opposite and inferior idea (*Opif.* 74). The doctrine of the irrational soul was accepted into Stoicism through the intervention of Posidonius (Runia 1986: 484). This helped the reconciliation of many Stoic and Platonic ideas. Thus Philo's use of Stoic ethical ideas does not oppose his use of Plato.

Philo finds the confirmation of his exegesis in the fact that in Gen. 1: 27, (singular verb, i.e. God only) Moses uses the article when speaking of mans creation (*the* man as his *logismos*), whereas in the previous verse (where the plurality of creators is indicated) it is deleted (man as composite of the rational and irrational), (parag. 71-72). In terms of the body Philo affirms that God indeed created man's body.

Plato similarly as Philo absolves the Demiurge from the responsibility of creating the negative side of the human soul. This is the work of the young gods. Plato believed that the young gods in composing mans body utilize the four elements (*Tim*. 42E-47E). Plato writes that after the creation of the cosmos the young gods received the task of "framing and controlling all the rest of the human soul which it was still necessary to add, together with all that belonged thereto, and of governing this mortal creature in the fairest and best way possible, to the utmost of their power, except in so far as it might itself become the cause of its own evils" (*Timaeus* 42d-e).

An interesting account regarding the creation of man is seen in the Midrash literature. Thus Rabbi Berekiah at Genesis Rabbah 8: 4 writes: "When the Holy One, blessed by He, came to create Adam, He saw righteous and wicked arising from him. Said He: "If I create him, wicked men will spring from him; if I do not create him, how are the righteous to spring from him?" What then did the Lord do? He removed the way of the wicked from out of His sight (i.e. He deliberately disregarded it) and associated the quality with Himself and created him… (translation H. Freedman and M. Simon).

In *Leg*. 1. 65 Philo links the female principle Sophia with the intellectual principle the Logos. As was pointed out by J. Dillon, it is possible to compare Sophia and Dike in Greek thought. Dike was the personification of justice, being seated besides Zeus as his assessor. It is possible that Philo transferred these functions of Dike to Sophia, who was according to Philo seated at the right hand of Jahweh (Dillon 164). Philo on occasions describes the Logos as the son of God *and* Sophia (*Fug*. 109 and *Det*. 115-116. *Leg*. 1.65). Leg. 1. 65 also expresses the idea that Sophia and the Logos of God are identical (…της του θεου σοφίας ή δέ έστιν ό θεου λόγος). Origen similarly has a concept that the son of God the Logos equals wisdom, (*Princ* 1.4.4).

Wisdom in modern scholarship has undergone a renaissance. There are a number of explanations available regarding wisdom. Thus wisdom could have its own hypostasis, that wisdom was present at creation, that wisdom could be personified and so on.

Dillon suggests that Philo is trying to combat the "Peripatetic heresy" that the world has an independent existence apart from God, in the sense that it cannot be agenetos (Dillon 1993: 153). An interesting debate on genetos is found in Calvenus Taurus, and Alcinous in the Didaskalikos (MP pp. 242 and 286-7).

The soul

Philo's conception of the soul is often ambiguous since he uses a number of sources in his understanding and description of the soul.

The most important aspect of Philo's division of the soul is that the human soul is a compound of an undivided (*Heres* 232, the souls "rational part, which was named mind, He /the Maker/ left undivided (*to de logikon, o de nous wnomasthe, aschiston*) rational part (the faculty of reasoning) and an irrational part (the passions, senses, speech, reproduction). Billings statement that the basic bipartite division of the soul "is important for ethics" deals with the issue of moral evil which is located in the tension between the rational and irrational part of the soul (Billings in Frick 1999: 156).

According to Philo the rational soul (*logistikon*), "commanding faculty" is the most important and highest part of the soul and terms it variously *egemonikon* (*Opif.* 117) or *nous* (*Heres* 232, *Agr.* 30). In a passage that is reminiscent of the Stoic definition of the soul (*outws psuches egemonikon estin o nous*), (*LA* 1: 39) and elsewhere he maintains that the souls "rational part, which was named mind, He /the Maker/ left undivided (*to de logikon, o de nous wnomasthe, aschiston*)", (*Heres.* 232). Philo uses various terms to designate the rational part of the soul, which includes the *logos*, *logismos*, *egemonikon*, *nous, and dianoia.*

We live in a world of "sense perception" or the "sensible world". From sense perception or from sense impulses we can move on to form concepts about these sense perceptions. Once we do so, we move into the intelligible world. Usually Philo treats statements about God in the Scriptures as belonging to the intelligible world. The lower mind receives sense perceptions, and the higher mind forms concepts out of these sense perceptions.

In *LA* 3: 15 Philo remarks that "our soul consists of three parts, and has one part given to reasoning (*logistikon*), a second to high spirit (*thumikon*), a third to desire (*empithumetikon*)", (*LA* 3: 15). This division seems to recall Platonic psychology in the Republic (Frick 1999: 154). There Plato maintains a tripartite composition of the soul which consists of rational part (*logistikon*), the courageous or spirited part (*thumoeides*), and the appetitive part (*empithumetikon*), (Cf. *Republic* 436a, 504a, 550b, 580d-e), (Frick 1999: 154).

On occasions, Philo refers to the Aristotelian division of the soul which consists of the nutritive (*threptikon*), the perceptive (*aisthetikon*) and the rational (*logikon*) parts (Cf. *QG* 2: 59, *Opif*. 76), (Frick 1999: 154). Very often Philo relies on the Stoic classification of the soul and states that in addition to the ruling part (*egemonikon*), the soul "is divided into seven parts, namely five senses (*pente aistheseis*), the faculty of speech (*fwneterion organon*), last that of generation (*gonimon*)", (*Opif*. 177), (Frick 1999: 155). Only the ruling part of the soul was considered rational by the Stoics, while the other seven parts (five sense, speech, and generation) belonged to the irrational part of the soul.

The relation between *nous* and *psuche* is one of the more difficult aspects of Greek philosophy. It is difficult to separate the soul (*psyche*) from the higher mind. We can say that the soul contains not only the higher mind, but also man's awareness or conscience. The soul also includes the *elenchos*, "discipliner", which controls the soul from submitting to the demands of the body. The soul is the totality of man, while the higher mind contains mans capacity for reason. Once a person dies, the body disintegrates, while the soul moves on, albeit Philo admits himself he does not know exactly where.

Those wishing to stress the ontological superiority of the nous to psuche used two texts from Plato (Tim. 30b3-8 and 90a2-3, c4-5), (cf. Dillon 213, and Cherniss *ad Plut*. *Mor*. 943A, Boyance *Miscellanea Rostagni* 51). Apparently Philo has the former text in mind at *Abr*. 272 and *QE* 2. 11 ("as the mind is in the soul, so the soul is in the body"), (Runia 1986: 331). It is possible to conclude that Philo adheres to a separation between the nous and the psuche (Runia 1986: 331). However, at large Philo in his usage of *nous* agrees with the Platonic corpus (with Aristotelian and Stoic terminology). "Very often *nous* indicates a *function or capacity* of the rational part of the soul, equivalent, to the role of *aisthesis* in the irrational part" (Runia 1986: 331). "On other occasions nous represents an *entity* rather than a function, and then it is in effect equivalent to the rational part of the soul" (Runia 1986: 331). While the soul is incarnated it needs irrational parts in order to control the body and adapt to its corporeal residence. Therefore the rational part of the soul or the *nous* is different from the soul understood as a whole, but is its leading and guiding part (*egemwn*, *egemonikon*). When the soul disincarnates we are able to speak of the equivalence of the soul and mind.

One of the reasons for the separation of the nous from the psuche was to "emphasize the minds association with the noetic world and the measure of transcendence that could consequently be attributed to it" (Runia 1986: 332). The mind whence contemplating the ideal world departs from the material realm. In a number of texts Philo affirms that the mind leaves the realm of the sense-perceptible reality entirely and joins the incorporeal world of ideas; cf. *Gig*. 54, 61, *Her*. 280 (exeg. Gen. 15: 15, cf. above II 7. 1. 1), *QG* 4. 138). Plato at *Tim*. 90a2-4 writes that God has given man to *kuriwtaton psuches eidos* as a *daimwn* ("guiding genius" in Cornfords translation). Philo conflates the concept of the *daimwn* with the nous.

Since man possess a divine element, that is the rational part of the soul or the nous, he is able to potentially become a god. Philo states explicitly that "every man, in respect to mind, is intimately related to the divine Logos, being an imprint or fragment or effulgence of that blessed nature" (*Opif*. 146). This is possible once, he engages in rational contemplative activity. A concept of *theosis* is apparent in Philo, but the question needs to be discussed as to the nature of this *theosis*. Any discussion of Philo's concept of *theosis* has to deal with the issue of rationality. As Frick notes, "For Philo, the point of connection between a human being and God is the idea of rationality" (Frick 1999: 171). "Crucial to that idea is that the mind, conceived as logos and situated in the rational part of the soul, is both a copy and part of the divine Logos of God" (Frick 1999: 171).

On the issue of the *pathe*, Philo uses both the Stoic and Platonic traditions. Posidonius rejected the doctrine of the Old Stoa that the soul is unitary and the pathe are mistaken judgments on the part of the egemonikon (cf. Rist *Stoic Philosophy* 212). Posidonius argued that the rational faculty is distinct from the faculty of the soul, which is the source of the passions, and so effectively returned to the Platonic tripartition of the soul (which, amounts to a division between the rational and irrational part). This division later facilitated the development in Middle Platonism, which saw the assimilation of the Stoic and Platonic doctrines of the pathe (cf. Lilla 84-92). While later Platonists adhered to the tripartite division of the soul in Plato, the division of the soul into the rational and irrational parts was more pronounced.

An influence (*dunamis*) from the nous gives off reflections of the minds thoughts and these are perceived as *eidwla* by the lowest part of the soul (*Timaeus* 61C-89C). In this way dreams, visions and ecstatic trances are a kind of knowledge, which God devises as a result of mans lack of wisdom. Plato states that these visions and dreams need to be interpreted by the rational part of the soul and usually by someone else. However, these elements enable one to gain knowledge about the past, the future and the present.

Souls free will

In contrast to other forms of creation, man is endowed with the faculty of free will. Of all beings and creatures, man alone has free will and is able to incline to both virtue and vice (*Opif*. 73). This ability according to Philo is located in the rational soul. The rational part of the soul makes every person uniquely knowledgeable of the difference between good and evil. As a rational creature (*logike*), "man is practically the only being who having knowledge of good and evil often chooses the worst, and shuns what should be the object of his efforts, and thus he stands apart as convicted of deliberate and premeditated sin" (*Conf*. 178). As noted by various commentators the moral character of the human person is dictated by the fundamental tension between the rational soul and its sensible part. The irrational and rational parts of the soul are in conflict, when the rational part of the soul attempts to take control over the senses and passions. "Even though mind, senses and passions constitute together one soul, as Philo explicitly states, "for sense perception and passions are parts and offspring of one soul with it /Mind/", (*LA* 2: 8) they are at war with each other". In his allegory of Eves deception by the serpent, Philo remarks that "desire (*epithemia*) becomes the evil origin of sins, and the first deceives sense (*aisthesis*), while sense takes the mind (*nous*) captive" (*QG* 1: 47). Similarly "And desire has a natural enmity toward sense, which (Scripture) symbolically calls woman. And notwithstanding that desires seem to be critical of the senses, they are in reality flatterers who plot evil in the manner of enemies" (*QG* 1: 48, cf. *LA* 2: 24, *Cher*. 58-60). "The passions", says Philo, "tear the soul to pieces… for the assault of the passions is violent and irresistible" (*LA* 2: 11) and "hardly ever shall you find a soul which has never tasted of passions or vices" (*Sacr*. 111).

Due to its unique character and due to the possibility of inclination to good or evil the *nous* is not included as part of the offerings of sacrificial victims.

God plants the Garden of Eden (Gen. 2: 8), earthly *sofia* or *arete*, "to bring succor and aid to the diseases of the soul" (Leg. 1. 45). The tree of life is generic virtue (Leg. 1. 59), but the tree of knowledge represents mans inclination to evil (Leg. 1. 60-62, 100ff., cf. Tim. 42b2). After man eats from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil his soul dies, while

the body continues living. After the tragedy portrayed in Genesis man is evolved in a moral contest. Adam in this sense has a neutral quality in respect to his *nous*.

Philo further elaborates on our inclinations. When we are infants we are totally subject to our passions, which is symbolized by Egypt. We then grow into the stage of adolescence, which is symbolized by Canaan and is also characterized by vices. We become reasoning creatures, once we reach the stage of adulthood. Adam symbolizes reason, while Eve symbolizes sense perception. Reason and sense perception function together. The mind functions first through the sense perceptions.

In the Garden of Eden Adam and Eve, i.e. reason and sense perception succumbed to the serpent, which is an allegory for pleasure, and therefore Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden of Eden or in other words virtue. With virtue Adam and Eve also lost the four cardinal virtues, represented by the rivers, which flowed out of Eden (Gen. 2: 10-14).

However we have hope, which is symbolized by Enos (Gen. 4: 26). Through hope we move to repentance symbolized by Enoch and then to tranquillity symbolized by Noah. Once we reach tranquillity, we are ready for the possibility of the vision of God. To reach this stage some of us possess three main gifts: the ability to learn, intuition, and progress through practice. The ancient patriarchs each possessed all three gifts, but in each of the patriarchs one of these gifts predominated. Abraham thus was marked by the gift of being receptive to instruction, Isaac the gift of intuition, and Jacob the gift of practice. Every person whether he possesses these three gifts can infer the existence of the divine Logos, by means of reflecting on the logos, which is in him.

Ideally, our higher mind should be able to control our five senses and four passions and thus reach harmony. We can then go on to study the encyclical studies, which are symbolized by Hagar and then move on to true philosophy and generic Virtue, symbolized by Sarah.

The patriarch Isaac also symbolizes "Joy" that is spiritual joy. Philo implies that God is the true father of Isaac, whom he begets from Sarah i.e. virtue.

Jacob, who changes his name thereby to Israel, which means "he who sees God", attains the vision of God. Jews or Gentiles are able to

achieve the vision of God, if they follow the *orthos logos*, that is the correct reason.

If one follows the literal laws and obeys them, he or she is living like the patriarchs even if they do not realize it, and therefore attain the "lower mystery". Those that live according to the laws while realizing their relationship with the lives of the patriarchs are living the "higher mystery". In all what we do we are constantly re-living the Bible, and the stories of the Bible have in this regard an a-historical quality.

In his discussion of the relationship between man and God Philo uses a number of themes from Plato. One of these themes is *sungeneia* i.e. the kinship or family relation that exists between man and the divine. Another is *omoiwsis*, which resembles *sungeneia* but represents "instead of a *state of affairs* based on birth or one's nature, the *dynamic process* of becoming like unto the divine or God" (Runia 1986: 341). *Omoiwsis* as such should be directed to God the creator and not to the heavenly bodies (as in the *Timaeus*), although these can lead the way by showing man how to live a perfect and blissful life. Philo uses the term *trofe* in the context of spiritual as opposed to physical food. This is one of his favorite themes and is based on this usage in the *Timaeus*.

Philo further utilizes Plato's image of man as comparable to a plant that is upside down (*Tim*. 90a). Whereas a plant draws its nourishment through its roots, man draws his nourishment through his head by means of his sight and learning (90a8 and 90c7). One example can be given in *Prov*. 2. 109, where Philo states that although Greece's climate is arid it does not hinder the development of man, since man has his roots in heaven.

A correlation between God's providence and the rational soul can be seen in Philo's allegorical interpretation of Noah's prayer for his son Japhet namely the verse, "Let him /God/ dwell in the house of Shem" (Genesis 9: 27), (Frick 1999: 173). "In Philo's allegory, the house is the soul and God is the one who dwells in it. Philo writes: "For what more worthy house could be found for God throughout the whole of creation, than a soul (*psuche*) that is perfectly purified, which holds moral beauty to be the only good and ranks all others which are so accounted, as but satellites and subjects? But God is said to inhabit a house not in the sense of dwelling in a particular place, for He contains all things and is contained by none, but in the sense that His special providence (*pronoia*)

watches over and cares for that spot. For every master of a house must needs to have the care of that house laid on him as a charge. Verily let everyone on whom the goodness of Gods love has fallen as rain, pray that he may have for his tenant the All-ruler who shall exalt this petty edifice, the mind (*nous*), high above the earth and join it to the ends of heaven", (*Sob*. 62-64). This spot in Philo is the rational part of the soul. By means of providential care Gods gifts of grace, which help to mould the soul on its way of virtue are awarded to the soul.

Man's double nature compels him to become a sojourner a constantly be in the state of migration as was the example of Abraham. This situation is the result of the creational *diataxis*. This migration consists of departing from our earthly limitations to the goal of higher intelligible realities.

Abraham's "trust in God" (Gen. 15: 6) is interpreted by Philo as meaning that one has to have a cautious attitude to the powers of *logismos* and *aisthesis*, which (respectively *noeta*, *orata*, *aletheia*, *doxa*), (*Praem*. 28-39). However, these goals can never be satisfactorily reached and the *logismos* always like the athlete finds itself collapsing. Only that person who moves beyond the corporal and corporeless reality and receives entire support from God can receive *vevaiotate pistis* and *ischurognwmwn logismos*. "Philo stresses the *deceptiveness* of *doxa* and the *weakness* of *logismos*, whereas Plato assumes the *excellence* of *noesis* and the *limitations* of *doxa*" (Runia 1986: 130). *Pistis* in this Philonic passage is not related to the pistis of Plato, which is associated with *doxa* and *genesis*. Here *pistis* means something like "firm conviction based on trust". It supplies the grounds for secure knowledge by stressing the soul's dependence on God.

Of course another aspect of man's double nature consists of the difficulty in finding and comprehending God. Plato had already indicated this fact and his statements were to have exercised an enormous influence on future thought (see *Tim*. 28c3-5). This is especially the case in later Christian theology. Its influence can be discerned on negative theology or on Gods unknowability (Corp. Herm. fR. 1.1); that Gods transcendence makes him unreachable to human beings (C. Cels. 7.42-43); that God is revealed only to those who are prepared to receive him (Alex. Str. 5.78); that since the Demiurge is reachable according to Plato, he cannot be equated with the highest God

(Num. Fr. 17, Plot. Apod. Procl. In *Tim*. 1. 305.25) and as an apologetic device showing that the Greeks were not totally ignorant of the highest God (for example Justin Apol. 2.10.6). Man is incapable of receiving God and so Gods powers in relation to creation are mixed, since man is incapable of receiving them in their fullness.

Already in Plato there are certain indications of a negative stance towards the body and its desires and needs. This attitude is felt to an extent in Philo. However, the degree of negativity accorded to the body in these authors is a question of one's perception. Generally, Philo treats the desires of the body, such as the gratification of the senses, as evil impulses. On the other hand deeds associated with the soul are considered as good. Philo distinguishes four passions, which include, lust, greed, hunger, and anger. The higher mind is able to control the pathological desires of the body.

Plato writes that a person who submits to bodily desires (*epithumiai*) or ambitions (*filonikiai*) gradually thinks mortal thoughts and becomes mortal himself. On the other hand a person who devotes himself to the pursuit of knowledge and the love of knowledge (*filomathia*) and truth will think immortal and divine thoughts and will a measure of immortality (*athanasia*) that his human nature will admit (*Tim*. 89D-92C). Plato had a negative stance towards bodily love, emphasizing that it is an inferior type of love.

Whereas Plato ignores the religious dimension of the health of the body, Philo emphasizes the close correlation between the health of the body and ones relation to God. Philo stresses that the body is a Holy Temple created by God to accommodate the rational soul (Opif. 137 (exeg. Gen. 2: 7), cf. *Decal.* 133; same image at *Laws* 869b, also I Cor. 6: 19).

Wolfson believes that in Philo virtue does not designate the suppression of passions but rather a control of them (268-79). For the Stoics virtue was a reward for its own sake. Wolfson believes that Philo holds that virtues assume "a grander and loftier aspect" if, they are practiced for the sake of "honoring and pleasing God, that is, for the love of God" (296). Philo writes that "those whose souls have ears" can hear God say: "My first rewards will be set apart for those who honor Me for Myself alone, the second to those who honor Me for heir own sakes, either hoping to win blessings or expecting to obtain remission of punish-

ments, …though their worship is for reward… yet …its range lies within the divine precincts". Sandmel thinks that the passage does not deal with rewards for virtues and that whatever the motifs or their grading they lie within the realm of virtues (Sandmel 1979: 116). Philo according to Sandmel does not deviate from regarding virtue as its own reward (Sandmel 1979: 116).

Philo speaks of a number of kinds of virtue, sometimes confusingly. Thus, he speaks of "contemplative virtue" and of "practical virtue" (*L. A.* I, 57). Of contemplative virtue he says: "it involves theory", for it is led into by philosophy, "and it involves conduct, for virtue is the art of the whole of life, and life includes all kinds of conduct… The theory of virtue is perfect in beauty, and the practice and exercise of it a prize to be striven for".

There is also "generic virtue", which is distinct from the four cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, bravery, and moderation. Generic virtue is equal to the idea of virtue in the intelligible world, while the four cardinal virtues are grounder in the sensible world. Thus for example Sarah after her name change from Sarai is allegorically generic virtue (*Cher.* 3-10 and *Mut*. 77-79). During her period as Sarai, she symbolized only a cardinal virtue of "my sovereignty" (*Cher.* 50). The generic virtue is eternal, while the cardinal virtues are temporal.

"In the case of Philo language is limited to the physical-physiological phenomenon of sound, it has no sign-value, but an interpretative function, it is only a medium of communication in the external sphere, ambivalent between truth and untruth" (Kweta 1996: 413). "Hence the importance of non-verbal cognition" (Kweta 1996: 413). "Silence-corresponding to light-forms a kind of horizon of human consciousness" (Kweta 1996: 413). "Objectively it is identified with the Divine, accessible through the Logos" (Kweta 1996: 413). "Man has to mediate between language and truth through his religious-ethical behaviour" (Kweta 1996: 424). "The path of metanastasis conducts him to a positive use of speech (Kweta 1996: 406).

The Therapeutae took care of the body, soul and spirit.

Philos use of the concept of physiologia, as a science surpassing knowledge based on the senses and obtain a vision of the divine (Her. 98). This concept is later used by Clement.

"What is not found in Philo, is the language of ecstatic possession or direct experience of God" (Winston 1996: 74-82). "For Philo the vision of God appears to culminate in a state of tranquility" (Winston 1996: 74-82). "Through an analysis of Praem. 36-46 Winston concludes that the vision of God must take place at the level of God as the Intelligible world, or God Qua Logos" (Winston 1996: 74-82).

"The Platonist theme of humans imitating the divine, homoiosis toi theoi" (Runia in Reydams-Schills 1996: 172).

"Along with Measson, we prefer to translate edone as "passion" and not "pleasure", to designate a feminine allegorical personage" (Alexandre 1999: 143).

Philo writes: "But in my store there is one thing which seems especially to involve hardship and discomfort, and this I will tell you frankly without concealment… this thing is toil, the first and greatest of blessings, the enemy of ease, waging war to the death against pleasure" (p. 35), (De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini).

Philo writes: "Choose any good thing whatsoever, and you will find that it results from and is established through toil. Piety and holiness are good, but we cannot attain them save through the service of God, and service calls for earnest toil as its yoke-fellow. Prudence, courage, justice, all these are noble and excellent and perfectly good, yet we cannot acquire them by self-indulgent ease. It is much indeed if by constant care and practice there arise a kindliness between us and them. Service pleasing to God and to virtue is like an intense and severe harmony, and in no soul is there an instrument capable of sustaining it, without such frequent relaxation and unstringing of the chords that it descends from the higher forms of art to the lower (p. 37, De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini).

A. Measson observes: "the image of fighting against the passions is habitually used by Cynic philosophers…" (in Alexandre 1999: 151). And according to E. Brehier, "to see in pleasure the foundation of evil and vice and to see in temperance the chief good, which enables us to resist the seductions of pleasure, these are two essential marks of Cynic morality" (Brehier in Alexandre 1999: 152).

In the Speech on the drunkenness of the wise man (De Plantatione 140-177) Philo speaks about the theme of drunkenness. "It is, in effect, an interesting epideictic discourse in which Philo, inspired by the Stoic

maxim that the wise man will freely drink and not become drunk, proposes "to demonstrate the coherence and relevance of the words of Moses and to intensify his audiences commitment to them and therefore to the Law itself" (Alexandre 1999: 154).

Philo writes: "Noah began to be a husbandman, a tiller of the soil: and he planted a vineyard and drank of the wine, and became drunk" (p. 140).

In Gig. 60-61 Philo presents in succession: those who "belong to the earth" because they seek after pleasures of the body, those who "belong to the heaven", i.e. the artists, scientists and scholars, and finally "the men of God".

Man, s goal in life is to attain spiritual joy. Joy is the child of its mother Virtue and God the father. This is suggested by Gen. 21: 1 in the LXX, which states that God "visited" Sarah, Philo adds "in her solitude".

Philo stresses that one's salvation depends on one's obedience to the Mosaic Laws. However, Philo is often silent on the concrete manifestations of one's "spirituality". He does mention concrete manifestations of religious life such as the various Jewish religious groups current in his day and he has admiration for their efforts, but in Philo's writings it is often difficult to find concrete "instructions" on the "correct" mode of worship. Even though of course Philo, assumes that the Mosaic Laws in themselves give a certain introduction to a religiously fulfilling life. Further obedience to the Mosaic laws often has an intellectual connotation in Philo. Choosing good over evil is a matter of the training in the rationality of the mind, an i.e. an essentially intellectual task In this regard Runia observes: "It should not be overlooked how often nearness to God means departure from the world of the *senses*, how often the blessings bestowed by God are related to the activity of the *mind*, how often the journey of the soul is portrayed as culminating in the possession of *knowledge and wisdom*" (Runia 1986: 542). "God is served not with a pure heart but with a pure mind" (Runia 1986: 542). "In Philo religion is not merely interiorized (Harl), it is also intellectualized" (Runia 1986: 542).

Runia correctly points out in contrast to Wolfsons view, that Philo is not concerned with demonstrating the superiority of the revealed law over reason, but to show that in fact the revealed word is "reasonable"

(Runia 1986: 539). It is even more reasonable than the rational thinking of the philosophers. In this regard Winstons view that the Mosaic Law is somewhat lower than the Noetic or Archetypal Law seems also to be erroneous. This is so since, it is only when the truth of the higher Law is intuitively seen that the concealed deeper meaning of Scripture appears (Winston "Philo's theory of revelation"). Runia writes: in Philo "*Reason and revelation are effectively identical*, as he never ceases to attempt to demonstrate in his long series of commentaries" (Runia 1986: 540).

The concrete benefits of one's nearness to God are displayed in the benefit of knowledge. It is important to realize that Philo uses a doctrine of hierarchy in relation to knowledge. While knowledge is available to all as displayed by the Bible, not everyone is able to grasp this knowledge. This is not because God did not choose to reveal the truth in its entirety, but because men are unable to grasp this knowledge. Persons who are more nearer to God and are more liberated from bodily passions are more easily able to grasp the divine truths. An exegete of Scripture is not just operating on the rational level, i.e. rationally uncovering truths, but exegesis is deeply connected with ones disposition to exegise, that is his or hers spiritual level. In order for one to allegorize one needs the right spiritual dispensation for his allegorical enterprise.

An important aspect of Philo's theology is the concept of memory and recollection. Boccaccini believes that Philo used Aristotle's *On Memory and Recollection* and an excursus in *pseudo-Aristeas* (150-61) on the religious value of memory (Boccachini in Winston 1993: 237). Winston adds that in this regard Philo was also influenced by the Stoics and Plato's *Theaetetus* (Winston 1993: 237). For Philo memory is essentially memory of God and constitutes the greatest good (*Spec*.1.1333; 2.17). Of the Therapeutae it is said with great admiration that "they keep the memory of God alive and never forget it" (*Cont*. 26). The memory of God thus constitutes an important aspect of the soul's spiritual journey. Moreover, recollection is linked to learning, since the learner is very apt to forget, and learning is only a half-way stage, not a perfect achievement (*Mut*. 97-102; *Det*. 65).

My thought: remembering is a process, which has a potential of activating the present reality. Thus when we remember some ridiculous thing, like that I owned a green pen, this has not potential of enlivening

my present reality and the memory does not have the potential of an active reality. On the other hand if I remember Gods command, and do this command this memory of the command has been activated in the present time. If he had perfect memories, i.e. all that good things about God and his command and remembered these memories by concrete acts, we would achieve a unity between the past composed of memories and the present. We would also achieve a unity with the future, that is if we planned to fulfil the commands of God which we have remembered, activated in the present and projected and continuously fulfilled in the future.

Philo does mention prayer as an important aspect of one's spiritual journey, and there are Scriptural passages such as *Ps*. 51: 19 and *Mic*. 6: 6-8, which suggest prayer to be superior to sacrifice. These ideas are also found in Philo (*Plant.* 126-129, *Cher*. 99-100, suggesting that temples are unnecessary). Philo also suggests that prayer can be silent as in *Spec*. I, 272. On the other hand Philo does not elaborate on the notion of repentance to a large extent. Repentance is mentioned in the book *On the Virtues* (175-186). Healthy bodies hold the primary place "but second to these stands rectification in its various forms, recovery from disease, deliverance… from the dangers of the voyage, and recollection super-vening on forgetfulness. This last has for its brother and close kinsman repentance… Absolute sinfulness belongs to God alone, or a godly man…"

The rational aspect of one's spiritual journey does have certain in-dividualistic connotations. While, Scripture does not really have a fully-fledged distinction between man and the corporate body later deve-lopments show a gradual move to individualistic concepts, such as the chapters 18 and 19 in Ezechiel. Individualism is also implied in Deut. 30: 15-20, where it is emphasised that every individual has a choice in front of him of being righteous or unrighteous. It is possible that this incipient individualism in Scripture coincided with later developments in this aspect in religious though around Philo's period and provided a bridge towards Platonic spirituality of an individualistic kind.

The level of one's attachment to sensible things dictates one's position in the hierarchical structure of things. Philo divides the souls into those souls which are incarnated into the body and have been overwhelmed by bodily passions, those souls which never descended

into the body, and those souls who while being incarnated in the body have escaped the body by devoting themselves to philosophy (*Gig*. 12-16, *Somn*. 1. 138-141). In this regard those souls that have not descended into the body are called angels. It is possible that this hierarchical understanding of beings was to have a strong influence on Origen's ideas.

Philo postulates that sexual activity should only happen for pro-creation only. Philo permits sexual activity within marriage. Part of this heritage was taken over by Christian moralists. Clement of Alexandria however, forbids sexual relations within marriage for non-procrea-tionalist purposes.

In Spec. IV: 133-135 Philo states that the virtues are common to all commandments and are not encompassed in any particular number in the Decalogue. Those who are trained in the laws and exhortations are called into the sacred arena to be tested. (my thought: In Christian thinking, it is not correct to think that once one has gained virtue, then one is tested, but opposite is the case one is tested during the time he learns how to live a spiritual life). The true athletes will then gain victory, while the unworthy will suffer punishments (Mos II: 52-65).

The goal of one's journey to God is his or her ascent to God. The paradigm of such an ascent is displayed in the person of Moses. Philo describes Moses' heavenly ascent in *Mos*. 1.158f in the context of Moses experience at Sinai and where the theme of the vision of God is also discussed. Philo always links any ascent to the Mosaic Laws and to those who abide by them. In this regard an ascent to heaven through other philosophical means is possible in so far as these confirm to Mosaic prescriptions. Philo also lists certain individuals who attempted illegitimately to ascend to heaven such as the person of Gaius Caligula and who in essence denied the supremacy of God.

We can discern two types of heavenly ascent in Philo's thought. Thus either a person e.g. Moses ascends to the presence of God in heaven, or the mind soars above the created things in order to "see" the Uncreated. The latter type is confined to the Jews who "see God". The vision of God entails the vision of the noetic cosmos. The vision of God does not entail the vision of the Transcendent God but of the powers through which God maintains and creates the cosmos.

Philo describes the ascent of the mind in the following terms: "…and being led on by love, which is the guide of wisdom, it proceeds onwards till, having surmounted all essence intelligible by the external senses, it comes to aspire to such as is perceptible only by the intellect; and perceiving in that original models and ideas of those things intelligible by the external senses which it saw here full of surpassing beauty, it becomes seized with a sort of sober intoxication like the zealots engaged in the Corybantian festivals, and yields to enthusiasm, becoming filled with another desire and a more excellent longing, by which it is conducted onwards to the very summit of such things as are perceptible only to the intellect, till it appears to be reaching the great King himself. And while it is eagerly longing to behold him pure and unmingling, rays of divine light are poured forth upon it like a torrent, so as to bewilder the eyes of its intelligence by their splendor" (Opif. 70f; tr. Yonge 11).

In the treatise De Opificio Mundi Philo argues that assimilation to God is the telos of human existence. Assimilation is also the ideal for rulers. Philo writes that a good ruler will always aspire to assimilation to God, since this will enable him to understand the needs of his subjects (Spec. 4. 188).

Assimilation to God was possible due to the particular nature of the human person. As was hinted Philo believed that the human person was affiliated with the divine logos. The mind (dianoia) not only contained an imprint of the divine logos (ekmageion), but was also considered as an (unbroken) fragment (apospasma) of the divine logos, or a effulgence, a ray (apaugasma) (De Opifico Mundi paragraph 146). Since man is created by the creating power of the logos, assimilation entails a return to the source of man's creation. However, it is significant that Philo does not imply that one is to assimilate to the transcendent God, but only to the divine Logos. The mortal nature cannot image the Highest God due to its mortal nature.

In relation to Platonic thought there are indications of the existence of the concept of an assimilation to God. Plato gives advice to "flee this world and become like god as much as one can" (Φυγή δέ ὁμόίωσις θεώ κατά τό δυνατόν). See Helleman 52. For further stuff) (Theaetetus 176b 176c). In Platonic thought this fleeing from oneself is not a process of escaping from the self, but rather the cultivation of godlike qualities

within the soul: fronesis and nous. Eudorus of Alexandria argued that is especially the cultivation of froneses (wisdom) which was the basic requirement for the assimilation to God. One had to practice virtue areth to accomplish this goal. In Phaedrus 252-3 Plato links the process of assimilation with partaking metaschein of the divine nature. Philo expands on the concept of fleeing from this world found in Plato in the treatise De Fuga.

Similarly to Platonic thought, assimilation to God in Philo is not understood as a flight from God, but a turning away from evil to good. In relation to the assimilation to God it is interesting that Philo does not use Plato's words of partaking or sharing metechein, a verb used by Plato to describe the relationship of the particular to its ideal form. This is possibly due to the fact that Philo did not wish to imply that one can partake of the divine nature (Helleman 1990: 63).

Philo admonishes human beings to imitate God and this is the requirement for one to be able to assimilate to God. Imitating God follows from the fact that the mind resembles God as an eikwn. The human being must strive to be a most perfect reflection of the original.

 Thus the process of omoiwsis is linked with the concept of the imitation of God. Imitation of God is linked to the divine virtues such as justice or courage, which one ideally should strive to imitate. This can be done for example by imitating the creative power of God by procreating. Imitation of God is basically the nurturing of that, which is noble in the soul.

In terms of the terms theos or theios, these are used by Philo for a variety of beings, including the highest deity. Moses is also called "god" in Philo (theos), which is linked to the passage in Ex. 7: 1, where we read "I am giving you as a god to Pharaoh". Moses is called god because his qualities perfectly resemble the powers of God, namely the creative, beneficent and ruling powers. Philo clearly implies that Moses' divinity is of a derivative nature in Det. 159-162, where Philo states that Moses was a god only in the manner of speaking.

Philo thinks that the "fathers" mentioned in Genesis refer to the "incorporeal substances and inhabitants of the divine world, whom in other passages /Moses/ is accustomed to call angels" (*QG* III, 11). In another passage (*Sacr*.5) Philo states that after his death Abraham became "equal to the angels".

Philo understands angels to be intermediaries between man and God. Their purpose is that "they both convey the biddings of the Father to His children and report the children's need to their Father" (*Somn*. 1: 141), and again that "they go on embassies bearing tidings from the great Ruler to His subjects of the boons which He sends them, and reporting to the Monarch what His subjects are in need of" (*Plant*. 14, cf. *Gig*. 12, *QE* 2: 13). In *Spec*. 1: 66 angels are said to be: "servitors to His powers, un-bodied souls, not compounds of rational and irrational nature, as ours are, but with the irrational eliminated, all mind through and through, pure intelligence's, in the likeness of the monad".

Philo also hints that angels on occasions could have a hypostised mode of existence. On one occasion Philo writes that "the substance (ousia) of angels is spiritual (*pneumatike*), however, it often happens that they imitate the forms of men" (*QG* 1: 92).

Writing in the context of the burning bush in *Mos*. 1: 66-67 Philo writes: "In the midst of the flame was a form (*morfe*) of the fairest beauty, unlike any visible object, an image supremely divine in appearance, refulgent with a light brighter that the light of fire. It might be supposed that this was the image of Him who IS (*eikona tou ontos einai*), but let us rather call it an angel (*angelos*) or herald… The angel was a symbol of Gods providence (*pronoias ek theou*), which all silently brings relief to the great dangers, exceeding every hope".

Godly pursuits result in one receiving the fruits of God's providence, whereas, an ungodly life results in one loosing the benefits of God's providence. In one fragment, Philo comments on those that speculate about free will and the work of God's providence. Here Philo says that if in fact Gods providence chooses good for the mind, then man has no real choice, that questioning if for those "who have not yet been initiated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created" (Fragment 8).

The role of providence in one's spiritual life is accentuated in *Agr*. 168-9 where Philo writes: "Quite frequently persons who had attained perfection /of virtuous living/ have been accounted imperfect owing to their fancying that their improvement was due to their zeal and not to the directing providence (*epifrosune theou*) of God" (*Agr*. 169). Philo comments on the verse "Why did not Sarah the wife of Abraham bear

him children?" (Genesis 16: 1): "In order that the conceiving and bearing might not be so much through union with a man as through the providence of God. For when a barren woman gives birth, it is not by way of generation, but the work of the divine power (*theias dunamews ergon*), (*QG* 3: 18). Elsewhere Philo comments on the same event in this way: "And so, if a centenarian and (a woman) of ninety years produce children, the element of ordinary even is removed, and only the divine power and grace clearly appear", (*QG* 3: 56).

Abraham's life is the example of Gods providence. Abraham "had been alienated by the providence of God" from his forefathers in Chaldea (*Heres*. 278). However, Gods providence took care of Abraham throughout all his life and his dealings. This providence helped Abraham in his virtuous life and God seeking. He did not "pause until he received clearer visions, not of His essence, for that is impossible, but of His existence and providence" (Abr. 235).

Apart from concepts such as the "vision of God" and others, which deal with the goal of one's life, there is little indication of the concept of heaven in Philo's thought. Immortality is no reward for virtue, but rather a natural progression of the soul. According to Philo, the soul returns to the megapolis… from which it originally migrated into the body" (*QG* III, 11). Philo based his views on Gen. 15: 15: "But thou shalt go to thy fathers, nourished with peace, in a goodly old age". Philo writes that some interpret "fathers" to mean the sun, moon, and the stars (*Heres*. 280). Others think "fathers" as the four elements, earth, water, air and fire, but Philo adds that possibly the soul returns to the "fifth" element, the ether. This latter idea seems to resemble the Stoic view of the soul returning to the universal soul from which it came. There is also no concept of hell in Philo.

Philo is the first person to introduce divination in a monotheistic context. Philo accepts divination through the interpretation of dreams. The initiative for divination is totally left to God and not to human devices.

The role of the Priest

The idea of agency is an important aspect of Philo's thought (see *Legat*. 239). The primary agency is the priesthood. The sage can also have the function as a mediator and to that extent resembles the logos. The High priest is central in this regard and in Philo's view the High Priest becomes the Divine Logos of the universe and the Divine Logos becomes the High Priest in the soul.

Philo sees every member of Israel as a priest. Philo states that before the institution of the priesthood the Israelites functioned as priests. Thus when they crossed the sea they all spontaneously offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving (*Mos*. 2.224, *QE* 1.10).

The High Priests actions symbolise the progression from the created order to the higher order, which culminates not in the human reason but in the Divine Logos. Similarly to the High Priest the worshipper or priest leaves the ordinary world behind and then enter a spiritual sacrifice (see *Somn*. 2.183, 2.249). The priesthood reflects a kind of spiritual journey, which ends with the equality with the Logos, which until then functioned merely as a mediator and guide (Laporte 1991:75), (see *QE* 2.13).

Before entering the Holy of Holies the High Priest takes of his glittering garment and puts on a linen tunic symbolising the departure from this world and his entering into the intelligible world. In the Holy of Holies occurs the spiritual sacrifice, which consists of acknowledging the fact that ones soul belongs to God and is the gift of God. Philo interprets the simple attire of the Priest as symbolic of the rejection of the opinions of the secular philosophers and the rejection of the passions of the body (*QE* 2. 71, *Ebr*. 144, 152, *Somn*. 2. 183, 249, *Somn*. 1.215, 241-250, *QE* 2. 51).

In *De Somnis* Philo allegorises the meaning of rich robe and of the pectoral of high priest (2.214-215): "for there are two temples of God: one of them, this universe, in which there is also as High Priest His First-born, the divine Word, and the other the rational soul, whose priest is the real Man, the outward and visible image of whom is he who offers the prayers and sacrifices handed down from our fathers, to whom it has been committed to wear the aforesaid tunic, which is a copy and replica of the whole heaven, the intention of which being

that the universe may join with man in the holy rites and man with the universe".

Like Aaron, the High Priest, "who stood with his censer between the living and the dead, and the plague ceased", the sacred Logos distinguishes and separates the thoughts, which are holy from those which are impious in our sick soul (*Her*. 201-206, cf. *Num*. 16: 47-48). Again, as when "the priest enters the leper house, and everything becomes impure", when the divine Logos enters our soul, we discover the guilt, which we ignored before (*Deus* 134-135, cf. *Lev*. 14: 34-36).

The High priest in Jerusalem in the Holy of Holies is neither man nor God and the high priest Logos in our soul, who is at the limit between God and man standing between the Lord and men, a surety to both sides (*Lev*. 16: 17, *Deut*. 5: 5, *Her*. 205-206).

The ordinary priest is the human logos, or reason, the counterpart of the high priest Logos (*Migr*. 102). The Divine Logos functions as a mediator of praise until the time when we no longer require the advocacy of a divine power, (*Conf*. 145-147) but we can reach some day a position when we no longer require the Logos and are able to deal without the intermediary of the divine powers with the One, "in the place of the divine Logos (*Migr*. 171-175, *Mut*. 53, 57-59, *QE* 2. 39). Abraham was able to deal with the One without the mediatorship of the power because was united to God by heavenly love (*QG* 4.4). This change occurs when we as the High priest take off the cosmic robe and put on the simple linen tunic, i.e. when we pass from cosmic praise to the offering of the spiritual sacrifice. "Like the high priest Logos, we then pour the libation of the self and make the offering of virtue, in the cup which the divine cup-bearer, the Logos, is himself filling for us" (*Somn*. 2. 183, 2.249).

Philo states that God deals with sinners through the powers, the Punitive or Merciful, which enable communication between God and the sinner (Somn. 1.144). The divine Logos is involved in the healing and prevention of sin. This is shown among other images by the image of the *logeion* fixed on the *ephod* of the High Priest when he is wearing his sumptuous vesture. In an allegorical interpretation the *logeion* is understood as the human logos, or reason, which is enlightened by the divine Logos, and thereby able to distinguish between right and wrong, and to obtain a judgement of God in the moral conscience (*Spec*. 3.207-2-9, 4.69, *Mos*. 2.128-130).

Philo's doctrine of God

Philosophical background

In his doctrine of God Philo uses a great deal of thought from traditional Greek philosophy. Runia divides these sources into five categories which are based on the various philosophical traditions involved (Runia 1986: 434-5):

(1) Philo took over the Stoic assumption that God fills the universe with his powers, together with the idea of divine agency suggested by the terms *logos* and *fusis*. Further the idea that God contains and is not contained. Also the language of logos and fusis for God's operation in the cosmos recalls Stoic theology (Zeller in Runia 1986: 434).

(2) The ideas that God is the highest cause (*aition*), (*Conf*. 123-124, *Plant*. 64, *Abr*. 78 etc.) and that God is immovable but mover for all else (*Mut*. 54, 57, *Somn*. 2. 19, 219ff., *QG* 1. 32, *QE* 2. 37), that God is unceasingly divine, and perhaps the distinction between divine *ousia* and *dunamis* are taken from Aristotle and the Peripatetics. From the Peripatetics and Aristotle the concept of God as unceasingly active, achieving his purpose with absolute ease (*Leg*. 1.5, *Cher*. 87-90, *Gig*. 42),

(3) From Plato (namely the Timaeus) and the Platonist tradition Philo took the idea that God is the maker, father, creator and providential maintainer of the cosmos, prompted by Philo's understanding of the theology of the Timaeus. The Republic VI and VII could have also furnished Philo with the theology of God, who is alone true being (*to ontws on*), the source of being and knowledge for all other existents (*Deus* 11, *Ebr*. 83, *Congr*. 51). The ultimate quest is the vision of God and was granted to Jacob as shown by his new name Israel (see *Rep*. 533d; *Mut*. 81-82, *Praem*. 44). Philo does not utilize the theology available at *Rep*. 509b, which suggests that God is beyond being.

(4) Finally Philo's concept of God betrays traces of the Old Academy and Neopythagoreanism. Runia paraphrases these traces, based on the passage QE 2: 68, as the idea that "God is One or the Monad, or, in an even loftier affirmation of divine transcendence and simplicity, *kai enos kai monados presvuteros*". Neophythagorean influence is probably also evident in Philo's view that Gods oneness includes being (*Deus* 11: *to en kai e monas, to ontws on*).

Scholars such as Mansfeld (Mansfeld 1988: 92-117) and John Whittaker (Whittaker 1973: 77-86) posit the view that in relation to Philo's notion of transcendence he could have been influenced by Pseudo-Archytus and Eudorus of Alexandria. Eudorus postulated a supranoetic first principle above a pair of opposites, the monad and the dyad, in theological language, one supreme God is placed "beyond the opposites which come forth from him because he is their principle, or cause" (Mansfeld 1988: 97). Philo reconceived this "flexible Pythagorean system" of "transcended polarities" into his idiosyncratic scheme of ontology. "The Neopythagorean-Middle Platonic idea of the supranoetic One as the highest principle becomes in Philo the transcendent God, the pair of opposites below the supranoetic One is reconceived in the hierarchical manner so that the monad becomes the Logos and is above the Neopythagorean dyad, which-even though it is a principle of matter- is perhaps reconceived as the two chief powers. "But Philo goes one step further". "By explicitly subordinating the Neopythagorean-Middle Platonist supranoetic first principle to his understanding that God "is *better* than the good, *more* venerable than the monad, *purer* that the unit" (*Praem*. 40), he introduces a conceptual nuance commonly referred to among Philonic scholars as Gods "utter" or "absolute" transcendence" (Frick 1999: 29). In *QE* 2: 68, God is said to be "He Who is elder than the one and the monad and the beginning".

God's transcendence and immanence

In view of Philo's Judaic framework of mind it is no surprise that Philo adheres to a strict monotheistic understanding of God. God is one and He is supremely transcendent. God as (Mosaically) *o wn* and (Platonically) to on is supremely transcendent, in his essence and fullness unknowable. The emphasis on God's oneness can also be seen in the Old Academy and the Neopythagoreans and Philo possibly derives his emphasis on the oneness of God from these schools (See *Leg*. 2. 1-3, 3. 48). Philo's strict adherence to a belief in the transcendence of God is suggested by his use of the Platonic phrase *To On* "that which exists" or the phrase *To ontos On*, "that which *existingly* (that is, "truly") exists". In his transcendence God is totally inaccessible, even by reason. In *Opif*. 172 Philo writes: "(1) God is and is from eternity, and (2) that He who really Is One, and (3) that He has made the world and (4) has made it

one world, unique as Himself is unique, and (5) that He ever exercises providence for his creation (*kai oti aei pronoei tou gegonotos*).

Philo often distinguishes between Gods existence (*uparxis*) and his essence (*ousia*). Of course man can only ever know that God exists (*ei estin*) but he cannot comprehend God as being or what he is (*ti estin*), (*Post*. 167-169, *Deus* 55, 62, *Fug*. 165, *Mut*. 7-10, *Spec*. 1. 40-50, *Virt*. 215, *Praem*. 36-46). While God is absolute his is in relation to being by means of his powers and the Logos. In certain texts (*Post*. 169, *Fug*. 165, *Mut*. 9. *Spec*. 1. 40-50) implies that in their essence Gods powers are also unknowable; man can perceive and impress an image of their *energeia*. Philo on occasions associates the term *eimi* with the meaning of "Gods unknowable essence" and *uparcho* with the meaning of "Gods knowable existence" (Frick 1999: 2). In *Opif*. 21-22, in Philo, the term ousia does not indicate Platonic "being" nor Aristotelian "substance", but is equivalent to the *ule* (*Opif*. 171) displaying an influence of the Stoa.

Philo makes a distinction between Gods essence and existence in *Somn*. 1: 230 where he comments the term *o wn*. He states that "it is not the nature of Him who IS to be spoken of, but simply to be (*einai*)", and again in *Somn*. 1: 231, in the phrase that we "may recognize His subsistence (*uparxis*)". Usually Philo employs *uparxis* to denote "existence" and the term *ousia* to denote "essence". Of course Gods essence is beyond human understanding.

Philo derives his doctrine of Gods transcendence from the masculine *o wn* or the neuter *to on*. In Philo's writings *o wn* ("He who IS") is specified is specified more precisely in terms such that God "truly exists" (*Virt*. 64, *o ontws wn*, cf. Decal. 59) that he is "the One, the truly existing God", (*Virt*. 40, *tou enos kai ontws ontos*), that he is "the Alone existent One," (*Fuga* 101, *tou monou, o estin apseudws*), that he is "the only God" (*Fuga* 140, *Theou monou*), and, above all, that he is the "best of all existences, incomparable Cause of all things" (*Fuga* 141, *tou twn ontwn aristou kai asugkritou kai pantwn aitiou*). Further that "God is the most generic one" (*LA* 2: 86 Frick's translation of *to de genikwtaton estin o Theos*, Whittaker translates "the primal existence is God", or "supremely generic" God). In *Sacr*. 92. Philo speaks of God as the highest genus.

The phrase in Exodus 3: 14 in the LXX reads *egw eimi o wn* ("I am He who IS"). Philo discusses this text in Mut 11, *Somn*. 1: 230, *Mos*. 1: 75,

and *Det*. 160 but also *Deo* 4. While Philo does not oppose the phrase *o wn* ("He who IS") as referring to Gods name, he rather maintains that it alludes to Gods true nature. In *Mut*. 11 Philo believes that *o wn* is equivalent to "My nature is to be (*einai*), not to be spoken". In *Somn*. 1: 231 o wn entails that a person "may recognize His subsistence (*uparxis*)," by which Philo means (in *Somn*. 1: 230) that "it is not the nature of Him who IS to be spoken of, but simply to be (*einai*)". In *Mos*. 1: 75 *o wn* refers "to Whom alone existence belongs" and presupposes "the difference between what IS and what is not", and in *Det*. 160 it implies that "God alone has veritable being" because "other lesser than He have not being, as being indeed is (*ouk ontwn kata to einai*), but exist in semblance only, and are conventionally said to exist".

God's transcendence is implied in a number of aprivative expressions that Philo uses, which include the term "uncreated" (*agenetos*), (*Mos*. 2: 171, *Deus* 56), the term "incorruptible" (*adekastos*), (*Cher*. 17, *Deus* 18, *Plant*. 108, *Conf*. 121, *Migr*. 115), the term "unalterable" (*atreptos*), (srovnej to s *atrepsia* nemenitelnost), (*Mut*. 54), the expression "beyond perception" (*akataleptos*), (*Det*. 89, *Somn*. 1: 67, *Deo* 4), the expression "without name" (*akatonomastos*), (*Deo* 4, *Somn*. 1: 67), the word "ineffable" (*arretos*), (*Deo* 4, *Somn*. 1: 67, *LA* 3: 206, *Heres*. 170), the word "invisible, unseen" (*aoratos*), (*Cher*. 101, *Conf*. 138), the expression "beyond circumscription, description" (*aperigrafos*), (*Sacr*. 59), the word "incomparable" (*asugkritos*), (*Fuga* 141), the expression "without form" (*aeide*), (*Mos*. 1: 158), and finally, the word "incorporeal" (*aswmatos*), (*Mos*. 1: 158).

In *De Mutatione Nominum* Philo writes: "The Existent considered as existent is not relative (*pros ti*). He is full of Himself and is sufficient for Himself… But the Potencies (*dunameis*) which He has projected into creation to benefit (*ep, euergesia*) what He has framed are in some cases spoken of as in a sense relative (*pros ti*), such as the kingly (*ten Vasiliken*) and the beneficial (*ten euergetiken*), for a king is a king of someone and a benefactor the benefactor of someone, while the subject of the kingship and the recipient of the benefit is necessarily something different" (*Mut*. 27-28.).

It is fundamental to Philo's thought that God is not relative (*ou pros ti*) but that the powers are in a sense relative (*wsanei pros ti*) with respect to creation. As noted by Drummond the significance of this thought

must be seen in relation to Aristotle's teaching on the category of relation (*pros ti*) Drummond in Frick 1999: 77). To say that God is not relative does not imply, notes Drummond, "that Philo places God beyond the reach of every relation" (Frick 1999: 77), "but rests on the logic of Aristotle's correlative terms" (Frick 1999: 77). "For example, according to Aristotle, the idea of "man" is not correlative of the idea of "slave", even though a man might have a slave, but the idea of "man" is correlative of the idea of "slave" because of the idea that man is also a "master" (Frick 1999: 77, Cf. Categories 7).

"Applied to Philo's idea of Gods transcendent existence, God is pure essence complete and not himself correlative to something else" (Frick 1999: 77). "But as soon as God is spoken of as maker and artificer (poietes kai demiourgos, Mut. 29), he is brought into relation with things made, that is creation" (Frick 1999: 77). According to Philo the essence of God is beyond relation (pros ti), but the powers are said to be "in a sense relative" (wsanei pros ti). "The kingly power is relative of king and subject, the beneficial of benefactor and recipient, the creative of creator and creation" (Frick 1999: 77). "But as Drummond writes, the relation between powers and subjects is not mutually correlative one- he calls it a *quasi* relation- because the powers do not experience any alteration in their intrinsic character by being in relation to something else, "it would be truer to say that their objects are relative to them than that they are relative to their objects" (Drummond in Frick 1999: 77).

In summary Philo's doctrine of transcendence, postulates that God is unlike any other being. There is a distinction between the existence (expressed by the term *uparxis*) and nature or essence of God (expressed by the terms *einai, ousia*. These aspects result in the fundamental concept of the unknowability of God.

Uknowability of God

God's supreme transcendence implies that we cannot know God. Philo's doctrine of the unknowability of God can be seen in his exegesis of Exodus 33: 12ff LXX dealing with the encounter of Moses with God after the demolition of the golden calf (in *Spec.* 1: 41-50 and *Post.* 166-9). "When Moses (the person most loved by God *theofilestatos Mwuses*) beseeches God: "Reveal Thyself to me (*emfanison moi sauton*)", (*Spec.* 1:

41, cf. Exodus 33: 13 LXX: *emfanison moi seauton*). Philo discusses this request of Moses also in *Post.* 16, 169, *Fuga* 165, *Mut.* 8, *LA* 3: 101.

As shown by Wolfson, when Philo speaks of Moses direct apprehension of God (*LA* 3: 101), Philo means Moses' direct perception of the existence (and not essence) of God (Wolfson 83-90). God is made known to Moses by revelation and prophecy, which induces Moses to desire to gain knowledge of God's essence. Moses does not realize God's existence through the observation of natural phenomena. To Moses' desire God replies in the negative for the "apprehension (*katalepsin*) of Me is something more than human nature (*anthrwpou fusis*), yea even the whole heaven and universe will be able to contain" (*Spec.* 1: 43-44). The reason for the inability is that "we have in us no organ (*organon*)" through which we can apprehend Gods essence, "neither in sense (*aisthesis*), for it is not perceptible by sense, nor yet in mind (*nous*)" (Cf. *Mut.* 7).

If we can speak of "seeing God" Philo remarks that this is only in an indirect fashion through his powers. Philo interprets the verse "See, see that I AM" (Deuteronomy 32: 39), in this fashion. The reference that "the Existent One is visible", he says, refers "to each of his powers" (*Post.* 168). The verse does not say, "See Me", but, "See that I AM" and for Philo this means that a person can only apprehend Gods existence (*uparxis*), because "it is quite enough for a mans reasoning faculty to advance as far as to learn that the Cause of the Universe is and subsists (*esti te kai uparchei*)", (*Post.* 168). Similarly, God "can be perceived and known… from the powers that range the universe, and from the constant and ceaseless motion of His ineffable works" (*Post.* 167).

Philo comments on Exodus 33: 23 upon Moses request to see God: "This meant that, that all that follows in the wake of God is within the good mans apprehension, while He Himself alone is beyond it, beyond, that is, in the line of straight and direct approach, a mode of approach by which (had it been possible) His quality would have been made known, but brought within ken by the powers that follow and attend Him, for these make evident not His essence but subsistence from the things which He accomplishes" (*Post.* 169).

God is thus according to Philo mediated in the universe by means of His Powers and therefore "through his *relationality*". We can never no Gods essence. The powers are not identical with Gods essence but

reveal him through creation and God relation with creation. In one instance Philo identifies the powers with the "glory of God (*Spec*. 1: 45. In QG 4: 54, Philo remarks that God "holds out of sight the glory of his powers") because they "present to your sight a sort of impress and copy of their active working" (*Spec*. 147) and again they supply "quality and shape to things which lack either" (*Spec*. 1: 47). What we know about God then is only limited to what the Powers make apparent. The powers are not identical to Gods essence. Therefore even if the powers reveal to us that God is provident, we cannot ascribe this quality to Gods essence.

In 42 Omn Philo interpreting Exod 7:1 uses a gradual argument from lower to higher (from friends of kings, friends of celestial gods and) to the extreme freedom "of him who was possessed by love of the divine and worshipped the Self-existent only, as having passed from a man into a god, thou, indeed, a god to men…" (Exod 7: 1).

Our knowledge of God is thus strictly limited to the observation of creation or in other words revelation. Revelation has an essentially indirect nature. Similarly we can judge that God is provident indirectly *kata dunamin* through the contemplation of the cosmos. Any knowledge of God that we can have appears through God acting. Philo says in *Cher*. 77 that "it belongs to God alone to act (*poiew*), and this we may not ascribe to any created being. What belongs to the created is to suffer (*paschw*)". In *LA* 1: 5 Philo explains in more detail that "God never leaves off making (*poiew*), (Cf. *Gig*. 42, "God is uncreated and ever active (*poiwn aei*)"), but even as it is the property (idion) of fire to burn and of snow to chill, so it is the property of God to make. /…/ He is to all besides the source of action.". In *Det*. 162 he says "He who really IS must needs to be active not passive", and in *Prov*. 1: 6, a passage complicated by text-critical minutiae, Philo refers to the Stoic view that it is unfitting for the deity to be ever inactive.

In reference to the naming of God Philo believes this is only possible through applying language catachrestically (Philo uses the verb katachraomai and the noun katachresis). Katachresis is a term used in rhetoric and grammar and belongs to the theory of tropes. Pseudo-Plutarch writes in *Vita Homeri*, that katachresis is "the transference of a word-usage from an object which is properly (kuriws) signified to another object which has no proper name (*kurion onoma*)", (Runia 1988:

84). Of course even the term God in this context only refers to the aspect of his activity but not to his essence. In *Somn*. 1: 230 we read: "He who IS… has no proper name (*kurion onoma*), and that whatever name anyone may use of Him he will use by license of language (*katachraomai*), for it is not the nature of Him who IS spoken of, but simply to be".

In describing God Philo uses both a kataphatic and an apophatic approach. In response to the verse that "God is not a man" (Numbers 23: 19), Philo remarks that mortal human beings are not able to think worthily of "the nature of the Cause", and then explains as follows: "We shun indeed in words the monstrosity of saying that God is of human form, but in actual fact we accept the impious thought that He is of human passions. And therefore we invent for Him hands and feet, incoming and outgoings, enmities, aversions, estrangements, anger, in fact such parts and passions as can never belong to the Cause" (*Sacr*. 95-96, cf. *Deus* 53-56, *Mut*. 54, *Plant*. 70).

Divine immanence

Although Philo adheres to a strict belief in Gods transcendence, he also believes that God is immanent. God's immanence in a sense is already implied in the designation of God as being supremely good. The powers and the Logos primarily indicate God's immanence. God is immanent without loosing any of his transcendence. This unique balance is shown in the fact that the Logos has a transcendent aspect in its relationship to God and the ideas and in its immanent aspect as the concretisation of Gods activity in the cosmos. Philo characterizes the angel at the burning bush as analogous to God immanence or Gods powers. Philo stresses that while God is supremely transcendent he fills the cosmos with his presence. In *Post*. 14 we read: "But though transcending and being beyond what He has made, nonetheless has He filled the universe with Himself, for he has caused His powers to extend themselves throughout the Universe to its utmost bounds".

The Logos

The concept of the Logos or divine Logos is a very important part of Philo's doctrines. The concept of the Logos has initiated the publication of numerous works, which deal with the subject. In Philo,

the term has a multifaceted character. It is important to realize that there is no concept of the Divine Logos in the *Timaeus*, which usually furnishes Philo with his ideas about God.

The Logos is located in the intelligible world and contains the Divine Logos or Divine Reason. In Philo's writings, the Logos can on the one hand be the totality of the "ideas" in the intelligible world or the single "idea" containing all the ideas. As the Divine Logos is the totality of the archetypal ideas, it can have various synonyms, such as virtue, wisdom, (in Greek, *sophia*), and pure philosophy (during Hellenistic times, the Hebrew *hokma* was equated with *sophia* and *sophia* with both Torah and Logos). These various archetypal ideas are the many *logoi*, which are contained in the Divine Logos. Thus the Logos can designate the totality of the intelligible world, or be a separate entity within the intelligible world. Scholarship has not yet decided on the issue of whether in Philo the Logos has some kind of "personality" or is a mere abstract.

The *To On* reaches down into the intelligible world in the form of the Divine Logos. The Logos in this aspect is the expression of God's immanence. The Divine Logos is very important, since it forms a kind of intersection between the *To On* and us humans. While we cannot reach the *To On* we can reach the Divine Logos. Philo speaks of the Logos as of "Gods first born son" (*Agr.* 31) or eldest son (*Conf.* 146-147). The various religious ceremonials, which are prescribed in the Scripture, are located in the sensible world, but actually point to the intelligible world. Hence, Philo's identification of the high priest with the Logos. The ceremonies can unite us with the Divine Logos.

Philo expounds the doctrine that the Logos (equated with the *kosmos noetos*) is an *eikwn* of God whereas the cosmos is an *eikwn* of the Logos (see esp. *Opif.* 24-25). The cosmos and man the microcosm are both image of an image. This idea is difficult to reconcile with the *Timaeus* (Runia 1986: 447).

In its capacity as a kind of bridge between the Transcendent God and human beings the Logos displays a transcendent and immanent characteristic. The transcendent aspect of the Logos of course deals with its relationship with the supreme God. In its immanent aspect the Logos channels the work of the powers in the created world. Providence in the level of the powers corresponds to the gracious power. The Logos also

represents divine immanence in the cosmos, thereby assuming the role of the cosmic soul of the *Timaeus*. However, Philo is very reluctant to accept the doctrine of the cosmic soul.

The transcendent aspect of the Logos is connected to the *noetos kosmos* (*Opif*. 24-25, *Prov*. 1: 7). The is the thinking-acting faculty of God executed by the immanent aspect of the Logos in the sensible world through the powers. God exercises providence in the world through his immanent powers. Since it is in the creation that God reveals his powers, the creation as such is the instrument of one's perception of Gods providential activity. The cosmos' plan or model is located in the Logos (*Opif*. 20, 36). The model in a sense is the noetic aspect of the Logos, since the Logos also contains the power(s) of God active in the creational process (*Opif*. 20-21).

Wolfson, Winston and Runia agree "that Philo envisions the Logos on the highest level as the noetic mind of God and on the lower level as the immanent or hypostasised aspect of that mind in form of the divine powers by which the Logos brings into existence and maintains the order of creation", (Frick 1999: 76). The transcendent level and the immanent level of the Logos is bridged by its role in the creational process. The lower immanent level according to both Wolfson and Runia is characterized by the operation of God's providential activity under the direction of the Logos.

One of the most important functions of the Logos consists of its role in the creational process. The Logos is the instrument of creation. The texts where Philo portrays the Logos as the instrument through which (*di ou*) or with which (*w*) God creates are the following: *Leg*. 3. 96, *Cher*. 28, *Sacr*. 8, *Deus* 57, *Conf*. 62, *Migr*. 6, *Fug*. 12, 95, *Somn*. 2. 45, *Spec*. 1.81). In *Leg*. 3. 96, *Fug*. 12 and *Somn*. 2. 45, the Logos is both paradigm or seal and instrument.

God does not enter into a direct relationship with matter but employs the Logos as the cutter (*tomeus*), (*Her*. 140, *Cher*. 28 (*logw*), 31). As emphasized by Runia, it is necessary to realize that in Philo the Logos is never awarded the title of *poietes kai pater* or demiurgic creator (Runia 1986: 449). Runia writes: "When the Logos is regarded as the 'embodiment" of Gods thought focussed on the cosmos (i.e. place of the kosmos noetos) or as the "embodiment" of Gods creational activity (i.e. foremost of the powers), the difference between God and his Logos

appears to be kept to a minimum, perhaps a matter of aspect rather than level… But when the immanent presence of the Logos is stressed, Philo envisages a direct contact with and permeation through the cosmos which it holds together" (Runia 1986: 450). The Logos is *presvutatos twn ora gegone and presvutatos kai prwtogonos*, even God's archangel (Runia 1986: 450). "The Logos has to all appearances become a *hypostasis*, a level of God's being given real existence outside God himself" (Runia 1986: 450). While the Logos creates in actuality it is God who creates through the Logos.

The Logos is also associated with the Powers. In terms of the hierarchy beneath God, Philo writes in *QE* 2: 68: "In the first place (there is) He Who is elder than the one and the monad and the beginning. Then (comes) the Logos of the Existent One, the truly seminal substance of existing things. And from the divine Logos, as from a spring, there divide and break forth two powers (*apo de tou Theiou logou, kathaper apo peges, schizontai duo dunameis*). One is the creative (power), through which the Artificer placed and ordered all things, this is named "God". And (the other is) the royal (power), since through it the Creator rulers over created things, this is called "Lord"".

The Logos in this scheme is below God but higher than the two royal powers or primary powers. The Logos is thus a mediator between Gods transcendence and immanence (In addition to mediator, elsewhere Philo describes the logos also as "the first principle, the archetypal idea (*archetupos idea*), the pre-measurer (*prometretes*) of all things" (*QG* 1: 4), the oldest and most generic of created things, or even as "the second God (*o deuteros theos, os estin ekeinou logos*), (*QG* 2: 62), or "pre-Logos God (*o pro tou logou theos*)", (*QG* 2: 62), or "the Word who is antecedent to all that has come into existence (*o logos o presvuteros twn genesin eilefotwn*)", (*Mig*. 6, cf. *Agr*. 51), or the sum total of the ideas (*Spec*. 1: 48, 329) which constitutes the intelligible world after which the sensible one is formed).

The mediating role of the logos is made apparent in Philo's exegesis on the verse, "And I /Moses/ stood between the Lord and you" (Deuteronomy 5: 5). Philo declares that the logos is: "neither unbegotten (*agenetos*) as God, nor begotten (*genetos*) as you, but midway between the two extremes, serving as a pledge for both, to the Creator as assurance that the creature should never completely shake of the reins

and rebel, choosing disorder rather than order, to the creature warranting his hopefulness that the gracious God will never disregard his own work" (*Heres* 206, translation by D. Winston, Selections, 94).

Various scholars have variously classified the fundamental aspects of Philo's doctrine of the Logos. Wolfson identifies three elements in Philo's doctrine of the Logos. He discerns in the logos three stages. (1) The property (mind) of God, and as such identical with divine essence, (2) the totality of incorporeal ideas and powers, but unlike Gods essence, and (3) the totality of powers immanent in the world. In its third stage, the Logos "is the instrument of divine providence or of the preservation of the world" (Wolfson vol. 1, 226-40, 327-32).

David Winston speaks of "the twofold Logos in the Universe", the intelligible world of ideas and the visible world as copies of the ideas, but also of the "one Logos that constitutes the manifestation of God as thinking-acting" (Winston Logos and Mystical Theology, 17-19).

David Runia distinguishes three aspects of the Logos. (1) The transcendent aspect, which is the place of the noetic cosmos, corresponding to the Platonic model in creation (2) the immanent aspect, which is "the providential maintainer of the cosmos once it is created (cf. Plato's world-soul or the Stoic Logos)" and (3) the instrument of creation, which bridges the transcendent and the immanent aspect), (Runia God and Man in Philo of Alexandria 72-73).

The Stoic background of the term logos connotes the reason, which indwells in the universe. The term has traditionally been associated with reason. Our speech can also be "reasonable". However, on most occasions our speech does not correspond with our thoughts, which are capable of being pure logos. Thus as was hinted above, the Scripture in its literal meaning (Aaron) is the "speech", while the allegorical meaning (Moses) is the "thought".

It is no surprise that given the terms connotations that it was often associated with wisdom. During Philo's time the attributes of Sophia have already been associated with Gods word or Logos. This fact was already suggested in Scripture where in I Kgs. 3: 5-12 wisdom is a gift of Solomon. Wisdom was present during creation as implied by Prov. 8: 22-32. Chapter eight of the same work even personifies wisdom. Thus there exists a parallel between the Logos' role in creation and the role of

Wisdom. It is difficult to determine in how far Philo went in attributing the Logos a hypostatic existence.

In terms of the relationship between the *logos* and *pronoia*, the issue hinges on whether Philo understands the dative *pronoia* to mean that providence is an instrument of creation. This is usually the function of the Logos, which is expressed by means of the dative *logw* (Frick 1999: 109). This is noted by Hans-Friedrich Weiss (Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des hellenistischen und palastinischen Judentums, *TU* 97 (Berlin, 1966), 268) who observes that it is characteristic of Philo to employ the dative of instrument (*logw*) to convey the meaning of instrument, the idea that the world is created "through" the logos". The problem is compounded by the fact that the dative *pronoia* occurs at least five times in a cosmological context in the passages *QG* 2: 7, 3: 18, *Deo* 5, 12, *Decal*. 58". Usually Philo describes providence as an attribute of God, which he expresses in a subjective genitive construction, such as *pronoia tou Theou* (Frick 1999: 109).

It is possible to say that Philo, while adhering to an ontological unity, actually exposes a belief in a Trinity, consisting of two primary powers and a Logos.

Providence

Providence or Divine providence is a concept, which is often used by Philo. As such it is closely related with God's activity in the world. Providence is an important attribute of God's activity, especially in relation to creation. Philo's texts dealing with providence include *Opif*. 170-72 and also his book *De Providentia*. In relation to the word itself the Greek term is *pronoia*. The root of the word carries the connotation of *mental* or *intellectual* activity. Usually the word is translated as "fore-knowledge", but this translation often misses various nuances and meanings, which the term can have in Philo's thought. (The German rendering of *pronoia* is "*gottliche Vorsehung, gottliches Walten, gottliche Fursorge*).

In Philo's thought providence is often associated with the concept of Divinity that is as "Divine Providence". Divine providence as such is not mentioned in Plato's Timaeus and the term *pronoia*, which does occur, is mentioned in relation to the theology of the universe and mans design (30b8, 44c7, 73a1). However there are indications of an incipient

concept of Divine Providence in Plato and according to Diogenes Laertius, who recalls the remark of Favorinus (2ⁿᵈ century sophist), Plato was the first to introduce the concept of divine providence (theou pronoian), which is found in Timaeus 30c (Diogenes Laertius 3: 24). Philo employs the term pronoia 66 times (According to G. Mayer, *Index Philoneus* (Berlin, 1974), 245-6 The prepositional phrase *ek pronoia* means "intentionally, with intent" and must be distinguished from the idea of providence).

In Philo the word has two main meanings. On the philosophical side it means "divine providence", on the other side "care, provision, foresight". The idea of providence is also expressed by Philo with the term *epifrosune*, usually translated as "thoughtfulness". Occasionally Philo expresses the idea of providence with the term *epimeleia*.

In Philo's thinking providence or Divine providence is essentially related to God's function as caretaker of the world. Thus the meaning of providence is closely associated with God's activity and not merely as knowledge of future things. It can be called foresight in the sense that God knows what the world or people need at any given moment. In *Spec*. 1: 308 Philo writes: God "takes pity and compassion (*eleon kai oikton lamvanei*)" and offers "His providential care (*pronoia*)". God, "in the graciousness of His nature (*dia ten ilew fusin autou*) does not refuse the task of caring (*pronoia*)". Philo further writes: "Fifthly, that God also exercises providence (*pronoew*) on the worlds behalf… For that the Maker should care for the things made (*oti kai pronoei kosmou o Theos*) is required by the laws and ordinances of Nature, and it is in accordance with these that parents take thought beforehand for children" (*Opif*. 171-2).

According to Philo, God's providence can clearly be seen in the works of creation. Abraham believed in God also due to the fact that he observed the providence of God in the world. Philo tells of Abraham that he did not rest from seeking the One, "until he received clearer visions, not of His essence (*ousia*), for that is impossible, but of His existence and providence (*tes uparxews kai pronoias autou*). And, therefore he is the first person spoken of as believing in God, since he first grasped a firm and unswerving conception of the truth that there is one Cause above all (*en aition to anwtatw*), and that it exercises

providence (pronoew) for the world and all that there is therein" (*Virt*. 215-6).

Because God if Father it follows that it is in the nature of the father to care for his offspring. In *QG* 3: 42 Philo explains God's pledge to Abraham, that he will become "the father of multitude of nations" (Genesis 17: 4). The concept of the caring father permeates a number of Philo's passages. In *Spec*. 3: 189 (cf. *Mut*. 45, *Spec*. 1: 318), for example, God is rightly called Father and Maker, says Philo, because the Father who made the universe "takes thought (*epimeleomai*) for his offspring, His providence watching over (*pronoew*) both the whole and the parts". Similarly, in *Opif*. 9-10, "Those who assert that this world is unoriginate unconsciously eliminate that which of all incentives to piety is the most beneficial and the most indispensable, namely providence. For it stands to reason that what has been brought into existence should be cared for (*epimeleomai*) by its Father and Maker. For as we know, it is a fathers aim in regard to his offspring to preserve them and an artificers in regard of his handiwork to preserve them". In *Opif*. 171 Philo writes: "God exercises providence on the worlds behalf. "For that the Maker should care (epimeleomai) for the thing made is required by the laws and ordinances of Nature, and it is in accordance with these that parents take thought beforehand for children".

God's providential nature enables us to accept the existence of God. It is the concrete manifestation of God's existence as such.

The Logos and the powers effectuate God's immanent presence in the world. That God cares for his world can clearly be seen by means of the gracious and providential powers. In order to establish the correlation between divine existence and providence Philo uses the cosmological and teleological argument as seen in *Ebr*. 19. Pharaoh replies to Moses' plea to let the people of Israel go in the words: "Who is He that I should obey Him", and "I know not the Lord" (*Exodus* 5: 2). Philo comments as follows: (1) In the first of these utterances he /Pharaoh/ asserts that there is no God /oti ouk esti to Theon), (2) in the second that even if there is a God he is not known to us, and this conclusion presupposes the assumption that there is no divine providence (*oper ek tou me pronoein*). For if there were such a thing as providence, God too would be known (*ei gar prounoei, kan eginwsketo*).

The passage Prov. 126, shows that Philo believes that every part of creation is a testimony to Gods care and therefore creation itself is the proof of the existence of Gods providence. The teleological perfection of the universe testifies to Gods providential care (cf. Prov. 1: 31-33, 2: 74), this fact presupposes a great deal of art and knowledge Philo states in *Spec*. 1: 35 "we have gained the conception of the existence of God (*touton ton tropon ennoian elavomen uparxews Theou*)". According to Philo *philanthropia* characterises Gods relation to human beings.

Philo proves the existence of God also with reference to Plato's statement in the Timaeus that "everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause, for without a cause it is impossible for anything to attain becoming" (*Timaeus* 28a, cf. *Fuga* 12: "For the world has come into being, and assuredly it has done so under the hand of some Cause"), or by allusion to Aristotle's view of God as prime mover (cf. *Fuga* 8, *Conf*. 123, *Spec*. 2: 5, *Prov*. 1: 12) or immovable mover (cf. *Post*. 28).

Similarly to Cicero, Philo establishes the *existentia dei* on the basis that we discern "the Artificer by means of His works (*dia twn ergwn ton techniten katanoountes*)," (*LA*. 3: 99, cf. *Spec*. 1: 41, *Post*. 167-9, Prov. 1: 23, *Anim*. 65, Wisdom of Solomon 13: 5). As Myrto Dragona-Monachou remarks, Philo's "arguments for the existence of providence almost fully correspond to the Stoic arguments in Cicero's *De natura deorum*" (Myrto Dragona-Monachou in Frick 1999: 47).

Frick observes that on one occasion in Philo's writings we can detect Philo stating that providence belongs to Gods essence. In the passage *Spec*. 1: 209, Philo employs the unique predicate construction *o gar Theos… pronetikos*, a phrase embedded in the sentence: *o gar theos agathos te esti kai poietes kai gennetes twn olwn kai pronoetikos wn egennese* (Frick 1999: 51). Colson translates this sentence into English as follows: "God is good, He is the maker and begetter of the universe and His providence is over what He has begotten". The subject of the sentence is o theos, the verb is *estin* and takes four predicates: the two adjectives agathos and pronoetikos, and the two nouns poietes and gennetes (Frick 1999: 51). A literal translation is thus, "God is good, /he is/ maker and begetter… and /he is/ provident. The literal translation accentuates the fact that Philo on this occasion employs the adjective *pronoetikos* to describe the idea of providence (Frick 1999: 51). Philo's use of *pronetikos*

is especially significant if one keeps in mind that he usually describes the idea of providence with the noun *pronoia* and the verb *pronoew* (Frick 1999: 52). In Philo's usage the terms *pronoia* or *pronoew* emphasize the point of Gods providential activity, for example in creation or in relation to humanity (Frick 1999: 52). However here in the passage *Spec.* 1: 209, the grammatical function of the adjective pronoetikos is that of a predicate in relation to God (Frick 1999: 52). Of course as noted by Frick this seems to suggest that providence belongs to God's essence that He *is* provident (*o theos estin pronoetikos*) and that this quality belongs to his nature (Frick 1999: 52). Of course this observation is interesting, but has to be judged in the overall theological framework of Philo. As Frick himself admits, this is only one instance of the instances where Philo usually speaks of Divine providence in terms of providential activity. One would be very surprised that Philo would admit to an ontological predicate of God such as this one given his stress on God's utter transcendence. In fact Philo uses other predicates of God, while keeping in mind that they are only pedagogical devices for our understanding. If Philo would recognize providence as a mark of God's essence, he would be in fact stating that it is in the nature of God to be in relation.

The explicit connection between God as transcendent cause and providence is made clear in the passage Virt. 216 where Philo narrates Abraham's journey from the land of the Chaldeans, Abraham "is the first person spoken of as believing in God, since he first grasped a firm and unswerving conception of the truth that there is one Cause above all (*en aition to anwtatw*), and that it exercises providence (*pronoew*) for the world and all that there is therein". (F. H. Colsons translation of the phrase *kai pronoei tou te kosmou kai twn en autw*, as "and that it /God as Cause/ provides for the world," ignores the fact that whenever God is the subject of the verb *pronoew*, the reference is specifically to Gods *providence*).

Philo avoids the classification of Providence into three categories, as was the case with Middle Platonists. For example Pseudo-Plutarch (572f), says that "the highest, or primary, Providence is the intellection or will, beneficent to all things, of the primary God… Secondary Providence belongs to secondary gods, who move in heaven", and tertiary providence is said to be "contained in fate" (Dillon Middle Platonists 324).

If one states that providence equals continuos care for creation it does suggest that providence had some role in the creational event or in other words that it was also an instrument of creation. This is partly suggested by the fact that God is good and in it is in his nature to act. To be good and to act implies a certain degree of action. If God acts providence is always linked to God's activity. Thus, creation is the result of God's goodness and as such can be characterized as the activation of his providence. During creation God has to be provident and thus it would logically presuppose that providence could be characterized as an instrument of creation. Philo hints at this notion in a number of his statements. However it must be kept in mind that the chief instrument of creation in Philo's thought is the Logos. It would be more likely that the idea of providence is an aspect of the Logos' instrumental role during creation and that providence had the specific task of making rational some of the things created by the Logos (Frick 1999: 114).

Frick believes that the doctrine of providence is central to Philo, even though he does not give a systematic exposition of the concept (Frick 1999: 193).

The notion of Providence in Greek Philosophy and Hellenistic Judaism

As in Philo, so in Greek philosophy the word *pronoia* expresses providence. The word appears in the *Timaeus* 30c (*ten tou Theou pronoian*) and 44c (*pronoai Theon*), and in book X of the *Laws* (896e-905d). In this context Plato speaks of a world soul guiding the universe and the universal care of God for the world.

While the notion of providence is less pronounced in Aristotle the Stoics adapted the Platonic ideas to their concept of God who is understood to be identical to the immanent world Soul, Providence or Logos and in this aspect functions as a first principle (Frick 1999: 5). God is not a personal entity in the Stoics but an underlying principle. The middle Platonists took over these notions and identified this guiding principle of the Stoics with the notion of God.

There are some indications about providence in literature such as *Qoheleth*, *Ben Sira*, the *Septuagint*, *Daniel*, *Wisdom of Solomon*, and *Josephus*. In the Septuagint the term has two meanings (*Wisdom* 14: 3, 17: 2, *Daniel* 6: 19, 2 *Maccabees* 4: 6, 3 *Maccabees* 4: 21, 5: 30, 4 *Maccabees* 9: 24,

13: 19, 17: 22). When God is the subject of *pronoia* the meaning of the word is providence, when a person is the subject of pronoia the meaning of the word is that of "attention". This contrasts to the verb *pronoew* as it is employed by the LXX (employed in *Numbers* 23: 9, 1 *Esdras* 2: 28, *Job* 24: 15, *Proverbs* 3: 4, *Wisdom* 6: 7, 13: 16, *Daniel* 11: 37 (twice), 2 *Maccabees* 14: 9, 3 *Maccabees* 3: 24, 4 *Maccabees* 7: 18). Here the verb signifies "attending to" and in only one instance (*Wisdom* 6: 7) does it signify Gods providential activity.

Philo writes about Abrahams highest religious experience: "Then opening the souls eye as though after a profound sleep, and beginning to see the pure beam instead of deep darkness, he followed the ray and discerned what he had not beheld before, a charioteer and pilot presiding over the world and directing in safety his own work, assuming the charge and superintendence of that work and of all such parts of it as are worthy of the Divine care" (Abr. 70). Further, He "came forward to meet him and revealed His nature, so far as the beholders power of sight allowed" (Abr. 79).

Politics

It is interesting that Philo does not mention many historical aspects of Judea in his time. He does not mention the Maccabean dynasty, nor are for example the three sons of Herod. In this context it is also interesting that David is never mentioned as king. It is possible that Philo is less concerned with historical aspects than he is with characterisations of an ideal community or *politeuma*. This ideal *politeuma* is of a spiritual kind and not one of physical ancestry or nature.

Philo,s ideal monarch is one who is able to free his higher mind from the influence of the lower mind and then translate these experiences in the higher mind to concrete laws or statutes. Thus the ideal king is the philosopher-king. A philosopher king establishes "democracy in his soul". After the king has absorbed the laws of nature he becomes a *nomos empsychos kai logikos* a law articulate in a man.

In this regard Moses encompassed four roles: king, law-giver, priest and prophet. Philo in contrast to the hellenistic framework, will not accept the divinity of the king. The suggestion that Moses as king is divine is found in Exod. 7: 1.

What is interesting is the Philo completely lacks a concept of the Messiah.

Jewish Literature in Greek outside Alexandria.

Cleodemus Malchas (North Africa). This author subordinates hellenism to the Jewish heritage and has made Abraham the ancestor of numerous peoples (Sterling 1999: 5).

The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (Cyrene and Egypt).

2 Enoch (Cyrene and Egypt).

3 Baruch (Cyrene and Egypt).

Egyptian Sibylline Oracles (Cyrene and Egypt).

Eupolemus (Palestine**, the evidence suggests from Palestine that Greek was common).**

Lives of the Prophets. (Palestine).

Justus of Tiberias (Palestine).

4 Maccabees (Syria).

Hellenistic Synagogue Prayers. (Christians took over into the Apostolic Constitutions).

Pagan authors.

Numenius of Apamea.

Celsus.

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Boccachini discusses Ben Sira and examines it against the back-ground of the Book of the Watchers and The Book of Astronomy of 1 Enoch (6-36; 72-82). These latter works locate the source of evil in the actions of fallen angels who had relations with earthly women. These gave birth to giants who turned into demonic spirits and revealed secret sciences to humans which ended in corruption. "In these works", says Boccaccini, "individual responsibility is gravely compromised. Salva-tion is entrusted to an extraordinary intervention by God and the idea of the covenant is emptied of all substance" (Boccaccini in Winston 1993: 234).

Boccachini notes, that wisdom in contrast to the law is something higher than law and belongs to God. The laws are pedagogical instruments which may lead to wisdom given the operation of Gods grace. Therefore according to Boccachini the statement in Ben Sira which states that the Law is the historical manifestation in Israel of a Pretemporal wisdom is far from an affirmation of identity (Sir 24: 3-23), (Boccachini in Winston 1993: 234).

Ben Sira is a book which is the first book in Judaism to emphasise the concept of free will. Ben Sira denies an extraneous cause of human evil. It states in 21: 27: "when an impious man curses the satan, he really curses his own soul". For Ben Sira human ambivalence reflects the ambivalent structure of the cosmos, in which the opposites coexist but are "annulled in the inscrutable unity of divine will" (Boccachini in Winston 1993: 235). Boccachini contrasts Ben Siras emphasis on free will with the determinism of the Book of Astronomy and the Book of the Watchers, where the human fate is determined by supernatural forces.

The Stoics and also the Egyptian writing Papyrus Insinger, also dealt with determinism, but they did not seem to see much of a problem in simply proposing that while everything is determined by the gods in advance, nevertheless success and failure is dependant on concrete human action. Similarly Ben Sira speaks of pre-determinism and free will, possibly relying on a Stoic tradition (Winston 1993: 236).

The works on Abraham and Joseph betray marks of hellenistic biography (Borgen 1987: 24). Thus, on Abraham contains certain topics of the genre rhetorical panegyric: eudaimonismus (115) and synkrisis

(178-199), (Borgen 1987: 24). The treatise omits accounts, which would darken Abrahams authority. "The allegorical sections show affinities with the religio-philosophical biography written for edifying purpose" (Borgen 1987: 24).

It has been noted that Philos Questions and Answers resemble commentaries on Homer. This form however, is also found in rabbinic expositions of the laws of Moses. There is a close resemblance of Philos Opif. 77-78 and the rabbinic exposition in the Tosephta, Sanhedrin 8: 7-9. In both treatises the issue of Adams creation as being the last creation is phrased in a form of a question. The answers are also similar and it is interpreted in the sense that the host invites the guest when the meal is ready, i.e. when the creation is ready. Obviously the Tosephta is a later work, but both writings seem to draw on a common tradition (Borgen 1987: 31). Philo states in Opif. 77 that he himself relied in this interpretation from another tradition: "those, then who have studied more deeply than others the laws of Moses and who examine their contents with all possible minuteness…"

Dreams

Philo views dreams in a positive light. While Philo is careful in ascribing great significance to the art of fortune telling, he nevertheless believes that in certain instances the foretelling of future can be the result of heavenly revelation. The authenticity of dreams is dictated by the involvement of God and his co-operation. Philo writes: "This third kind of dreams arises whenever the soul in sleep, setting itself in motion and agitation of its own accord, becomes frenzied, and with the prescient power due to such inspiration foretells the future. The first kind of dreams we saw to be those in which God originates the movement and invisibly suggests things obscure to us but patent to Himself: while the second kind consisted of dreams in which the understanding moves in concert with a divinely induced madness, which is permitted to foretell many coming events" (*Somn*. I: 1-2 and *Somn*. II: 1-2). The treatise where Philo describes the first class of dreams is lost.

A similar thought to that one in the above passage is found in Posidonius: "there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods: second, the air is full of immortal souls (i.e. demons), already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the gods in person converse with men when they are asleep" (Cicero, *De Divinatione*, I: 30, 64).

Agency

As was hinted above the idea of agency is an integral part of Philo's thought. This was seen especially in relation to the High Priest and the priesthood. But the Jews as a community is also important as a link between God and man, since they are a nation of suppliants. God cares for His creation and other nations primarily through the care for his chosen people.

Proselytes

In his treatment of proselytism Philo seems to emphasise a spiritual proselytism. Philo interprets Exod 22: 21, which according to the Septuagint reads: "and a proselyte (*preslutos*) you shall not mistreat, nor shall you oppress him. For you were proselytes in the land of Egypt". Philo interprets the term *proselutos* in Exod. 22: 21: "*proselutos* is not the one who has circumcised his uncircumcision, but the one who (has circumcised) his desires and sensual pleasures and the other passions of the soul. For in Egypt the Hebrew nation was not circumcised, but, being mistreated with all mistreatments of the cruelty shown by inhabitants against strangers, it lived with them in self-restraint and endurance, not by necessity, but rather of free choice, because it took refuge in the Saviour, God, who sent his beneficent power and delivered the suppliants from their difficult and hopeless situation" (*Questiones in Exodum* II: 2).

In terms of proselytes Philo does not specifically mention circum-cision. Bodily circumcision portrays the excision of pleasure and all passions (Migr. 92), Spec. I: 305, Quaes Gen. III: 47-52). The foreskin symbolises sense-pleasures (Quaes Gen. III: 52). Similar interpretations of the circumcision as in Philo we can discover in the Qumran tradition. According to 1 QpHab 11: 13 the foreskin of the heart is to be circumcised in addition to the circumcision of the body, which seems assumed. A parallel to the thought of Philo also occurs in 1 QS 5: 5-6, where it says that the foreskin of the evil inclination is to be circumcised".

Wolfson argues, that Philo distinguishes between a "spiritual proselyte" and a full proselyte who was bodily circumcised and from a resident alien, who did not follow the Hebrew religion.

Wolfson writes: "Unlike the proselyte who had adopted all the practices and beliefs of Judaism and is a full member of the "congregation of the Lord", this new kind of proselyte is like the *ger toshab* of the rabbis, who, while he has not undergone circumcision and has not adopted all the Jewish practices and beliefs, has renounced polytheism and idolatry and has given up certain other heathen practices. We shall refer to this kind of proselyte as the "spiritual proselyte" instead of the more common name "semi-proselyte" to which objection has been raised… Still, while not circumcised, the "proselyte" in question is assumed by Philo to have accepted certain principles of Judaism. What those principles are he does not specify. He only describes them as (a) a circumcision of "the pleasures and the desires and the other passions of the soul" and (b) "an estrangement (*allotriwsis*) from the opinions of the worshipers of many gods, and establishing a relationship (*oikwiwsis* with those who honour the one God, the Father of the universe." (Wolfson 369-73). While Wolfson's statement has merit, it needs to be further discussed whether this category of "spiritual proselyte" actually existed, and whether it is not a figure of speech and what rights did such individuals have.

An ethical criterion for a proselyte was also applied by the Palestinian rabbis. According to b. *Sabb*. 31 a Hillel gave the status of proselyte to a heathen who came to him and accepted the Golden Rule as summary of Torah. Both Hillel and Philo disregard bodily circumcision in regards to the status of being a member in the Jewish community.

Philos testimony hints at the existence of certain Jewish groups who had an ethical understanding of the Jewish laws and tended to spiritualise them (Borgen 1987: 220), (see Migr. 86-92).

While Wilson's view has merit the issue is more complicated, since even if one accepts the notion of a "spiritual proselyte" in Philo's thoughts, Philo does not clearly state what is the relationship between a "spiritual proselyte" and a full proselyte and their respective rights and benefits.

Philo accords full rights to any "full proselyte" and admonishes Jews to welcome such a convert into their ranks with all rights. The command of awarding the proselyte full rights is found in the Pentateuch. Lev. 19: 34 in the LXX states: "The proselyte that comes to you shall be as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself".

In Virt. 102-104 Philo states that the proselytes have left their family (geneaˇ), their country (patriˇV), their customs (eqoV rough breathing and a an apostrophe to the right). Abraham is the prototype of the proselyte who leaves his home in this way, Virt. 214. The proselytes thus have made their kinsfolk (suggeneiV carka nad i) into mortal enemies (Spec. IV: 178). Philo writes that the proselytes had entered the Jewish politeia carka nad i, which implies citizenship and full rights.

The proselytes have entered a "new and godly commonwealth" (kainh circumflex on the e, and a carka pod e, kai carka nad i do leva, filoqew carka nad e do prava a iota subscrit pod omegou, polieia carka nad iota do prava) Virt. 180, "a commonwealth full of true life and vitality!", Virt. 219".

Observation of the external Laws

While Philo agrees with a deeper exegesis of the Jewish laws and emphasises their ethical character or role, he does not agree with those that use this understanding to conclude that it is not necessary to observe these laws externally. Thus for example Philo believes that the purpose of the Sabbath is to portray the correct relationship between the creature and its creator and that the circumcision portrays the excision of pleasure and the removal of false notions regarding mans creative power. However, he does not agree with those who use these meanings to argue that there is not reason to observe the Sabbath, since one can celebrate the "true meaning" of the Sabbath every day in various pursuits. In *On the Migration of Abraham*, Philo exhorts everyone to observe externally the laws. "It is quite true that the Seventh Day is meant to teach the power of the Unoriginate and the non-action of created beings. But let us not for this reason abrogate the laws laid down for its observance, and light fires or till the ground or carry loads or institute proceedings in court or act as jurors or demand the restoration of deposits or recover loans, or do all else that we are permitted to do as well on days that are not festival seasons (*On the Migration of Abraham* 86-93).

Those that do not observe the external laws are a cause of scandal to their fellow Jews. "If we keep and observe these (outward observances) …we shall not incur the censure of the many and the charges they are sure to bring against us" (*On the Migration of Abraham* 93). In *Migr*. 86 he writes: "For very many… through paying no regard to the general opinion have become the objects of hostility (*epevouleuthesan*)". This verb *epivouleuw* means to plot against in a hostile manner, and often the plotting for murder" (Borgen 1987: 68).

It is possible that those in the early Church who did practice circumcision were a cause for scandal to Christians who did practice circumcision. The apostle as is documented in Acts had to manifest a great deal of activity in order to defeat the "conservative" fraction in early Church. Similarly among the charges against Paul in Acts 21: 27-23: 22, the charge appears that Paul brought some uncircumcised people to the temple.

In *Leg*. 1. 65 Philo links the female principle Sophia with the intellectual principle the Logos. As was pointed out by J. Dillon, it is possible to compare Sophia and Dike in Greek thought. Dike was the personification of justice, being seated besides Zeus as his assessor. It is possible that Philo transferred these functions of Dike to Sophia, who was according to Philo seated at the right hand of Jahweh (Dillon 164). Philo on occasions describes the Logos as the son of God *and* Sophia (*Fug*. 109 and *Det*. 115-116. *Leg*. 1.65). Leg. 1. 65 also expresses the idea that Sophia and the Logos of God are identical (…της του θεου σοφίας ή δέ έστιν ό θεου λόγος).

Origen similarly has a concept that the son of God the Logos equals wisdom, (*Princ* 1.4.4).

Conclusion

Philo as a religious Alexandrian Jew, was heavily influenced by the Greek philosophical systems circulating in his day. He also accentuated the benefits of Greek culture and education. Philo did not choose any particular Hellenistic philosophy in favour of another, but in Philo, we find a wonderful mix of all the major schools of philosophy which were accessible to him in his period. Philo was an eclectic who used every material that he deemed handy. He was influenced both by Aristotle and Plato, the Sceptics, Stoics and others.

The Hellenistic systems of thought not only influenced Philo in terms of content and theme, but also in terms of exegetical technique. As was seen, in his use of the allegorical method Philo has drawn on a variety of Greek traditions of exegetical enterprise. Again, we cannot conclude, that one particular Hellenistic exegetical school exercised a decisive influence on Philo. Rather, Philo took over exegetical techniques and structures in his allegories from the Stoics, the Greek rhetorical schools and others. Any analysis is complicated by the widespread disagreements amongst scholars on the various influences on Philo's exegetical methods.

However, while Philo was keen on absorbing the wisdom of others he remained a Jew for whom the Scripture was the highest authority. Every non-Scriptural wisdom that ever existed was according to Philo, subject to the wisdom found in Scripture and already contained in it. Philo's use of the Greek traditions had a twofold aspect. On the one hand Greek 'insights' helped him to interpret the Scripture to arrive at his intended spiritual goals and meanings and on the other it showed the Greek cultural world, that the Scripture is superior and all their wisdom is already there and even existed prior to the Greek philosophers.

Philo was not satisfied solely with the plain meaning of Scripture. He believed, that it contained spiritual deeper meanings, that needed to be revealed. In this regard, the primary purpose of the allegorical method was to allow Philo to discover meanings and themes in Scripture that did not appear on the mere surface. By means of the allegorical method, Philo not only discovered Greek wisdom, but also spiritual truths and benefits which would guide one's relationship with

God, which was the most important thing for Philo. Philo's allegories can thus be characterised as spiritual allegories. They provide spiritual insights and have a pedagogical role.

As shown, there were other Jews like Philo, especially in Alexandria, who developed a similar line of interpretation as Philo. These Jewish writers were living around the period of Philo and before him. However, it is difficult to assess the influence of incipient rabbinical interpretation, or midrashic interpretation on Philo. Certainly, one would argue that the midrash genre would have had a greater influence on Philo than say the rabbinical tradition. The rabbinical exegesis was more literal in its interpretation and was not too ready to submit to allegory. As was shown there are of course parallels that can be discerned between Philo and the Jewish traditions.

One can argue that the allegorical style of interpretation could have originated in the synagogue context and therefore was predominantly a Diaspora phenomenon.

Philo's enterprise had a double effect. On the one hand it invited the Gentiles to become Jewish, since the Jewish laws were laws of nature itself and on the other hand it showed Jews that they can take on board some elements of Greek culture.

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A REFLECTION
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